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V\^ 2.5-6 I 



i 




HARVARD 
COLLEGE 
LIBRARY 



i 




r 



HISTORY 



GREEK REVOLUTION 



611 



Koi irap&y ipi 

Ti ydp crc fAaXOdtrcroifi* ttv &y is ffirrcpoy 
Ycvtrroi ^ayo^fieer; 6p0hy ^X^^ci' Act. 



HISTORY 



or TBI 



GEEEK REVOLUTION 



BY 

GEORGE FINLAy/lL.D. 

Hou. Member of tbe Royal Scciety of Literature. Member t>t the Amerioaa Antlquiirijta 

Society, Correapondind Member of the Arcbeeological Inatituca at Rome. 

Exxi^ht Ocdd Croaa of tba Greek Order of the Redeemer 

AtrfHOB or Tim " mmwy or oaBws vnins voaMav ronnrATHHi,'' arc 



IN TWO VOLUMES 



VOL. ^L . 



WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 

EDINBURGH AND LONDON 

MDCCCLXI 



The Right of TranaloMvn is reserved 



■H^~55(^^I™C{)3 






/v\(^3s-G.///j^ 



,/ /^ARVAkDN 

'^ jUNIVERSITY) 

LIBRARY 
I DEC 18 195r I 



PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH, 



CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 



BOOK FIRST. 

EVENTS PBECEDINO THE REVOLUTION. 



CHAPTER I. *^ 

THR OONDITIOn OF THE MODKRV OREVKA. 



Numbers of the Greek and Torkuh races in Europe, 






Page 
1 


Pashaliks into which the country inhabited by the Qreekc 
Effect of the treaty of Kainardgi on the Greek population 
Distinction of Greek orthodoxy and Greek nationality, 
Social divisions of the Greek race, 


iwaadi 


vided. 


8 

6 

8 

10 


Greeks in Moldavia and Vallachia, . 
Four general divisions of the Greek nation 
Clergy, .... 
Primates, .... 










11 
12 
12 
18 


Urban population, . 
Rural population, 
Municipid institutions, 
State of education, . 










14 
15 
16 
18 


General condition of the people, 
Land-tax or tenths, . 










20 
21 


Haratch or capitation -tax, . 
Romeliots, .... 
Armatoli, ..... 










22 
22 
24 


Privileges of the province of Agrapha, 
Klepbts, .... 
Moreots, .... 


\. 








26 
27 
29 


Moreot klepbts, .... 
Maniats, .... 










82 
82 


Islanders, .... 






33 


CHAPTER 11. ^ 


THE ALBA] 


^lANS. 











Extent of country occupied by the Albanian race in Greece, 

Albanian Mussulmans of Lalla and Bardania, 

Christian Albanians of the Dervenokhoria, Hydra, and Spetzas, 

VOL. I. 



84 
36 

87 



a 



VI 



CONTENTS. 



Character and institutioDS of the Hydriots, 

The Albanians a distinct branch of the Indo-Germanic race, 

Two divisions, Gueghs and Tosks, .... 

Character, manners, and social condition of the Albanians', 

Administrative divisions of Albania^ 

Military influence of the Albanians in the eighteenth century. 

And in Greece after the year 1770, 

Policy of AH Pasha of Joannina, . . . 

The Suliots the most remarkable tribe of orthodox Albanians, 

Their rise and social condition, .... 

Repeatedly attacked by Ali Pasha, .... 

Last war, ....... 

The priest Samuel, ...... 

Treachery of Suliots, and capitulation of Suli, 

Fate of the Suliots, ...... 



Pa«e 
88 
41 
42 
43 
46 
47 
49 
49 
51 
53 
55 
58 
60 
61 
62 



CHAPTER III. 



SULTAN MAHMUD AND ALI PASHA OF JOANNINA. 



Character of Sultan Mahmud, ...... 65 

State of the Othoman empire, ...... 68 

Ali Pasha of Joannina, ....... 70 

Ali's cruelty. Anecdote of Euphrosyne, . . . . .73 

Anecdotes of the Bishop of Greveno, and of Ignatius, metropolitan of Arta, 78 
Destruction of Khormovo, ...... 80 

And of Gardhiki, ........ 84 

Sultan Mahmud alarmed at All's power, ..... 85 

All's attempt to assassinate Ismael Pasho Bey, .... 86 

Ali declared a rebel, ..... . . 87 

His plans and forces, ....... 88 

Sultan's means of attack, ....... 90 

Ali convokes a divan, . .91 

Both belligerents appeal to the Greeks, ..... 93 

Operations in Albania, ....... 95 

Ali is deserted by his sons, ....... 96 

Recall of the Suliots, ....... 97 

They jom Ali, ........ 99 

Ehurshid Pasha of the Morea named Seraskier, .... 101 

Condition of the Suliots on their return, ..... 102 

Their military system, ....... 103 

Operations in 1821, ........ 106 

Conduct of Khurshid before Joannina, . .108 

Compared with that of Philip V. of Macedon, .... 109 

Suliots join the cause of the Greeks, . .111 

Mission of Tahir Abbas to the Greeks, .112 

Death of Ali, ,116 



CONTENTS. 



Vll 



BOOK SECOND. 

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BEVOLUTION. 



CHAPTER I. 



THE 0AUBK8. 



General progren of society, ..... 

Secret sooietieti, ....... 

Philik^ Hetairia, ....... 

DifiRcult position in which the Turks were placed. 

Plots of the Hetairists betrayed, ..... 

Progress of education and moral improyement in Greece, 

Turks nationally more depressed than the Greeks, 

Influence of Roman law on modem Greek ciTilUation, 

Improvement in the condition of the Greeks after the peace of Kainardgi 

in 1774, 

Greeks live in Turkey under foreign protection, . 



Page 
118 
120 
121 
123 
124 
126 
127 
129 

130 
131 



CHAPTER II. 



THE OPEBATIOHS 0¥ THE GREEK HETAIBI8T8 BETOKD THE DANUBE. 



Character of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, 

Relations between Russia and Turkey, 

State of the goTemment and of the Rouman population in Moldavia 

and Vallachia, . 
Invasion of Moldavia, 
Massacre of the Turks at Galatz, . 
And at Tassi, 

Fury of the Mussulmans in Turkey, 
Revolution in Vallachia, 
Georgaki, Savas, and Yladimiresko, 
Hypsilantes at Bucharest, . 
Sacred Battalion, 
Proceedings in Vallachia, 
Anathema of Hetairists by the patriarch, 
Russia disclaims the Revolution, . 
Deceitful conduct of Hypsilantes, 
The murder of Vladimiresko, 
Battle of Dragashan, 
Flight of Hypsilantes, 
Operations in Moldavia, 
Afi&ir of Skuleni, 
Death of Georgaki, . 
Termination of the Revolution in Moldavia and Vallachia, 



134 

137 

139 
143 
146 
147 
149 
149 
150 
162 
163 
164 
166 
166 
167 
169 
161 
164 
166 
167 
168 
169 



Vlll 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION IN ORBEOE. 



Exterminaiion of the Turkish population, 

Preparations of the Othoman government, 

Operations of the Hetairists in the Morea, 

The archimandrite Gregorios Dikaios, 

Attempt of primates to defer the insurrection, 

Hostages summoned to Tripolitza by the Turks, . 

Warning letter forged by the Greeks, 

First insurrectional movements in the Peloponnesus, 

Turks at Kalavryta surrender, and are murdered, . 

Character of Petrobey, .... 

Taking of Kalamata, and first Te Deum for victory. 

Outbreak at Patras, .... 

Extermination of the Mohammedan population in Greece, 

Character and biography of Theodore Kolokotrones, 

His prayer at Chrysovitzi, .... 

Revolution at Salona, and character of Panourias, .« 

Salona and Livadea taken, . 

Character of Diakos, 

Murder of Mohammedans, . 

Acropolis of Athens besieged, 

Revolution at Mesolonghi, . 

Yiachori taken, and Turks and Jews massacred, 

Revolution in the islands, . 

Oligarchy and system of trade at Hydra, . 

Spetzas first joins the Revolution, . 

Psara follows, .... 

Insurrection at Hydra headed by Economos, 

First cruise of the Greek fleet, 

Murder of the Sheik-el- Islam, 

Fall of Economos, .... 

Othoman fleet quits the Dardanelles, 

Greeks prepare fire-ships, 

Turkish liue-of-battle ship burned ofif Mitylene, 

Kydonies sacked by the Turks, 

Squadron under Miaculis on western coast. 



Page 
171 
172 
173 
175 
176 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
184 
186 
187 
189 
194 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
202 
204 
206 
208 
209 
210 
212 
214 
215 
217 
218 
219 
221 
224 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE POLIOT AND CONDUCT OF SULTAN IIAHMUD IL 

Policy of Sultan Mahmud, ...... 

Suppressive measures and first executions of Greeks, 

Execution of the patriarch Gr^orios, .... 



225 
227 



CONTENTS. 



IX 



His character, 

Massacres of Greeks, 

Sultan restores order, 

Cruelties of Turks and Greeks, 

Rupture with Russia, 

Difficulties of Sultan Mahmud in 1821, 

Measures adopted to suppress the Greek Revolution, 

Order re-established in Agrapha, . 

Among Vallachian population of Mount Plndos, . 

Rapacity of the Greek troops, 

Insurrection on Mouut Pelion suppressed, 

Revolution in the free villages of the Chalcidio^, . 

Among the monks on Mount Athos, 

Suppressed by Aboulabad Pasha of Saloniki, 

Insurrection on the Macedonia mountains, 

Sack of Niausta, ..... 

Success of Sultan Mahmud in maintaining order, . 



231 
282 
285 
236 
237 
240 
241 
248 
248 
245 
245 
248 
249 
252 
254 
255 
256 



BOOK THIRD. 

THE SUCCESSES OF THE GBESKS. 



CHAPTER I. 



THE ESTABLISHIIENT OF OREEOB AS AN INDEPENDEIIT 8TATI. 



Victory of the Greeks at Valtetai, . 

Capitulation of Monemvasia, 

Capitulation of Navarin, and massacre of the Turks, 

Fraudulent division of the booty, . 

Taking of Tripolitza, and capitulation of the Albanians, 

The heroine Bobolina, .... 

Sack of Tripolitza, ..... 

Anarchy it produced, .... 

Cruise of the Othoman fleet in 1821, 

Violation of neutrality at Zante, 

Return of the Othoman fleet to Constantinople, . 

Kolokotrones prevented from besieging Patras, 

Surrender of Corinth, .... 

Resources of the Greeks for carrying on the war, . 

Administrative organisation which arose with the Revolution, 

Advantages and disadvantages of the communal system, 

A Peloponnesian senate formed, . . ; 

Arrival, character, and conduct of Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes, 



258 
260 
262 
268 
264 
266 
267 
270 
271 
272 
275 
276 
277 
278 
281 
282 
285 
285 



CONTENTS. 



He claims absolute power, . 

Arrival of Alexander Mavrocordatos, 

Organisation of continental Greece, 

The Greeks demand a central goyemment, 

Hypsilantes convokes a national assembly, 

The antagonistic positions of the national assembly and 

sian senate, ..... 
Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes deserts the popular cause, 
The Peloponnesians make their senate independent, 
Constitution of Epidaurus, .... 



the Peloponne- 



Page 
286 
290 
290 
292 
293 

294 
294 
295 
296 



CHAPTER 11. ^ 



THE PRESIDENCY OF MAYROCOBDATOB. 

Character and political position of Alexander Mavrocordatos, 
Affairs of Euboea, and death of Elias Mavromichales, 
Conduct of Odysseus at Karystos, .... 

Affairs of Chios, ...... 

Invasion of the island by the Samiots, 

Prompt measures of Sultan Mahmud, 

Massacres of the Chiots, ..... 

Greek fleet puts to sea, ..... 

Constantino Eanaris bums the capitan-pasha's ship, 
Operations of Greek fleet, ..... 

Devastation of Chios, ..... 

Mavrocordatos assumes the chief command in Western Greece, 
Treachery of Gogos, ..... 

Defeat at Petta, ...... 

Effects of this defeat, ..... 

Death of Kyriakules Mavromichales, 

Capitulation of the Suliots, .... 

Affairs of Acamania, . . 

Siege of Mesolonghi, ..... 

Defeat of the Turks, ..... 



800 
802 
804 
806 
307 
310 
312 
815 
316 
318 
819 
321 
324 
826 
831 
333 
334 
334 
836 
338 



CHAPTER III. 



FALL OF ATHENS — DEFEAT OF DBAMALI — FALL OF NAUPLIA. 



Preparations of Sultan Mahmud for reconquering Greece, 

Defensive measures of the Greeks, . 

Their quarrels and intrigues, 

Odysseus murders Noutzas and Palaskas, 

Capitulation of Athens, 

Massacre of men, women, and children, 

Expedition of Dramali, 



840 
842 
843 
846 
847 
348 
849 



fh 



CONTENTS. 



Xi 



F»go 

Corinth retaken — Turkish plans of campaign, .... 851 

First capitulation of Nauplia, ...... 353 

Flight of Greeks from Ai^os, ...... 356 

They defend the lArissa, ....... 857 

Patriotic conduct of Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes, . . 858 

Number of Greek troops in the field, ..... 859 

Defeat of Dramali, ........ 860 

Greeks retain possession of the Burdjee, ..... 864 

Operations of the hostile fleets, ...... 865 

Second capitulation of Nauplia, ...... 867 

Turkish inhabitants saved by Captain Hamilton of H.M.S. Cambiiau, 869 

Elanaris again destroys a Turkish line-of -battle ship, 870 

State of the naval warfare between the Greeks and Tuiks, 871 

State of affidrs at Athens, ....... 878 

Odysseus gains possession of Athens, .874 

Concludes an armistice with the Turks, ..... 876 



HISTORY 



OF THE 



GREEK REVOLUTION. 



BOOK FIRST. 

KVENTS PRECEDING THE BEVOLDTION. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE CONDITION OP THE MODERN GREEKS. 



" CountlMi gencntiOBi ot nuakiiid 
Depart, and 1mt« no TMtiffe where they trode."— WomoevoaiTK. 



\ 



Numbers of the Greek and Turkish races in Europe— Pasha ukb into 

WHICH THE country INHABITED BT THE QbEEKS WAS DIVIDED — EFFECT 

OF THE Treaty of Kainardoi on the condition of the Greeks — Die- "^ 

TINCTION BETWEEN GREEK ORTHODOXY AND GrEEK NATIONALITY— SoCIAL 

divisions of the Greek race— Greeks in Moldavia and Vallachia — 
Cleroy — Primates — Urban population — Rural — Municipal institu- 
tions — State of education — Condition of the Greeks — Land-tax — 
Haratch — Romeliots — Armatoli — Privileges of the province of 
Agrapha — Klephts — Moreots — ^Moreot klefhts — Maniats — Islanders. 

This History records the events which established the 
independence of Greece. 

As long as the literature and the taste of the ancient 
Greeks continue to nurture scholars and inspire artists, 
modem Greece must be an object of interest to culti- 
vated minds. Nor is the history of the modem Greeks 

VOL. 1. A 



NUMBERS OF GREEK RACE. 



BOOK I. 

CHAP. I. 



unworthy of attention. The importance of the Greek 
race to the progress of European civilisation is not to 
be measured by its numerical strength, but by its 
social and religious influence in the East. Yet, even 
geographically, the Greeks occupy a wide extent of sea- 
coast, and the countries in which they dwell are so 
thinly peopled that they have ample room to multiply 
and form a populous nation. At present their influ- 
ence extends far beyond the territories occupied by 
their race; for Greek priests and Greek teachers have 
transfused their language and their ideas into the greater 
part of the Christian population of European Turkey. 
They have thus constituted themselves the representa- 
tives of Eastern Christianity, and placed themselves in 
prominent opposition to their conquerors, the Othoman 
Turks, who invaded Europe as apostles of the religion 
of Mohammed. The Greeks, during their subjection to 
the yoke of a foreign nation and a hostile religion, 
never forgot that the land which they inhabited was 
the land of their fathers ; and their antagonism to their 
alien and infidel masters, in the hour of their most 



\ abject servitude, presaged that their opposition must 

' end in their destruction or deliverance. 

The Greek Revolution came at last. It delivered a 
Christian nation from subjection to Mohammedanism, 
founded a new state in Europe, and extended the 
advantages of civil liberty to regions where despotisna 
had for ages been indigenous. In order to unfold its 
causes, it is necessary to describe the condition of the 
Greek people and of the Othoman government during 
the early part of this century. 

When the Greeks took up arms, the numbers of the 
Greek and Turkish races in Europe were in all proba- 
bility nearly equal, and neither is supposed to have 
greatly exceeded, two millions. The population of 
continental Greece, from Cape Taenaron to the northern- 



OTHOMAN DIVISIONS OP GREECE. 3 

most limit of the Greek language, was supposed to be RwnoewcT. 
not much greater than a million.^ Another million 
may be added for the population of Crete, the Cyclades, 
the Ionian Islands, Constantinople, and the Greek 
maritime towns. If we add to this the Greek popula- 
tion of Asia Minor, the islands on the Asiatic coast, 
Cyprus, the trans -Danubian provinces, Kussia, and 
other countries, the whole number of the Greek race 
cannot be estimated at more than three millions and a 
half. 

Two Christian races in the sultan's European domin- 
ions were more numerous : the VaJlachian or Roman 
race was not less than four millions ; the Sclavonian, 
including the Bulgarian, which speaks the Sclavonic 
language, exceeded five millions.* 

The provinces in which the Greeks formed a majority 
of the inhabitants were divided into six pashaJiks of 
high rank, and many smaller districts, governed imme- 
diately by inferior pashas. 

1. The most important of the great pashas who 
ruled the Greeks was the capitan- pasha. Besides 
being the minister of the marine, and the commander- 
.in-chief of all the naval forces of the empire, he was 
governor-general of the islands, and of part of the 
coast of Greece. Inferior pashas administered the 
aflFairs of Cyprus, Ehodes, and Mytilene under his 
superintendence. 

2. The pashalik of the Morea was regarded as one 
of the most valuable governments in European Turkey, 

1 This is the estimate of Colonel Leake, the most accurate and observant 
traveller in Greece. — An Historical Outline of the Greek Revolution (London, 
1826), p. 20. 

^ Little dependence can be placed on the statistical accounts of the Othoman 
empire. Ubicini, one of the best authorities, in Lettres tur la Turquie (1858, 
p. 49), gives 60,000 as the population of Bassora. In the same year, the official 
registers at Constantinople were said to give only 5000 ; and English officers 
who visited it shortly after, during the Persian war, did not suppose that it 
could contain a greater number. In 1820 the population was estimated at 
12,000, and it has been declining ever since. 



CHAP. I. 



4 OTHOMAN DIVISIONS OF GREECE. 

BOOK I. for it remitted a large surplus revenue aiinually to the 
- sultan. It included the whole Peloponnesus, with the 
exception of Maina, which was under the jurisdiction 
of the capitan-pasha, and it extended beyond the 
Isthmus of Corinth, over the Derveno-khoria, embrac- 
ing the whole of Megavis and a corner of Attica. The 
pasha of Naupaktos, or Lepanto, was also subordinate 
to the vizier of the Morea. 

3. The pashalik of Egriboz included the whole island 
of Euboea and the adjoining provinces of Boeotia, 
Locris, and Attica. Thebes, Athens, Livadea, Salona, 
and Talanta, formed Kazas, whose revenues were ad- 
ministered by voevodes appointed annually by the 
Sublime Porte. Athens was a provincial town belong- 
ing to the fief or avpalik of the kislar-aga, who named 
its voevode, and this officer had an interest in protect- 
ing the inhabitants against the exactions of the pasha 
of Egriboz. In consequence of the great authority of 
the kislar-aga (the chief of the black eunuchs), the 
Christians of Athens enjoyed a considerable degree of 
local liberty. Tradition says that Athens owed this 
happiness to the beauty of one of her daughters, who 
proved as great a benefactress as the empresses Eudocia 
and Irene.^ An Athenian slave named Vasilike became 
the favourite of Sultan Achmet I., and in order to 
relieve her fellow-countrymen from the tyranny of the 
Mussulmans of Negrepont, she obtained as a boon 
from her imperial lover that the revenues of Athens 
should be administered by the kislar-aga. The reforms 
of Selim III. had, however, recently placed Athens 
under the jurisdiction of the Tchelebi-effendi. 

4. Southern Albania formed a pashalik, which took 
its name from its capital, the city of Joannina. It had 
been long governed by Ali Pasha, who had annexed the 

* Greece under the Romans, 2d edit., p. 209. History of the Byzantine Empire, 
i. 82. 



OTHOMAN ADMINISTRATION. 6 

greater part of Thessaly and all Western Greece, except bbtbospbct 
Naupaktos, to his pashalik. 

5. The pashalik of Selanik, or Thessalonica, extended 
over the greater part of Macedonia; but in its northern 
part there were many semi -independent beys, who 
farmed the taxes and land revenues. Even in the 
vicinity of Thessalonica, the descendants of Evrenos, 
whom the Turks call Ghazi Gavrinos, retained the 
appanage which Murad II. had conferred on their 
ancestor. They still held in fief the istira, or monopoly 
of the corn annually remitted to Constantinople.^ 

6. The island of Crete formed a great pashalik, 
divided into three inferior military governments, under 
subordinate pashas, who resided in the fortresses of 
Candia, Canea, and Eetymo. The district of Sphakia, 
which was inhabited by Christians alone, was governed 
by its own primates. 

The wrongs of the subject Christians in Turkey have 
been loudly proclaimed, and the tyranny of the Otho- 
man government has been justly condemned; yet for 
two centuries after the conquest of Greece, Christian 
subjects were as well treated by Turkish sultans as 
heretical subjects were by Christian kings. Indeed, 
the central government of the sultan, or the Sublime 
Porte, as it was termed, has generally treated its Mus- , 
sulman subjects with as much cruelty and injustice as i 
the conquered Christians. The sufierings of the Greeks I 
were caused by the insolence and oppression of the 
ruling class, and the corruption that reigned in the 
Othoman administration, rather than by the direct ex- 
ercise of the sultan's power. In his private affairs, a 
Greek had a better chance of obtaining justice from his 
bishop and the elders of his district than a Turk from 
the cadi or the voevode. 

^ Ducas calls Evrenos, Abranezes; Chalcocondyles, Brenezes^ page 115 
ed. Par. 



6 TREATY OF KAINARDGI. 

BOOK I. The government of the sultan was the administration 

CHAP. 1- « 1 

of a despot whose cabinet was composed of household 

slaves. The feudal system, which for two centuries 
lightened the weight of Othoman power to the Turk- 
ish population, was an inheritance of the Seljouk em- 
pire. The inherent defect of the empire founded by 
Othman was the absence of a judicial administration, 
bound to observe fixed rules of justice and a settled 
form of judicial procedure. 

The treaty of Kainardgi, in the year 1774, made a 
great change in the condition of the Greeks. It af- 
forded Kussia a pretext for interfering in their favour 
whenever they were treated with gross injustice ; and 
the interference of Russia soon led to like interference 
on the part of the other European powers ; so that, be- 
fore the end of the eighteenth century, the Christians in 
many parts of the sultan's dominions were beginning 
^ to acquire a recognised species of foreign protection. 
\ The pashas in large commercial cities often found it 
less dangerous .to enrich themselves at the expense of 
Ithe Turks than to venture on open exactions from the 
Greeks. A provincial Mussulman could rarely find an 
advocate at the Porte ; an oppressed Greek could either 
bribe a dragoman or interest a consul to awaken the 
meddling spirit that rarely sleeps in the breast of a 
diplomatist, and thereby secure the protection of some 
ambassador at Constantinople. But as it was evident 
that the whole fabric of society among the Mussulman 
population of the Othoman empire presented an insur- 
mountable barrier to the introduction of just laws and 
an equitable dispensation of justice, so experience at 
last proved that no foreign protection could secure the 
; lives and properties of the subject Christians from the 
j tyranny of a government which paid no respect even 
' to the lives of its Turkish and Mussulman subjects. 
The sultan's government, like the government of the 



CONDITION OF THE GREEKS. 7 

Roman emperors, was a monarch's household trans- bwbootot . 
formed into an imperial administration, and both de- 
stroyed the resources of their subjects and depopulated 
the regions they governed, without making any dis- 
tinction between the conquerors and the conquered. 
A conyiction that the Othoman empire was hastening^ 
to dissolution became prevalent both among the Chris- 
tian and Mussulman inhabitants of European Turkey 
at the commencement of the present century. 1h 

In the year 1820 no Christian government, except 
that of Kussia, considered itself entitled to interfere 
with the manner in which the sultan treated his sub- 
jects of the Greek Church. Any interference on the 
part of Great Britain, under the pretext that the king 
exercised a protectorate over the Ionian Islands, w<^uld 
have been treated as an unjustifiable assumption. The 
sultan would have considered himself as much en- 
titled to suggest measures for governing the Moham- 
medans in India as the King of England to advise any 
changes in the treatment of the Christians in Turkey. 
All questions relating to the East were then beyond 
the domain of public opinion, and very little was i 
known in England concerning the condition of the ^ 
modern Greeks. 

The testimony of travellers was singularly discor-^ 
dant : some represented the Greeks as suffering in- 
tolerable oppression, as living in hourly fear of their 
lives or of the confiscation of their property ; others 
declared that no people in Europe was so lightly taxed, 
and subject to so few personal burdens. They were 
said to enjoy a degree of religious liberty which the 
Catholics of Ireland might envy ; and that they had a 
more direct authority over their municipal affairs than 
was possessed by the citizens in .French communes. 
The Greek Church was known to possess considerable 
wealth and great political influence over all Turkey. 



8 ORTHODOXY AND NATIONALITY. 

BOOK I. Greeks were known to exercise sovereign power in Val- 

-CHAP. I. _ , , CJ X 

lachia and Moldavia, and to profit by the corruption 

that existed in every branch of the Othoman adminis- 
tration at Constantinople. The primates of Greece col- 
lected the greater part of the sultan's revenues in 
Europe ; and th^ Greek municipalities were, in many 
districts, allowed to exercise an almost unlimited autho- 
rity. It was evident that the condition of the Greeks 
presented many anomalies. At Constantinople, the 
Greek was a crouching slave; at Bucharest and Yassy, a 
despotic tyrant; at Chios, a happy subject ; and at Psara, 
^. and in the villages of Mount Pelion, a free citizen. 

A confusion of ideas has been produced by not 
distinguishing clearly between Greek orthodoxy and 
Greek nationality. The ancient Greeks paid great at- 
tention to purity of race ; the modern Greeks have 
/jtransferred their care to purity of doctrine. The Mes- 
senians preserved their manners and their dialect un- 
changed during centuries of exile ; the Moreats have 
kept their orthodoxy untainted during ages of foreign 
domination. At present the Greeks are willing to in- 
termarry with Vallachians, Eussians, and Albanians of 
the Eastern Church ; but to render a marriage lawful 
with a Catholic of the purest Hellenic descent, it would 
be necessary to rebaptise the spouse. 

The tendency to forget everything but orthodoxy 
was cherished by the political privileges which the 
^sultans had conferred on the Greek Church. Its ad- 
herents formed a great community in the Othoman 
^ empire, known to the Turks by the national design- 
ation of Eoum. The immense orthodox population of 
European Turkey and Asia Minor, embracing many 
nationalities, was confounded with the small number 
of the Greek race. Yet these two bodies were com- 
posed of heterogeneous elements, influenced by diver- 
gent interests and feelings, and to whose political 



ORTHODOXY AND NATIONALITY. 9 

union geography, language, and manners presented RETEoeracT. 
an almost insunnountable barrier. Even among the^ 
Greeks, though the people confounded orthodoxy and j 
nationality, it was only the priests and the learned [ 
class who looked forward to a restoration of the Byzan- 
tine empire, and to the establishment of the Greeks as 
a dominant race, by rendering political power a con- 
sequence of ecclesiastical authority. They alone de-| 
luded themselves with the dream that the Albanians,, 
the Servians, the Bulgarians, and the Vallachians would,' 
submit to be ruled by Greek sovereigns and prefectsj 
because they prayed under the guidance of Greekl 
patriarchs and bishops. 

The sultan recognised the patriarch of Constanti- 
nople as the ecclesiastical chief of all the orthodox 
Christians in European Turkey, and supported him in 
the exercise of an extensive civil jurisdiction over 
several nations. Among these, the Greeks really occu-] 
pied the position of a dominant race. To the Valla- 
chian and the Bulgarian, the Greek was in some degree 
what the Turk was to the Greek. The Greek language 
was the language of the church and the law which ruled 
the whole assemblage of nations called by the Otho- 
man administration, Roum meleti, or Koman nation. 
Indeed, the power and jurisdiction of the patriarch and 
synod of Constantinople, as it existed under the Otho- 
man sultans, was an institution remodelled by Moham- 
med II. ; and had the Othoman government found 
either Vallachians or Bulgarians fitter instruments to 
govern the orthodox community in accordance with 
Othoman interests, the patriarchs and the members of 
the synod of Constantinople would in all probability 
have ceased to be Greeks. 

The great influence of the Greek race in the East is 
not, however, entirely derived from its priestly and 
literary superiority. It rests on a wide social basis, 



10 NATIONAL DIVISIONS. 

BOOK I. \for it forms the majority of the middle class in many 
-^^!^^^ districts where the cultivators of the soil and the mass 
of the people are of another race. A considerable part 
of the trade of Turkey was in the hands of the Greeks, 
and their communications were more frequent between 
the distant parts of the country than those of the other 
divisions of the population. All news was generally 
transmitted through a Greek medium, coloured with 
Greek hopes and prejudices, or perverted by Greek 
interests. 

Yet, great as the ecclesiastical, literary, and commer- 
cial influence of the Greek race really was in European 
Turkey, the events of the Greek Kevolution showed 

I that the influence of Greek nationality had been greatly 

' overrated by the Greeks themselves. Even in the 
V r Greek Church, ecclesiastical interest was more power- 
' ful than national feeling. A large part of the Greek 

i nation made but feeble efforts to aid their countrymen 
when struggling for independence. The literary powers 
of the learned created a loud echo of patriotism ; but 
thousands of wealthy Greeks continued to pursue their 
own schemes of interest and profit, under the protection 

, of the sultan's government, during the whole period of 

'^ the Greek Revolution. 

The Greeks were divided into many classes, separated 
y social trammels as well as dispersed in distant pro- 
vinces. It is not uncommon to find Constantinople 
spoken of as the capital of the Greek nation because 
it is the seat of the head of the orthodox church. 
This is a great error. The Greeks do not form one 
quarter of the population, and the agricultural popu- 
lation of the surrounding country consists chiefly of 
Bulgarians. The Turkish and Bulgarian languages are 
more extensively spoken than the Greek. The ancient 
Byzantium was a Greek colony, but the Constantinople 
founded by the great Constantine was a Roman city, 



u 



NATIONAL DIVISIONS. 11 

ia which Latin long continued to be the language of ii«TBoeFTCT. 
the government aud the principal families. Since the 
conquest of the city by Mohammed II., the Greek 
population has formed a foreign colony in a Mussul- 
man city. Its numbers have been recruited by emi- 
grants from every part of the Othoman empire. The 
phanariot families in the service of the sultan emi- 
grated from different provinces. The merchants were 
generally Chiots, the shopkeepers Moreots, and the 
domestic servants natives of the islands of the Archi- 
pelago. The lower orders of the Christian population 
were recruited more extensively from the Sclavonians 
and Bulgarians in the northern provinces than from 
the Greeks. There was no permanent nucleus of a 
native Greek population in Constantinople as there 
was of a Turkish. 

In Vallachia and Moldavia the Greeks formed a domi- 
nant race. They held there a position very similar to 
what the Turks held in Greece. The most lucrative 
offices were in their possession; the greater part of 
the ecclesiastical and national property was occupied 
by them under various titles and pretexts. Like the 
Turks in Greece, too, they were detested by the natives 
as fiscal extortioners and cruel oppressors ; and it was 
only by the support they derived from the sultan's 
authority that they were able to maintain their posi- 
tion. That position was lost by the Greek Eevolution. 

The strength of the Greek race lay in the ancient^ 
seats of Greek liberty. In the Peloponnesus, in con- 
tinental Greece, and in the Greek Islands, they not 
only formed the majority of the population, but theyj 
still possessed some municipal authority, and a con- 
siderable part of the landed property under cultiva- 
tion. Even in Southern Epirus and in the Chacidice 
of Macedonia they formed the majority of the agricul- 
tural population. 



CHAP. I. 



12 GREEK CLERGY. 

BOOK I. The Greeks were divided into four classes — the 
clergy, the primates, the urban population or towns- 
men, and the rural population or peasants. The 

/ marked separation of these classes deserves particular 
attention, as forming a characteristic feature of modern 
Greek civilisation at the outbreak of the Revolution. 
This division exerted a powerful influence on society, 
and modified the effects of every political event. Each 
of these classes was connected with the sultan's govern- 
ment by different ties. Their religion, their language, 
and their hatred of Othoman domination, were their 
bonds of union. 

From the time Sultan Mohammed II. had reorgan- 
ised the Greek Church under the Patriarch Gennadius, 
Greek bishops had acted in their dioceses as a kind of 
Othoman prefects over the orthodolx population. Eccle- 
siastical rank in the orthodox church was oftener 
obtained by bribing a vizier than by theological learn- 
,ing or Christian piety. Every diocese was loaded with 
debt in consequence of the simony which prevailed. 
The most observant traveller who visited Greece before 
the Revolution declares, that it is a common sentiment 

I among the laity, that the bishops have been a great 

j cause of the present degraded condition of the Greek 
nation ; nor have the Greeks in general any esteem 
for their higher clergy, or for the monastic order from 
which the prelates are promoted. But Colonel Leake 
thinks that this is in some degree an injustice ; for 
although the clergy were often instruments of oppres- 
sion, and a bishop could hardly avoid acting like a 

\ Turk in office, the regular clergy had kept the Greek 
language alive, and perhaps prevented the dissolution 
of all national union.^ Yet this opinion may be ques- 
tioned, for in cultivating an imperfect study of a 

^ Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, iv. 281. See an anecdote in Note B to 
the second canto of Childe Harold concerning the Christian Bosili. 



PRIMATES. 13 

pedantic ecclesiastical imitation of the classic languageiRrpEOBPiBCP. 
they seem to have prevented the improvement of the* 
modem dialect ; and, on the whole, the Greek nation 
seems to have done more to support the patriarchal i 
and synodal church of the Othoman empire than that j 
ecclesiastical establishment did to protect and improve 
the Greek nation. 

At the commencement of the present century, the 
Greek clergy, sharing the general opinion that the 
Othoman empire was on the eve of its dissolution, 
began to expect a speedy deliverance by the advance 
of the armies of Russia. The priests contemplated ^ 
being called upon, before the lapse of many years, to 
transfer their allegiance to the Czar of Muscovy ; but 
by them the independence of Greece was never sup- I 
posed either to be possible or desirable. An orthodox 
emperor seated on the thrpne of Constantinople would 
of course confirm and extend all the privileges of the 
Greek clergy. 

The primates in Greece formed a substitute for an ^ 
aristocracy. The real aristocracy of the Greek nation 
was exterminated by the Othoman conquest. Its 
members were either slain by the Turks, driven into 
exile, or induced to embrace Mohammedanism, Seve- 
ral apostates of distinguished Greek families obtained 
high rank in the sultan's service. Mohammed II. de* 
liberately put to death every Greek who exercised any 
political influence, as the simplest mode of establishing 
tranquillity in Greece; and the torpid condition of 
Greek society for several generations attests the wis- 
dom of his Satanic policy. 

The patronage of the Othoman government gradu- 
ally created a Greek aristocracy of administrative 
agents and tax-gatherers. This aristocracy consisted ^ 
of the phanariots at Constantinople and the codga- 
bashees, or primates, in Greece. The moral and politi- 



OHAP. I. 



14 URBAN POPULATION. 

BOOK I. cal position of this class has been well described by 
calling them " a kind of Christian Turks/' A voevode 
or a bey purchased the taxes of a district as farmer- 
general. He then sublet the diflFerent branches of re- 
venue to Greek primates, who again usually relet their 
portions in smaller shares to the local magistrates of the 
communities within the district. In this way the public 
revenues of Greece maintained three distinct classes 
of fiscal officers at the expense of the people. 

Among the Greeks, as among every other people in 
the East, a broad line of distinction exists between the 
urban and the rural population. The citizen and the 
peasant occupy different grades in the scale of civilisa- 
, tion. Their condition in society is more strongly cha- 
racterised by their place of dwelling and the nature of 
their occupation, than by their nationality. This dis- 
tinction is an inheritance of the Koman empire which 
survived all the vicissitudes of the Byzantine adminis- 
tration, and resisted the endeavours of the crusaders to 
introduce feudality as an element of Greek society. 
The Mussulman conquest made no unfavourable change 
in the relative position of the citizen and the peasant ; 
but it must be noted, that at the time of the Turkish 
conquest the citizen in Eastern towns generally occu- 
pied a higher social position than the citizen of Western 
Europe in a corresponding occupation, but they la- 
boured under great moral disadvantages. The servile 
position of the Christian subjects of the sultan, and the 
corruption of the Othoman administration, rendered 
^deceit the best defence against extortion. Truth and 
honesty were impediments to the acquisition of wealth ; 
and consequently the prosperous Greek trader was very 
rarely a better man than his poorer countrymen. False- 
hood and fraud became habitual, and were considered 
by strangers as national qualities rather than individual 
characteristics. 



RURAL POPULATION. 15 

The Christian population in the towns of Turkey was RwRospBrr. 
divided into corporate bodies, according to the trades " 
exercised by individuals, in the same way as the Mus- 
sulman population ; but the Mussulman corporations 
generally contrived to throw the burden of all local 
expenditure on the Christians. It was, therefore, only 
by counterfeiting poverty, or by bribing some powerful 
protector, that the Greek rayah could escape ruinous 
extortion ; and it was only by simulating some bodily 
infirmity or chronic disease that he could evade being 
condemned to forced labour at inadequate wages. 

A nation's strength lies in its rural population. In 
Greece this class has for ages been poor and neglected, 
yet the Mohammedan conquest tended on the whole 
to better its condition, for it destroyed the predial serf- 
dom inherited from the Byzantine empire, and enforced 
by the feudal principles of the Frank conquerors. It i 
raised the peasants to the rank of free men, and con- | 
verted them into the staple of Greek nationality. From I 
their ranks the waste of city life was everywhere re- 
paired, and the rural recruits transferred into the urban 
population an unadulterated supply of Greek feelings 
and traditions, which prevented the Othoman domina- 
tion from denationalising the city traders, and reducing 
them to any identity of character with the dispersed 
Jews. 

The agricultural population of Greece, as, indeed, the 
agricultural population throughout the East, from the 
Adriatic to the Bay of Bengal, was fixed in a station- 
ary condition by fiscal laws. It was compelled to 
labour the land, and gather in the harvest, according 
to regulations framed, to protect the revenue of the 
sovereign, not to encourage or reward the labour of the 
cultivator. The sovereign was entitled to one-tenth 
of the fruits of the soil, and from the moment the crop 
began to ripen, he became a joint proprietor in the 



16 MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. 

BOOK I. whole. The property of the cultivator in nine-tenths of 

CHAP. I. _ *.!.*/ 

the crop was from that moment treated as a matter sub- 
sidiary to the arrangement relative to the disposal of 
the remaining tenth, which belonged to the sovereign. 
An industrious peasant could rarely make any profit 
by raising an early crop, or by improving the quality 
of his produce, for the farmer of the tenths mixed all 
qualities together, and was generally the principal dealer 
\ in produce in the district. No superiority of skill or 
\ increase of labour could, under such circumstances, 
1 secure a higher price where markets were distant and 
' where no roads existed. The effects of this system of 
taxation on the condition of Greek agriculture may 
still be studied in the dominions of Sultan Abdul- 
meshid, or of King Otho, for they rival one another 
in the disastrous effects of their fiscal administration 
(A.D. 1859). 

The municipal institutions of the Greeks under the 
Othoman government have been much vaunted. In 
reality they amounted to little more than arrangements 
^ for facilitating the collection of the tenth of the produce 
of the soil by the agency of the Greeks themselves, in 
order to prevent the extermination of the agricultural 
population. The Othoman sultans appear to have had 
a clearer insight into the effects of an intolerable land- 
tax than the Eoman emperors before the time of Dio- 
cletian. 

The communal system in Greece has been sometimes 
considered to be a tradition of Hellenic liberty. Human 
institutions are rarely so durable ; and it could not be 
expected that, in a land where the names of Sparta, 
Plataea, Olympia, and Delphi had fallen into oblivion, 
any relics of civil liberty had been preserved by tradi- 
tion. History tells us that every trace of Hellenic in- 
stitutions were swept away by the Roman empire and 



MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. 17 

the Christian church. The Greek city was supplanted RmtoiPEcr. 
by the Roman municipality. The provincial adminis- 
tration and the civil laws of Rome eflFaced every vestige 
of Hellenic freedom. The Christian religion and the 
laws of Justinian are the oldest social traditions of the 
modem Greeks. 

Even the Roman municipal system was swept away 
by the centralising despotism of the Byzantine em- 
perors, and in the ninth century it was formally abro- 
gated by Leo the Philosopher.^ 

Oriental fiscality was the essence of the municipal 
institutions of the modem Greeks. Each district was 
assessed to pay a certain amount of taxes, and the re- 
partition of a part of the sum to be paid by the Chris- 
tians was left to the clergy and the primates. In some 
places the persons intrusted with this power were 
named by the Porte ; in others they were elected by 
the people. The authority thus created was greater in 
the rural districts than in the towns. And in those 
parts of Greece in which there were few resident Turks, 
a popular election gave the institution a national cha- 
racter. But this municipal system was too intimately/ 
connected with bad principles of taxation to become aJ 
means of training a nation to freedom and justice. Like 
everything in the Othoman empire, it was full of ano- 
malies. Some communities had the privilege of main- 
taining armed guards or Christian troops, called arma- 
toli ; some enjoyed their freedom under the guarantee 
of written charters from the sultans ; some enjoyed 
great local privileges ; and some were relieved entirely 
from the land-tax.^ 

^ History of the Byzantine Empire, i. 282. 

' The Greeks have forged many written charters. Mr Tricoupi publishes 
one as genuine in the second volume of his History of Oreece which carries 
proofs of its forgery, even though the date is omitted in Tricoupi's copy. Mr 
Argyropulos, in his work on the Municipal Administration of Greece, Arifuniidi 
AtoiKTja-is iv 'EXAciSi, p. 25, gives a copy of the document, with the date, year of 

VOL. I. B 



18 STATE OF EDUCATION. 

BOOK I. Nothing partaking of real self-government could 

'■— exist wherever the dominant class of Mohammedans 

dwelt, intermingled with the Greek population, in a 
despotism like that of the Othoman sultans, in which 
the power of life and death was intrusted to local gov- 
ernors. Municipal liberty can have no vitality, unless 
the local magistrates are directly elected by the people, 
and responsible to the law alone. If a sultan or a 
pasha can revoke the mandate granted by the people 
when the local magistrate has violated no law and 
neglected no duty, and replace the defender of the 
people by his own nominee, municipal institutions are 
nothing more than a convenience for assisting the 
central administration in ruling the people. 

The slight hold which the municipal institutions 
of the modern Greeks had acquired in the affections 
of the people is demonstrated by the ease with which 
they were perverted by Capodistrias, and changed for 
a new system by the Bavarian Eegency. Yet these 
institutions, though they did not possess the energy 
required for producing a national revolution, aided the 
Greeks in maintaining their struggle with the Otho- 
man government, by supplying a system of local 
organisation, which enabled them to call the whole 
strength and resources of the agricultural population 
simultaneously into action. 

It has been already stated that the position and 
character of the Greek clergy tended to weaken the 
power of the Greek Church, though ecclesiastical in- 
fluence still remained the highest national authority. 
The next in importance was literary education, and 
those who dispensed it enjoyed a moral influence in 

the Hegira 1036 — ie., a.d. 1626. It purports to be a ratification by Sultan n>ra- 
him of privileges granted by Suleiman the Magnificent to Naxos and other 
islands. Sultan Ibrahim ascended the throne in 1640. The document is full 
of historical and chronological blunders, and the part which is genuine is tran- 
scribed from a charter of a more modem date, or the blunders could not have 
been committed. 



STATE OP EDUCATION. 19 

society second only to the clergy. More learning RBnwenKTr. 
existed among the modem Greek laity under the 
Othoman rule than is generally supposed. Since the 
Kevolution it has been more generally disseminated, 
but it does not appear to be deeper in those branches 
not immediately connected with profitable employ- "^ 
ment. The state of education explains the failure of 
the missionaries sent from Europe and America to 
improve the religious ideas of the Greeks. In theolo- 
gical learning these missionaries were always inferior 
to many of the Greek clergy ; in classical knowledge 
they were as much inferior to many lay teachers. 
During the period of destitution which succeeded the 
cessation of hostilities with the Turks, they were wel- 
comed as teachers of elementary schools, and they 
were popular for a time, because they gave both in- 
struction and books gratis ; but, in order to make their 
schools of any use, they were obKged to employ Greeks 
as teachers. DiflFerences arose between the missionaries 
themselves, and between the missionaries and their 
schoolmasters. The clergy, taking advantage of these 
disputes to recover their authority, succeeded in closing 
the schools of all the missionaries who did not allow 
the Greek priesthood to control the religious instruc- 
tion of the pupils. The principle that the religious 
instruction of the children of orthodox parents can 
only be directed by the orthodox, has been adopted by 
the government since the Ee volution of 1843, and 
applied to missionary schools even more stringently 
than had been done previously. As might have been 
expected, religious bigotry has received a stronger im- 
pulse than religious education. 

For inore than three centuries after the Othoman con- 
quest the literature of the modern Greeks was almost 
exclusively confined to ecclesiastical subjects ; and its 
language was not the spoken dialect of the people, but 



CHAP. I. 



20 CONDITION OF THE GREEKS. 

BOOK I. a pedantic imitation of the language of the fathers of 
the Church. The popular language, as written by mer- 
chants and traders, was disfigured by ignorance of 
grammar and orthography, to such a degree as to give 
it the appearance of a new tongue ; but the popular 
songs and epistolary correspondence of this period, if 
written with a corrected orthography, prove their 
close connection with ancient Greek. Degraded as 
the condition of the Greeks was politically, it is 
'^probable that a larger proportion could read and write 
than among any other Christian race in Europe. The 
Greeks of every class have always set a higher value 
on a knowledge of letters than any other people. They 
have a national tendency to pedantism. 

At the commencement of this century the effects 
oi the French Eevolution were strongly felt in Greece. 
Classic history was studied ; classic names were revived ; 
Athenian liberty became a theme of conversation 
among men ; Spartan virtue was spoken of by women ; 
literature was cultivated with enthusiasm as a step to 
revolution. 

On the eve of the Eevolution the condition of the 
Greek race might be represented under two different 
aspects, and innumerable facts might be cited to prove 
that both were true ; yet, under the one, the Greeks 
would appear as oppressed and degraded, and, under 
the other, as a happy and prosperous people, enjoying 
many valuable privileges. A comparison might be 
instituted between the condition of the Greek rayahs 
under the sultan, and the Russian serfs under the 
czar. The Christians who cultivated the soil in 
Turkey enjoyed a larger share of the fruits of their 
labours than the Christian peasantry in Poland and 
Hungary. The Greek citizen enjoyed a greater degree 
of liberty of speech, and possessed as much influence 
on the local affairs of his township, as the citizen of the 



CONDITION OF THE GREEKS. 21 

French empire under Napoleon I. Nor were the r«tro«fbct. 
orthodox in the East more galled by the restrictions 
which their religion imposed on them than the Catholics 
of Ireland. 

The Greeks were allowed a considerable share of 
authority in the executive administration of the Otho- 
man government. The patriarch of Constantinople, 
as I have already mentioned, was a kind of under- 
secretary to the grand vizier for the aflFairs of the 
orthodox Christians. The dragoman of the Porte and 
the dragoman of the fleet, who were Greeks, were also 
virtually members of the sultan's government. The 
Christians of the Morea had also a recognised agent 
at Constantinople, and other Greek communities had 
recognised official protectors, who controlled the fiscal 
oppression and the arbitrary injustice of the provincial 
pashas. This recognition, on the part of the Othoman 
government, that the Greeks required some defence 
against abuses of power on the part of their rulers, 
proves that the sultans not only perceived the evils 
inherent in the constitution of the Othoman empire, 
but they were also desirous of redressing them. 

In some degree, and in several provinces of the 
empire, the agricultural population was always in the 
same condition, whether it was composed of Mussul- 
mans or Christians. Both were oppressed by the same 
fiscal regulations, and both were retained in the same 
stationary condition. In the richest plains the peasant 
who cultivated the lands of a Mussulman aga or of a 
Christian primate, usually paid a seventh of the gross 
produce of the land to the sultan, and divided the 
remainder with his landlord. When the destruction of 
stock or a decline in the fertility of the soil rendered 
it impossible for the peasantry to perpetuate the race 
of cultivators on the proportion of the produce which 
fell to their share, they emigrated, or the race died out; 



CEEAP. 



22 EOMELIOTS. 

BOOK I. and the frequency of this event, both in Europe and 
Asia, was apparent to every traveller — abandoned vil- 
lages and ruined mosques were met with in the richest 
provinces of the empire. 

In addition to the land-tax paid in kind, the Otho- 
man government compelled the cultivators of the soil 
to furnish a determinate quantity of grain for the 
supply of Constantinople. The loss incurred by this 
right of pre-emption was thrown on the peasantry. 

The Christians regarded the haratch, or capitation 
tax, as the moat offensive badge of their subjection. It 
reduced them to the condition of rayahs or ransomed 
subjects. Yet it was in general more gallitig from the 
manner of its collection than from the amount which 
each individual was obliged to pay. Its collection was 
made a pretext for enforcing many vexatious police 
regulations, and it was doubly hated because Moham- 
medans of the lowest class were exempted from its 
burden. 

The haratch was frequently farmed to the worst 
class of a pasha's retinue ; and in Greece it was often 
sublet in districts to the petty officers of the Albanian 
mercenaries. An insulting term was applied to these 
unpopular tax-gatherers, who were called gypsy- 
haratchers. The origin of the nickname was a popular 
opinion that gypsies were bound to pay double haratch, 
and the reproach conveyed was that the Albanians 
attempted to treat eveiy man liable to the haratch as 
a gypsy. 
\ So anomalous was the condition of different por- 
tions of the Greek population, that the inhabitants of 
some mountain districts in Eomelia lived like a free 
people. Those who dwelt in Agrapha and the moun- 
tain-ranges that extend from PeUon and Olympus 
northward as far as the Greek language was spoken in 



I 



ROMELIOTS. 23 

Macedonia, enjoyed the right of bearing arms asRwiwwpBCT 
armatoli. They elected their own primates or elders, 
and their local authorities collected the taxes due by 
the district. Their character was that of freemen, and 
was marked by a degree of courage and independence 
not to be found in other parts of Greece. Consider- 
able numbers were engaged in commercial pursuits, 
which carried them into various parts of the sultan's 
empire, and into many ports of the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea. Many travelled far into Austria and 
Russia. These wanderings enlarged their minds, and 
when they settled in their native towns, they became 
local magistrates, and displayed some signs of that ac- 
tive spirit that usually pervades commercial republics. 
In the rude condition of Greek society and trade, 
the muleteers engaged in the transport of produce 
formed a numerous class, for everything was trans- 
ported on the backs of pack-horses or mules. The 
number of this class was much greater than the de- 
populated appearance of European Turkey would have 
led a stranger to suppose possible. Coarse woollen 
cloth of different kinds, and the cloaks which imitate 
sheep-skins, were manufactured in the interior of the 
continent, and these bulky goods employed thousands 
of horses to convey them to the sea-coast. The cheese 
and butter of the mountains was transported into the 
plains, and the grain of the plains was carried back into 
the mountains. Considerable quantities of money were 
also constantly in movement, partly for purposes of 
trade, and partly as remittances to provincial officers, 
or to the imperial treasury. Every class considered it 
good policy to conciliate the agoyiates, or muleteers. 
Powerful pashas patronised them, wealthy merchants 
treated them with respect and confidence ; they were 
favoured by Mussulman beys and Greek primates, and 



CHAP. I, 



24 AKMATOLI. 

BOOK I. they were esteemed and trusted by the peasantry; 
their friendship was sought by armatoli, and their 
enmity was feared by klephts. 

^ The shepherds were also a numerous class in Romelia. 
They were as independent, though not so influential, as 
the muleteers. 

I The peasants of the mountain districts, the muleteers, 
I and the shepherds, formed the best representatives of 
the Greek nation ; and it was from among them that 
the ranks of the armatoli were recruited. 

The armatoli were a Christian local militia, which 
had existed in the Byzantine empire, and which had in 
some degree protected the Greek population against 
the Franks, the Servians, and the Albanians, during 
the anarchy that reigned in Greece and Macedonia, 
while the worthless race of the Paleologoi ruled at 
Constantinople. The Greeks in the mountain districts, 
fearing anarchy more than despotism, generally sub- 
mitted to the sultans on the condition of being allowed 
to retain their local privileges. The institution of the 
armatoli was thus adopted into the scheme of the 
sultan's administration. The Greek communities of 
the mountains collected their own taxes, and the Greek 
troops guarded the great roads through the mountain 
passes ; but, as the sultans gradually increased the 
power and extended the authority of the central ad- 
ministration, the importance of the armatoli declined. 
The Dervendji-pasha, who represented the Kleisour- 
arches of the Byzantine emperors, stationed Turkish 
troops to guard the principal dervends, or passes, and 
circumscribed the service of the armatoli as much as 
possible to that of rural guards. In some districts 
the military authority which had been vested in the 
Christians was entirely transferred to the Mussulmans 
before the end of the last century. The case of the 
town of Servia is an instance, which commands the 



ABMATOLI. 25 

great road between Larissa and Monastir or Bitoglia retbospbct. 
(Pelagonia). The service of the armatoli was first 
rendered so burdensome, that the communities sought 
to purchase exemption from the obligation of furnish- 
ing additional armatoli. The money was employed to 
pa)^ Albanian mercenaries. 

The history of the armatoli, from the time of the 
Turkish conquest until the peace of Belgrade in 1739, 
has not met with the attention it deserves from the 
modern Greeks. The number of the armatoliks re- 
cognised by Othoman government is said to have been 
originally fourteen ; but no correct list appears to exist. 
After the peace of Belgrade, the policy of diminishing 
the numbers of the armatoli was steadily and success- 
fully pursued. To destroy the power of this Christian 
militia, the sultans, in the year 1 740, departed from the 
ancient practice of the Porte, not to name an Albanian 
bey to the rank of pasha in his native country. Sulei- 
man of Arghyrokastron, a man of activity and daring, 
was appointed pasha of Joannina and dervendji-pasha, 
with strict orders to watch the intrigues of the Greeks, 
who were suspected of being employed by Kussia to 
prepare the Christians to rebel, and to circumscribe the 
power of the armatoli. 

Suleiman fulfilled his instructions with much ability. 
He worked on the mutual jealousies which are the 
bane of Greek society. By tolerating the feuds of 
the captains, and then aiding the people who suffered 
from their hostilities, he gradually weakened the or- 
ganisation of the ancient captainliks, and introduced 
Albanian Mussulmans into Christian districts. The 
venality of some captains enabled him to purchase the 
chief military power in their district. 

Kurd Pasha, another Albanian bey, succeeded Sulei- 
man, and held the office of dervendji-pasha for fifteen 
years ; at first, in conjunction with the pashalik of 



CHAP. I. 



26 ABMATOLI. 

BOOK L Joannina, and afterwards with that of Berat, Kurd 
acted under instructions similar to those given to 
Suleiman. His administration commenced about the 
time the Kussians invaded the Morea; and this circum- 
stance aflforded him a reasonable pretext for diminishing 
the numbers of the armed Christians and reducing their 
pay. The severity of his measures against the arma- 
toli, instead of being relaxed, was increased after the 
peace of Kainardji in 1 774. 

Ali of Tepelen became dervendji-pasha in the year 
1787, with strict orders to pursue the same policy as 
Suleiman and Kurd. He destroyed the old system so 
completely, that the proud armatoli of earlier days were 
reduced to be local policemen in their native districts. 
Into every armatolik he introduced a number of 
Albanian Mussulman mercenaries. With the perfidy, 
cruelty, and vigour that formed his policy, he circum- 
scribed the legal authority, and nullified the traditional 
privileges of the Christian militia, without openly 
abrogating their ancient charters. The jealousies of 
rival captains were encouraged and their hostilities 
overlooked until it served Ali^s purpose to interfere. 
The Greek clergy and primates were prompted to 
make complaints against the exactions of the soldiers 
and the feuds of the captains. Bands of robbers 
(klephts) were tolerated, and even encouraged, imtil a 
case was made out which served as a popular pretext 
for introducing Mussulman Albanians into a Christian 
armatolik. During the government of Ali most of 
the districts, which had from time immemorial enjoyed 
the right of electing their captains of armatoli, were 
forced to waive this privilege, and request AU to 
appoint their captain. 

The last blow was given to the ancient system of 
armatoli at Agrapha by Ali. Mohammed II. is said 
to have confirmed the municipal independence and 



AGRAPHA. 27 

the privileges of the armatolik of this district by aRBTRoePEcr. 
written charter. When the sultans became the lords 
and protectors of Agrapha, it had long been engaged 
in hostilities with the Frank dukes of Athens and 
with the despots of Epirus, Its relations with the 
Othoman government were friendly, and its armatoli 
guarded the passes of Mount Pindus between Thessaly 
and Epirus, as they had done for ages under the 
Byzantine emperors. The population of Agrapha is 
of the Greek race, without the admixture of Bulgarian, 
Albanian, and Vallachian blood which pervades the 
neighbouring districts. It appears, indeed, to have 
successfully resisted the great Sclavonian colonisation 
of Greece during the transformation of the Roman 
into the Byzantine empire, which implanted new 
geographical names on the rest of Greece. But though 
it resisted the social influence of the Sclavonians, it 
could not evade the policy of Ali : he succeeded in 
sowing dissensions among the population of this 
favoured district, and then, under the pretext of an 
anxiety to prevent hostilities between the rival fac- 
tions, he persuaded the municipal authorities to 
reduce the number of the armatoli to two hundred 
men. Shortly after he found an opportunity of send- 
ing a Mussulman derven-aga, with three hundred 
Albanians, to remain as a permanent garrison in 
Agrapha. 

As the authority of the armatoli declined, the 
klephts, or brigands, grew up into political and social 
importance as a permanent class in the Greek nation. 
As long as the institution of the armatoli preserved 
its pristine energy, the klephts were repressed with a 
vigorous hand; but when the Porte began to reduce 
the numbers and curtail the privileges of the Christian 
militia, many discontented armatoli fled to the moun- , 
tains, and lived by levying contributions on the culti- 



OHAP. 



28 KLEPHTS. 

BOOK I. vators of the soil. Where the government shows no 
- respect for justice, lawless men are often supported by 
the lower orders of the people, as a means of securing 
revenge or of redressing intolerable social evils. A 
life of independence, even when stained with crime, 
has always been found to throw a spell over the 
'minds of oppressed nations. The Greeks make Kobin 
Hoods, or demi-heroes, of their leading klephts; they 
magnify the exploits of the class, and antedate its 
existence. The patriotic brigands of modern Greek 
poetry are a creation of yesterday. Even at the com- 
mencement of the present century, several of the most 
numerous bands in Macedonia consisted of as many 
Mussulmans as Christians, and Albanians were always 

[more numerous in their ranks than Greeks. 

During the government of Ali Pasha, the districts of 
Verria and Niausta were infested by a celebrated Mus- 
sulman klepht, named Sulu Proshova, whose band 
amounted to several hundred men, the majority of 
which was said to consist of Christians. The popular 

^ongs of the Greeks have given fame to the klephts, and 
the language in which the songs are written has caused 
scholars to exaggerate their merit as poetical composi- 
tions. The habitual cruelty of the klephts would have 

J rendered pathos satire. Their most glorious exploits 

I were to murder Turkish agas in mountain passes, as 
Lord Byron describes the scene in his " Giaour."^ 

The ordinary life of the klepht was as little distin- 
guished by mercy to the poor as it was ennobled by 

^ The Greeks suflfered far more than the Turks from the klephts. Rich 
primates were more defenceless than wealthy agas ; and robbers must have 
food every day. Every traveller in the East could cite proofs of this from his 
own experience. Two examples will suffice. Colonel Leake says : " The master 
of the house in which I lodge (at Kalabaka), among his other misfortunes, has 
left an eye with the klephts." — Travels in Northern Greece^ iv. 262. Mr Dod- 
well says : '' Our lodging at Livanatis was in the cottage of a poor Albanian 
woman, who was lamenting the loss of her husband, who had been killed by 
the klephts, while her infant son was taken prisoner, whom she had ransomed 
with the savings of several years." — ClcLssiccU Tour, ii. 59. Livanatis is a vil- 
lage peopled by Christian Albanians, near Talanta. 



MOEEOTS. 29 

national patriotism. There is very rarely anything tqj|Rn«»p»T. 
eulogise in the conduct of criminals. But the klephtsj^ 
after the treaty of Belgrade, became gradually more 
and more confounded with the armatoli in the ideas'^ 
of the urban population of Greece, from the frequency 
with which Ali enrolled distinguished klephts among 
his Christian guards, and conferred on them commands 
of armatoli ; while at the same time a constant deser- 
tion of discontented armatoli was recruiting the ranks 
of the klephts. This interchange of the members of 
the two corps at last created a certain community of 
feelings and interests. The existence of the klephts 
was necessary to render the services of the armatoli 
indispensable. Ali was often accused of neglecting to 
suppress the depredations of the klephts, in order to 
extend his power as dervendji-pasha. But when any 
individual klepht incurred his hatred, neither valour 
nor caution could elude his vengeance. The treachery 
with which he murdered Katziko- Jani, and the cruelty 
with which he inflicted the most horrible tortures on 
Katz-Antoni, are celebrated in Greek songs with feel- 
ings of mingled admiration and abhorrence.* 

The people furnished the true type of the Greek race 
in Komelia ; but in the Morea, the nation was repre- 
sented by the proesti and primates. The people were 
of little account, for the primates were rarely elected 
by popular sufirage. Almost every local authority de- 
rived its power from the central administration of the 
pasha, and acted as fiscal agents of the sultan* Their 
insolence to the poorer class of Christians, and their 
exactions from the Greek peasantry, were only exceeded 
by the Mussulman Albanians who collected the har- 
atch. In manners and dress they imitated the Turks, 
and they were accused of leaguing with the higher 
clergy to keep the people in ignorance and subjection* 

^ Flauriel, Chants Populaires de la Qr^cty i. 170. 



CHAP. I. 



30 MOREOTS. 

3800K I. Before the Revolution, it was observed that education 
flourished more at Joannina, under the eye of the 
tyrant Ali, than at Patras or Tripolitza, under the care 
of Greek primates. Education owed its chief obli- 
gations to traders and monks. 

The Greeks of all classes in the Morea lived in com- 
parative ease and abundance, in spite of the exactions 
of Turks and primates. The very circumstance which 
made taxation arrest the progress of society, rendered 
its burden light on individuals. It was paid in kind 
at harvest-time. A part was taken from a heap. The 
population was thin, and no produce was raised that 
was not raised in abundance. At the time of harvest, 
therefore, the price was always low. The farmers of 
taxes were usually primates and large landholders; and 
whether they were Turks or Greeks, they had a virtual 
monopoly of the market. Merchants found it more 
advantageous to make their price with those who could 
furnish a whole cargo than to collect small quantities 
in detail, even at a lower price, but with the risk of 
not finding adequate means of transport to the port of 
embarkation, and of not being able to complete a cargo 
within a fixed period. 

The wellbeing of the Moreot peasantry in many 
districts arose from a cause which was easily over- 
looked. They enjoyed the benefit of a large amount 
of capital vested in improvements in former days. 
Buildings, mills, watercourses, and cisterns, facilitated 
labour and increased profits. But every generation 
saw some portion of this vested capital disappear, and 
with it a portion of the population vanished. Planta- 
tions of olive, mulberry, fig, and other fruit-trees, and 
vineyards producing wine or currants, occasioned so 
, great a demand for agricultural labour, that the con- 
I dition of the day-labourer was not inferior to that of 
the small peasant-proprietor. Indeed, no condition of 



MOREOTS. 31 

society could be more favourable to the individual rbtikwpect. 
labourer. The demand for labour was limited, but\ 
wages were high, and the price of provisions was low. ' 

The municipal organisation of the Morea w<as more 
complete than in the other parts of Greece, but it was 
not so free. Each village elected its own Demogeront; 
the demogeronts and the people of the towns elected 
Proesti, and the proesti elected the primate of the pro- 
vince. The primates resided at Tripolitza, to transact 
the business relating to the whole Christian population 
of the pashalik. The proesti and primates, with the 
assistance of the bishops and abbots of the principal 
monasteries, elected a vekil or primate, who resided at 
Constantinople, as the oflBcial organ of communication 
with the sultan's ministers, and whose duty it was to 
keep the dragoman of the Porte and the dragoman of 
the fleet accurately informed concerning the affairs of 
the Greeks, as far as related to their respective depart- 
ments. This system invested the aristocracy of thei 
Morea with a considerable share of political power,' 
and rendered it a check on the authority of the 
pasha. 

The character of the Moreots was not viewed with 
favour by the other Greeks. The primates were ac- 
cused of retaining the intriguing, treacherous, and ran- 
corous disposition which the imperial historian Canta- 
cuzenos tells us characterised them in the fourteenth 
century.^ Nor were either the citizens or the peasants 
supposed to be more imbued with the spirit of truth 
and justice. Their industry and intelligence were re- 
cognised; but their deficiency in candour, courage, and 
honesty was almost proverbial. A Moreot was sup- \ 
posed, as a matter of course, to be more inconsistent, 
envious, and imgrateful than any other Greek. 

The primates generally maintained a few armed 

* Cantacuzeni ffistoria, lib. iv. c 13, p. 761, ed. Par. 



CHAP. 



32 MANIATS. 

BOOK I. guards, partly to enforce their authority and collect 
• taxes, and partly to defend their property from the 
klephts. But no regular armatoli ever existed in the 
I Morea. Even the klephts of the Morea, who were 
mere brigands, were not numerous until after the 
social disorganisation caused by the Kussian invasion 
and the insurrectionary movements of 1770. The ex- 
ploits of Zacharias and of Kolokotroni, though cele- 
brated in unpoetic verses and in bombastical prose, 
were only the deeds of highwaymen and sheep-stealers. 
[They lived habitually at the expense of the poor Chris- 
'tian peasants, and rarely ventured to waylay a rich 
Greek primate, still more rarely to plunder a Turkish 
aga. The song of Zacharias celebrates the destruction 
of Greek villages, the plunder of Greek priests, the 
insult of Greek women, the murder of one Greek child, 
and the ransom of another.^ Dodwell mentions the 
readiness with which the Greek peasantry joined in 
hunting down the band of Kolokotroni, and with 
which the Greek bishops excommunicated the klephts.^ 
Kolokotroni s own account of the events witnessed by 
Dodwell has been published, and it proves that nothing 
can have been more brutal than the life of a Moreot 
klepht. They were crafty and cruel, and if the trade 
was ever nobler, it must have been long before the 
days of Kolokotroni.^ 

The Maniats and the Tzakonians must be excepted 
from the general description of the Moreot character. 
The former were remarkable for their love of violence 
and plunder, but also for their frankness and independ- 
ence. The latter were distinguished by their peaceful 
habits, their honesty, and their industry. Both were 

^ Flauriel, Chants Poptdaires de la Grece Modeme^ voL i. p. 76. Chant xiv. 

• Classical Tour, i. 76., ii. 371. Captain George is confounded with Kolo- 
kotroni. ii. 356. 

3 Ai-^Tijo-is tvfi^vrcaVf pp. 20, 21. Kolokotroni speaks of burniDg Greek vil- 
lages, when he was a klepht, as a matter of no impoi*tance — *^ cicam rh x^p^**-" 
p. 14. 



ISLANDEBS. 33 

considered brave. The Tzakonians kept provision- »n«<*racT. 
shops in almost every seaport on the Egean. The 
Maniats carried on piracy in every gulf.^ 

The Greek inhabitants of the islands exhibited a 
great variety of character, for they lived under a diver- 
sity of social influences. The maritime population of 
Psara, Kassos, Kalymnos, and Patmos, was active, in- 
telligent, and brave ; the Sciots were industrious and 
honest ; the inhabitants of Tinos and Syra, whether 
orthodox or Catholic, were timid and well-behaved — 
formed by nature and art to make excellent cooks and 
nurses. The characteristic of the islanders of the Archi- 
pekgo was supposed to be timidity. The Turks who 
visited them only to collect tribute, and who saw them 
scamper off to the mountains when the tax-gatherers 
arrived, nicknamed them taoshan, or hares. Little did 
the Turks think that these hares were about to turn on 
the greyhounds and drive them back into their kennel. 

^ See the account of the condition of the Maniats in the History of Greece 
under Othoman Domination, 132, &c. Colonel Leake relates two characteristic 
anecdotes of Maniat manners. — Travels in the Morea, L 272, 282. Kolokotroni 
tells us, in his Memoirs, that the Maniats forget every thing when there is a ques- 
tion of gaining money. ** Ol Mayidrai \ri<rfioyovy SXa 8i& t& yp6<ruL'^ — Atiiytio'is 
^vfifidmwy rris 'ZWriviKris *v\ris &irh rii 1770 l^vs rit 1836, viray6p€v<rf 6. K, 
KoXoKorp^vris. A^vrfiriVf 1846. 



VOL. L 



CHAPTER II. 

THE ALBANIANS. 



BfffTptorSy Kol MoXarrcSv ficrii rhv KaraKXvfffihUf iffropovtrt ^oABovra ficuriKevtrcu 
irpwroy Iva ray fi€rh HfKdtryov irapayeyofi^yay eh r^v "Hvetpoy, — Plutaroh. 

Phaeton was the first who reigned in Albania after the Deluge, and he came 
into Epirus with the Pelasgians. 



EXTBNT OF COUNTRY OCCUPIED BY THE ALBANIAN RACE IN GREECE — ALBAN- 
IAN Mussulmans of Lalla and Bardunia — Christian Albanla.ns of 

THE DeRYENOKHORIA, HYDRA, AND SpETZAS — CHARACTER AND CIVIL INSTI- 
TUTIONS OF THE HyDRIOTS — THB ALBANIANS FORM A DISTINCT BRANCH OF 
THE InDO-QeRMANIC RACE — GUEGHS AND TOSKS — CHARACTER, MANNERS, 

and social condition of the albanians — administrative divisions — 
Military influence gained by the Albanians during the eighteenth 
CENTURY— In Greece after the year 1770 — Policy of Ali Pasha of Jo- 
annina — suliots, the most remarkable tribe of orthodox albanians 
— Their rise and social condition — Repeatedly attacked by Ali 
Pasha — Last war — The priest Samuel — Treachery of Suliots— Capi- 
tulation of Suu — Fate of Suliots. 

The Albanian race occupies no inconsiderable portion 
of ancient Greece. In the Greek kingdom it numbers 
about 200,000 souls, chiefly cultivators of the soil, 
though a part forms the most enterprising maritime 
population of modern Greece. 

Some Albanian colonies settled in Greece before it 
was conquered by the Othoman Turks; and within the 
greater part of the limits occupied by the Albanians at 
the present day, the Greeks have been as completely 
expelled as the Celtic race in England by the Saxon.^ 

Albanian colonists now occupy all Attica and Me- 
garis, with the exception of the towns of Athens and 
Megara, where they form only a portion of the popula- 

> MftiiemI Greece, 88, 275. 



ALBANIANS IN GREECE. 35 

tion. They possess the greater part of Boeotia and a rbtrospkct. 
small portion of Locris, near Talanta. The southern 
part of Euboea and the northern part of Andros, the 
whole of Salamis, and a part of Egina, are peopled by 
Albanians. In the Peloponnesus they are still more 
numerous. They occupy the whole of Corinthia and 
Argolis, extending themselves into the northern part 
of Arcadia and the eastern part of Achaia. In Laconia 
they inhabit the slopes of Taygetus, called Bardunia, 
which extend to the plain of Helos, and, crossing the 
Eurotas, they occupy a large district around Monem- 
vasia to the south, of the Tzakonians, and to the north 
of a small Greek population which dwells near Cape 
Malea, in the district called Vatika. In the western 
part of the peninsula they occupied a considerable part 
of the mountains which extend from Lalla to the north- 
eastern corner of Messenia, south of the Neda. Besides 
these large settlements, there are some smaller clusters 
of Albanian villages to the north of Karitena, and in 
the mountains between the Bay of Navarin and the 
Gulf of Coron. The islands of Hydra and Spetzas were 
entirely peopled by Albanians. 

The extent of country occupied by the Albanian race 
is more clearly displayed in a coloured map than by 
the most minute description. Marathon, Platsea, 
Leuctra, Salamis, Mantinea, Ira, and Olympia, are now 
inhabited by Albanians, and not by Greeks. Even in 
the streets of Athens, though it has been for more than 
a quarter of a century the capital of a Greek kingdom, 
the Albanian language is still heard among the children 
playing in the streets near the temple of Theseus and 
the arch of Hadrian. 

Not more than a tenth of the Albanian population^ 
settled in Greece professed the Mohammedan religion. 
The most warlike tribes were those of Lalla, Bardunia^ 
and Carystos, in Euboea. 



CHAP. II. 



36 LALLA AND BARDUNIA. 

BOOK I. The Albanian Mussulmans of Lalla occupied a healthy 
and agreeable situation in an elevated plain on Mount 
Phloe. Their scattered habitations formed a great 
village rather than a town. The principal men dwelt 
in towers capable of defence. Lalla contained upwards 
of 3000 inhabitants, and about 400 were well armed 
and well mounted. 

The district of Bardunia took its name from a By- 
zantine castle, high up on the slope of Taygetus, near 
the sources of the river of Passava. It comprised the 
south-eastern declivities of the mountain, which run out 
into a broad ridge overlooking the lower valley of the 
Eurotas, and extending almost to the sea-coast near 
Marathonisi. For three centuries this district was 
possessed by Albanians, who were without any tradi- 
tion concerning the period at which their ancestors had 
colonised the countr)^, or embraced Mohammedanism. 
It may, perhaps, be inferred from this ignorance, that 
the Barduniots expelled the Sclavonian population, 
which the Byzantine writers tell us occupied this dis- 
trict at the time of the Turkish conquest, and that they 
embraced Mohammedanism to become landlords instead 
of peasants. 

The Barduniots dwelt in fortified towers dispersed 
over the country, and both their situation and their 
valour enabled them to restrain the forays of the Mani- 
ats in the rich plains of Laconia. The exactions of the 
Barduniot agas were nevertheless often found to be 
almost as intolerable as the depredations of the Greeks 
of Mania. The whole population was able to arm about 
2500 men. Between forty and fifty families held a 
superior rank in consequence of their large landed pos- 
sessions. 

The armatoli were not the only Christians in the 

Othoman empire who were authorised to bear arms. 

[Several Albanian communities in Greece, though en- 



DERVENOKHORIA — HYDRA. 37 

tirely composed of Christians, received this privilege Retbobpect. 
from the sultan. The inhabitants of Megaris, who oc- 
cupied five large villages, called Dervenokhoria, were 
particularly favoured by the Porte. The care of guard- 
ing the passes over Mounts Cithaeron and Geranion, 
which lead to the Isthmus of Corinth, was intrusted to 
them ; and they were relieved from several taxes, on the 
condition that they should furnish a body of armed 
men constantly on duty. The number of armed men 
in the five villages amounted to about 2000. 

The most influential, though not the most numerous, | 
portion of the Albanian population in Greece, consisted 
of the shipowners and sailors of Hydra and Spetzas, and 
of the boatmen of Poros, Kastri, and Kranidi. 

The island of Hydra contained nearly twenty thou- 
sand inhabitants of pure Albanian race before the 
Greek Eevolution. It is a long ridge of limestone 
rocks, with -only a few acres of soil capable of cultiva- 
tion. The town is situated near the middle of the 
island, on the channel which separates it from Argolis. 
Seen from the sea, it presents a noble aspect, forming 
an amphitheatre of white houses, rising one above the 
other round a small creek which can hardly be used 
as a port. The houses cling like swallows^ nests to the 
sides of a barren mountain, which towers far above 
them, and whose summit is crowned by a monastery 
of St Elias. The streets are narrow, crooked, unpaved 
lanes, but the smallest dwellings are built of stone, and 
near the sea some large and solidly-constructed houses 
give the place an imposing aspect. In these houses the 
wealthy primates of Hydra resided at the breaking out 
of the Eevolution. They lived, like most Albanians, a 
frugal, and, it may even be said, a penurious life. In 
their dress, their education, and their character, indeed, 
there was very little difference between the primate, 
the captain, and the common sailor of Hydra. The 



38 HYDRA. 

BOOK I. ricli Hydriot usually displayed his wealth in erecting 

CHAP. II. "^ •/ X •/ O 

'■ — a large building near the sea, which served as a dwell- 
ing for his family and a warehouse for his goods. In 
some of the rooms the sails and cordage of his ships 
were stored ; in others he lived.^ 

The Hydriots of every rank displayed the peculiar 
character of the Albanian race. They were proud, 
insolent, turbulent, and greedy of gain. The primates 
were jealous and exacting, the people rude and violent. 
But both possessed some sterling virtues ; and they 
were distinguished from the Greeks by their love of 
truth, and by the honesty with which they fulfilled 
their engagements. There were no traders in the 
Levant who paid more punctually than the merchants, 
and no sailors who took better care of ship and cargo 
than the mariners of Hydra. 

The civil government, conceded by the sultan and 
protected by the capitan- pasha, was entirely in the 
hands of the shipowners and retired captains, who 
formed a class of capitalists. About the year 1730, 
when the Albanian colony established itself in the 
then deserted island in order to escape the exactions 
of the pasha of the Morea, the local administration 
of the small trading community was intrusted to three 
elders, called, in the Albanian dialect, plekjeria, who 
were chosen by the people. The annual tribute paid 
to the sultan amounted to 200 piastres, a sum at»that 
time not equal to £30 sterling. When the islanders 
grew richer and more numerous, the number of elders 
was gradually increased, until it reached twelve. But 

^ Both Gordon {History of the Greek Revolution^ i. 164) and Waddington 
{Visit to Greece, 102) speak of the costly marbles and splendid furniture at 
Hydra. The marbles were only flags from Leghorn with which the courts 
were paved ; and the richest furniture consisted of a few damask chairs from 
Marseilles. Generally, the best houses of the Hydriot primates were not so 
expensively furnished as those of the Moreots. The houses were built at con- 
siderable expense, but were solid, not splendid. They still stand to bear 
evidence of the rude social condition of the Hydriots at the period of their 
greatest wealth. 



HYDRA. 39 

the new settlers never acquired the full rights of RBTnoePEcr. 
the original colonists, and the government became an 
oligarchy, which indeed appears to be the type to which 
political society tends among the Albanians. The twelve 
elders were chosen by the capitalists, and formed a 
municipal council, divided into three sections composed 
of four members. Each section acted for four months, 
and met daily to transact business with the governor 
or head of the police, who was a primate of the island, 
named by the c^pitan-pasha, and commonly called the 
Bey. 

The celebrated capitan-pasha, Kutchuk Hussein, who 
was a steady protector of the Hydriots and Spetziots, 
was the first who appointed a governor to act as the 
sultan's representative at Hydra. He did so at the 
request of the Hydriots, who found their municipal 
authorities unable to restrain the turbulence of rival 
factions, or to bring murderers to justice. 

The family of Konduriottis was one of the most 
ancient and most distinguished in the island. It was 
founded by the younger son of an Albanian peasant 
of the dervenokhorion of Kundura, who settled as a 
boatman shortly after the expulsion of the Venetians 
from the Morea, and before Hydra received the colony 
which formed a regular community. Lazaros Kondu- 
riottis was the head of the family during the Greek 
Revolution. At his marriage his father was assassi- 
nated by the bravo of a rival family. Old Kondu- 
riottis saw Kolodemo, whom he knew to be an assassin, 
approaching him covertly during the ceremony. Sus- 
pecting his design, he placed a stool before his body, 
holding it in his hand. The murderer, however, ad- 
vanced so close that old Konduriottis was forced to 
hold him at bay with the stool, and endeavour to push 
him towards the door. Kolodemo was in danger of 
being baffled, but by stooping down he contrived to 



40 HYDRA AND SPETZAS. 

BOOK I. stab his enemy with a long knife in the belly, and to 
■ '^^^' '' escape, leaving the weapon in the wound. This assas- 
sination caused the Hydriots to petition the sultan to 
send a governor with the power of life and death. 
Kutchuck Hussein named a Hydriot called Bulgaris as 
the first governor, in the year 1802. Bulgaris had 
served with the capitan -pasha in the Othoman fleet, 
as quartermaster of the Christian seamen. The autho- 
rity of the Christian bey was not, however, sufficient 
to . control the turbulence of his countrymen, and 
assassination was never completely suppressed.^ 

Hydra paid no direct taxes to the sultan, but it 
was obliged to furnish a contingent of two hundred 
and fifty able-bodied seamen to the Othoman fleet, 
and to pay them from the local treasury. The expense 
of this contingent amounted to 16,000 dollars annually. 
Besides this sum, about 4000 dollars were annually 
expended in presents to the capitan - pasha, to the 
Greek dragoman of the fleet, and to several officials 
employed at the admiralty and dockyard at Constan- 
tinople. To raise these sums, a tax of five per cent was 
imposed by the local administration on the gains of 
every Hydriot, and some custom-duties were levied at 
the port. 

The condition of Spetzas was very similar to that 
of Hydra. The population was smaller, the propor- 
tion of small capitalists was greater, and the local 
administration was more democratic. 
^ A considerable portion of the coasting trade in the 
Archipelago was in the hands of the Albanians of Poros, 
Kastri, and Kranidi, who possessed many decked boats. 
Over this maritime population the Hydriots and Spet- 
ziots exercised supremacy. 

* Waddington {Visit to Greece) mentions that a band of assassins existed 
at Hydra during the early years of the Revolution ; and many of their crimes 
might be cited to prove the correctness of his assertion. 



ALBANIAN RACE. 41 

fRE 



Such was the position of the Albanian race in Greece, 
where its settlements were comparatively modern. In 
its native regions its political importance and moral 
influence had been constantly increasing during the 
latter half of the last century, and it had attained the 
acme of its power at the commencement of the Greek 
Revolution. In Albania a considerable proportion of 
the population had embraced the Mohammedan reli- 
gion; but the Albanian Mussulmans were detested by 
Osmanlees and hated by the Greeks. Their religion 
was hardly a matter of conscience with the majority. 
They were less bigoted than the Turks, and less super- 
stitious than the Greeks. Their avarice was, however, 
insatiable, and for gold an Albanian Mussulman would 
willingly serve a Christian master, or a Christian Al- 
banian a Mussulman chief, even if the service was to 
be rendered in deeds of blood. 

The Albanian forms a distinct race among the nations 
of Europe. They have been supposed by some to be 
the representatives of the Pelasgians. They call them- 
selves Shkipetar. Some suppose them to have occu- 
pied the regions they now inhabit before the days of 
Homer, and that they are the lineal descendants of 
the race to which the ancient Epirots and Macedo- 
nians belonged as cognate tribes. Alexander the Great 
must, according to these archaeologists, have spoken 
an ancient Albanian dialect at his riotous banquets 
with his Macedonian officers. 

The researches of modern philology have established 
beyond question that the Albanian language is an 
early offset from the Sanscrit, and that its grammar 
was complete at as old a date as the oldest Greek 
dialect.^ Nearly the same boundary separates the 

* The best works on Albania and 'its population are — Leake's Travels in 
Nortkem Greece, 4 vols., 1835 ; and AWanesische Studien, by Dr J. Q. von Hahii, 
1853. For the language— 1. Researches in Greece, by Col. Leake, 1814; 2. 



42 GUEGHS AND TOSKS. 

BOOK I. Hellenic from tlie non-Hellenic population at the pre- 

CHAP. 11. , ■*■•*■, •*• 

sent day as in ancient times. Thucydides calls the 

Amphilochians who dwelt at the head of the Gulf of 
Arta barbarians. Strabo says that one race inhabited 
the whole country, from the Acroceraunian Mountains 
to the borders of Thessaly and to the plain of Pela- 
gonia, under the name of Epirots or Macedonians, for 
both spoke the same language.^ 

Ancient Epirus was filled with Greek colonies, and 
the Greek race is now more numerous than the Alban- 
ian in the region immediately to the north of the Gulf 
of Arta. But, on the other hand, one-fifth of modern 
Greece is at present inhabited by Albanian colonists.* 
The inhabitants of Albania, of the Shkipetar race, con- 
sist of two distinct branches — the Gueghs, who dwell to 
the north of the valley of the Skumbi and the line of 
the Via Egnatia. That great artery of Koman life now 
forms a desolate line of separation between the Gueghs 
and the Tosks. The dialects of these two branches are 
said not to differ more in their grammar than the 
Scotch of Ayrshire and the English of Somersetshire, 
yet a Guegh and a Tosk are unintelligible to one an- 
other at their first meeting. Both branches are subdi- 
vided into several tribes. Among the Gueghs several 
Catholic tribes retain their semi-independence, and 
uphold the Papal supremacy alike against the Mo- 

Die SpracTie der Alhanesen oder Schhipetarm, by Ritter vod Xylander, 1835; 
3. There is an excellent grammar and dictionary in the philological portion of 
the Albanesiache Studim of Dr von Hahn ; 4. Pelasgica, by Dr Reinhold of the 
Greek Navy, published at Athens, 1866. The most important philological 
dissertations are — 1. An essay entitled Tst die Alhanesische Sprache eine Indo- 
Germaniache f by Th. Stier, published in the A llgemeine Monatsschrift fiir 
Wissenschaft und Litteratur, Brunswick, November 1854; 2. Ueber das 
Alhanesische in seinen Verwandt schaftlichen Beziekimgen, von Franz Bopp, 
Berlin, 1855; 3. Uepl rijs AvroxBovla9 r£v AXfiavau fjroi '^Kiirirhp, iypa^e 
N. P. NiK0KA.7)s, Gottingen, 1865; 4. Das Alhanesische Element in Griechenland, 
von Dr J. Ph. Fallmerayer, Munich, 1 857. Several poems in the Albanian 
language have been printed at Naples, and one by Dr Stier at Bnmswick, in 
1856. 

1 Thucydides, ii. 68. Strabo, vii. s. xiv. 326, ed. 1620. 



CHIEFS. 43 

hammedan Gueghs and their northern neighbours, rtoowkt. 
the fierce orthodox freemen of Montenegro. The Mir- 
dites are considered the most warlike of the Christians. 
They are all Catholics, and boast that they are the de- 
scendants of the companions and soldiers of Skan- 
derbeg. 

The Tosks, who dwell to the south of the Skumbi, 
are the neighbours of the Greeks. The Albanian colo- 
nies in Greece are all composed of Tosks. This branch 
is divided into three great tribes, which are again sub- 
di^nded into many septs — the Toskides proper, the 
Lyapides, and the Tchamides. The Toskides are gene- 
rally Mussulmans, but among the Lyapides and the 
Tchamides several septs of orthodox Christians retained 
the privilege of bearing arms, even to the time of Ali 
of Joannina. 

The Albanian aristocracy embraced Mohammedanism 
in the fifteenth century, but a considerable portion of the 
people did not apostatise until the end of the seventeenth 
century. Their conversion was caused by their desire to 
escape the tribute of Christian children, which compelled 
them to furnish recruits to the corps of janissaries and 
to the slaves of the sultan's household. As among the 
Greeks, apostacy was common among the higher classes 
at the time of the first irruptions of the Othomans, and 
a large proportion of the Albanian chiefs retained their 
property by changing their religion. Some of the Al- 
banian beys, however, claim descent from the Otho- 
man Turks who accompanied Sultan Bayezid I. and 
Murad 11. in their expeditions, and there can be no 
doubt that Mohammed II. made some grants of lands 
and conceded high offices in Albania to several Turks. 
But, in most cases, the claim to Turkish descent rests 
only on a tradition that the ancestor of the present bey 
received a sanjak or some military fief from one of the 
sultans already mentioned ; and, in nine cases out of 



44} PEASANTRY. 

BOOK I. ten, these grants were the rewards of apostacy, not of 

'—^ previous service. Like the Byzantine nobles at the 

time of conquest, the morality of the Albanian chiefs 
was such that they were not likely to become more 
wicked by becoming Mussulmans. Their change of 
religion was little more than a change of name and 
their marriage with three additional wives. The ties 
of family and tribe existed without modification, and 
they attest that the chieftains and the people of Albania 
have a common origin. 

The whole of Albania, from the Gulf of Arta to the 
Lake of Skodra, is divided into innumerable lateral 
valleys by rugged mountains, which render the com- 
munications so difficult as to confine trade to a few 
lines of transport. The agricultural population is 
thinly scattered in these valleys, and, as in most parts 
of Turkey, those who cultivate the soil, even.when they 
are Mussulmans, are considered as forming an inferior 
grade of society. But there is nothing to prevent the 
peasant, since he is free, from adopting a military life, 
and rising to wealth and power.' In general, however, 
the soil is cultivated from generation to generation by 
the same families, and for centuries it has been culti- 
vated with the same routine. From each yoke of land 
(zevgari) the landlord receives a rent paid in produce. 
The peculiarities of Albanian society are most marked 
in the manner of life among those who are the pro- 
prietors of the soil. All of this class consider that they 
are born to carry arms. The great landlords are cap- 
tains and leaders. The peasant-proprietors are soldiers 
or brigands. Landlords, whether large or small, possess 
flocks, which supply them with milk, cheese, and wool, 
olive-trees which furnish them with olives and oil, 
and fruit-trees which enable them to vary their diet. 
Every landlord who was rich enough to lay up consi- 
derable supplies in his storehouses expended them in 



ALBANIAN SOCIETY. 45 

maintaining as many armed followers as possible, and Bmomm. 
if his relations were numerous, and his phara or clan 
warlike, he became a chieftain of some political im- 
portance. Every Albanian who can avoid working for 
his livelihood goes constantly armed, so that when- 
ever the central authority was weak bloody feuds were 
prevalent. And at the commencement of the present 
century anarchy appeared to be the normal condi- 
tion of Albanian society ; Gueghs, Tosks, tribes, septs, 
pharas, towns, and villages, were engaged in unceasing 
hostilities ; open wars were waged, and extensive alli- 
ances were formed, in defiance of the power of the 
pashas and of the authority of the sultan. 

Most of the towns were divided into clusters of 
houses called makhalds, generally separated from one 
another by ravines. Each makhala was inhabited by a 
phara, which was a social division resembling a clan, 
but usually smaller. The warlike habits of the Alban- 
ians were displayed even in their town life. Large 
houses stood apart, surrounded by walled enclosures 
flanked by small towers. Within these feeble imita- 
tions of feudal castles there was always a well-stocked 
magazine of provisions. Kichly caparisoned steeds 
occupied the court during the day ; lean, muscular, 
and greedy-eyed soldiers, covered with embroidered 
dresses and ornamented arms, lounged at the gate ; 
and from an open gallery the proprietor watched the 
movements of his neighbours, smoking his long tchi- 
bouk amidst his select friends. The wealthy chieftain 
lived like his warlike followers. His only luxuries were 
more, splendid arms, finer horses, and a longer pipe. 
His pride was in a numerous band of well-armed 
attendants. 

The Christian population of Albania diminished from 
age to age. The anarchy that prevailed during the 
latter half of the eighteenth century drove many to 



CHAP. II. 



46 ALBANIAN SOCIETY. 

BOOK I. apostacy and many into exile. Colonies of Albanian 
Christians had emigrated to the kingdom of Naples in 
the fifteenth century, and these emigrants were re- 
cruited in the sixteenth by numbers who fled from the 
burden of severe taxation, the exaction of unpaid labour, 
and the terrible tribute of Christian children. So many 
Christians sold their property, that the sultans were 
alarmed at the diminution of the capitation tax, and 
the difficulty of finding the necessary recruits for the 
janissaries and the bostangees. This commenced so 
early, that Suleiman the Magnificent enacted that no 
Christian proprietor should be allowed to sell his land, 
if the sale tended to diminish these sources of the 
Othoman power. If a rayah disposed of his land or 
ceased to cultivate it, the spahi or timariot of the 
village was authorised to grant it to another family for 
cultivation. But no laws can arrest the progress of 
depopulation, as the history of the Roman empire 
testifies. Emigration continued, and when emigration 
was impossible, apostacy increased. At the commence- 
ment of the present century even the Greek clergy 
admitted that Mohammedanism was rapidly extending 
in parts of Albania which had previously adhered 
steadfastly to the Christian faith. 

The administrative divisions of Albania have varied 
at different periods of Othoman history, but the posi- 
tions of Skodra, Berat, and Joannina, have rendered 
these cities the residence of pashas, to whom the rulers 
of the districts of Elbassan, Dukadjin, Del vino, and 
Tchamuria, have generally been subordinate. These 
three pashaliks have been held by viziers or pashas of 
the highest rank. Many districts, Mohammedan, Catho- 
lic, and orthodox, enjoyed a recognised local semi- 
independence, protected by the sultan. Any common 
interest united pharas, makhalds, towns, communities, 
and beys in hostile array against a pasha, and even 



ALBANIAN MILITARY INFLUENCE. 47 

against the authority of the sultan. But when no RmoBPErr. 
danger existed of any external attack on their privi- 
leges, local feuds and intestine wars revived as fiercely 
as ever. 

The power and influence of the Albanians steadily in- 
creased in the Othornan empire. In the East, the sword 
alone commands popular respect and political influence. 
During the last century, as the turbulence of the janis- 
saries increased and their military value declined, the 
Albanians rose in consideration and power. In every 
province of European Turkey the Othornan race seemed 
to decline, in courage as well as in wealth and number. 
The Albanians everywhere seized the military power | 
when it escaped from the hands of the Turks. Every 
pasha enrolled a guard of Albanian mercenaries, in 
order to intimidate the ayans and Turkish landlords in 
his pashalik. The tendency of the Othornan govern- 
ment towards centralisation had already commenced, 
though it still remained almost imperceptible amidst 
the existing anarchy. The Albanian mercenaries were 
used as instruments to advance this centralisation ; and 
the power they attained being more apparent than the 
end for which they were employed, even the Turks, who 
have always affected military tastes and habits, became 
imitators of the Albanians. At the commencement of 
this century, the Greeks from day to day feared the 
Turks less and the Albanians more. 

The history of the Greek Revolution would often be 
obscure unless the importance of the Albanian element, 
which pervaded military society in the Othoman em- 
pire, is fully appreciated. A trifling but striking 
mark of the high position which the Albanians had 
gained was exhibited by the general adoption of their 
dress. Though a strong antipathy to the Mussulman 
Albanians had been always felt by the Othoman Turks, 
towards the end of the last century they began to 



48 MUSSULMANS AND CHRISTIANS IN ALBANIA. 

BOOK L pay an involuntary homage to the warlike reputation 

CHAP. II. "^ , T 

' of the Albanian mercenaries. It became then not un- 
common, in Greece and Macedonia, to see the children 
of the proudest Osmanlees dressed in the fustinello, 
or white kilt of the Tosks. Subsequently, when Veli 
Pasha, the second son of Ali of Joannina, governed the 
Morea,^ even young Greeks of rank ventured to assume 
this dress, particularly when travelling, as it afforded 
them an opportunity of wearing arms. The Greek 
armatoli and the Christians employed as police-guards, 
even in the Morea, also wore this dress ; but it was 
the fame of the Albanians — for the military reputation 
of the armatoli was then on the decline and that of 
the Suliots on the ascendant — which induced the 
f modern Greeks to adopt the Albanian kilt as their 
' national costume. It is in consequence of this admir- 
ation of Albanianism that the court of King Otho 
assumes its melo- dramatic aspect, and glitters in 
tawdry tinsel mimicry of the rich and splendid garb 
which arrested the attention of Childe Harold in the 
galleries of the palace of Tepelin ; but the calico fus- 
tinello hangs round the legs of the Greeks like a paper 
petticoat, while the white kilt of the Tosk, formed of a 
strong product of native looms, fell in the graceful folds 
of antique drapery. 

The relations of Mussulman and Christian Albanians 
were much more friendly than the relations of Alban- 
ians and Turks. The Albanian, unlike the Greek, felt 
I the bonds of nationality stronger than those of reli- 
'gion. The hostile feelings with which he regarded 
the Othomans originated in the tyranny of Turkish 
pashas and the avarice of Turkish voevodes, cadis, and 
moolahs. Against the oppression of these aliens the 
natives, whether Mussulmans or Christians, had for 
many generations acted in common. 

1 Veli was pasha of the Morea from 1807 to 1812. 



MUSSULMANS AND CHRISTIANS IN ALBANIA. 49 

On the other hand, where orthodox Albanians and fmuomct . 
Greeks dwelt together, as in a considerable portion of 
southern Epirus, their common lot as Christians ex- 
posed them to the same exactions, and eflfaced the 
distinction of race. The obstinacy of the Albanian 
and the cunning of the Greek were employed for the 
same object, and exhibited themselves more as indi- 
vidual peculiarities than as national characteristics. 

The power of the Albanians in Greece was greatly 
increased by the employment of a large body to sup- 
press the insurrection excited by the Eussians in 1770. 
Large bodies of Albanian mercenaries maintained 
themselves for nine years in a state of merely nominal 
dependence on the pasha of the province, levying con- 
tributions from Turks and Greeks alike, and setting 
the authority of the sultan at defiance. They were 
at last defeated near Tripolitza by Hassan Ghazi, the 
great captom-pasha, and almost exterminated ; but 
fresh bands of Albanians were again poured into the 
Morea by the sultan during the Eussian war in 1787, 
for it was well known that the Greeks regarded these 
rapacious mountaineers with far greater terror than 
Turkish troops. 

It was at this time that Ali Pasha became dervendji, 
and about the same period all the pashas in European 
Turkey greatly augmented the number of Albanian 
mercenaries in their service. This demand for Alban- 1 
ian soldiers, which had gone on increasing for at least' 
two generations, gave a considerable impulse to popu- 
lation ; and so many of these mercenaries returned to 
their native villages enriched by foreign service, that "^ 
a visible improvement took place in the wellbeing of 
the people about the time Ali was appointed to the 
pashalik of Joannina. 

The policy of Ali Pasha was to centralise all power| 
in his own hands. He followed the plans of his prede- 

VOL, I. D 



BOOK h\ 

-CHAP. IL 



50 POLICY OF ALI PASHA. 

cessors, Suleiman and Kurd, in depressing the armatoli; 
and he commenced a series of measures tending to 
weaken the influence of the Othoman Turks holding 
property in those parts of Greece and Macedonia sub- 
jected to his authority. His immediate object was to 
weaken the power of the sultan — its direct result was 
to improve the position of the Greek race ; for much 
of the authority previously exercised by the Othomans 
in civil and fiscal business passed into the hands of 
the Greeks, and not into those of the Mussulman 
Albanians, whose military authority Ali was constantly 
extending. 

The Turks in Greece and Macedonia were a haughty, 
ignorant, and lazy race ; but as spahis, timariots, or 
janissaries, they were affiliated with the most influen- 
tial classes in the Othoman empire, and Ali did not 
venture to attack them openly. Their pride of race, 
as well as their personal interests, rendered them the 
irreconcilable enemies of the independent authority 
which he desired to establish. He therefore carried 
on an incessant war against them ; but he conducted 
this warfare as a series of personal afiairs. He strove 
to conceal his general policy, but he spared no secret 
intrigue to gain his ends, and often resorted to assas- 
sination as the speediest and most effectual means. 
He usually commenced his operations against his ene- 
mies by what Bentham calls vituperative personalities ; 
and by imputing bad designs as a proof of bad cha- 
racter, he generally succeeded in fomenting family 
quarrels, for Turks are childishly credulous. He also 
encouraged the Greeks to complain of acts of injus- 
tice, and then, as the representative of the sultan's 
despotism, he judged the accused. If no other means 
could be found, he accused powerful beys of treasonable 
conduct, pretending that they held secret communi- 
cations with the rebel pashas, then proscribed by the 



CHRISTIAN ALBANIANS. 51 

Porte; or with bands of klephts, who were as much a REraoflPEcr. 
domestic institution in his pashalik as they have since 
been in King Otho's kingdom. In this way he rarely 
failed to obtain a warrant from the sultan sanctioning 
the execution of his enemy. By pursuing this policy 
steadily for more than a quarter of a century, most 
of the Osmanlees in Thessaly were impoverished, and 
several of the principal families ruined. The towns 
everywhere showed signs of decay; the best houses in 
the Turkish quarters were often tenanted by Greek or 
Vallach traders, or occupied by Albanian officers. 

While the wealth and numbers of the Turkish race 
diminished, Ali took care to invest his own Albanian 
followers with the military authority he wrung from 
the hands of the Osmanlees ; but the increasing in- 
fluence of the Albanian race during the early part of 
the present century was not confined to the increase 
in the numbers and power of the Mussulman soldiery, 
nor to the augmentation of the commercial enterprise 
of the maritime population of Hydra and Spetzas. 
Several warlike Christian tribes still retained the privi- 
lege of bearing arms in Albania. In northern Albania 
these tribes were Catholic, but in southern Albania 
they were orthodox; and among the orthodox the 
Suliots were pre-eminent for their warlike qualities,, 
even among the warlike population by which they 
were surrounded. 

. The Suliots were a branch of the Tchamides, one of 
the three great divisions of the Tosks. The constitu- 
tion of their community deserves notice. The Suliots 
inhabited a district consisting of steep ranges of bare 
and precipitous mountains, overlooking the course of 
the Acheron ; that river, uniting with the Cocytus in 
its lower course, forms a marshy lake, and renders the 
country at its mouth so unhealthy that it was con- 
sidered the shortest road to the reahns beyond thei 



CHAP. II. 



62 SULIOTS. 

BOOK I. grave. In the immediate vicinity of Suli the moun- 
tarns afford only a scanty pasture for goats ; but 
when they ascend, broad ridges spread out covered 
with oaks; and when they rise still higher, their loftier 
summits protrude in rocky peaks above forests of 
pine. 

The strength of Suli lay in the diflSculty of approach- 
ing it with a large body of men, and of attacking 
well-trained riflemen in stone buildings without ar- 
tillery. The deep and dark ravine of the Acheron 
renders Suli inaccessible in front. The lair of the 
Suliots lies imbedded in a lateral valley covered by 
two rocky hills, where a confluent joins the black 
waters of the Acheron. The approach is by a gorge 
lower down, called Kleisura, which separates the moun- 
tain fastnesses from the fertile plains. Under the 
Byzantine emperors it appears that the rich and well- 
watered soil of the lower valleys maintained a numerous 
population. The district was once a bishop's see, whose 
cathedral church stood near the entrance of the Klei- 
Bura. At present the former population is represented 
by the Mussulman proprietors of Paramythia and 
Margariti. 

When Sultan Murad IL conquered Joannina, the 
whole country, to the shores of the Ionian Sea, sub- 
mitted to Mussulman domination. The territory 
afterwards occupied by the Suliots was granted as a 
military fief to a timariot, who resided at Joannina. 
Christian liberty and Suliot independence were in 
this district the growth of later years. For centuries 
the Christians paid haratch and the tribute of their 
children. The anarchy that prevailed during the vic- 
torious campaigns of the Venetians under Morosini, 
and the cession of the Morea by the treaty of Car- 
lovitz in 1 6^ 9y compelled many Christians to form 
armed companies for their protection against lawless 



SULIOTS. 53 

bands of brigands. As the orthodox Greeks were at ri!tbow«ot. 
that time generally as little disposed to oppose the 
sultan's government as they were to unite with the 
Catholic Venetians, the pashas of Albania and northern 
Greece favoured the military ardour of the orthodox 
communities. Some of the companies of armed Chris- 
tians, which have been confounded with the ancient 
armatoli, date only from this period, and the com- 
munity of the Suliots cannot be traced to an earlier ^ 
origin. 

In the year 1730, the number of Suliot families 
which enjoyed the privilege of bearing arms was esti- 
mated at one hundred. The precise year when the 
right was officially recognised by the pasha of Joan- 
nina is not known. The armed Suliot were the guards 
of a small Christian district over which they exercised 
the authority of feudal superiors. Their own property 
was small, but they formed a military caste, and de- 
spised all labour as much as the proudest Mussulman. 
The soil in the richest portion of their territory was 
cultivated by peasants, who were of the Greek race. 
The name of Suliots was reserved for the Albanian 
warriors, who ruled and protected the agricultural 
population like the ancient Spartans. The peasants 
were distinguished by the name of the village in which 
they dwelt. 

Anarchy prevailed in the greater part of southern 
Albania during the early part of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, and many Christians of the tribe of the Tchamides 
sought refuge from the Suliot community. Its protec- 
tion prevented the Mussulman communities in the 
neighbourhood from encroaching on the rights of any 
Christians who acknowledged themselves its vassals. 
But about the middle of the century they extended 
this protection so far as to become involved in feuds 
with their Mussulman neighbours. The hostilities 



54 SULIOTS. 

BOOK I. which ensued induced the Suliots to recruit their force 

CHAP. II. _ . . , . /-NT • • 

by admitting every danng and active young Christian 

of the tribe of the Tchamides to serve in their ranks. 
If any of these volunteers distinguished himself by his 
courage, and was fortunate enough to gain booty as 
well as honour, he was admitted a member of the 
Suliot community, and allowed to marry a maiden of 
Suli. In this way the community increased in num-. 
bers and in power. It was favoured by the sultan's 
government, as a check on the lawless independence of 
the Mussulman communities of Paramythia and Mar- 
gariti; and it was supplied with arms and ammunition, 
and encouraged to defend its independence, by the 
Venetian governors of Parga and Previsa. 

Many attacks were made on Suli by the Mussulman 
agas of the vicinity, but they were always repulsed 
w^ith such success that the Sidiots gradually acquired 
the reputation of being the best warriors among the 
warlike Tosks. 

The state of Suli now became an epitome of the 
state of Albania. The community was divided into 
pharas. The chiefs of the pharas formed alliances 
abroad in order to increase their influence at home, 
and the pharas were sometimes involved in civil broils. 
The assistance of the principal pharas was often soli- 
cited and richly remunerated by the neighbouring 
Mussulmans in their private feuds. The Suliot lead- 
ers, like the other Albanian chiefs of pharas, collected 
as many armed followers as possible ; but their reve- 
nues were scanty, and the constitution of the Suliot 
community was democratic, so that the only way to 
reward followers was to make successful forays on the 
lands of those neighbours who refused to purchase im- 
munity from depredation. Like most highlanders who 
dwell on barren mountains overlooking fertile plains, 
they levied contributions with unsparing rapacity when- 



8ULI0TS. 55 

ever they could do so with impunity. Depredation retbobpect. 
they honoured with the name of war, and war they ' ' 
considered to be the only honourable occupation for a 
true Suliot. The poverty of this territory, which the 
Suliots held in property, and their numbers, com- 
pared with the revenues of the district over which 
their protection extended, rendered it impossible for 
them to subsist in idleness without plundering their 
neighbours. 

When Ali Pasha assumed the government of Joan- 
nina, in the year 1788, many complaints were made of 
the lawless conduct of the Suliots. Shortly before his 
nomination, they had pushed their forays into the plain 
of Joannina, and rendered themselves so unpopular 
that Ali deemed they were not likely to find any allies. 
In pursuance of his policy of centralising all power in 
his own hands, he resolved to destroy all the independ- 
ent communities in his pashalik, whether Mussulman 
or Christian. Prudence required him to commence 
with the Christians, and circumstances appeared to 
favour his operations against the Suliots. But when 
he attacked them, all their neighbours were alarmed, 
recent injuries were forgiven, and new alliances were 
formed. Mussulman beys and the Venetian governors 
of Parga and Previsa supplied them secretly with aid, 
and the first attacks of Ali on their territory were re- 
pulsed without much difficulty. 

The intrigues of Kussian agents drew the atten- 
tion of the sultan to the afiairs of Suli in 1792, and 
Selim III. ordered Ali to renew his attacks on a spot 
which was now looked on at the Porte as a nest of 
treason, as well as a nursery of brigandage. Kussia 
having abandoned her orthodox partisans at the peace 
of Yassi, Ali again attacked the Suliots. Their power 
was now so great that Suli formed a little republic. 
Upwards of sixty villages and hamlets, inhabited by 



CHAP. II.. 



56 ALI PASHA ATTACKS SULT. 

BOOK L Christian peasants, paid tribute to the Suliots. That 
tribute, it is true, consisted only of a small portion of 
the produce of the soil. The Suliot territory at this 
time extended over all the mountain district on both 
sides of the Acheron, as far as the western bank of the 
Charadra. But the community of Suliots consisted 
of only 450 families, divided into nineteen pharas, or 
unions of families. The military force did not exceed 
1500 men. Local disputes were violent amoDg the 
chiefs of the pharas, and the inextinguishable jealousies 
of Albanian society had caused the Suliots to divide 
their habitations into four distinct villages or mak- 
halds, called Kako Suli, Baapha, Avariko, and Samon- 
eva. The name of Kako Suli recalls that of Kakoilion, 
in the Odyssey. It was a name of terror in Albania, 
as well as of hate and evil omen. 

The attack of Ali on Suli, in the year 1792, failed 
completely. His Dumbers enabled him to force the 
Kleisura from the south, and to gain temporary pos- 
session of Kako Suli by assault. But the troops of the 
pasha were unable to keep the position they had wod, 
and their loss in the vain attempt was so severe that, 
in retreating from the village, they abandoned all their 
advanced positions in the valley. Many beys were de- 
serted by their followers, others quitted Ali's camp, 
and the desertion became so general that he himself 
returned hastily to Joannina. His hostilities lasted only 
three weeks ; but the activity and daring displayed by 
the Suliots in the incessant skirmishing which they 
carried on, added greatly to their military reputation. 
Unfortunately, their confidence in their own powers 
became from this time so overweening that they pur- 
sued a more selfish policy than before. They began to 
fancy that their alliance was a matter of importance to 
the Emperor of Bussia and the Eepublic of Venice, and 
they exercised their authority over the Christians in 



ALI RENEWS HIS ATTACK ON SULT. 57 

their territory with increased severity, and plundered bctbobpect. 
their Mussulman neighbours With greater rapacity. 

In the mean time, the power of Ali increased steadily. 
He seized the wealth of many rich agas, he murdered 
many powerful beys, and he reduced several indepen- 
dent communities to subjection. In the spring of 1798 
he gained possession of the territory of one of the 
Christian communities from which the Albanian regi- 
ments in the Neapolitan service had drawn their re- 
cruits. Ali surprised Nivitza, on the coast of Chimara, 
with the assistance of the French general who com- 
manded at Corfu, in the most treacherous manner ; and 
when he gained possession of the place, he put all the in- 
habitants to the sword with his usual cruelty. In the 
autumn of the same year he repaid the French for the 
criminal concessions they had made to win his favour, 
by obeying the sultan's orders, and driving them from 
their possessions in the south of Epirus. After defeat- 
ing their forces at Nicopolis, he compelled them to sur- 
render the fortresses of Previsa and Vonitza. 

Ali once more turned his arms against the Suliots, 
whose intrigues with Eussia and France had excited 
the indignation of the sultan and the alarm of the 
Mussulman population of southern Albania. He now 
employed secret treachery as a more eflfectual means 
of victory than open hostility. The rivalries and 
dissensions of the pharas enabled him to gain over 
several chiefs, who entered his service as mercenary 
soldiers. He also contrived to seize and retain seve- 
ral members of the Suliot families who opposed his 
schemes, as hostages, at Joannina. Photo Djavella,, 
the most powerful Suliot, became his partisan; and 
George Botzaris, with all his phara, entered his service,/ 
and was employed to guard the lands of the Mussul-1 
man and Christian cultivators of the soil, lying be-! 
tween the Suliot territory and the plain of Joannina, 



CHAP. II. 



58 ALl's OPERATIONS. 

BOOK I. from the forays of their countrymen. By this defection 
the community lost the services of seventy families, 
and of about a hundred good soldiers. 

Hostilities were commenced in 1799: George Botz- 
aris commenced operations by attacking the advanced 
post of his countrymen at Eedovuni with a body of 
two hundred Christian troops in All's service, but he 
was completely defeated, and died shortly after. As 
usual in similar cases of treachery and sudden death, 
report said that he was poisoned. Keport, however, 
said that most of the deaths in the dominions of Ali 
Pasha at this time were caused by poison, so that if 
these reports deserve credit, the trade in deleterious 
drugs must have formed a flourishing branch of com- 
merce in the pashalik of Joannina. 

* Treason is contagious, and Ali did everything in 
his power to propagate the contagion. He made high 
ofiers to mQst of the Suliot chiefs, but his faithless- 
ness was too notorious for him to gain many par- 
tisans. At last he addressed himself to the whole 
community. He declared that he was resolved to 
repress all depredations; and as it was difficult for 
the Suliots to obtain the means of subsistence in their 
mountains, he invited them to emigrate to fertile lands 
which he ofiered to cede to them. If they refused his 
ofier, he threatened them with implacable hatred, in- 
cessant hostilities, and inevitable extermination. To 
the chiefs of the pharas he made secret ojQfers of money 
and pensions to those who would quit Suli. His offers 
were rejected, for it was evident that his object was 
only to sow dissension among the people, and prevent 
the chiefs from acting cordially together. 

The experience Ali had gained by his defeat in 
1792, prevented his making any attempt to storm' the 
stronghold of the Suliots a second time. During 1799 
and 1800 he confined his operations to circumscribing 



OPERATIONS OF ALT. 59 

the forays of the Suliots, by occupying a number of R«TBOBraCT. 
strong positions, which he fortified with care. In this "' 
way he succeeded in shutting them up within narrow 
limits. The Suliots at this time were unpopular, and 
neither the Christian cultivators of the soil, nor the 
Greeks in general, showed much sympathy with their 
cause. Indeed, many Greek captains of armatoli 
served against them in the army of Ali. 

In the summer of 1801, hunger began to be severely 
felt at Suli, and numbers of women and children were 
removed to Parga, from whence they were conveyed 
to Corfu, which was then occupied by the Russians, 
by whom they Were well received. To prevent further 
communications with Parga, which was now the only 
friendly spot in Epirus, the pasha strengthened his 
posts to the westward ; and to deprive the Suliots of 
all hope of assistance from the orthodox, he induced 
the Greek clergy to declare against them. Ignatius, the 
metropolitan of Arta, wrote a circular to his clergy, 
forbidding the Christians in his diocese aflFording the 
Suliots any assistance, under pain of excommunica- 
tion. Ali himself dictated a letter to the bishop of 
Paramythia, in the name of his superior, the metro- 
politan of Joannina, ordering him to employ all his 
spiritual influence against the Suliots as a predatory 
and rebellious tribe.^ 

The final struggle took place in 1803. The sultan 
supposed, not without some reason, that Ali connived 
at the prolongation of the war ; for it seemed impos- 
sible that the Suliots could have resisted the power of 
the pasha of Joannina for more than four years, if that 
power had been vigorously employed. Information 
having been transmitted to Constantinople that the 
Suliots had procured considerable supplies of ammu- 
nition from French ships, the Porte sent peremptory 

1 CoL Leake has published this letter: Ti^aveU in Northern Greece, i. 513. 



60 SAMUEL THE PRIEST. 

BOOK I. orders to Ali to press the siege of Suli with greater 
''^^' "• activity. Hitherto the Suliots, attended by their wives, 
had often passed through the lines of the besieging 
force during the night, and plundered distant villages. 
The booty and provisions obtained in these expeditions 
were carried back by the women, who were accustomed 
to transport heavy burdens on their shoulders over 
paths impracticable to mules. New posts and addi- 
tional vigilance cut off this resource. 

The hero of Suli was a priest named Samuel, who 
had assumed the strange cognomen of " The Last 
' Judgment.'' It was said that he was an Albanian 
from the northern part of the island of Andros ; but 
he appears to have concealed his origin, for a hero in 
the East must be surrounded with a halo of mystery, 
though Samuel may have wished to erase from his 
memory everything connected with the past, in order 
to devote his soul to the contest with the Mussulmans, 
which he considered to be his chief duty on earth. 
He was an enthusiast in his mission ; and as he was 
doing the work of Christ, he cared little for the ex- 
communication of servile Greek bishops. The Suliots, 
who generally regarded every stranger with suspicion, 
received Samuel, when he first came among them as a 
mysterious guest, with respect and awe. At last, in 
the hour of peril, they elected him, though a priest 
and a stranger, to be their military chief. Eeligious 
fervour was the pervading impulse of his soul. His 
virtue as a man, his valour as a soldier, his prudence 
when the interest of the community was concerned, 
and his utter abnegation of every selfish object, caused 
him to be generally recognised by the soldiers of all 
the pharas as the common chief, without any formal 
election. His personal conduct remained unchanged 
by the rank accorded to him, and, except in the council 
and the field, he was still the simple priest. As he 



TREACHEKY. 61 

never assumed any superiority over the chiefs of the nmomcr. 
pharas, his influence excited no jealousy. 

On the 3d of September 1803, the troops of All 
gained possession of the village of Kakosuli, in conse- 
quence of the treachery of Pylio Gousi, who admitted 
two hundred Mussulman Albanians into his house and 
barn during the night, Gousi sold his country for 
the paltry sum of twelve purses, then equal to about 
£300 sterling, which was paid to him by Veli Pasha, 
Ali^s second son, who conducted the siege. The traitor 
pretended that his object was to obtain the release of 
his son-in-law, who was retained by Ali as a prisoner 
at Joannina. He considered afiection to his own 
family an apology for treason to his country, but he 
took care to receive its price in money. About the 
same time, another Suliot, named Koutzonika, also de- 
serted the cause of his countrymen. The defence of 
the Suliot territory was now hopeless. 

One of the two hills which cover the approach to 
the ravine of Suli, called Bira, had been abandoned by 
the pharas of Zervas two months before the treason of 
Gousi. Treachery placed the besiegers in possession 
of Kakosuli and Avariko. The second hill, called 
Kughni, and the village of Baapha, were the only 
strongholds left to the Suliots. 

Samuel had charge of the magazines on Kughni, 
and the position was defended by three hundred fami- 
lies. The men guarded the accessible paths, posted 
behind low parapets of stone called meteris, and the 
women carried water and provisions to these intrench- 
ments under the fire of the besiegers, who treated 
them as combatants. The number of women slain and 
wounded during the defence of Kughni was conse- 
quently proportionably great. The little garrison dug 
holes in the ground under the shelter of rocks, and 
these holes, when roofed with pine-trees, thick layers 



62 CONQUEST OP SULI. 

BOOK L of branches, and well-beaten earth, formed a tolerable 
'—^ protection from the feeble artillery of the pasha's army. 

Ali was extremely anxious to secure the persons of 
several Suliot chiefs. The indulgence of his reyenge 
was one of his greatest pleasures. He therefore ordered 
Veli to treat with Photo Djavella, determined, if he 
could find an opportunity of seizing any of the Suliot 
chiefs, to violate the treaty which his son might have 
concluded. A capitulation was signed on the 12th 
of December 1803, by which the Suliots surrendered 
Kughni and Kiapha to Veli Pasha and Djavella: Drako 
and Zerva, with their pharas, were allowed to retire 
to Parga. Ali in the mean time sent orders to place 
an ambuscade on the road to Parga, and seize the 
Suliot chiefs ; but the agas of Paramythia, and some 
of the armatoli in Veli's army, hearing of the move- 
ment, sent secret warning to the Suliots, who, by a 
rapid march and a sudden change of route at the point 
of danger, baffled the treacherous designs of the pasha. 

Samuel refused to trust to any capitulation with Ali 
or his sons, whom he knew no oath could bind. The 
fall of Suli seemed to terminate his mission. When 
the Suliots had quitted the hill of Kughni, he retired 
into the powder-magazine with a lighted match, de- 
claring that no infidel should ever employ ammunition 
intrusted to his care against Christians, and he perished 
in the explosion. 

The selfish Suliots who had concluded separate 
treaties with Ali Pasha — Botzaris, Koutzonika,^ and 

^ The treachery of Botzaris and Koutzonika is mentioned in a popular song 
on the fall of Suli:— 

Ka\ VcVa Kovr^oWica* 
M^ T^y dovKiiaf irov Kdfieraif 
Tovro rh KoXoKoipi" 

Heaven's curse on you, Botzaris ! 

And you too, Koutzonika 1 
Sad was the work you did 

This summer. 



FATE OP THE SULTOTS. 63 

Palaska — obtained nothing but disgrace by abandoning b»tbobp«ct . 
their countrymen. They had taken up their residence 
at Zalongo under a promise of protection, but Ali, as 
soon as he gained possession of Kiapha, sent a body of 
troops to attack them by surprise. About one hun- 
dred and fifty persons were seized and reduced to the 
condition of slaves. Twenty -five men were killed 
defending themselves, and six men and twenty two 
women threw themselves over a precipice behind the 
village, to avoid falling into the hands of their inhuman 
persecutor. Albanian soldiers, on returning to Joan- 
nina, declared that they saw several young women 
throw their children from the rock, and then spring 
down themselves. The bodies of four children were 
found below, Botzaris succeeded in collecting toge- 
ther about two hundred persons, and the resistance he 
and his companions offered to their assailants enabled 
this body to escape. The soldiers of Ali were not so 
bloody-minded as the pasha. After some skirmishing, 
Botzaris was allowed to retire with the women and 
children to Parga. But the cruelty of Ali was insa- 
tiable. He ordered Suliot families, who were living 
dispersed in different places, to be murdered; and he 
sent seventy families, who had surrendered at the com- 
mencement of hostilities, and whom he had treated 
with kindness until Suli capitulated, to inhabit the 
most unhealthy spots in his pashalik. 

The Suliots who escaped to Parga passed over into 
the Ionian Islands, where they were hospitably received 
by the Kussians. Many entered the Russian service ; 
but when the treaty of Tilsit transferred the posses- 
sion of the Ionian Islands to France, most of the 
Suliots passed from the Russian into the French ser- 
vice. Only a few who, like Palaskas, were unpopular 
for their conduct during the fall of Suli, quitted Corfu 
with the Russians. 



64i 



FATE OF THE SULIOTS. 



BOOK I. 

. CHAP. II. 



Ali Pasha constructed a strong fort at Kiapha, and 
converted the church of St Donates, the patron saint 
of Suli, into a mosque. A few Mussulman Albanians, 
from the pasha^s native town of Tepelin, were esta- 
blished as guards of the district instead of the Suliots. 
The Christian peasants returned to cultivate the soil, 
and for several years they found the agents of the 
pasha less exacting and rapacious masters than the 
proud and needy Suliots. 

The only Christian communities in southern Albania 
which now preserved the right of bearing arms, were 
the inhabitants of some mountain villages amidst the 
barren rocks of Chimara. 

Such was the position of the orthodox Christians of 
the Albanian race, in the pashalik of Joannina, when 
Ali Pasha was declared a rebel by Sultan Mahmud. 



CHAPTEE III. 

SULTAN MAHMU» AND ALI PASHA OP JOANNINA. 



" Tyranny must be. 
Though to the tyrant thereby no excuse." 

— Paradise Regained, xii. 95. 



Character of Sultan Mahhud— State of the Othoman Empire — Au 
Pasha of Joannina— Ali's cruelty — Anecdote of Euphrosynb — ^Anec- 
dotes OP the Bishop op Qrevbna, and of Ignatius, metropolitan of 
Arta — ^Destruction of Khormovo and of Qardhiki— Sultan Mahmud 
alarmed at Ali's power — Ali's attempt to assassinate Ismael Pasha 
Bey — Ali declared a rebel — Plans and forces of Alt — Sudan's means 

OF ATTACK — AlI CONVOKES A DIVAN — BOTH BELLIGERENTS APPEAL TO THE 

Greeks — Operations against Ali — He is deserted by his sons — Recall 

OP THE SuLIOTS to ALBANIA — ThEY JOIN AlI — KHURSHID NAMED SeRASKIER 

— Condition of the Suuots on their return — Their military system 
— Operations in 1821 — Conduct of Khurshid before Joannina— Com- 
pared with that of Philip V. of Macedon — Suuots join the cause of 
the Greeks — ^Mission of Tahir Abbas to the Greeks — Death of All 

In the year 1820, the Othoman empire seemed to be 
on the eve of dissolution. Ali Pasha was in open rebel- 
lion at the head of a warlike nation, and with reason- 
able hope of establishing an independent throne in 
Albania. An insurrection of the Greeks was also 
awaited with some anxiety by almost every Christian 
in the Levant, excepting the English consuls. 

Sultan Mahmud II. then ruled Turkey. He ascended 
the throne in the year 1808, in his twenty-fifth year, 
after a series of revolutions at Constantinople, caused 
by the attempts of his cousin. Sultan Selim III., to re- 
form the public administration, and introduce military 
discipline in the corps of janissaries. Selim, who was 

VOL. I. E 



CHAP. III. 



66 CHARACTER OP SULTAN MAHMUD II. 

BOOK L dethroned in 1807, had neither energy nor talent. His 
successor, Mustapha IV., lost his crown and life, after 
murdering his cousin Selim in order to retain them, by 
a revolution that seated his younger brother Mahmud 
on the throne. 

Mahmud IT. had reigned twelve years ; yet few of 
his subjects were acquainted with his personal cha- 
racter. The fate of his cousin and brother warned him 
of the danger in attempting to reform the abuses which, 
if they remained unreformed, would inevitably cause 
the dissolution of the Othoman empire at no very 
distant day. Mahmud revolved the condition of his 
empire, and the difficulties of his own position, con- 
stantly in his mind, and he persuaded himself that, in 
order to restore vigour to his empire, it was necessary 
to begin by centralising all power in his own hands. 
His own prudence, and the seclusion of the serai, en- 
abled him to conceal his ambitious projects, while the 
iron firmness of his character enabled him to perfect 
the design which for years he was compelled to keep 
in abeyance. 

The personal appearance of Mahmud may be known 
to many from the numerous portraits, which represent 
it with tolerable accuracy. His face was sallow, and 
his beard, naturally dark, was artificially stained of a 
shining black His expression was. that of sombre 
melancholy rather than of stern severity ; it was re- 
pellent, though not ofiensive. There was, however, 
something so artificial in his whole appearance in 
public, that a physiognomist might have been baffled 
by the unvarying mask with which Othoman etiquette 
clothes a sultanas countenance. He was of middle 
stature ; but as, like most Turks, he had short legs, he 
appeared tall when on horseback or when seated. 

Sultan Mahmud was long deemed a cruel and blood- 
thirsty tyrant, and death was for many years the 



CHARACTER OF SULTAN MAHMUD II. 67 

lightest punishment he ever inflicted. It was said that r«iro«fkt. 
he ordered all the females of his brother's harem to be '■ 
thrown into the Bosphorus, and few travellers entered 
the court of the serai without seeing a head or a pile 
of ears and noses exposed in the niches at the gate. 
Dead bodies hanging from shop - fronts, or stretched 
across the pathway of a narrow street, were sights of 
daily occurrence, and proved that the sultan was in- 
different to human suffering and regardless of human 
life. Yet he was really neither cruel nor bloodthirsty. 
The terrible punishments he inflicted were the result 
of habit and policy, not of passion. When his absolute 
power was firmly established, he ceased to inflict the 
cruel punishments which he had employed as a means 
of intimidation. The administration of his latter years 
was comparatively mild. Now, certainly, innate cruelty 
could not, after long indulgence, have assumed the 
mask of humanity ; but policy may render a prince 
either cruel or merciful as he deems it expedient for 
his purpose. The fact is, that Mahmud, though he 
possessed little sympathy with humanity, restrained 
and ultimately subdued the Oriental ferocity which had 
from time immemorial formed a characteristic of the 
government of the Sublime Porte. When we count the 
number of lives sacrificed by public executions in the 
early years of his reign, it must not be forgotten that 
the power of life and death was then vested not only 
in the grand vizier and the provincial pashas, but was 
also intrusted to the governors of petty fortresses, and 
to the captains of single frigates. Sultan Mahmud 
was a thoughtful, stern, and obstinate man, whose 
strongest characteristic was an inflexible will, not vio- 
lent passions. The restraint with which he long sup- 
pressed his feelings, and the patience with which he 
waited for opportunities of carrying his plans into exe- 
cution, misled many acute observers into the belief that 



68 STATE OF THE OTHOMAN EMPIRE. 

BOOK I. he was a weak prince. Ali Pasha of Joannina was one 
— '■ — 1 of those who mistook the character of his master. 

.Few European statesmen in 1820 believed that it 
was possible to arrest the decline of the Othoman 
empire ; many expected its immediate dissolution. 
Yet some competent authorities asserted that the reor- 
ganisation of the sultan's administration was not an 
impracticable enterprise in the hands of an able and 
energetic sultan, and that its success would restore 
strength to the Othoman empire.^ Both foreign rela- 
tions and internal aflfairs, however, presented great 
difficulties to a reformer. Turkey was not compre- 
hended in the general system of territorial guarantees 
established by the treaty of Vienna. This circumstance 
favoured the Russians in their schemes of aggrandise- 
ment, and the Greeks in their projects of revolution. 

The Mussulman population of European Turkey was 
visibly declining both in wealth and number. This 
decline commenced when the Othomans ceased to re- 
cruit their ranks with tribute-children, slaves captured 
in war, and apostates. By some inexplicable social 
law, a dominant race almost invariably consumes life 
and riches more rapidly than it supplies them. In the 
wide extended empire of the sultan, the whole military 
service was performed by the Mussulmans, and in all 
foreign wars and domestic hostilities the loss always 
fell heaviest on the Turkish race. The prejudices of a 
warlike people prevented the Othomans from engaging 
in those occupations in which wealth is most securely 
accumulated ; and if they were not entirely an aristo- 
cratic class, they were invariably a privileged caste of 
the populatioii. 

The long duration of the Othoman empire in Europe 
is a historical marvel. No other government ever 

^ See some obsenrationB on this subject in the Ditcoura Priliminaire of the 
Tableau Q€n4ral de V Empire Othoman^ par M. D'Ohfison, p. iz. 



STATE OF THE OTHOMAN EMPIRE. 69 

combined so much political wisdom with so great aREmoeran. 
mass of social corruption. Taxation was always op- 
pressive to the agricultural population, justice was 
corrupt, so that in these two departments the Mussul- 
mans suffered as much from the vices of the adminis- 
tration as the Christians. Yet, with all its defects, the 
sultan's government retained hostile races and rival 
religions in daily intercourse without dangerous colli- 
sions, and ruled subject nations for generations with- 
out goading them to rebellion. Its peculiar feature 
was, that it always remained disconnected from every 
nation and race in its dominions. The sway of the 
sultan was not politically more closely identified with 
the supremacy of the Turkish than of the Arabic race. 
The theory of the government, even as late as the 
year 1820, was, that Sultan Mahmud was the despotic 
master of the empire, and that viziers and pashas exer- 
cised their authority in his name as his household 
slaves. 

The empire seemed to be perishing from tyranny 
and weakness. Its tyranny had produced universal 
discontent, and among the Christians an eager desire 
to throw off its yoke. Its weakness invited ambitious 
pashas and lawless tribes to live in open rebellion. In 
some provinces the sultan's authority was lost. Al- 
giers, Tunis, and Tripoli, were virtually independent. 
Egypt had been so under the Mamelukes ; and under 
Mohammed Ali its allegiance was still doubtful. Syria, 
Servia, Bosnia, and a part of Bulgaria, had been re- 
cently in a state of revolt. The Curds of Armenia 
and the Arabs of Mesopotamia paid the sultan only a 
nominal allegiance. Ali Pasha of Joannina had long 
acted as an independent vassal, and had been treated 
as a sovereign both by France and England. Many 
Der^beys, whose castles commanded only a single 
valley, claimed a kind of feudal independence, on the 



CHAP. III. 



70 ALI PASHA. 

BOOK I. ground that they held their lands from the time of the 

fiITAP_ TIT. ^, ■• ••, 

Seljuk empire, in Asia Minor, on the tenure of military 
service alone. The janissaries and the ulema, in Con- 
stantinople, were not more loyal than the feudal chief- 
tains in the distant provinces. Anarchy and rebellion 
prognosticated the fall of the empire as inevitable to 
statesmen. Omens and prophecies were cited as evi- 
dence that the fall was near by the people. The Greeks 
revived the prophecies which their ancestors had re- 
peated when the Belgian Baldwin became master of 
Constantinople, and was proclaimed Emperor of the 
East. Alexander I. of Russia was the/laviLS Rex, and 
the Turks represented the corrupted Greeks of the 
Byzantine empire. 

The voice of nations attributed to Ali Pasha of Jo- 
annina the energy and talent which Sultan Mahmud 
was supposed to want. His policy had increased the 
power of the Albanian race, and to the careless ob- 
server it appeared to rest on the firm adherence of a 
warlike nation. The Greeks were thriving in his do- 
minions, and appeared satisfied with his government. 
Political speculators proclaimed that his independence 
would soon be established by a successful rebellion. 

Ali was a type of the Albanian character. With all 
his energy and activity he was a mere savage. He 
was borne forward to power by circumstances whose 
current he followed, but which he was unable to con- 
trol or guide. As a ruler he exhibited the qualities of 
an astute Albanian chieftain corrupted by exercising 
the despotic authority of a Turkish pasha. 

The ancestors of Ali were Christians, who embraced 
Mohammedanism in the fifteenth century ; though to 
Osmanlees and strangers he sometimes pretended that 
he was descended from a Turk of Brusa who had re- 
ceived a zeSrmet from Sultan Bayazid I. To his native 
clansmen he made no such boast. His family dwelt 



ALI PASHA. 71 

at Tebelin, a small town composed of a cluster of forti- ^momcr, 
fied houses inhabited by wealthy Mussulman landed 
proprietors; The agas of Tebelin enjoyed a degree of 
local independence which was maintained by some- 
thing like a regular municipal organisation. But the 
intense selfishness of the Albanian race broke out in 
frequent quarrels, and kept the place always on the 
verge of anarchy. 

The great-grandfather of Ali, Mutza Yussuf,* raised 
himself to considerable power by his personal valour. 
From him the phara of which he was the chieftain 
assumed the name of Mutzochusats. In Albania, it is 
worthy of remark that, as in Greece in the time of 
Homer, no genealogy is carried by name beyond the 
great-grandfather of the most distinguished man. 
Mukhtar Bey, the son and successor of Mutza, was 
slain at the siege of Corfu, fighting against Schulem- 
burg. Veli, the third son of Mukhtar, was accused of 
poisoning his two elder brothers to secure the chief- 
tainship. Perhaps he poisoned himself, for, like his 
brothers, he died young. 

Ali, the infant son of Veli, was left to the care of his 
mother, whose relationship to Kurd Pasha of Berat, a 
powerful Albanian chieftain, secured protection to the 
infant. The young Ali grew up in lawless habits. 
Sheep-stealing involved him in local feuds, and, falling 
into the hands of an injured neighbour, he was only 
saved from death by the interference of Kurd Pasha. 
He then entered the sultan's service, and was employed 
by Kurd as a guard of the dervens. He was brave 
and active, restless in mind and body, and utterly 
destitute of all moral and religious feeling : but his 
good -humour made him popular among his com- 
panions, and he displayed afiection to the members of 
his family and gratitude to his friends. As he grew 

^ That ifl, Mosea Joseph. 



72 ALI PASHA. 

BOOK I. older and rose in power, he became, like most Albanians, 
^'°^' "'' habitually false ; and, regarding cunning as a proof of 
capacity, his conversation with strangers was usually 
intended to mislead the listeners. During his long 
and brilliant career his personal interests or passions 
were the sole guides of his conduct. Within the 
circle of Albanian life his experience was complete, 
for he rose gradually from the position of a petty 
chieftain to the rank of a powerful prince ; yet his 
moral and political vision seems never to have been 
enlarged, for at his greatest elevation selfishness ob- 
scured his intellect, and avarice neutralised his politi- 
cal sagacity. His ambition in some cases was the 
result of his physical activity. 

Ali, like every Albanian or Greek who has risen to 
great power by his own exertions, ascribed his success 
solely to his own ability, and his self-conceit persuaded 
him that his own talents were an infallible resource in 
every emergency. He thought that he could deceive 
all men, and that nobody could deceive him ; and as 
usually happens with men of this frame of mind, he 
overlooked those impediments which did not lie directly 
in his path. As an Albanian, a pasha, and a Moham- 
medan, he was often swayed by different interests : 
hence his conduct was full of contradictions. At 
times he acted with excessive audacity ; at times with 
extreme timidity. By turns he was mild and cruel, 
tolerant and tyrannical ; but his avarice never slept, 
and to gratify it there was no crime which he was not 
constantly ready to perpetrate. 

The boasted ability of Ali was displayed in subduing 
the Albanians, cheating the Othoman government, and 
ruling the Greeks. His skiU as the head of the police 
in his dominions gave strangers a favourable opinion 
of his talents as a sovereign. He found knowledge 
v/tiseful in his servants, he therefore favoured education. 



ALI'S CRUELTY. 73 

His household at Joannina had all the pomp and cir- nmomcr. 
cumstance of an Eastern court ; but it had no feature 
more remarkable than a number of young pages en- 
gaged in study. The children of Albanian Mussul- 
mans might be seen in one antechamber reading the 
Koran with a learned Osmanlee, while in another room 
an equal number of young Christians might be seen 
studying Hellenic grammar with a Greek priest. 

Under All's government Joannina became the liter- 
ary capital of the Greek nation, for he protected lay- 
men who rebelled against the patriarch and synod of 
Constantinople, as well as priests who intrigued against 
the sultan. Colleges, libraries, and schools flourished 
and enjoyed independent endowments. He ostenta- 
tiously recommended all teachers to pay great atten- 
tion to the morals of their pupils, and in his conversa- 
tion with Greek bishops he dwelt with a cynic simpli- 
city on the importance of religious principles, showing 
that he valued them as a kind of insurance against 
dishonesty, and a means of diminishing financial pecu- 
lation. Greek, being the literary language of southern} 
Albania, was studied by Mussulmans as well as Chris-/ 
tians. Poems and songs, as well as letters and accounts, 
were written by Mohammedans in Greek, and many 
were circulated in manuscript. Unfortunately no col- 
lection of Mohammedan songs and poems has been 
published.^ 

The cruelty of Ali excited horror in civilised Europe, 
but it extorted admiration from his barbarous subjects. 

^ Colonel Leake has published an abstract of a curious Greek poem by a 
Mussulman Albanian^ which is one of the most authentic sources of informa- 
tion for the early career of Ali. There is a copy of this poem in the library of 
the University of Athens, but the text is not so pure as in the copy from which 
Leake took his extracts. The copy at Athens has been transcribed by one 
logiotatos and corrected by another. The cruelty of Ali is thus yaunted : — 

"''Oo'oi Kal &y ^TMf trrik x^P^^ '''^^^ ti^aiyav rh plUui 
Tovs r(dKi<r€ rh y6yaTa Kot irXdrcus Koi vaylHia.*' 

^Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, i. 463-497. 



CHAP. III. 



74 ' ANECDOTE OF EUPHROSYNE. 

BOOK I. The greatest compliment they could pay him was to 
praise his cruelty to his face. Persons still living have 
seen him listen with complacency to flattery embodied 
in an enumeration of his acts of direst cruelty, and 
shuddered at his low demoniacal laugh when his Greek 
secretaries reminded him how he had hung one man, 
impaled another, and tortured a third. Lord Byron 
might well say, that 

" With a bloody hand 
He ruled a nation turbulent and bold." 

One of his most wanton acts of cruelty has been 
much celebrated, and the circumstances which attended 
it deserve to be recorded, as afibrding a characteristic 
trait of Ali and of his government. 

A Greek lady of Joannina excited the jealousy ot 
Ali's daughter-in-law, the wife of his eldest son Mukh- 
tar. Euphrosyne was the niece of Gabriel, the arch- 
bishop of Joannina, but she had neglected the study of 
the lives of the saints, and turned her attention to the 
naughty reading in the Greek classics. She possessed 
great beauty and singularly attractive manners. In 
an evil hour her classic tastes led her to revive the 
elegance and wickedness of the ancient hetairaiy and 
for a time her graceful manners concealed her grace- 
less conduct. Her husband visited Venice, fearing 
Ali's designs on his purse, and disliking the attentions 
of Mukhtar to his wife. During his prolonged absence 
the house of the fair Euphrosyne became the resort 
of the educated and wealthy young men of Joannina, 
and she received private visits and rich presents from 
Mukhtar Pasha without much efibrt to conceal the 
disgraceful connection. This conduct caused much 
scandal, and it was said that married ladies, whose 
husbands were not so far distant as Euphrosyne's, 
imitated her behaviour. A storm of indignation arose 



ANECDOTE OF EUPHEOSYNB. 75 

among Christian husbands and Mussulman wives. The nmMnct. 
complaints of Mukhtar's wife were at last made a 
pretext for punishment, but report said that Ali sought 
revenge because he had been an unsuccessful lover. 
EQs vices were notorious. Childe Harold remarked, — 

" Yon hoary lengthening beard 
HI suits the passions that belong to youth." 

Men said that the hoary beard attempted to conceal 
its evil passions under a veil of public duty. It was 
resolved to eradicate the great social evil of Joannina 
by some effectual measure of reform. Ali decided on 
a general massacre of the culprits, and never was 
cruelty perpetrated with more ruthless deliberation or 
greater barbarity. 

Ali was in the habit of dining with his subjects at 
their own houses when he wished to confer on them an 
extraordinary mark of favour. He signified to Nicho- 
las Yanko, whose wife was one of the proscribed, his 
intention to honour him with a visit. The men dine 
alone in Eastern lands. After dinner the great pasha 
requested that the lady of the house might present his 
coffee, in order to receive his thanks for the entertain- 
ment. When she approached, he addressed her in his 
usual style of conversation with Greek females, mixing 
kindness with playful sarcasm. Bising after his coffee, 
he ordered the attendants in waiting to invite several 
ladies, whose conduct, if not virtuous, had certainly 
not been scandalous, to visit Yanko's wife at her house. 

Ali proceeded to the house of Euphrosyne, attended 
by a few guards, and, walking suddenly into her pre- 
sence, made a motion with his hand, which served as 
a signal for carrying off the victim, who was conveyed 
to Yanko's house much more astonished than alarmed. 
Ali rode on to his palace and engaged in his usual 
employments. The ladies of the party assembled at 



76 ANECDOTE OP EUPHROSYNE. 

BOOK I. Yanko's were soon discomposed by having an equal 
__^^:J^ number of females of the very lowest order in Joannina 
thrust into the room by policemen. In a few minutes 
the whole party was hurried off to the church of St 
Nicholas, Yanko's patron saint, at the northern extre- 
mity of the lake. There the unfortunate culprits were 
informed that they were condemned to death by the 
pasha. The wealthier were at first not much fright- 
ened, for Ali's avarice was so notorious that they 
believed their relations would either voluntarily ran- 
som their lives, or be compelled to do so. The worst 
punishment they feared was imprisonment in the con- 
vents on the islands of the lake. 

Morning had dawned before the party reached the 
church of St Nicholas, and Mohammedan customs 
require that the execution of a sentence of death on 
females by drowning must be carried into effect while 
the sun is below the horizon. For twenty hours, ladies 
of rank and women of the lowest class remained huddled 
together, trembling at times with the fear of death, and 
at others confident with delusive hopes of life. At 
sunset a violent storm swept the surface of the lake, 
and it was midnight before they were embarked in 
small boats and carried to the middle of the lake. 
There they were thrown overboard, without being tied 
up in sacks according to the Mussulman formality in 
executing a similar sentence. Most of the victims 
submitted to their fate with calm resignation, sinking 
without an audible word, or with a short prayer ; but 
some resisted to the utmost with piercing shrieks, and 
one whose hands got loose clung to the side of the 
boat, and could only be plunged under water by horrid 
violence. When all was finished, the police guards 
watched silently in the boats until morning dawned ; 
they then hastened to inform the pasha that his orders 
had been faithfully executed. One of the policemen 



ANECDOTE OF EUPHEOSYNE. 77 

present, who had witnessed many a horrid deed of airaoepECT. 
torture, declared long after that the scene almost de- 
prived him of his senses at the time, and that for years 
the voices of the dying women were constantly echoing 
in his ears, and their faces rising before his eyes at 
midnight. 

Several days elapsed before all the bodies were found 
and buried. In this instance Ali's cruelty excited 
extreme loathing among the Christian population. 
Seventeen females had perished, and public feeling was 
so strong that their funerals were attended by crowds. 
Yet none of their relations had made an effort to save 
them, and the husbands of more than one were accused 
of being privy to the pasha's design. Ali, when he 
saw the violence of public indignation, thought it 
prudent to apologise for his severity by declaring that 
he would have pardoned all those who could have 
found an intercessor, and that he deemed his victims 
deserved death since no one spoke a word in their 
favour. This was mere hypocrisy ; he knew the sel- 
fishness of his subjects. 

The beautiful Euphrosyne was twenty-eight years of 
age. Being the niece of an archbishop, the orthodox 
cherished her memory with affection, as if she had been 
a martyr, instead of viewing her conduct with repro- 
bation and her fate with pity. But public feeling 
expresses itself before public opinion is formed. The 
cruel fate of the elegant Euphrosyne awakened sym- 
pathy, but her sixteen fellow- sufferers died almost 
unpitied, though many of them were less blamable. 
Several songs were composed on the subject of her 
death, which were repeated over all Greece.* 

1 According to the popular story, Mukhtar Pasha gave Euphrosyne an emer- 
ald ring which he had refused to his wife. She saw it on the hand of the lady 
at the bath, and hastened to her father-in-law, who listened to her prayer for 
vengeance. A Qreek song says, — 



CHAP. III. 



78 ANECDOTE OF THE BISHOP OF GREVENA. 

BOOK I. Alfs habitual exhibition of cunning and sagacity 

nnAV ¥TT. ^ , , 

was considered as a display of political wisdom. His 
artifice allured the intellects of the subtile Greeks 
and the fancy of the enthusiastic Albanians. Colonel 
Leake, who was several years the diplomatic agent of 
the British government at his court, recounts an anec- 
dote which proves that he was unable to lay aside his 
habits of deceit even when his good-nature prompted 
him to do an act of kindness. "Not long ago he 
almost frightened to death the Bishop of Grevena, a 
mild and timid man, by a proceeding meant to increase 
the bishop's authority. Being about to visit Grevena, 
he ordered the bishop to prepare the episcopal palace 
for his reception, but instead of proceeding there, went 
to another lodging, pretending to believe that the 
bishop had so ordered it. Having sent for the unfor- 
tunate holy man of Grevena, he assumed an air of 
extreme anger, ordered the bishop to prison, and issued 
a proclamation that all persons having complaints 
against him should make a statement of their griev- 
ances. Nobody having appeared, the vizier sent for 
the bishop next day, and congratulated him on the 
proof that he had no enemies, and that he governed his 
flock with kindness.''^ 

Another anecdote deserves notice because it illus- 
trates the manner in which the Greek bishops in his 
dominions served as instruments of his avarice. Hav- 
ing observed that the bishops possessed more authority 
than his tax-gatherers, he resolved to employ them in 



M^ fidWvs 5aicTw\tJ5i ; 
"Ti rh fjMv6iy€i 6 AA.^-ira<r<ras, 
:g^ piirr€i fi4o* €i$ T^v \lfivri" 

I told you, Euphrosyne, dear, 
The ring, oh ! do not take. 

Ali the news will quickly hear — 
Hell drown you in the lake. 

^ Travels in Northern Greece, i. 407. 



. HISTORY OF ALI PASHA. 79 

collecting his revenues. He began the experiment by bwbobfkct . 
obliging the celebrated Ignatius, metropolitan of Arta, 
who afterwards escaped to Italy, and resided at Pisa, 
to become the tax-gatherer of his diocese. The orders 
given to the bishop were severe, and he used little for- 
bearance in his eagerness to win the pasha's favour. 
This severity caused many quarrels, without bringing 
an increase of revenue. Disturbances occurred, and 
Ali was compelled to listen to the complaints of the 
sufferers. As soon as the bishop had paid all the 
money he had collected into the pasha's treasury, Ali 
decided that a remission of taxation ought to be made, 
to the amount of £2000 sterling. The claimants com- 
pelled the bishop to refund the money, but Ali retained 
the fruits of his extortion. 

It has been already mentioned that Ali was elevated 
to the rank of devendji-pasha in the year 1787. The 
pashalik of Thessaly was united with that office. His 
activity obtained for him the pashalik of Joannina, in 
addition to his other commands, in the following year. 
His instructions required him to destroy the authority 
still possessed by the Christian armatoli, whose sym- 
pathies with Russia disquieted the Porte, and Ali car- 
ried out the views of the Othoman government with 
zeal and vigour. 

At this period, a strong feeling in favour of increas- 
ing the direct authority of the sultan in the provinces 
had arisen both among Mussulmans and Christians. 
It was thought that the central government would re- 
strain the exactions of the local pashas, and repress the 
feudal anarchy of the hereditary beys. Ali took ad- 
vantage of this feeling to curtail privileges of armatoli, 
ayans, and Mussulman and Christian communities alike. 
His firmness of purpose soon consolidated his authority 
both in Epirus and Thessaly ; for at this early period 
of his career, justice and equity were words constantly 



CHAP. III. 



80 DESTRUCTION OP KHORMOVO. 

BOOK I. on his lips, and they appeared to direct his conduct. 
The armatoli had latterly become grievous oppressors 
of the peasantry. The ayans had always been the 
tyrants of the Christian population. The communities 
were powerless, except to increase the general anarchy. 
Ali constituted himself the redresser of wrongs, and he 
succeeded in establishing a degree of order which had 
not previously prevailed. Under the pretext of secur- 
ing equal justice to all, he compelled every district 
which enjoyed the right of maintaining Greek armatoli 
to receive a garrison of Mussulman Albanians ; while 
in those districts where the Turkish landlords were all- 
powerful, he placed detachments of armatoli to protect 
the cultivators of the soil. His energy secured to the 
people a larger share of the fruits of their industry 
than they had previously enjoyed, so that they will- 
ingly submitted to the contributions he compelled them 
to pay for his protection. His exactions were chiefly 
directed against the rich ; and as he seldom allowed 
his agents to plunder with impunity, he was spoken of 
as a hard man, but a just pasha. 

The sultan supported Ali^s plan of centralising all 
power in his own hands, as long as it was evident that 
he was only the sultan's viceroy. The boldest beys 
were drawn into hostilities, and then overwhelmed with 
forces prepared in secret for their destruction. The 
wary were assassinated or poisoned. These murders 
generally removed men as cruel and treacherous as 
Ali, who, as the destroyer of a legion of tyrants, was 
considered a benefactor by a suffering people. 

In the year 1796 he began to exhibit the ferocity of 
his character in its darkest colours. Khormovo was a 
Christian township, situated high up in the mountains, 
between the rivers Aoussa and Dryno, and not far from 
their junction. The inhabitants were dangerous bri- 
gands ; and it was said that for several generations 



DESTRUCTION OF KHORMOVO. 81 

they waylaid travellers under the guidance of their kwbo«™ct. 
priest. A hollow tree, in the pass near the bridge of 
Tebelin, was long shown to travellers as the place of 
concealment of this orthodox priphti,^ from whence he 
uttered his oracular decisions concerning the fate of 
those who were plundered. If the unfortunate prisoner 
was a Turk, he was hung on the tree ; if a Greek in 
the service of the pasha or the sultan, he was drowned 
in the river; but if an Albanian, he was generally 
allowed to escape on payment of a ransom. 

The Christians of Khormovo maintained their law- 
less independence by means of a close alliance with the 
Mussulmans of Gardhiki, a powerful community in the 
mountains to the south of the Dryno. Nearly thirty 
years had elapsed since the mother and sister of Ali 
had been seized in a civil war between the people of 
Khormovo and Gardhiki and the phara of the Mutza- 
chats. The ladies were treated with the grossest in- 
dignity, and they instilled into the breast of Ali their 
own rancorous longing for revenge. An occasion at 
last occurred of punishing the children for their fathers' 
crime. The territory of Khormovo was laid waste, the 
inhabitants shot down, the son of the priest was roasted 
alive, and a Greek poem, by a Mussulman, recounts 
with Oriental ferocity all the details of the tortures in- 
flicted by All's soldiers on their unhappy prisoners.^ 

The cruelty with which a Christian community was 
treated made very little impression, and was soon for- 
gotten. 

After a further interval of sixteen years, a new 
catastrophe struck all men with amazement and horror. 

^ The Albanian word for priest. 
• " 'Ejui3'3'C€ &irb T^v fiia fitpih, Koi itirh rijy A?<Xri fiy4yti 
noiovardfi rh, Kopynk Koi aK6fn Uly x^P^^^*^' 

Koi x^^^Koi' T* i^K^pL rov <r^ fiayimfi4voi x6koi 
Th (TKoriyh rh x^pM-^^o iyivriKt fiipdyi 

Kal T(aohs Tlp<^7j5 iyiyucf Kffiirdfiiri e<j rh rriydyi.^* 

VOL. 1. . F 



CHAP. III. 



82 DESTRUCTION OP GARDHIKI. 

BOOK I. The Mussulmans of Gardhiki were a powerful body, 
and their alliance with the inhabitants of Arghyro- 
kastro enabled them to escape All's vengeance for 
forty-five years. The cause of his anger was generally 
forgotten and never mentioned. 

Demir Dost, the principal aga of Gardhiki, was a 
brave and honourable man, who had aided Ali in sub- 
duing Khormovo. Ali, having determined to deprive 
the communities of Arghyrokastro and Gardhiki of the 
local privileges which their alliance had hitherto en- 
abled them to maintain, marched against them in per- 
son. The peasantry declared in his favour, and Demir 
Dost and sixty agas of Gardhiki were admitted to con^ 
elude a capitulation which permitted them to retain 
their property and their territorial rights, on the con- 
dition that they should reside at Joannina until the 
new civil and fiscal ojQ&cers of the pasha were estab- 
lished in the district. 

After the departure of the agas, the pasha summoned 
the people of Gardhiki to meet him at the Khan of 
Valiar4 on the right bank of the Dryno, below Arghy- 
rokastro, which is situated on the left bank. The 
pasha's agents declared that he wished to enrol a strong 
body of Gardhikiots in his service, and no better lure 
could be held out to attract the Albanian Mussulmans, 
who scorn to cultivate their lands if they can gain their 
living by military service. Gardhiki, also, like most 
Albanian communities, had been long in the habit of 
sending mercenaries to every pashalik in the Othoman 
empire. The hope of becoming the instruments ot 
All's power rendered the common people careless of 
the loss of a troubled independence, from which only 
the chieftains of the pharas derived any profit. 

On the 27th of March 1812, about 670 Gardhikiots 
sat down to eat their mid-day meal in the Khan of 
Valiar^ and in the large quadrangular court adjoining. 



DESTRUCTION OP GARDHIKT. 83 

Athanasios Vaias, a Christian high in Ali's favour, wasRnwwFwr. 
ready with a band of soldiers, who mounted on the 
walls of the enclosure, occupied the towers at its angles, 
and closed the gates. They opened a sudden fire of mus- 
ketry on their unsuspecting victims, and it is said that 
two hundred fell at the first volley. The soldiers then 
raised diabolical shouts, in order to overpower the 
shrieks of the wounded and the dying, and kept up a 
continual fire, without intermission, for an hour and a 
half, until not a limb moved in the quadrangle, and 
the Khan was enveloped in flames. The survivors, 
after the first volley, had vainly attempted to climb the 
wall and force the gates. The murderer had prepared 
the means of baffling every effort of despair. 

Ali had not ventured to intrust many of his officers 
with the secret of the premeditated massacre, and the 
firing created some confusion among his troops ; but 
he diverted the attention of the Mussulmans, who 
might have been inclined to favour the escape of the 
Gardhikiots, by a proclamation that the plunder of 
Gardhiki was granted to the soldiers. "When plunder 
is to be gained, neither Albanians nor armatoli feel any 
sentiments of patriotism or humanity. All the troops 
whom Ali distrusted and wished to withdraw from the 
scene of the massacre were soon on their march up the 
mountain. The town of Gardhiki was sacked; the 
houses were plundered in regular succession, in order 
to insure to all a fair share of the booty ; the women 
and children were carried off and reduced to slavery, in 
direct violation of the Mohammedan law ; and all the 
fortified houses of the agas were burned to the ground. 
Demir Dost and the sixty agas who had retired to Joan- 
nina were murdered at the same time by Ali's order. 

As soon as he had perpetrated this act of treachery 
and blood, Ali returned to Joannina, from whence he 
issued orders for the murder of every Gardhikiot who had 



CHAP. III. 



84! DESTRUCTION OF GARDHIKI. 

BOOK I. escaped the massacre at the Khan and the sack of the 
town. But this cruelty exceeded the limits of human 
wickedness, and his orders were disobeyed even by his 
own sons, who concealed many of his intended victims. 
The deliberate extermination of a Mussulman com- 
munity of eight hundred families was an act of atrocity 
that roused the indignation of every Mohammedan ; and 
from that day Ali was accursed in the opinion of all 
true believers. The deserted habitations, blackened 
with fire, the desecrated mosques with their ruined 
minarets, the Mohammedan women and children weep- 
ing in slavery, cried loudly for vengeance. Yet Ali, in 
his intense selfishness, thought so much of the wrongs 
of his mother and his sister, and so little of the sufier- 
ings of thousands of innocent individuals, that he 
boasted of his wickedness, and commemorated his in- 
famy in an inscription over the gateway of the Khan 
of Valiar^. The entrance was walled up. The bones 
were left unburied in the court, and a marble tablet 
informed the passer-by, in both Turkish and Greek, 
that Ali was proud of the vengeance which he had in- 
flicted on the enemies of his house. A curious poem 
in Greek, consisting of sixty-four verses, was circiQated 
in manuscript, which was said to be an exact copy of 
the inscription, and to have been read over repeatedly to 
the pasha. It is a strange production, in the form of 
a conversation between the Khan and the dead bodies. 
The building asks for information concerning the cause 
of their death. The dead bodies reply, that fifty years 
ago they had burned Mi's house and destroyed his clan, 
and they add, " For this he slew us here, he razed our 
town, and ordered it to remain for ever desolate, for he 
is a just man.'' In conclusion, Ali speaks a few warning 
words in his own person : " I do not wish to do another 
similar act of severity, so let no man molest my house.*'^ 

1 Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, i. 498. 



HOSTILITY OP SULTAN MAHMUD. 85 

All's power at last alarmed Sultan Mahmud, who rctbospect. 
was labouring night and day to circumscribe the 
authority of his pashas and great vassals. He had 
hitherto made but slow progress in establishing his 
system of centralising, but he had prepared the Porte 
for pursuing his policy with success. He availed him- 
self of the universal indignation manifested at the 
murder of the Gardhikiots to diminish the power of 
Ali. The first step was to deprive Veli, Ali's second 
son, of the pashalik of the Morea, in August 1812, 
and send him to rule the insignificant pashalik of 
Larissa. Public opinion, which had favoured Ali in 
his plans of centralisation at the expense of beys 
and communes^ now favoured the projects of Sultan 
Mahmud at the expense of Ali. The Porte could alone 
afford protection against local tyranny : the sultan 
seemed to be the only authority in the Othoman empire 
who had a direct interest in enforcing an equitable 
administration of justice ; every other authority seemed 
to derive a profit from injustice. Ali remained insen- 
sible to the change which had taken place in public 
opinion since he first attained the rank of pasha. This 
is not wonderful, for the ambassadors of the European 
powers at Constantinople, and their consuls in the 
provinces, were as blind to the increasing power of 
centralisation as the Albanian pasha. The prudence 
of Sultan Mahmud was generally mistaken for weak- 
ness, and at the court of Joannina it was the fashion 
to speak of the anarchy and corruption that prevailed 
in the empire with great freedom, and of the dismem- 
berment of Turkey as a probable event. The adroit 
flattery of Greek sycophants, the impolitic intrigues 
of European diplomatic agents, and the general im- 
provement in the condition of the people under his 
government, induced Ali to believe that the hour had 
arrived when he might act as independent sovereign of 



CHAP. III. 



86 ISMAEL PASHO BEY. 

BOOK I. Epirus with perfect security. Yet he had reached the 

cm 4 ¥* TTT_ JL X •r 

edge of a precipice, and the vicissitudes of a long and 
eventful life, rich in social and political changes, had 
exhibited its lessons of experience in vain. He fell pur- 
suing the course of selfish criminal gratification, which 
he had often combined with the measures which raised 
him to power. 

In the year 1819 Sultan Mahmud took advantage of 
the numerous complaints against the lavish expendi- 
ture and illegal extortions of Veli, to remove him from 
the government of Larissa to the still more insignifi- 
cant pashalik of Lepanto. Ali saw clearly that the 
object was to circumscribe his power ; but he attri- 
buted the measure to the influence of Ismael Pasho 
bey, his active personal enemy, and not to the deep 
policy of Sultan Mahmud. All his malicious pas- 
sions were roused, and he resolved to strike a blow 
that would destroy his enemy and intimidate his 
sovereign. 

Ismael Pasho bey was an Albanian of family and 
wealth, allied to All's house by blood. He had served 
the pasha of Joannina in youth with much devotion ; 
but some cause of mutual distrust arose, and Ismael 
contrived to have his services transferred to Veli, when 
All's unworthy son was named pasha of the Morea 
in 1807. The hatred of Ali increased; but Ismael, 
warned in time, fled to save his life. For some years 
he escaped notice, but, finding that All's agents had 
discovered his place of residence, he removed to Con- 
stantinople, where he believed no assassin would ven- 
ture to attack him openly. By attaching himself to 
the Ulema, frequenting the mosques with assiduity, 
and transacting the business of every Albanian who 
had any affair before the divan, he acquired some in- 
fluence, and was named capidjee-pasha. 

In the month of February 1820 three Albanians 



ALI DEOLABED A REBEL. 87 

made an attempt to assassinate Ismael Fasho bey at RRBosracr. 
noon in the streets of Constantinople. They were ar- 
rested; and, finding that their victim was oidy slightly 
wounded, they expected to save their lives by confes- 
sion. They declared that they had been sent by Ali, 
pasha of Joannina, who had assured them that, in case of 
success, several members of the divan were prepared to 
protect them from punishment. This insinuation, that 
Ali possessed an overwhelming influence in the divan, 
offended Sultan Mahmud deeply. The assassins were 
immediately executed, and Ali was pronounced guilty 
of high treason. The traitor was summoned to present 
himself as a suppliant before the Sublime Porte within 
forty days. The pashalik of Joannina was conferred 
on Ismael Pasho. The period granted for repentance 
elapsed, and the new pasha was ordered to march against 
the rebel. 

While Ali was pursuing his course of wickedness, he 
was acting as an instrument in the hands of Provi- 
dence to advance the social progress of the Greeks. 
Indeed, the career of this celebrated man, with all his 
power and wickedness, would hardly have merited a 
place in history had circumstances not rendered him 
the herald of the Greek Revolution. The scenes of his 
eventful life produced very little direct change either in 
the political condition of the Othoman empire or of the 
Albanian nation. 

When Ali received the news of his condemnation he 
was fully prepared to resist the sultan's authority, and 
his military arrangements for the defence of his pasha- 
lik were well planned. He had long revolved projects 
of rebellion in his mind, and the time appeared favour- 
able for asserting his independence. The power of 
national feelings in upholding thrones and overthrow- 
ing dynasties was the theme of general discussion. A 
national revolution had just broken out in Spain, which 



88 ALfs PLANS. 

BOOK I. was expected to produce great political changes in 

CHAP. HI. ^ i O i O 

Europe. Ali was told by his political advisers that 

an appeal to the nationality of the Albanians and 
Greeks would induce them to unite in emancipating 
themselves from the Othoman domination, and expose 
their lives and fortunes for his cause. He was liberal, 
therefore, of promises. He talked of constitutions and 
representative assemblies with as much fluency and as 
little sincerity as the kings of Spain, Naples, and Sar- 
dinia. He promised rewards to his troops, who be- 
lieved in nothing but payments in coined money, and 
he invited the Greeks to co-operate with him in resist- 
ing the sultan, little foreseeing the consequences of his 
encouragement. 

The soldiers of Ali were habituated to mountain 
warfare, and were intimately acquainted with every 
ravine and pass in the range of Mount Pindus. Every 
path that afforded ingress into Southern Albania from 
Macedonia and Thessaly was fortified sufficiently to 
resist Othoman infantry. A camp was formed to 
support every point which could be assailed, and easy 
communications were insured with the central maga- 
zines at Joannina by means of the lake. In every- 
thing the army of Ali appeared far superior to any 
force the sultan could bring against him. 

The dispositions adopted for the defence of Southern 
Albania were the result of a long-meditated plan of 
resistance. From the north, All's dominions were ex- 
posed to an attack by Mustai, pasha of Skodra, at the 
head of the Mussulman Gueghs and Catholic Mirdits, 
who were as good soldiers in mountain warfare as the 
Tosks and the armatoli. But Mustai was, like Ali, an 
Albanian, and his career had been so similar, that he 
was not likely to view the ruin of his fellow-pasha with 
favour, particularly as they had never been involved 
in any personal contests of importance. Ali had also 



ALl's ARMY. 89 

secured several friends among the chieftains in the retrobpect. 
north, and he apprehended little danger from that 
quarter. The task of opposing the Skodra pasha was 
intrusted to Ali's eldest son, Mukhtar, pasha of Berat ; 
but the right of Mukhtar's line of defence was exposed 
to be turned by a Turkish army assembled at Monastir, 
imder the command of the Romely-Valessi, which 
could penetrate into Albania by the pass of Devol, and 
thus unite with the Gueghs. Mustai was the first of 
Ali's assailants who took the field. He advanced as 
far as Durazzo without meeting any opposition ; but, 
after he had occupied Elbassan, he was recalled to the 
north by some movements among his unquiet neigh- 
bours, the Montenegrins, or he made their movements 
a pretext for retreating, in order to paralyse the ad- 
vance of the Romely-Valessi, whom he had no desire 
to see established in the valley of the river of Berat. 

The direct line of approach for an army advancing 
to attack Joannina from the east is by the pass of 
Metzovo. Two great roads — one from Macedonia by 
the valley of the Indjee-kara-sou, and the other from 
Thessaly by the valley of the Salamvria — converge at 
this pass, and two powerful armies may be simul- 
taneously prepared to force the passage, and main- 
tained in its immediate vicinity by supplies from the 
fertile districts of Anaselitza, Grevena, and Trikkala. 

To protect this pass, an army of 15,000 men was 
encamped on the eastern slopes of Paleovani, between 
the sources of the Viosa and the river of Arta. It 
was commanded by Omer Vrioni, an Albanian chief- 
tain, who had acquired considerable reputation as a 
soldier, and great wealth by his military service in 
Egypt, during the troubled times which preceded the 
consolidation of Mohammed Ali's authority.^ The 

^ The Greeks erroneously assert that Omer Vrioni derived his name from 
the Byzantine &mily of Briennios, but it is notorious that he received it from 
the village of Vrionti, near Berat, of which he was a native. 



CHAP. III. 



90 SULTAN S MEANS OF ATTACK. 

BOOK I. Albanian camp was established near the position 

CHAP. Til. ■•■ ■■■ 

occupied by Philip V. of Macedon after his defeat by 
Flamininus at the Fauces Antigonenses, or Kleisura of 
the Viosa, and where he lingered a few days, doubting 
whether he ought to march into Thessaly or fall back 
on Macedonia.^ 

To the south of the pass of Metzovo there is another 
pass leading from Thessaly into the valley of the Aspro- 
potamos, called Portals, or the gates of Trikkala ; and 
there are several mountain paths farther south, by 
which light troops may march from the upper valley of 
the Sperchius and the head waters of the Megdova, by 
the valley of the Aspropotamos, into the valley of the 
river of Arta, and thus gain an entrance into the plain 
of Joannina. But the country through which these 
roads pass is intersected by successive ranges of high 
mountains and deep valleys, besides being occupied by 
Christian armatoli and by the indigenous robbers of 
Mount Kotziaka. 

Ali committed the defence of the passes to the south 
of Metzovo to many local chieftains, Albanians and 
Greeks, Mussulmans and Christians. 

The greatest danger to which he was exposed lay in 
the facility of landing troops on the southern coast of 
Epirus. Previsa was the key of his maritime defences, 
and he intrusted its command to Veli, his second son, 
who fled from Lepanto on the first approach of a 
Turkish force. 

When the sultan proclaimed Ali a traitor, and named 
Ismael Pasho his successor, the imperial authority was 
almost nominal in many provinces of the Othoman 
empire, and Mahmud had no army ready to enforce 
his authority. The janissaries at Constantinople were 
as little under his control as the mercenaries of distant 
pashas. But no man then living had studied the con- 

^ Livy, xxxii. c. 13. Leake*B Travels in Northern Greece, I 399. 



sultan's means of attack. 91 

dition of the Othoman empire, or knew so well the RwEoeiwr. 
strength and weakness of his own authority, as Sultan 
Mahmud. He alone understood how far he could 
make use of the instrumentality of rival pashas to 
destroy the rebel without allowing them to increase 
their own power. His systematic measures for strength- 
ening the authority of the central administration, for 
reforming the Othoman government, and arresting the 
decline of the empire on the brink of destruction, 
were then as little suspected as the firm and daring 
character of the man who planned them. 

The sultan intrusted the chief command of the army 
destined to attack Ali from the east to Ismael, the 
new pasha of Joannina. No person appeared likely to 
rally the discontented Albanians to his standard with 
so much certainty, and no one could be selected with 
whom it was more diflScult for Ali to treat. Several 
pashas were ordered to assemble all their timariots 
and holders of military fiefs, and take the field with 
Ismael. The Othoman army was slowly collected, and 
it formed a motley assembly, without order and with- 
out artillery. Each pasha moved forward as he mus- 
tered his followers, with a separate commissariat and a 
separate military chest. The daily rations and daily 
pay of the soldier differed in different divisions of the 
army. Ismael was really only the nominal commander- 
in-chief. He was not a soldier, and had he been an 
experienced officer, he could have done little to enforce 
order in the forces he commanded. 

Ali knew that his government was unpopular, but 
he acted under the usual delusion of princes who con- 
sider that they are necessary to the order of society. 
He considered himself the natural chief of the Tosks, 
and he believed that he could easily become the poli- 
tical head of the Greeks. He had heard so much lately 
of constitutions and political assemblies, that he ex- 



CHAP. III. 



92 ALI CONVOKES A DIVAN. 

BOOK I. pected to create a strong national feeling in his favour 

CHAP. Ill- r ^ ^ o o 

by promising the Greeks a constitution, and convok- 
ing the Albanian chieftains in a national assembly, 
though he had formed no very clear idea of what was 
meant by a constitution, or what a national assembly 
really was. His Greek secretaries, however, assured 
him that it would be easy to raise the Greeks in arms 
against the sultan, and his Mussulman councillors 
declared that every Albanian was ready to support 
him as their sovereign. To make himself a national 
monarch, in opposition to the Oriental despotism of the 
sultan, he convoked a divan to consider the question 
of raising supplies, that being the only means of assem- 
bling Albanian agas and Greek bishops in one assembly, 
without violating Mussulman usages and offending 
Mohammedan pride. 

The divan met, and Ali addressed the assembly in 
Greek. He condescended to explain the motives which 
induced him to resist the sultanas authority. He pre- 
tended that he was persecuted by the viziers of the 
Porte, because he supported the interests of the Alban- 
ians against the Osmanlees, and protected the Chris- 
tians against ruinous exactions. He invited all present 
to urge their countrymen to support him and his offi- 
cers in the approaching hostilities, and assured them 
that their interests would suffer as much as his own 
if the Othoman army penetrated beyond the passes. 

The assembled Mussulmans were either his parti- 
sans or his creatures. They testified their approba- 
tion of his discourse with the humility of Eastern cere- 
mony. Each bey repeated gravely in succession, with 
emphatic solemnity, some trite compliment, or pro- 
nounced, with the air of having made a great dis- 
covery, " Our lord, the vizier, speaks well ; we are the 
slaves of his highness.'' Even Ali felt that the scene 
was ridiculous, for he knew that the same words 



APPEAL TO THE GREEKS. 93 

would be uttered, in the same tone, to his enemy Ismael, BrnioBMCT. 
should he ever succeed in entering Joannina. 

The Greeks remained silent. They felt no inclina- 
tion to support the tyranny of Ali. It is certain that 
at this time the existence of an organised plan for pro- 
claiming the Greeks an independent nation was not 
known to the clergy and primates of Northern Greece 
and Epirus. Though the FhilikS Hetairia had made 
great progress in enrolling proselytes in Constanti- 
nople, the Morea, and the Ionian Islands, it had not 
succeeded in Joannina, and among the armatoli. Greek 
historians tell us that the terror inspired by Ali Pasha's 
government prevented the apostles of the hetairia 
from visiting his dominions.^ But that is certainly not 
the whole truth. Many agents of the hetairia travelled 
through Epirus, but they were deterred from attempt- 
ing to make proselytes, from fear of treachery on the 
part of their countrymen. They found that both the 
bishops and the primates were too closely identified 
with Alfs administration, and derived too great profits 
from acting as his political and financial agents, to feel 
disposed to plot against his authority. The fear of be- 
traying the schemes of the hetairia to false friends was 
stronger than the fear of All's cruelty. The hetairists 
were partisans of Russia, and the £omeliat Greeks did 
not generally connect their patriotic aspirations with 
Russian projects. They, moreover, generally despised 
the class of men who travelled as apostles of the 
hetairia. 

Suleiman Pasha, who had succeeded Veli in the go- 
vernment of Larissa, was invested by the sultan with 
the office of dervendji when Ali was proclaimed a 
rebel. On assuming the official direction of the arma- 
toli, and publishing the firman proscribing Ali, he in- 

^ 'Airofivrifiovevfiara UoXcfitK^k XpurTO<j>6pov ncf^/^ot/Sov, 1. Tricoupi is of the 
same opinion, L 26. 



CHAP. III. 



94 APPEAL TO THE GREEKS. 

BOOK I. vited all the sultan's faithful subjects to take up arms 
against the traitor. A circular was addressed to all 
Mussulmans, to those Christian communities which re- 
tained the privilege. of keeping armed guards, and par- 
ticularly to the captains of armatoli, inviting them to 
expel the adherents of Ali Pasha from their districts. 
The Greek text of this circular assumed the form of a 
proclamation, calling on the Christians to take up arms 
for their own protection. It is said to have diflfered 
materially from the Turkish copy, and the pasha's 
Greek secretary, Anagnostes, was supposed to have 
availed himself of the opportunity, in order to assist 
the designs of the hetairists. Circumstances favoured 
the Greeks. The number of armed Christians in the 
mountains of Thessaly and Epirus was great, and both 
the belligerents felt thfe importance of gaining their 
assistance. 

Several bands of Christian troops remained attached 
to All's cause. Odysseus, whom he particularly fa- 
voured, and who had been a page in his household, was 
intrusted with the chief command at Livadea. Stour- 
nari was stationed in Valtos, Vamakioti in Xerromero, 
Andreas Hyskos in Agrapha, and Zongas was sent to 
harass the communications of the Othoman army. 
But, as early as the month of June 1820, several bodies 
of armatoli had joined the sultan's forces, or had taken 
military possession of their capitanliks, and expelled 
the Albanian Mussulmans who remained faithful to 
Ali. For some time the Othoman authorities encour- 
aged these enterprises. The armed Christians, how- 
ever, knowing that they had nothing to gain by a 
decided victory either of the Turks or the Albanians, 
showed a disposition to remain neutral as soon as they 
had expelled the Mussulmans, and their attitude 
awakened the suspicion of the Porte. 

The sultan was alarmed, and fearing some collusion 



OPERATIONS AGAINST ALL 95 

with the rebel, he degraded Suleiman, and soon after 
put him to death. Mohammed Dramali was named 
his successor, and ordered to occupy all the passes 
leading from Thessaly into Epirus, In the mean time 
the main body of the Othoman army, under Ismael, 
advanced to Kalabak. The left wing, under Pehlevan 
Baba, of Rutshuk, who was named pasha of Lepanto 
in place of Veli, descended into Greece. Pehlevan had 
distinguished himself as a leader of light cavalry on 
the banks of the Danube in the last war with Russia. 
He now marched at the head of the same active and 
disorderly troops through Thermopylae to Livadea, from 
which he drove Odysseus. Veli fled from Lepanto, 
and Pehlevan occupied all Etolia and Acamania with- 
out opposition, penetrated through the pass of Makry- 
noro, which is a western Thermopylae, and fixed his 
headquarters at Arta. All's defences were thus turned, 
and the road into the plain of Joannina was open to 
the Othoman army. 

The summer was far advanced before the grand army 
commenced its operations, but its first movements were 
crowned with great success. Instead of attempting to 
force the pass of Metzovo, which Omer Vrioni was pre- 
pared to defend, Ismael sent a body of Albanians to 
seize the portals or gates of Trikkala. This corps oc- 
cupied the bridge of Koraki, took possession of the pass 
of Pentepegadhia, and opened communications with 
Pehlevan. Other detachments occupied the upper valley 
of the Aspropotamos and the valley of the river of Arta, 
where their arrival was welcomed by the native popula- 
tion, which consists of Zinzar Vallachs.* Omer Vrioni, 
finding that his. position was turned, instead of falling 
back on Joannina and concentrating All's army in 

^ This branch of the Vallachian race makes its appearance m the history of 
the Byzantine empire, imder its present name, in the eleventh century, and in 
the twelfth it was so powerful as to be independent. See History qfthe Byzan- 
tine Empire^ ii 277. 



CHAP. III. 



96 JOANNINA BESIEGED. 

BOOK I. order to give battle to Ismael in the plain, treated with 

niTAP TIT- ^^ 

the Othoman commander-in-chief to obtain advance- 
ment for himself by deserting the rebel. He was pro- 
mised the pashalik of Berat, then held by Ali's eldest 
son, Mukhtar. The army under his orders, which was 
encamped on Paleovani, dispersed. Many of the soldiers 
returned to their native villages to watch the progress 
of hostilities before choosing their side. Others imme- 
diately took service with Ismael. 

Joannina was now besieged. Ali had barely time to 
burn the city in order to prevent his enemy finding 
cover in the houses. The citadel, which is separated 
from the city by a wet ditch, was well furnished with 
artillery, military stores, and provisions. The garrison 
amounted to six thousand men. Ali possessed an armed 
flotilla on the lake, which secured his communications 
with the mountains to the north. He expected to be 
able to cut off the supplies of the Othoman army, and 
compel Ismael to raise the siege before the arrival of 
his heavy artillery. The cowardice and treachery of 
his sons frustrated his plans. 

A division of the Othoman fleet arrived off the Al- 
banian coast during the summer, and as soon as Pehle- 
van occupied Arta, the Capitana bey besieged Previsa, 
Veli possessed ample means of defending the place, but 
he was a coward. Ismael had been his friend in youth. 
Veli received promises of pardon, and was ordered to 
treat with the Capitana bey. He opened negotiations 
by pleading his filial obedience as an apology for his 
rebellion, and offered to surrender Previsa with all its 
stores on being allowed to carry off his own wealth, and 
receiving the promise of a pashalik, to which he might 
retire without degradation. Ismael ratified these 
terms, and Veli removed with his harem on board the 
Othoman fleet. Both Ismael and Veli were subse- 
quently put to death by the sultan's orders. 



ALI DESEKTED BY HIS SONS. 97 

Mukhtar, who had abandoned Berat to fortify himself RnaomcT. 
in Arghyrokastro, soon followed his brother's example. 
He was not destitute of courage, but he was bribed to 
desert his father by a promise of the pashalik of Ku- 
taieh. In quitting Albania, he persuaded his youngest 
brother Salik to accompany him. 

The surrender of Previsa, Berat, and Arghyrokastro, 
enabled Ismael to obtain supplies of every kind, but 
the communications between his camp and the fleet 
were so difficult and so ill-managed, that heavy guns 
and ammunition were brought up very slowly. His 
rear was often attacked by the partisans of Ali, and, 
being compelled to look out for allies among the Alba- 
nians, he remembered the glorious exploits of the 
Suliots, and their implacable hatred to Ali. Sultan 
Mahmud authorised him to put them again in posses- 
sion of Suli, and the Capitana bey was instructed to 
treat with them. The Suliots had now lived as exiles 
at Corfu for seventeen years, eating the bread of 
charity bestowed on them in turns by the Russians, 
the French, and the English, as each became the 
masters of the Ionian Islands. The proposals of the 
Capitana bey were soon accepted ; the Suliots crossed 
over into Albania, and received Ismael's authority to 
invest the fort of Kiapha, which Ali had constructed to 
command Suli. The fort was garrisoned by Mussulman 
Albanians faithful to Ali. The numbers of the Suliots 
were not sufficient to blockade it closely, and the Otho- 
man commander-in-chief neglected to furnish them 
with rations. In a short time they were in a starving 
state, and, to obtain the means of subsistence, began to 
levy contributions on the Christian peasantry in the 
pashalik of Joannina who had submitted to the sultan. 
Ismael, forgetting his own neglect, was offended at 
their depredations in his pashalik. Personally he was 
a bigot, and not inclined to favour the establishment 

VOL. I. G 



CHAP. III. 



98 RECALL OF THE SULIOTS. 

BOOK I. of an independent tribe of Christians in the vicinity of 
his capital. The Mussulmans of Margariti and Paramy- 
thia, who had submitted to his authority, warned him 
against the danger of allowing the Suliots to gain pos- 
session of the strong fort of Kiapha. He felt the force 
of their reasoning as much as he wished to secure the 
assistance of the Suliots ; and, hoping to gain time, he 
ordered them to join his army before Joannina, pro- 
mising them both pay and rations, with which he could 
not easily supply them in Suli. 

The starving Suliots were compelled to obey ; but as 
their only object in returning to Albania had been to 
regain possession of their native mountains, they con- 
sidered themselves 'cheated by the pasha, and hence- 
forward they regarded all IsmaeFs conduct with dis- 
trust. They found that they were stationed in the 
most exposed situation, and when All's forces sallied out 
to attack them in overwhelming numbers, the Othoman 
troops in the nearest quarters came slowly to their 
assistance. In this diflficult position they owed their 
safety to their own vigilance and valour. They adopted 
every precaution to guard against a surprise either 
from friend or foe, and their military precautions justi- 
fied the reputation they had long enjoyed of being the 
best soldiers in Albania. 

In the month of October 1820, Ismael opened his fire 
on the fortress of Litharitza, which forms an acropolis 
to Joannina ; but the heavy guns and mortars which he 
had transported from Previsa were so ill-managed that 
the casemated batteries of the besieged suffered little ; 
while the guns of the fortress enfiladed the whole site 
of the ruined city, and impeded the approaches of the 
Turks against the citadel of the lake, which was the 
centre of All's strength, and from which he frequently 
made desperate sallies on his enemy. 

The military incapacity of Ismael, and his unfitness 



DEFENCE OF JOANNINA. 99 

for the office of seraskier, became daily more apparent, rktrobpect. 
He had dispersed the fine army of Omer Vrioni, and 
gained possession of Previsa without difficulty ; he ex- 
pected to conquer Joannina as easily. Instead, there- 
fore, of pushing the siege with vigour, he devoted his 
whole attention to the measures which he considered 
most likely to render his pashalik profitable to himself. 
His care was confined to his own territory, and his 
general negligence enabled the partisans of Ali to 
attack his convoys, and permitted the cavalry of Peh- 
levan, and the Gueghs of Dramali, to plunder the 
country in every direction. The villages on the great 
roads in Bpirus, Thessaly, and Northern Greece, were 
deserted by their inhabitants. Ali, well informed of 
all that was passing, watched the progress of the siege 
without alarm. He was still ignorant of the character 
of Sultan Mahmud, and did not suspect that he was 
the real antagonist who was playing the game against 
him. 

The Suliots felt that they were treated with scorn. 
Their rations were bad, and they received no pay. 
Ismael, and many Mussulmans in Albania and Greece, 
entertained a suspicion that the Greeks were plotting 
an insurrection in concert with Russia to assist Ali, 
and he was so imprudent as to display his ill-will to all 
classes of Christians. 

Ali took advantage of his rivaVs imprudence with 
his usual sagacity. Long conversations were carried 
on during the night between the Suliots and his Alba- 
nians. The Suliots told their grievances, the Albani- 
ans expressed sympathy, and boasted of their advan- 
tages. A formal negotiation was opened, and it termi- 
nated in the Suliots forming an alliance with Ali, whom 
they had long regarded as their bitterest enemy. The 
critical position in which both parties were placed 
forced them to cast a veil over the past. The Suliots 



CHAP. III. 



100 SULIOTS JOIN ALL 

BOOK I. regained possession of their native rocks. Ali resigned 
the proudest conquest of his long career. He aban- 
doned the policy of his government to save his life. 
He promised to put the Suliots in possession of his 
fort at Kiapha ; they engaged to join his partisans, and 
fall on the rear of the sultan's army. Hostages were 
given, for both sides were suspicious, and looked with 
some anxiety to the result of their strange alliance. . 

About midnight on the 12th of December 1820, the 
Suliots suddenly quitted the seraskier's camp before 
Joannina, and marched rapidly towards Suli by the 
road to Variadhes. A week after, Murto Tshiali, Ali's 
faithful adherent, put them in possession of Kiapha, 
with all its military stores and provisions. He also 
paid a sum of money to each of the chiefs of pharas, 
in order to enable them to take the field. In January 
1821 the Suliots formed a junction with a corps of 
fifteen hundred Mussulman Albanians under the com- 
mand of three chieftains devoted to Ali, of high mili- 
tary reputation — Seliktar Poda (the sword-bearer), 
Muhurdar Besiari (the seal-bearer), and Tahir Abbas, 
a bey of great personal influence. 

It was necessary for the Suliots to re-establish their 
authority over the Christian villages which had for- 
merly paid them tribute or black -mail ; otherwise 
they must have remained always dependent on Ali 
Pasha for their subsistence. The Othoman authorities 
already occupied several posts in the Suliot territory. 
The Suliot chiefs and their Mussulman allies resolved 
to make these positions their first object of attack. 
Two months were consumed in this operation. After 
some severe skirmishing, Devitzana and Variadhes, 
which command the two roads leading from Suli to 
Joannina, and Lelova and Kauza, which open an issue 
into the plains of Arta and Previsa, were conquered. 

But in the mean time Ali's position had grown much 



KHURSHID PASHA SERASKIER. 101 

worse. The severity of the winter had not, as he retbobfect. 
expected, forced Ismael to raise the siege, and he had 
himself fallen into a trap he had prepared for his 
enemy. Letters which he had written to the Seliktar 
Poda and the Suliots, concerting measures for a com- 
bined attack on the Othoman camp, fell into the hands 
of Omer Vrioni. They were answered as if they had 
arrived safely at their destination, and the garrisons 
both of Litharitza and the citadel were induced to 
make a sortie, which led them so far into the Othoman 
camp that it was with great difficulty they eflfected 
their retreat, leaving half their number dead on the 
field. This defeat took place on the 7th of February 
1821, and from that day Ali was compelled to act 
cautiously on the defensive. 

Sultan Mahmud saw that the conduct of the pashas 
before Joannina was compromising the success of the 
campaign. He punished the incapacity of Ismael and 
the insubordination of Pehlevan by removing them 
from their commands. Pehlevan was immediately 
condemned to death ; Ismael was sent to defend Arta 
in a subordinate position, and Khurshid Pasha of the 
Morea, a sagacious veteran, replaced him as seraskier 
before Joannina.^ Ismael's misconduct, when Arta 
was attacked by the Suliots, the Albanians, and the 
Greek armatoli, in the month of November 1821, caused 
him to be exiled to Demotika, where he was decapi- 
tated. Khurshid assumed the command of the Otho- 
man army at the beginning of the month of March 
1821. The Greek Ke volution broke out in the Morea 
shortly after, and both the fate of Ali Pasha and the 
fortunes of the Suliots became subordinate episodes 
in the military operations of Sultan Mahmud's reign. 

^ Khurshid was pasha of Egypt before Mohammed Ali, and was the first 
Turk who attempted to form a regular corps consisting of Kegro soldiers. He 
failed in the attempt, which his successor resumed at a later period more suc- 
cessfully. — Burckhardt's Travels in Arabia, L 147. 



CHAP. III. 



102 SULIOT COMMUNITY. 

BOOK I. The Suliots henceforth derive their historical import- 
ance from their connection with the great national 
struggle of the Greeks. Their characteristics as an 
Albanian tribe were gradually lost after they were 
finally expelled from Snli by Sultan Mahmud's officers, 
and became dependent for their existence on their pay 
as Greek soldiers. But their condition when they re- 
turned from Corfu to regain possession of their native 
mountains deserves to be recorded, since it marks the 
great transition of society in Southern Albania during 
the first quarter of the present century. 

During sixteen years of exile the Suliots were thrown 
into close connection with the modern Greeks. Their 
communal organisation remained in abeyance ; but 
their absence changed the condition of the Christian 
peasantry who had lived under their protection. Many 
of the cultivators of the soil found themselves better 
off as the tenants of Ali Pasha than they had been as 
the vassals of the Suliots ; and when they returned, 
they found the inhabitants of the villages in their for- 
mer territory unwilling to become again the agricultu- 
ral serfs of the Suliot confederacy. The Suliot warriors 
also were so reduced in number that they were com- 
pelled to seek recruits from among the Christian 
peasants, in order to counterbalance the strength of 
the Albanian Mussulmans with whom they were forced 
to act. It was therefore absolutely necessary to give 
the Suliot conmiunity a new constitution. 

This was done. The subject villages sent deputies 
to a general council, and every soldier enrolled under 
a Suliot chief was admitted to the privileges of a 
native warrior. This circumstance was considered an 
event of great social importance in Albanian society. 
It separated the Suliots from the great family of the 
Tchamidhes, and overthrew the organisation of the 
pharas. It is not easy for strangers to understand 



SULIOT MILITARY SYSTEM. 103 

the change which this revolution produced. They rctbospec^. 
cannot estimate the violence of the pride of class 
among the Albanians, nor the strength of local patriot- 
ism or prejudice among the Suliots. In the month of 
March 1821, when the Kevolution broke out in the 
Morea, the Suliots knew nothing of the Philik6 Hetai- 
ria, and cared nothing for the independence of the 
Greeks, yet Greek ideas had already produced a change 
in the political civilisation of this rude tribe of Alba- 
nians. The principles of civil equality and of the 
brotherhood of all the orthodox had been imprinted 
on their minds. They were made to feel that they 
were citizens and Christians as well as Suliots. They 
were drawn into the vortex of the Greek Revolution 
without their forming any preconceived design to aid 
the Greeks, just as they had been led by circumstances 
to aid their enemy Ali Pasha. But, once engaged in 
the cause, they embarked in it with their usual vehe- 
mence, and formed the van of its warriors, sacrificing 
their beloved Suli, and abandoning all the traditions of 
their race, to join the modem Greeks and assume the 
name of Hellenes. 

The intellectual progress of the Suliots in civil affairs, 
under the influence of Greek ideas, contrasts strangely 
with their obstinate rejection of the military lessons 
taught them by the Russians, the French, and the 
English, who placed the power of discipline and science 
in war constantly before their eyes. The legions of 
Napoleon and the regiments of England showed them 
the secret of rendering small bodies of well-trained 
soldiers a match for hosts of undisciplined troops, but 
they refused to learn the lesson. They deliberately 
rejected the advantages they might have derived from 
discipline and tactics, because no Suliot would diminish 
his self-importance. The spirit of personal independ- 
ence which made every individual Suliot pay only a 



CHAP. III. 



104> SULIOT MILITARY SYSTEM. 

BOOK L limited obedience to the chief of his phara, rendered 
the chiefs of the pharas unwilling to obey a commander- 
in-chief, so that a Suliot army of 700 men was a kind 
of Polish diet. Unfortunately for the Greeks, the 
brilliant courage of the Suliots induced the unwarlike 
leaders of the Revolution to overrate the value of the 
Albanian system of warfare. The Greeks had taught 
the Suliots some valuable social lessons ; the Suliots 
in return taught the Greeks to adopt the military bar- 
barism of the Albanians, to despise the restraints of 
discipline, and to depreciate the value of the tactics 
and science of civilised nations. Their lessons entailed 
many calamities on Greece during the revolutionary 
war. 

The Suliots .had some reasons for adopting their 
system in defending their own mountains against the 
pashas of Joannina, which were inapplicable to the de- 
fence of Greece against the Turks. The nature of the 
Suliot territory, serrated with deep ravines converging 
at acute angles, forced the Suliots to guard several 
passes. Their numbers were small, so that their ene- 
mies were enabled to attack many points with over- 
whelming numbers. To meet this danger, it was neces- 
sary to adopt some system of defensive warfare, by 
which a few men could effectually check the advance 
of a large body. They obtained this result by select- 
ing positions commanding those passes which their 
assailants could not avoid. In these passes a few men 
were posted in such a manner as to be concealed from 
the approaching enemy, but so disposed that each 
Suliot occupied a station overlooking the same portion 
of the road. A concentrated fire was thus brought to 
bear on the gorge of the pass. Every shot was ex- 
pected to prove mortal. 

The military science of the Suliot captains was dis- 
played in the selection of these positions, and in disposing 



SULIOT MILITARY SYSTEM. 105 

the men who occupied them. The great art was by a REmoflPFcr. 
sudden fire to encumber the narrowest part of the pass 
with the dead and woimded. It was also necessary for 
every man to have a second rifle ready, in order to 
prevent the enemy from availing himself of numbers, 
and rushing forward to storm the Suliot position. A 
perfect knowledge of the ground, the eye of an eagle, 
the activity of a goat, and the heart of a hero, were 
required to make a perfect Suliot warrior. It has 
often happened that a band of twenty-five Suliots has 
arrested several hundred men, until their countrymen 
could arrive in numbers suflBcient to throw themselves 
in the rear of the enemy and capture his baggage. 

When circumstances rendered retreat unavoidable, 
it was an important part of the tactics of the Suliots 
to abandon their position simultaneously, and remove 
unperceived into some new position equally suited for 
defence. In these operations each warrior watched 
the movements of his companions as carefully as those 
of the enemy; for it was as great a fault to remain too 
long in a position as to abandon it too soon. A wound 
received by unnecessary exposure was, at Suli, as dis- 
graceful as an act of military disobedience. No soldier 
was entitled to compromise the public safety to win 
personal glory. This species of defensive warfare re- 
quired great powers of endurance, and a facility of 
moving unperceived among stones and stunted brush- 
wood, which could only be acquired by long habit. 
An active youth becomes a good regular soldier in six 
months, but as many years were spent in exercising a 
Suliot warrior, before he was admitted to take his 
place in a chosen band appointed to defend an im- 
portant pass. Every man was there called upon to 
perform the part of a cautious general as well as of a 
daring soldier. 

The system of attack practised by the Mussulman 



106 ANECDOTE. 

BOOK I. Albanians bore great similarity to these defensive tac- 
-^^^^^^^ tics. The assailants dispersed in an extended semi- 
circle round the point of attack, and crept forward, 
covering themselves with every irregularity in the 
ground. The first object was to ascertain the exact 
position and the numbers of the enemy ; the second 
to outflank him. The first approach was usually made 
during the night; and before the grey mist of the 
morning rendered objects visible to any eyes but those 
of Albanian marksmen, a volley was often poured -on 
the sentinels, who looked up cautiously to examine the 
ground ; or the two parties were already mingled to- 
gether, and forced to engage hand to hand. 

It has been mentioned that when the Suliots were 
joined by the Mussulman Albanians in Ali's interest, 
they were compelled to attack the Othoman posts in 
order to expel them from the Suliot territory. Many 
of their allies had fought against them in 1803, but 
this circumstance only increased the mutual emulation. 
Tahir Abbas and the Muhurdar were not men to yield 
the palm of valour to Botzaris and Djiavellas. Though 
the posts of Bogonitza, Lelova, Variadhes, and Toskesi 
were defended by strong bodies of Gueghs, they were 
stormed one after the other. 

A curious story is told of the manner in which the 
Suliots gained possession of Variadhes.^ That position 
was occupied by about a thousand Gueghs and Scla- 
vonian Mussulmans from Macedonia. The only well 
was without the Turkish lines, though completely under 
cover of their fire. Five Suliots crept to this well 
during a dark night, and let down into it a dead body 
and a pig cut up in quarters. In spite of the silence 
they maintained, the Turks suspected that somebody 
was attempting to draw water, and wounded two 
Suliots with their fire. In the morning the Mussul- 



KHURSHID SERASKIER. 107 

mans discovered what their enemies had done. They rktro 
reproached the Christians with carrying on war dis- 
honourably, and of using unlawful weapons. The 
Suliots replied, " The well is in our country, and if 
you don't like the water, you can find many good 
springs in the territories of Ismael the seraskier/' 
After some disputing, the Turks were compelled to 
accept the terms oflfered by the Suliots, and retreat to 
the camp before Joannina. 

Khurshid Pasha, who replaced Ismael as seraskier, 
assumed the government of the Morea in the month of 
November 1820. The state of Greece already caused 
some alarm at Constantinople, but the rebellion of Ali 
was considered the real source of danger, and the con- 
quest of Joannina was therefore the first object of the 
sultan's care. As soon as Khurshid reported that there 
was no immediate cause of alarm in his pashalik, he 
was ordered to leave a kehaya at Tripolitza, and take 
the command of the army before Joannina. On Us 
arrival he found the Othoman army thoroughly dis- 
organised, and he set to work with energy to remedy 
the evils created by his predecessor's misconduct. No- 
thing astonished him so much as the military strength 
which the armatoli had assumed in the confusion. He 
perceived, that though the armed Christians had gene- 
rally ranged themselves under the banner of the sul- 
tan's seraskier, they were employed in strengthening 
their own position, not in weakening that of Ali Pasha's 
followers. His first business was to reorganise his 
troops, increase his numbers, and collect supplies of 
ammunition and provisions, preparatory to attacking 
Joannina with vigour. While thus engaged, he was 
astounded by the news that all the Morea, the islands, 
and a great part of continental Greece, had suddenly 
taken up arms, and that his communications with his 
pashalik were cut off both by land and sea. During 



108 KHURSHID SERASKIER. 

BOOK I. the whole of the summer of 1821, his operations were 

'■ — completely paralysed; but he wisely determined to 

keep Ali closely besieged, and to redouble his exertions 
to destroy the great rebel. There can be no doubt that 
this was the most prudent resolution he could adopt 
in the choice of difficulties which was offered him. 

The conduct of Khurshid has been severely blamed 
by some military critics. They consider his torpidity 
while the Greeks gained possession of Acarnania and 
Etolia, a proof of his incapacity. But it must be re- 
membered, that when the Greek Kevolution broke out, 
his army did not exceed twenty thousand, and a part of 
his force consisted of Christian armatoli, on whom he 
could no longer depend. He was compelled to maintain 
the blockade of Joannina, to oppose the progress of Ali's 
partisans and of the Suliots in Epirus, to keep open his 
communications with Arta and Previsa, and to garri- 
son the pass of Metzovo ; while he could not summon a 
single man to his assistance from Thessaly or Macedon, 
lest he should be cut off from his magazines at Larissa 
and Thessalonica, and from direct communication with 
Constantinople. 

Those who depreciate Khurshid's military talents 
observe that his camp before Joannina was only eight- 
een hours' march from the pass of Makrynoros ; that 
Arta and Previsa were occupied by Othoman garri- 
sons; and that Bekir Djokador (the gambler), who was 
governor of Previsa, commanded the Gulf of Arta, with 
the flotilla under his orders. It is argued that by land- 
ing a body of troops at Karavaserai, the pass of Mak- 
rynoros might be turned, and a body of troops marched 
to Vrachori in nine hours. The fertile plains of Acar- 
nania would have enabled the Othoman cavalry to 
render good service by confining the Greek armatoli 
to the hills, and thus communications might always 
have been kept open with Lepanto and Patras. 



KHURSHID AND PHILIP V. OP MACEDON. 109 

The classic student is reminded of the rapid marches rwbo«wct. 
of Philip V. of Macedon, and his brilliant operation in 
destroying Thermus, the capital of the EtoUans. The 
ruins of Thermus are still seen towering over the cen- 
tral plain of Etolia, on a rocky hill about six miles east 
of Vrachori. Like many other classic spots, they have 
now a Sclavonian name. Both the ruins and the dis- 
trict in which they lie are called Vlokho.^ The opera- 
tions of Philip V. afford a signal proof of the wonders 
that may be effected by rapid movements, strict dis- 
cipline, and able tactics. The Macedonian troops were 
landed at Limnsea (Karavaserai) in the afternoon. 
They marched all night, and reached the Achelous 
(Aspropotamos) at daybreak. The distance is twenty- 
five miles. Crossing the river, they pushed forward, 
and reached Thermus, situated about fifteen miles from 
the river, late in the afternoon. The city was surprised 
and systematically sacked. The public buildings were 
burned, and, as far as time permitted, the statues were 
broken to pieces. Next day Philip commenced his 
retreat. The great fatigue which his troops had under- 
gone during the two preceding days and nights, com- 
pelled him to move leisurely, and his men were en- 
cumbered with booty. He spent three days in his 
retreat, before he crossed the Achelous, and regained 
Limnsea.^ 

Khurshid had perhaps more than once an oppor- 
tunity of imitating the Macedonian king ; but those 
who have written the history of the Greek Revolution 
have estimated the obstacles to his making the attempt 
too lightly. It was even diflBcult for him to calculate 
how far defection might spread among the Mussulman 
Albanians, if he absented himself from the Othoman 
camp for a single day. The Sclavonian beys and the 

^ Leake's Travels in Northern Ch^eece. 
* Polybius, V. 6, &c. 



CHAF. III. 



110 CONDUCT OF KHURSHID. 

BOOK I. Gueghs often behaved with great insubordination while 

CHAP. Ill- O ITT 1 

he was present. There could be no hope of success 
unless he headed the expedition in person. His ab- 
sence from the camp might enable Ali to raise the 
siege of Joannina ; the defeat of the expedition might 
aflford him an opportunity of rousing all Southern 
Albania against the sultan, and of forming an alliance 
with the insurgent Greeks. It must not also be over- 
looked that, during the month of May 1821, Khurshid 
detached nearly ten thousand men from his army, 
partly to reinforce the garrisons of Patras and Tripo- 
litza, and partly to watch the vale of Tempo and the 
passes over the Carabunian mountains, and to keep in 
check the armatoli of Olympus and Ossa. By his pru- 
dence, chiefly, the Greek Kevolution was prevented from 
spreading northward, after the execution of the patri- 
arch Gregorios on Easter Sunday (22d April). 

The personal position of Khurshid was one of great 
delicacy. The interests of the Othoman empire, and 
his duty to the sultan, commanded him to prosecute 
the siege of Joannina, and keep Ali at bay in his last 
stronghold. But his own honour, and the safety of his 
family, called on him to march to Tripolitza, protect 
his harem, and save the Mohammedan population of 
his pashalik. The fate of the Othoman empire pro- 
bably depended on his decision, and he chose like a 
patriot. It is the duty of the historian to give the just 
meed of praise to able and honourable conduct, whether 
the actor be an enemy or a friend, a Mohammedan or 
a Christian, a Turk or a Greek. 

The Suliots did everything in their power to profit 
by the weakness of Khurshid's army : they attacked 
Previsa, and attempted to interrupt the seraskier's 
communications with Arta. Their endeavours to gain 
possession of Previsa depended for success on secret 
negotiations, not open assaults. They were frustrated 



SULIOTS JOIN THE GREEK CAUSE. Ill 

by the conduct of their Mussulman allies, who feared RmuMPEOT. 
lest they might become independent of Ali's assistance, 
and abandon his cause to secure a separate arrange- 
ment with the sultan. Their operations on the Arta 
road also met with only temporary success. 

On the 6th of August 1821, the united forces of the 
Mussulman Albanians and the Suliots attacked a con- 
voy of provisions and ammunition on its way from 
Arta to the seraskier's camp. The Suliots had not yet 
united their cause with that of the Greeks, so that no 
common measures were concerted with the Christians , 

who had taken up arms in Acarnania and Etolia. The 
Suliots still confined their views to securing the in- 
dependent possession of Suli, The allied force, after 
plundering the Turkish convoy, attacked the troops of 
Ehurshid stationed to guard the pass of Pentepegadhia, 
and stormed their position in a brilliant manner. In 
this exploit the Mussulman Albanians were more nu- 
merous than the Suliots. The Muhurdar had 500 
men under his command, while Drakos, who led the 
Suliots, had only 200.^ Had they been able to retain 
possession of the pass, which might probably have been 
done with the assistance of the Greek armatoli, Khur- 
shid would have been compelled to raise the siege of 
Joannina. The seraskier saw the danger, and sent an 
overwhelming force to recover the lost position, and 
keep open his communications. This force compelled 
the allies to retire, and from that time the Suliots 
began to lose ground. AJi could no longer supply them 
with either rations or pay, and they began again to 
plunder the Christian cultivators of the soil, who sought 
protection from Khurshid, who gradually succeeded in 
extending the sultan's authority over the whole of the 
Suliot territory. The agas of Margariti and Paramy- 
thia also regarded them with increased animosity since 

' Perraivos, i. 46. 



112 SULIOTS JOIN THE GREEKS. 

BOOK T. the outbreak of the Greek Revolution. The Suliots now 
^^^^!l^ turned to the Greeks for assistance, who had already- 
established themselves firmly in Etolia and Acamania, 
and were preparing to attack Arta. 

Mavrocordatos then acted as dictator in Western 
Greece. The captains of armatoli had already sent the 
Suliots several warnings of the danger of delivering Ali. 
The power of Khurshid was not feared. Indeed, the 
authority of Sultan Mahmud in Greece and Epirus was 
considered at an end. The agents of the Greek govern- 
^ ment, the friends of Mavrocordatos, and the captains 

of armatoli, all urged the Suliots to quit the cause of 
Ali and join that of Greece. They justly observed, 
that the cause at issue was that of Greece and Turkey, 
and that, whether Ali or Khurshid proved victorious, 
the victor would immediately turn all his forces against 
the Christians, and in the first place against the 
Suliots. The Suliots did not deny the truth of these 
observations, but they resolved not to break their 
plighted faith with the Mussulman Albanians, who had 
assisted them in their greatest diflBcultiea These Mus- 
sulman allies were at last persuaded that All's interest 
required the support of the Greeks. 

In the month of October 1821, Khurshid gained 
possession of Litharitza, and Ali found himself hard 
pressed in the fortress on the lake. The batteries of 
the besiegers destroyed several magazines, and inces- 
sant showers of shells rendered the place almost unten- 
able. The Greeks began to be alarmed lest Khurshid 
should immediately get possession of the immense trea- 
sures which they believed were heaped up in Joannina, 
and became consequently of a sudden eager to form 
an alliance with the Albanian Mussulmans who still 
adhered to All's cause. Several communications took 
place, and at last Tahir Abbas and Ago Besiari re- 
solved to visit Mesolonghi, in order to confer with 



MISSION OP TAHIR ABBAS. 113 

Mavrocordatos in person, and concert measures f or k«tiiobf»ct. 
assailing the rear of Khurshid s army, and opening an 
entrance into Ali's fortress. 

Tahir Abbas was a man of experience and sagacity, 
whose long intercourse with the Greeks rendered him 
perfectly acquainted with their character, and prevented 
his being deceived by their wiles. On the other hand, 
the Greeks laid themselves open to his observation by 
underrating his talents. They considered him ignorant 
and stupid, because he spoke Greek with the rude 
accent and simple phraseology of the Epirot peasantry. 
Mavrocordatos and the Greek captains, with that over- 
weening confidence in their intellectual superiority 
which makes the Greeks so often " the fools of their 
own thoughts," trusted to their powers of deception for 
using Ali's ^partisans as blind instruments. By feign- 
ing to see things as they wished him to see them, Tahir 
Abbas heard everything they ought to have concealed. 
He saw that many Greeks considered the Kevolution a 
movement excited by Kussia to destroy the Othoman 
empire, and that it would soon be openly supported by 
the Emperor Alexander. He perceived that the Greeks 
were fighting for their independence and for their re- 
ligion ; and, as a Mohammedan, he would have consi- 
dered the contest a war of extermination, even had he 
not seen evidence of the fact at every step he took 
in his journey to Mesolonghi. Though familiarly 
acquainted with the captains of armatoli, he was as- 
tonished at the numbers of veteran soldiers he saw 
under their command. He was even more astonished 
at the spirit of independence already displayed by the 
rayahs or Christian peasantry. The Greeks committed 
a great error in allowing him to pass through Vrachori, 
where the blackened walls of Turkish palaces, the de- 
secrated mosques and ruined minarets, could not escape 
his attention, and where their pride induced them to 

VOL. I. H 



CHAP. III. 



114 MISSION OF TAHIR ABBAS. 

BOOK L point out also the unburied bones of murdered Mussul- 

nvTATl ¥¥¥ ^ 

mans, and the unveiled faces of women who had dwelt 
in the harems of beys, serving as menials in Greek 
families. The scrutinising mind of Tahir Abbas seized 
the fact that a new phase had commenced in Turkish 
history ; that henceforward the Mussulmans in Europe 
would have to sustain a long war with all the Chris- 
tians who had been hitherto their obsequious serfs. 
When he reached Mesolonghi, he observed to an Italian 
whom he had known at Joannina, that the Revolution 
was the mortal combat of two religions. Of course he 
felt an internal satisfaction at making this declaration. 
As a sincere Mohammedan, he felt assured that though 
God might punish for a while the vices of the Otho- 
mans, eventually the victory would rest with Islam. 

It did not require the sagacity of Tahir Abbas to 
perceive that it was impossible to conclude a treaty of _ 
any value either with Mavrocordatos or the Greek 
government. The intrigues and tergiversations of 
those around him revealed the anarchy that prevailed 
in the public administration, and the dissensions that 
existed among the leading men. Finding that he could 
obtain no money in Greece to enroll a body of Mussul- 
man Albanians, and being convinced that it would be 
an act of folly to co-operate with Greek troops without 
a force sufficient to insure respect and good faith, 
he returned to his countrymen, who were still acting 
with the Suliots, determined not to serve as an instru- 
ment of Greek policy. He found a part of the Suliots 
already acting with the armatoli. 

In the mean time the conquest of Litharitzaliad con- 
vinced the Albanians that it was neither prudent nor 
possible any longer to resist the sultan's authority. 
Elmas bey, who had commanded the Albanians, arrived 
from Tripolitza, and gave a horrible picture of the 
cruelty of the Greeks. Khurshid availed himself of 



SURRENDER OE ALL 115 

this favourable opportunity to open negotiations with retrobwct. 
the partisans of Ali, and Tahir Abbas having informed 
them that it was impossible to come to any terms with 
the Greeks, the negotiations were soon terminated. 
The Albanians separated from the Suliots, but in- 
formed them that they would not act against them in 
the Suliot territory. The Suliots retired to their moun- 
tains, and the Greeks were compelled to abandon their 
operations against Arta. 

Ali was now living in a bomb-proof cellar, clothed 
in a bundle of dirty embroidered garments, defending 
the castle of the lake with a diminished and intimi- 
dated garrison. Khurshid was watching his prey with 
the vigilance of a lynx. The Albanian beys, who had 
hitherto done everything in their power to thwart the 
operations of the seraskier, were now so much alarmed 
at the progress of the Greek Eevolution, that they 
became eager for the triumph of the sultan. At last, 
in the month of January 1822, partly by treachery 
and partly by surprise, Khurshid's troops gained an 
entrance into the citadel of the lake, and Ali had barely 
time to shut himself up in the tower which contained 
his treasures and his powder-magazine. From this spot 
he entered into negotiations with Khurshid, who readily 
agreed to all his demands. Khurshid promised to spare 
Ali's life ; and the aged tyrant, who had never respected 
a promise or spared an enemy, flattered himself that he 
could escape the vengeance of Sultan Mahmud. As he 
was destitute of any feeling of that pride which makes 
life insupportable after defeat, and as he had no per- 
sonal vengeance to gratify by dying in defence of his 
treasury, he probably considered that at the worst it 
was more dignified for a pasha, and an unwieldy old 
man of eighty-two, to die by the bow-string than to be 
mangled in an explosion or slaughtered in an assault. 
Khurshid, on the other hand, had received the express 



CHAP. III. 



116 DEATH OF ALL 

BOOK I. orders of the sultan to send All's head to the Sublime 
Porte, and his difficulties rendered It absolutely neces- 
sary for him to get possession of All's treasury. Both 
he and All knew that a pasha's promise Is valueless 
against a sultan's order. Khurshld gained possession 
of the tower, and removed All's treasures, which he 
found by no means equal to his expectations. All re- 
tired to a kiosk in one of the islands of the lake. 

On the 5th of February 1822 a meeting took place 
between All and Mohammed Pasha, who was appointed 
Khurshid's successor in the pashallk of the Morea. 
When Mohammed rose to depart, the two viziers, being 
of equal rank, moved together towards the door with 
all the ceremonious politeness of Othoman etiquette. 
As they parted. All bowed low to his visitor, and 
Mohammed, seizing the moment when the watchful 
eye of the old man was turned away, drew his hanjar, 
and plunged it in All's heart. He walked on calmly 
to the gallery, and said to the attendants, " All of 
Tebelln is dead." The capidjee of the Porte entered 
the hall of conference, severed the head from the body, 
and carried it to the citadel, where it was exhibited to 
the troops before being sent off to Constantinople. A 
tumult arose between the Albanians and the Turks, 
in which several persons were killed ; but order was 
quickly re-established by the seliktar of Khurshld, 
who rode among the soldiers, announcing that the 
seraskier had given orders for the immediate payment 
of all the arrears due to the army, and that he would 
soon march into the warmer and more fertile region of 
Thessaly, and prepare to invade Greece, where booty 
and slaves would be obtained in abundance. Every- 
where he was- received with acclamation, and the 
Albanians as well as the Turks shouted, " The dog 
Kara All is dead. Long hfe to Sultan Mahmud and 
his valiant seraskier, Khurshld Pasha." 



DEATH OP ALL 117 

The head of Ali was exposed at the gate of the serai. Rg™»racT . 
A few weeks after, four heads of pashas occupied the 
same niche, placed side by side. They were the heads 
of Ali's sons, Mukhtar, Veli, and Salik, and of his 
grandson Mahmud, the son of Veli. They had been 
allowed to live quietly in Asia Minor until the old lion 
of Joannina was hunted down. The heads were buried 
at the cemetery before the gate of Selioria, where five 
marble tombs, ranged in a line, still arrest the attention 
of the traveller. The wicked father and his worthless 
sons are united in death. Filial ingratitude and Otho- 
man treachery are recorded in pompous inscriptions, 
teaching piety. 



BOOK SECOND. 

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BEVOLUTION. 



CHAPTEE I. 

THE CAUSES OP THE GHEEK REVOLUTION. 



N^/xos 6 irdvrwv fiaciXebs 
Syaray t€ icol Maydrwv, 



The causes peoduced by the improvement op society— Sbcbet societies — 
PniLiKi Hetaibia — Dippicult position in which the Turks were placed 
— Plots op the Hetairists betrayed — Progress op education and 

MORAL improvement AMONG THE GREEKS — TURKS NATIONALLY MORE DE- 
PRESSED BY THE OtHOMAN GOVERNMENT THAN GREEKS — InPLUENOB OF 

Roman law on modern Greek civilisation — Improvement which took 

PLACE AFTER THE PeaCE OP KaINARDGI, IN 1774 — GREEKS LIVING IN 

Turkey under foreign protection. 

The Greek Eevolution was the natural result of gene- 
ral causes : its success was the consequence of peculiar 
circumstances. Various events afforded the Greeks 
under the sultan's domination opportunities of acquir- 
ing knowledge and experience, and the development 
of their minds rendered the tyranny of the Turks in- 
supportable. "When a nation desires independence, a 
t revolution is probable ; but when it is spurred on by 
I an appetite for revenge as well as by a passion for 
(Jiberty, a revolution becomes inevitable. 

The most striking feature in the Othoman adminis- 



CAUSES OF THE KEVOLUTION. 119 

tration was the utter want of any judicial organisation bbtrowmt. 
for the dispensation of justice. The judicial adminis- 
tration of Turkey only contemplated revenge for acts 
of injustice, not the distribution of justice to those 
who suflFered wrong. A novelist has observed that 
when the Turks cut the wrong man's head off, they 
found a consolation in the fact that after it was over 
it could not be helped ; the vengeance of the law was 
wreaked, though an additional act of injustice was per- 
petrated. Now, both the good and the bad qualities 
of the Greeks rendered them peculiarly liable to be- 
come the victims of the precipitancy of Turkish justice 
and of the injustice of Turkish judges. The Othoman 
government constantly pointed out to them the ines- 
timable value of constitutional liberty by practical 
lessons, and educated them to prepare for a revolution 
as soon as they ceased to feel as slaves. It was not 
necessary for them to become acquainted with the 
writings of Voltaire or the theories of Kousseau. The 
same moral and political causes which produced the 
French Eevolution produced the Eevolution in Greece. 
English liberty and American independence had struck 
chords that vibrated wherever civilised men dwelt. 
The crowing of the Gallic cock did not, as M. Thiers 
insinuates, first discover the dawn of liberty, which it 
welcomed with more noise than harmony. 

Education among the Greeks was the herald oi\^ 
liberty. Several individuals endowed schools, andV^ 
sought to raise their countrymen from the degradation 
to which they had sunk towards the middle of the 
last century. The French Eevolution certainly gave 
an unnatural degree of excitement to all political ideas. *^ 
Its crimes and its grandeur fixed the attention of 
Europe on Paris. The Greeks were excited to pro- 
claim their rights as members of the human race more 
loudly, and to urge their nationality as a reason for 



120 SECRET SOCIETIES. 



BOOK 11. 

CHAP. I. 



throwing oflF the Othoman yoke more openly, when 
they found similar doctrines supported by powerful 
armies and glorious victories in other lands. It was 
everywhere the fashion for the discontented subjects 
of established governments to imitate the French. 

'^he influence of the clubs of Paris was peculiarly cal- 
culated to produce a powerful impression on the minds 
of the Greeks ; for it seemed to prove that great results 
might be effected by small assemblies, and that words, 
in which Greece has always been rich, might be em- 
ployed as an effectual weapon to overthrow govern- 
ments, and to do the work of swords. The Greeks 

tHbegan to form literary clubs and secret societies, with 
the vain hope that the Othoman empire might be de- 
stroyed by such inadequate instruments. 

Two societies are supposed to have contributed 
directly to accelerating the epoch of the Greek Revolu- 
tion, and to have aided in insuring its success. These 
were the Philomuse Society, founded at Athens in 1812, 
and the Pliilik6 Hetairia, established at Odessa in 1814. 
But these societies ought rather to be considered as 
accessories before the fact than as causes of the Eevolu- 
tion. The Philomuse Society was a kind of literary 
club, and it contributed the funds which enabled many 
men who took a distinguished part in the Revolution 
to acquire a European education. The Philike Hetai- 
ria was in its origin a political society, and it taught 
the Greeks, in every province of the Othoman empire, 
to expect immediate assistance from Russia as soon as 
they should take up arms, and thereby propagated the 
conviction that a contest with the Turks, far from 

( being a desperate enterprise, was one which was sure 

^ of success. 

As the Philike Hetairia was a political society ex- 
\pressly established to accelerate and direct a revolution 
'in Greece, its composition and proceedings deserve to 



PHILlKfi HETAIRIA. 121 

be noticed. The power of secret societies is very aptHii 
to be overrated, and in no case has the influence of a 
secret political society been more unduly magnified 
than in the case of the Philike Hetairia. Historians 
have recorded its exploits : * they have displayed its 
weakness, and revealed the ignorance and incapacity of 
its members. While its proceedings were veiled iiiJ 
mystery, they were easily magnified ; when its acts 
were aU fully known, it was evident that its conduct 
deserved contempt. It had, however, many paid 
agents, and many political adventurers gained both 
influence and profit by entering its precincts. It is 
not wonderful, therefore, that its historians have been 
its panegyrists. Many of the best Hetairists were"^ 
more directly under the influence of Eussian orthodoxy 
than of Hellenic independence, and many of the best 
men who distinguished themselves in the Greek Kevolu-^ 
tion were not Hetairists. 

The first members of the Philik^ Hetairia were bank- 
rupt merchants and intriguing adventurers, possessed \ 
of some cunning and great enthusiasm. Fanaticism ' 
was then one of the characteristics of every member of 
the Oriental or Orthodox Church. The Eussians felt 
it ; the Greeks often afiected it. Turkey was supposed 
to be on the eve of dissolution, and Eussia to be on 
the point of gaining possession of Constantinople. The 
Philike Hetairia was formed when these opinions were 
predominant, and by men who entertained them. It 
prospered. Subscriptions were easily collected; and 
agents, called apostles, were sent among the orthodox 
population of Turkey to preach hatred to the Turks 
and devotion to the czar of Eussia. The supreme 
direction of the society was, unfortunately, always in 

^ Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, i., Introduction, p. 41. ^iXiiiuoVf 
AoKifitoy ^IffTopiKhy irepl rrjs ^iXtKrjs 'ErcuptaSf Athens, 1834. UdyBoSy *AirofjLyrt' 
fiove^fAara irepl rrjs ^iXiKrjs *Eraipias, *A$rivaSf 1845. ^tX^/u^y, AoKifiioy ircpl 
rrjs *E?i\7iviKris 'Evayao'Tdffews, 2 vols., Athens, 1859. 



lETBOSPECT. 



y 



122 PHILIKfi HETAIRIA. 

BOOK II. the hands of incapable men, and the apostles were 

^^^'"^ often so ill selected that the members who resided in 

Greece refused to intrust them with large sums of 

money, and feared to confide their lives and fortimes 

to their prudence. 

"When this society was founded, orthodoxy and Greek 
nationality were so generally confounded, that the 
traders of Odessa who framed its organisation called 
the popular class of initiated brethren by the barbarous 
appellation of Vlamides, from the Albanian word via- 
meria, signifying brotherhood. In all probability the 
Philike Hetairia would have soon expired of inanition 
had it not been kept alive by its members making use 

i of the name of Alexander I., Emperor of Eussia, who 

' was generally supposed to grant it his secret protection. 
For several years it watched in vain for a field of 
action. The rebellion of Ali Pasha at last opened a 
chance of success. Had that rebellion not occurred, 
the Hetairists would have remained powerless until 

1 hostilities occurred between Russia and Turkey. 

The influence of secret societies on national move- 
ments can only be powerful when their movements 
coincide with the general impulse to which these socie- 
ties owe their own existence. But men are generally 

'^ore disposed to attribute great events to anomalous 
causes than to trace patiently the gradual operation of 
natural impulsions. The schemes of the Hetairists at 

Odessa were wild and visionary — the object of the in- 
habitants of Greece was definite and patriotic. The 
Hetairists proposed to set fire to Constantinople, to 
burn the arsenal, to destroy the fleet, to assassinate the 
sultan, to murder his ministers, and to efface the 
memory of the Sicilian vespers by a general massacre 
of the Mussulman population in the capital of the 
Othoman empire. And so infatuated were they, that 
the advantages and disadvantages of these diabolical 



PHILIKfi HETAIRIA. 123 

projects are coolly discussed in a history of the Philik6 
Hetairia published at Athens in the year 1834. These ' 
counting-house CatUines of Odessa imagined that they 
could overthrow an empire by burning an arsenal and 
assassinating a prince. They overlooked the possibility 
of arousing the just indignation and bloody vengeance 
of millions of warlike Mohammedans, who would have 
rushed to Constantinople to defend the Turkish domi- 
nation, and who, when the conspirators had destroyed 
the fountain-head of all the vices of the Othoman ad- 
ministration, might have laid the foundations of a new 
and more powerful Turkish empire. 

The increased boldness of the Greeks in European i 
Turkey after the commencement of hostilities with Ali I 
Pasha did not escape the observation of the Mussul- 
mans. The attention of the sultan and his ministers 
was repeatedly called to the conduct of Russian agents,] 
and to the bold language held by many Greeks. Yetl 
it is not surprising that the operations of the Philik^ 
Hetairia escaped the observation of the Othoman 
government, though its existence was discovered by 
the Russian police as early as 1818, for the Turks em- 
ploy no spies. Russia also, by permitting her consuls 
and dragomans in the Levant to act as agents and 
couriers for the Hetairists, both concealed their in- 
trigues and encouraged their activity. Apathetic as 
the Turks were, they could not overlook the great 
alteration which took place in the demeanour of the \ 
Greeks during the year 1820. The attitude assumed 
by the Christians was often seditious. Russian agents 
were always ready to protect them, and the evidence 
of a secret understanding seemed to be so strong that 
all foreign merchants, except the English consuls in 
the Levant, considered a rising of the Greeks and a 
war between Russia and the Porte to be inevitable. 

The position of the Othoman authorities in the pro- 



CHAP. I. 



124! DIFFICULTIES OF THE TURKS. 

BOOK 11. vinces where the Greeks were numerous, was one of 
considerable difficulty. The conduct of the Russians 
rendered it dangerous for any pasha to venture on 
taking measures for restraining the insolence of the 
Greeks before receiving express instructions from Con- 
stantinople. Any attempt to disarm the Greeks wouJd 
have produced little effect in those provinces where it 
could have been carried into execution with ease, and 
any attempt to disarm the Christians in Romelia would 
have caused all the armatoli to join the cause of Ali 
Pasha. It would hardly have been prudent to disarm 
even the unwarlike Moreots without making a great 
addition to the Othoman forces then in the peninsula. 
When we reflect, therefore, on the delicate circumstan- 
ces in which the Turkish officials were placed, it must 
be owned that they were not wanting in that combina- 
tion of prudence and courage, toleration and cruelty, 
which has enabled three millions of Mussulmans to 
retain ten millions of Christians in subjection for four 
centuries. Yet every hour was bringing the antagon- 
\ ism of the Greeks and Turks nearer to a hostile colli- 
sion, and it was by a general disarming of the Greeks 
that a revolution could alone be avoided. The fear 
that this measure would be considered by Russia as a 
declaration of war, prevented its adoption by Sultan 
Mahmud at a period when it was still practicable. 

The existence of the Philik^ Hetairia was betrayed 
to Ali Pasha, and communicated by him to the Porte 
shortly before his proscription. Several Hetairists 
betrayed their companions to the Turks, and several 
apostles were assassinated by the Greeks. An apostle 
named Aristides Popoff was executed at Adrianople ; 
another, Demetrius Hypatros, was murdered by Zaphy- 
ros, the primate of Niaousta. The plan of a general 
insurrection of the orthodox was revealed to the Porte 
by a Greek named Asemaki : the papers of some of 



TREACHERY OF HETAIRISTS. 125 

the apostles were seized in consequence of this revela- retrotpkot. 
tion ; and a number of letters were discovered which 
spoke of projects for murdering all the resident Turks 
in various towns on the Danube and on the shores of 
the Archipelago. Mr Tricoupi, the Greek historian of 
the Greek Revolution, who was formerly employed in 
the English consulate at Patras, thinks that the exist- 
ence of a secret police might have saved Turkey ; and 
he reproaches the Othoman government with its de- 
ficiency in this branch of despotism/ He overlooks 
the fact that the vices as well as the virtues of the \ 
Turks disqualify them from being eflficient spies. The 
secret police of the Othoman empire must therefore 
have been intrusted to Greeks ; and it is not probable 
that Greek spies would have revealed anything to the 
Turks sooner than Greek traitors. It was the absence 
of all systematic scheme of espionage that rendered the 
sultan's government, in the opinion of many Greeks, 
preferable to that of Venice, of Austria, and even of 
Eussia. The best historian of the Greek Revolution, 
General Gordon, errs in saying that " the stupid Mos- 
lems never entertained the least suspicion of a plot 
hatched in the midst of them ;" but he adds, that " the 
lynx-eyed police of the Russian empire (from a differ- 
ent cause, doubtless) was as blind as a mole to all 
matters connected with the society."^ The fact, how- 
ever, is, that neither Sultan Mahmud nor his ministers k 
required to be informed by traitor Hetairists that the \ 
Greeks had long been intriguing against the Othoman 
domination, under the direction and in concert with 
Russian agents. But it was fortunate that the treach- 
ery of the Hetairists did not enable the sultan to obtain 

^ '^TTvpi^avos, TpiKo^Trn^lirropta rfjs 'E?i\riytK7is 'Evayaardo'cws, i. 26. — " Ot cvfi- 
fivffTCU ijpx^O'oi.y vA ipyd^wyrtu inth r^v iBiav ' 0$uf fiaviK^v i^ovcicof rv^K^rovtrav 
TfcpX rk rotavra, ios fi^v Ixoi/trav acrrvyoiMiav irphs iLycucdkwI/ty rtov." 

2 History of the Qreek Revolution, by General Gordon, F.R.S., vol. i., In- 
troduction, p. 48. Compare ^Ckfifjuov, AoKifiiov irepi t^s 'EWrfyiKris 'Evayaard' 
<reusy i. 121, 123. 



126 CAUSES OF THE GREEK REVOLUTION. 

BOOK II. any information concerning the grand project for his 
— ^^^ own murder, and for a general massacre, until after the 
outbreak had taken place. When that scheme became 
known the sultan could not be reproached with apathy. 
His anger, indeed, got the better of his policy, and he 
made the wickedness of the Hetairists a pretext for ex- 
cessive cruelty to the Greek nation. 

It must be observed that very few of the Greek 
oflficials in the Othoman service, a body of men usually 
^called phana riots, were admitted members of the Phi- 
like Hetairia. They were not trusted by their coun- 
trymen. Halet Effendi, Sultan Mahmud's nishandjee 
and favourite minister, made use of the phanariots as 
spies both on the orthodox clergy and on the Greek 
nation ; and, trusting to their vigilance, he refused to 
believe the reports which reached the Porte that the 
Greeks were plotting a general insurrection. He con- 
sidered it incredible that the sultan's rayahs could risk 
a rebellion as long as the Porte avoided a war with 
Eussia. His influence with Sultan Mahmud rendered 
this opinion the guide of Othoman policy, and pre- 
vented the grand vizier from taking some measures 
of precaution suggested by the provincial pashas in 
Greece. 

It may now be asked by my readers. What was the 
real cause of the Greek Eevolution, if they are to con- 
sider the rebellion of Ali Pasha, and the machinations 
of the Philik^ Hetairia and Eussian agency only as 
'secondary causes ? The Greek Eevolution was the re- 
f ^ suit of the multifarious moral as well as political causes 

which cause a nation's intelligence to grow. The dis- 
' Va . pensations of Providence had turned many circum- 

stances to the advantage of the Greek race. Individual 
virtues had been developed, and individual improve- 
ment accelerated and extended. The consequence was 
an increase of moral energy, a desire of action, and a 



TURKS AS MUCH DEPRESSED AS GREEKS. 127 

longing for a national and political existence. The*" 
fulness of time had arrived : the corruption and ser- 
vility of the Greek race, which had retained it in a 
degraded condition from the time of its conquest by 
the Eomans, had been expiated by ages of suffering 
under the Othoman yoke; and the Greeks felt pre- 
pared to climb the rugged paths of virtue and self- 
sacrifice. The cause of the Greek Revolution embraces 
the history of the national character, and forms a sec- 
tion of the records of humanity not to be circumscribed 
by a survey of contemporary political events. 

The Revolution was facilitated by the moral andl 
physical decline of the Othoman race. That decline' 
was in no small degree the result of the social circum-^ 
stances which inevitably undermine the energy of 
every privileged dominant class ; but it proceeded also 
from the constitution of society in Mohammedan coun- 
tries, and particularly from the sultanas despotism, 
which consumed the riches and paralysed the energyl 
of the Osmanlees more effectu^y than that of the^ 
Christians. Nothing is more certain than that during 
a considerable period of Othoman history the Turkish 
population of the provinces was subjected to as much 
moral and political restraint as the Greek. This fact"^ 
has been so generally overlooked, that it is difficult to 
state it plainly without having the air of advancing a 
paradox. The Mussulmans were a dominant class on 
account of their religion, but the Turkish population of 
Asia, whose feudal institutions were older than the Otho- 
man empire, had always been an object of jealousy to 
the Othoman government at Constantinople. It is too 
much the habit to identify everything that is Turkish 
and Othoman in the sultan's empire. For ages the 
highest offices in the Othoman government were con- 
ferred on favourites of the sultan, and the cabinet was 
composed of men educated in his palace, or taken from 



y 



CHAP. 1. 



128 TUEKS AS MUCH DEPRESSED AS GREEKS. 

BOOK II. domestic employments in the imperial household. In 
that household a slave was more honoured than a free 
man. The ordinance of the Mosaic law was in full 
vigour. " The servant that is bought for money, when 
thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof (of 
thy bread). " A foreigner and a hired servant shall not 
eat thereof." A long period elapsed before the cabinet 
of the sultan contained many Turks who were bom sub- 
jects of the sultan, and the counsels of the sultan were 
generally shared, and the conduct of the grand vizier 
controlled, by purchased menials in the palace. With 
these men, the hereditary beys, agas, and timariots 
had no sympathy, and little political connection ; nor 
could the slaves of the imperial household understand 
or support the feudal institutions of the Turkish race, 
of which they rarely heard, except as obstacles to their 
measures. A Turk might possess patriotism as well 
as religious zeal : an Othoman official might be a good 
Mohammedan and a devoted servant of the sultan, but 
in him palace prejudices occupied the place of national 
feelings, 
f We ought not to feel astonished, therefore, when we 
; find that provincial Turks rose with greater difficulty 
to high rank in the Othoman service than Greeks, and 
possessed less influence in the administration of the 
empire. The Turkish aga was ill suited for an Otho- 
man instrument. He was deficient both in knowledge 
and servility. The Greeks possessed both in a high 
degree. A wicked government requires unprincipled 
agents ; and during the whole of the eighteenth cen- 
tury the Greeks held several important offices in the 
sultan's government because they were without prin- 
ciple. 

Greek influence was both ecclesiastical and civil. 
The authority of the patriarch and synod of Constan- 
tinople, as an administrative agency in the Othoman 



BENEFIT CONFERRED BY ROMAN LAW. 129 

government, was very great. It formed a more effi- rktrobpbct. 
cient protection for the orthodox Greeks than the 
ulema did for the rights of the Mohammedan Turks. 
The dragoman of the Porte and the dragoman of the 
fleet formed a more direct representation of the Greek 
people in the Othoman government than the Turks of 
Asia Minor possessed. Roman law, which regulated 
the civil relations of the Greeks, was better preserved 
and more equitably administered than the feudal in- 
stitutions of the Seljouk empire, or the ordinances of 
the Othoman sultans, which regulated the civil rights 
and protected the property of the Turks. This cir- 
cumstance, that a Greek could speak of equity as 
something permanent, while a Turk could only regard 
it as arbitrary, gave the Greek population a moral su- 
periority over the Turkish, in one of the most impor- 
tant elements of society. 

The Romans, by imposing their jurisprudence on all 
the nations they conquered, conferred a great benefit 
on Greece. The Greeks have ever been self-willed and 
presumptuous. Every Greek has always been eager to 
enforce judgment on others, and ready to defy law 
whenever he could do so to his own personal advan- 
tage with a hope of impunity. The Romans forced 
the Greeks to acknowledge the prindiple that justice 
ought to be invariably administered according to fixed 
forms of judicial procedure. The attempt was made 
to render the law more powerful and more permanent 
than the government. A sense of the value of justice 
was transfused into the minds of the Greeks, and its 
basis being enlarged by the conversion to Christianity, 
it was never lost. This combination of law and reli- 
gion, which is so interwoven into the national exist- 
ence as to influence every individual mind, is the great 
element of the social superiority of the Greeks over the 
Turks. 

VOL. I. I 



CHAP. 



130 WANT OF JUSTICE AMONG TURKS. 

BOOK ij. The sense of equity appears to be as strong in the 
4 mind of the individual Turk, and he is not so ready to 
I gratify his selfishness by acts of injustice as a Greek is. 
jYet there can be no doubt that both life and property 
Were, on the whole, more insecure among the Turkish 
'population of the Othoman empire than among the 
Greek. The want of laws, judicial institutions, and 
legal forms of procedure, rendered the administration 
I of justice arbitrary, and retained Turkish society in a 
/ state of barbarism. If the solution of the Eastern 
question require the regeneration of the Turkish power, 
this end cannot be attained without the introduction 
of a fixed legislation, and a systematic code of pro- 
cedure. If the Turks persist in despising law and 
contemning justice, the Eastern question, instead of 
being solved, must be exploded. New combinations 
and new governments must arise, and many Eastern 
questions will soon become Western ones. The five 
great Powers of Europe cannot regulate the waters of 
the political inundation of which they appear neither 
to know the depth nor the level. 

The condition of the Greek population in Turkey 
was, as has been already mentioned, greatly bettered 
by the treaty of Kainardgi in 1774. A considerable 
increase of its numbers in the commercial cities and 
maritime provinces soon became apparent. The Turk- 
ish government began also at this period to be more 
dependent on the state of its finances, and this circum- 
-^stance increased the political power of the Greeks, who 
were growing richer while the Turks were growing 
poorer. The sultan and his ministers persisted in re- 
lieving themselves from every financial difficulty by 
acts of bankruptcy. In this species of dishonesty the 
Othoman empire surpassed the Austrian. When a 
demand was made on the sultan's treasury, which it 
was deemed necessary to discharge without delay, and 



DISORDER IN OTHOMAN FIKANCES. 131 

the sum in the hands of the treasurer did not amount rbtrospbcv. 
to more than two-thirds of the sum due, the discre- 
pancy was arranged by adding one-third more of alloy 
to the coinage. Two hundred thousand piastres' worth 
of bullion were thus converted into three hundred thou- 
sand piastres in money, and the debt was paid. By 
these depreciations of the coinage, which followed one 
another in rapid succession, Greek capitalists were very\ 
often gainers, Turkish landlords invariably losers. 

While wealth was flowing into the hands of the 
Greeks, and ebbing from the coflFers of the Turks, the , 
ambition of the Greeks was directed to the sultan's 
service by a number of the highest official prizes in the 
Othoman administration. A slippered Greek, without 
stockings, a taoushan of the Archipelago, might become 
a sovereign prince beyond the Danube. Mavroyeni, a 
Greek secretary of the great capitan-pasha Hassan 
Ghazi, after serving as dragoman of the fleet, was ap- 
pointed Prince of Vallachia. 

A still more striking advantage which the provincial 
Greeks enjoyed over the Turks was the facility of ob- 
taining a complete exemption from the principal evils 
of the Othoman administration, by placing themselves 
under the protection of some foreign power. A prac- 
tice had grown up in the Othoman empire of granting 
charters of denaturalisation called berats, which placed 
the bom subjects of the sultan in the situation of sub- 
jects of some friendly sovereign, to whom their allegi- 
ance was transferred. The number of Greeks who 
obtained this privilege was very large, and it often \ 
enabled them to transgress all the laws of the empire . 
with impunity. The beratlees lived in the midst of 
the Turkish population, evading many of the heaviest • 
financial burdens to which even Mohammedans were 
subjected, and carrying on commerce without paying 
the same duties or being amenable to the same laws in 



CHAP. 



132 GREEKS ENJOY FOREIGN PROTECTION. 

BOOK II. their transactions. They were even protected in their 
— persons from the gripe of the Othoman police by the 
ambassador or consul to whom their allegiance was 
I virtually transferred. This class of Christians was 
\ known to share largely in the profits of debasing the 
1 coinage, defrauding the customhouse, and cheating the 
1 people by local monopolies. An instance is recounted 
of a Greek beratlee who realised a large fortune by 
forging a new coinage of more intrinsic value than the 
debased issue from the sultan's treasury. He had 
taken his measures to have his forged money ready for 
circulation at the same time as the government. It 
was not difficult, in the greater part of the empire, to 
persuade the people that the coinage which contained 
most pure metal was the lawful money. 
' Individuals belonging to this privileged class were the 
\ most active agents of the Greek Kevolution ; and many 
• who enjoyed the protection of Eussia were members of 
' the Philike Hetairia. The protection they enjoyed in- 
sured their escape from punishment, should their com- 
plicity be discovered. In this way a vast body of the 
^orthodox, who retained as much of their connection 
'with the patriarch and the ecclesiastical Greek nation- 
fetlity as suited their purpose, lived in the Othoman 
(empire relieved not only from the yoke of the sultan, 
but almost from the restraint of every other govem- 
tnent. It is needless to point out that such a position 
engendered the vices of avarice, falsehood, and dis- 
honesty, or that these emancipated slaves, suddenly 
converted into privileged freemen, conducted them- 
selves in general with extreme arrogance. The Turks 
were insulted whenever it was possible to insult them 
with impunity, and the Turks, in spite of their form- 
ing a dominant caste in the empire, had no revenge 
but the poor consolation that they could beat the 
lowest class of Christians whenever they thought fit. 



GREEKS ENJOY FOREIGN PROTECTION. 133 

Under these circumstances, the hatred of the Turks RBTRosFEcr. 
and Greeks became every day more violent. Both 
were justly irritated by chronic and irremediable evils 
in the condition of the society in which they lived. 
They felt what Milton tells us, " that justice is the 
only true sovereign and supreme majesty upon eartV 
but how to place themselves under the authority of 
the empire of justice they knew not. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE OPERATIONS OP THE GREEK HETAIRISTS BEYOND 
THE DANUBE. 



" These be good humours indeed ! Shall pack-horses, 
And hollow pampered jades of Asia, 
Which cannot go but thirty miles a-day, 
Compare with Ceesars, and with Cannibals, 
And Trojan Greeks ? Nay, rather damn them with 
King Cerberus, and let the welkin roar." — ^Pistol. 



Charaoteb op Pbinok Alexander Htpsilantes — Relations between 
Russia and Turkey — State op the government and op the Rouman 
POPULATION IN Moldavia and Vallachia — Invasion op Moldavia — 

• Massacre op the Turks at Galatz and Yassi — Fury op the Turks 
— Revolution in Vallachia — Georqaki, Savas, and Vladimiresko — 
Hypsilantes at Bucharest— Sacred battalion— Proceedings in Val- 
lachia— Anathema OP THE PATRIARCH — RUSSLA DISCLAIMS THE REVOLU- 
TION — Deceitpul CONDUCT OP Hypsilantes — The murder op Vladimir- 
esko — Battle op Dragashan — Flight op Hypsilantes — Appair of 
Skuleni— Death op Georqaki — Termination op the Revolution in the 
prinoipalitibs. 

In the year 1820 the managers of the Philik^ He- 
tairia became sensible that they did not enjoy the con- 
fidence of the Greek nation. The ablest, the honestest, 
and the most influential men kept aloof from the society 
of the apostles, or, if they became members, expressed 
openly their distrust in the persons who represented 
the secret direction. To inspire general confidence, it 
was necessary that some person of character, experience, 
and talent, should appear as the executive chief, though 
the names of his councillors might remain enveloped in 
mystery. The revolutionary projects of the Greeks 
were publicly discussed ; the existence of a secret so- 



PRINCE ALEXANDER HYPSILANTES. 135 

ciety was generally known, and the impossibility of retrorffct. 
delaying an insurrection was universally felt ; yet the 
managers of the Hetairia were so destitute of pract ical 
capacity, that they had not prepared any depots^ of 
afmr^Hd ammunition, and had not organised a single 
battalion. The resources of the society had been spent 
by the apostles in travelling and in taverns, and the 
capacity of the managers exhausted in writing instruc- 
tions^ and drawing plans remarkable only for va^iie 
patriot ism and i mpracticable ambition . The storm was 
about To* burst, and the magicians, who fancied they 
had raised it, felt themselves incapable of steering the 
vessel in which they were embarked with Greece and 
its fortunes. One man ^ by common consent, was 
deemed equaLjfca -the... task of bringing Greece safe 
throug h the hurricane. That man was Count John 
(^podistrias. TEe supreme direction was oftiBred to 
lumTISWril^refused it without allowing the agents of 
the Hetairia to unfold their plans or explain their or- 
ganisation, and it remains still a question how much of 
their schemes was known to him. He was certainly 
not ignorant of the revolutionary projects of the society 
and of the Greeks generally ; but he difltrnated the 
f apafiitjr of tihf Fftti^P^*=^^^, and he had no confidence in 
the energy and perseverance of the people : he was 
not without patriotism, but his patriotic feelings were 
not stronger than his personal ambition. 

Capodistrias having refused the supreme direction, 
it was offered to Prince Alexaiider HypsiLantes, who, 
though he knew notEihg about the society previously, 
SLQSg^tod it withouj} .hesitations^ and immediately as- 
sumed an absolute command over the Hetairists, their 
plans and resources. Hypsilantes was the eldest son 
of the hospodar of Vallachia, whose deposition in 
1806 had served Russia as a pretext for commencing 
war with Turkey. Bred at a despotic court, where the 



CHAP. 11. 



136 PRINCE ALEXANDER HYPSILANTES. 

BOOK II. will of the sovereign conferred all social, political, and 
military rank, he had lived only with men servile to 
those in power, and insolent to those who were their 
inferiors. He had risen to the rank of major-general 
in the Russian service, distinguished himself as an 
officer, and lost hia right. arm at the battle of _Culm. 

/His experience of life was gained in courts and camps ; 
he possessed considerable abilities and many superficial 

[ accomplishments, but he was extremely ambitious, and 

his inordinate vanity, joined to the high value he set on 

the princely title which his father had obtained from 

the Othoman sultan, became a subject of ridicule to 

/ some of his Greek followers in the transdanubian prin- 

ticipalities. The Greek Eevolution could hardly have 

Ifallen under the direction of a man less suited to be a 
nation's leader than Alexander Hypsilantes. He was 
so ignorant of the feelings of the Greek mountaineers 
and seamen, that he believed the whole people ready to 
hail him as their monarch. Still, it may be doubted 
whether he would have embarked in a contest with 
Turkey, had he not been persuaded that the Emperor 
Alexander I. would support his enterprise. His edu- 
cation, moreover, taught him to overrate the power of 
Russia in the international system of Europe. He be- 
lieved that it would find no serious difficulty in annex- 
ing Moldavia and Vallachia, and that to accomplish 
that annexation, and indemnify him for his services in 
creating the opportunity, a new state would be founded 
in Greece, of which he would be declared the sovereign. 
The private character of Alexander Hypsilantes was 
respectable, his public conduct contemptible. He was 
a man of agreeable manners and a good disposition, 
possessing the instruction usually acquired in a well- 
conducted school-room, and the conversational elo- 
quence familiar to courts. As a soldier he had dis- 
played personal courage"; he boasted of his patriotism 



PRINCE ALEXANDER HYPSILANTES. 137 

as a Greekjbiit his v^ were blended 

witir'aieftws.,aL^ ^ throne. His "per- 

sonal good qualities were neutralised by great defects. 
Though active in words, he was sluggish in action. 
Though brave as a soldier, he was timid as a general ; 
and when placed at the head of an enterprise which 
could only succeed by rapid and decisive move- 
ments, he was slow and irresolute. Deficient in the 
art of reading men's characters, he collected round him 
a crowd of would-be courtiers, and disgusted his mili- 
tary and democratic partisans by the ill-timed princely 
airs he assumed. He was also ignorant of military 
tactics, negligent of discipline, and deficient in that 
sense of order which enforces obedience and replaces 
the want of administrative experience. Unfortunately, 
his character was tainted with a worse vice. He had 
no reverence for^Jroth^himgfilf, nny jjuj lift appreciate 
iti^yilue m 0^^ He began and ended his great 
enterprise with acts of deceit and falsehood. 

Secret societies are usually hot-beds of internal in- 
trigue. Men who throw ofi* the restraint of those 
moral obligations which command their obedience in 
one case, are not likely to respect any laws that restrain 
their desires. It has been already mentioned that 
traitors were found among the Hetairists. Acts of 
misconduct or of treachery induced the superior direc- 
tion of the society to order its apostles to be assassi- 
nated, and HypsUantes is accused of being privy to 
these assaaainaliQnS:^ 

The relations between the Eussian and Turkish 
governments were almost hostile. The Greeks had 
some reason to expect assistance from the Emperor 

1 Gordon, i. 88. Tricoupi, i. 40. Philemon, ^i\ik^ *Eraipla, 250 and 267. 
But in a recent work of the same author, the complicity of Hypsilantes in the 
assassination of Kamarenos at Galatz is denied, and it is ascribed to other 
Hetairists. 'EAXr^i^tK^^ ^Eiravdffrcuris, i. irpoo\4. Several assassinations are enume- 
rated by Speliades, 'Aironrnfioveifiara, i. 4, 10, 21, 23. 



Retrospect. 



138 RELATIONS OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY. 

BOOK II. Alexander L, the Turks good grounds for distrusting 

— him. The secret treaty which he had concluded with 

Napoleon I., after the conferences at Erfiirth, for the 
incorporation of Moldavia and Vallachia in the Russian 
empire, was known to Sultan Mahmud, who saw little 
reason for placing any reliance in the assurances or the 
honour of Christian emperors after the treacherous 
conduct of Napoleon to the Porte on that occasion.^ 
The treaty of Bucharest had indeed restored the trans- 
danubian principalities to Turkey, but several circum- 
stances gave the sultan reason to suspect that Russia 
would seek an early opportunity of reconquering them. 
In order to facilitate an invasion of Turkey at a future 
period, the Emperor Alexander, when he saw that he 
would be compelled to make peace, issued an inhuman 
order to his generals in Bulgaria to destroy the towns 
of Nicopolis, Sistova, Rutshuk, and Silistria, before 
evacuating them, and to lay waste all the country south 
of the Danube before retiring beyond the river.^ These 
barbarous proceedings, and the falsehood and injustice 
of the Christian powers in many of their dealings with 
the Porte, made Sultan Mahmud extremely suspicious 
of the good faith of all Christian princes. The iniqui- 
tous invasion of Egypt by France in 1798 ; the unjust 
attempt to coerce the Porte by Great Britain in 1807; 
the violation of his engagements by Napoleon at Tilsit ; 
the projected dismemberment of the Othoman empire at 
Erfurth, and the protection granted by Austria to 
fraudulent employes, who, like Karadja, the fugitive 
hospodar of Vallachia, decamped with large sums of 
public money, destroyed all confidence in the honesty 
of Christians and the honour of sovereigns. 

^ The contents of this treaty are given by Bignon, viii. 5. 

* BXzoa'SerouloBfJIistoire de rinsurrectionOrecque, 210, 213, mentions these 
wanton and inhuman ravages. In the war of 1828 and 1829, Russia pursued the 
same policy, and the whole Dobrudsha was depopulated before it was restored 
to the sultan. The villages were aU burned, and hardly a house was left 
standing in many towns. 



RELATIONS OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY. 139 

On the other hand, it was impossible for Christian RKmoBracr. 
nations to view the treatment of their fellow-Christians 
in Turkey without indignation. The conduct of the 
officials in the Kussian consulates was at variance with 
both justice and international law, but the conduct of 
the Othoman government was so unjust, that all means 
of protecting men from its abuses seemed equitable. 
Tyranny on one side and fraud on the other, had, in the 
year 1820, produced a degree of mutual exasperation, 
which rendered an outbreak both inevitable and neces- 
sary. Prince Hypsilantes believed with some ground 
that the Emperor Alexander would avail himself of 
his right to oppose the entry of Turkish troops into 
the transdanubian principalities, or at least that he 
would insist on a joint occupation ; and it is not impro- 
bable that, if the prince had acted with energy and ca- 
pacity, and the Greek Hetairists with more courage and 
honesty, the one or the other must have happened. The 
ambition of Alexander was, however, counteracted by 
the principles of the Holy Alliance, and the revolution- 
ary movements of the Spaniards and Italians. 

The government of the Greek hospodars in Vallachia 
and Moldavia was extremely oppressive, and the con- 
dition of the Rouman population under their power 
was more wretched than that of the Greeks under the 
Turkish pashas. The hospodars were men who had 
passed the best years of their lives in the dangerous but 
profitable offices of dragoman of the Porte or the fleet. 
From a position of servility they were suddenly in- 
vested with arbitrary power over a defenceless foreign 
population. They were aliens in the land they ruled, 
as the Turks were aliens in Greece. That, like Otho- 
man pashas, they proved rapacious tyrants, was the 
natural consequence of their position and their educa- 
tion. Yet, while at Yassi and Bucharest they wasted 
the wealth of the provinces in the splendour of a court, 



CHAP. II. 



140 STATE OF THE PRINCIPALITIES. 

BOOK II. and treated their Rouman subjects as a nation of slaves, 
tney were regarded by their master and the divan only 
as tax-gatherers and policemen. The only merit of a 
hospodar with the Othoman government, consisted in 
the regularity with which he remitted his tribute, and 
the liberality with which he bribed the sultan's favour- 
ites and the ministers of the Porte. As the fiscal agent 
of the sultan he was terrible to his subjects, and as an 
extortioner, to fill his own private treasury, he was 
hateful. The hospodars themselves amassed large for- 
tunes in a few years,^ and every new hospodar came 
attended by a crowd of hungry and rapacious Greeks, 
who usually arrived loaded with debts, but who ex- 
pected, like their master, to enrich themselves during 
a short tenure of office. An army of Greek, Albanian, 
and Bulgarian policemen and soldiers alone enabled 
the hospodars to enforce their authority; and this force 
would not have suflBced without the support of the 
powerful suzerain at Constantinople, whose name was 
a shield to his vassal. 

The transdanubian principalities, like all the fertile 
provinces of the Othoman empire, were compelled to 
furnish the capital with supplies of provisions. The 
system of ancient Rome was revived by the Othoman 
sultans. A contribution of wheat, called istira, was 
exacted from the fertile plains of Macedonia, Thessaly, 
and Thrace. Originally the cultivator of the soil re- 
ceived a fair indemnification for his grain, but before 
the commencement of the Greek Revolution, the depre- 
ciation of the Othoman coinage rendered the price paid 
by the istiradgee almost illusory. In Vallachia and 
Moldavia the export of almost every article of produce 
was monopolised by the administration for the benefit 
of the inhabitants of Constantinople, and the profit of 

^ 2^11ony, E88ai sw les Fanariotes, p. 64, says that hospodars have carried off 
ten luillions of francs after enjojing office for only two years. 



STATE OF THE PRINCIPALITIES. 141 

V 

the hospodars.^ To fulfil this duty with exactitude, rbthospect. 
the hospodars were allowed a right of pre-emption for 
a certain quantity of grain and a fixed number of 
cattle, in addition to the tenth of the gross produce of 
the soil, which they received as the land-tax of the 
Othoman empire. The right of pre-emption gave rise 
to abuses and exactions, which formed a severe burden 
on the people, and a sure means of enriching the hos- 
podars and their phanariot followers. A large extra 
supply was always collected under the pretext of paying 
the expense of transport, and covering the losses that 
might take place among the cattle. The hospodars 
themselves often became grain-merchants and cattle- 
dealers, and made large sums of money by evading the 
monopolies they rigorously enforced on others. The 
Othoman government sent annually to the Danube 
vessels capable of conveying 1,500,000 kilos of wheat 
to Constantinople ;^ and when a greater quantity was 
required, the hospodars were allowed to provide for the 
purchase and transport of this extra quantity by a 
special tax on their provinces. After this notice of the 
principal burdens on the agricultural population of the 
principalities, it is needless to attempt to paint their 
misery. They were the wretched slaves of a race of 
rapacious oppressors, who were also themselves slaves. 
The native race in Vallachia and Moldavia claims 
a descent from the Eoman colonies which settled in 
Dacia ; but as it is found speaking the same language 
in eastern Hungary, in Transylvania, in Bessarabia, on 
Mount Pindus, and in the valley of the Aspropotamos, 
it may be that it represents a race that occupied the 
same countries before the coming of the Eomans, but 

1 Wilkinson, Description of Moldavia and VaJla^hia, French translation, 
p. 68, says that the only articles of export exempted from monopoly were wool, 
yellow hemes {Rhamnus Infectoria), and hare-skins, which were exported in 
foreign ships. 

3 Nearly 200,000 quarters. A considerable number of cattle and sheep were 
also conveyed to Constantinople by sea, but many were driven there by land. 



CHAP. II. 



142 STATE OP THE PRINCIPALITIES. 

BOOK II. whose language had a considerable aflBnity with Latin, 
and who received the civilisation of Eome, though they 
had resisted that of Greece.^ In 1821, the Rouman 
race numbered six millions of souls, and its lot was 
most unhappy. The boyards and the native nobility 
had been demoralised by the government of the Greek 
princes — they were tyrants of the peasants who culti- 
vated the soil. The greater part of the land belonged 
either to large proprietors, who were like feudal lords, 
or to monasteries and ecclesiastical establishments. 
Though the cultivator was in reality a free colon, his 
condition was as degraded and helpless as that of a 
serf attached to the glebe. He was bound to work a 
certain number of days on a piece of land of which 
the whole produce belonged to the landlord. He had 
no prospect of ever improving his condition by his 
own industry, for his landlord had the power of send- 
ing him to cultivate land of an inferior quality at any 
time ; and the landlord's steward could exercise every 
power belonging to the landlord. The result was, 
that the Roumans were a sluggish race, nor had they, 
like the Greeks, the consolation of meeting with any 
sympathy among the Christians of happier countries. 
During the occupation of the principalities by the 
Russians from 1808 to 1812, they had suflFered severer 
exactions than the Greeks of the Peloponnesus had 
suffered at the same time from Veli Pasha. The sub- 
sequent extortions of Karadja and Kallimaki had 
prevented them from recovering from the exactions of 
the Russians. It is not, therefore, wonderful that the 
Rouman population regarded the Greeks with a deep- 
rooted hatred, and that the idea of Greek princes and 
phanariot officials coming to them as the heralds of 
liberty appeared to be a bitter mockery. 

Alexander Hypsilantes crossed the Pruth, attended 

^ Byzantine HUtory, ii. 278. 



INVASION OP MOLDAVIA. 143 

by a few followers, on the 6th of March 1821. He ad. i82i. 
had concerted his measures with Michael Soutzos, the 
reigning hospodar, and the leading phanariot officials 
in the province who had been admitted members of 
the Hetairia. Hypsilantes believed that he was enter- i 
ing on a smooth and brilliant career ; that Moldavia 1 
and Vallachia would submit to his government at his j 
mere requisition ; that the machinery of administra- / 
tion would move smoothly on as under the suzerainty j 
of the sultan, with the advantage that he should be 
able to retain in his own hands the sultan's tribute ; 
that a European congress would relieve him from 
every difficulty, and the protection of the Emperor '^ 
Alexander secure either a principality on the Danube,' 
or a throne in Greece. 

The first acts of Hypsilantes betrayed his utter 
incapacity for the post into which he had thrust him- 
self. Instead of endeavouring to gain possession of 
Ibrail, which alone could have enabled him to proceed 
in his enterprise with any prospect of success, he took 
up a position at Yassy, where his presence was unne- 
cessary. The hospodar, Michael Soutzos, and the 
postelnik, Eizos Neroulos, were amiable, weak-minded, 
and ambitious men. They shared all Hypsilantes's 
foolish hopes of Eussian intervention ; and, like him, 
they forgot that neither Providence nor Russia was 
likely to assist men who neglected their own affairs. 
Had Hypsilantes rendered it difficult for the Turks to 
enter the principalities, Russia might have refused to 
allow them to make the attempt. To gain the support 
of the people it would have been necessary to promise 
the Roumans liberty, and to insure them some guaran- 
tee against the oppression of the Greeks and Russians, 
rather than an imaginary relief from the Turkish 
yoke ; for in the minds of the agricultural population 
in the principalities, Turkish tyranny was regarded 



144 HYPSILA.NTES IN MOLDAVIA. 

BOOK II. as a phrase for expressing phanariot rapacity. But 

IHypsUantes as a Russian protege, and Michael Soutzos 
as a phanariot tax-gatherer, had no thought of increas- 
ing the liberties or lightening the burdens of the 
people. Hypsilantes, therefore, as leader of the Greek 
Revolution, took his stand in Moldavia as the chief of 
\ a band of foreign meroenaries, striving to conquer the 
y Rouman country in order to transfer the suzerainty 
from the Sultan of Constantinople to the Czar of Russia. 
The invasion of the Hetairists overthrew the civil 
government, which derived its authority from the 
Porte ; and Alexander Hypsilantes, as commander-in- 
chief of the army, issued a proclamation as supreme 
head of a new order of things, in which, instead of 
marking his confidence in himself and his army, he 
boasted in enigmatic phrases that Russia protected his 
enterprise, and that her assistance would insure his 
triumph.^ His fatuity looked like a satire on revo- 
lutions. Jjt-ftetifln^he was as destitute of energy as 
he was deficient of pru3ence*in:"C6imsHr Instead of 
marching to surprise the enemy, and secure a strong 
, military position, he trifled away his time in idle cere- 
' monies or absolute inaction. 

The treason of Michael Soutzos and several of the 
Moldavian ministers placed the whole financial and 
military resources of the province at Hypsilantes's dis- 
posal, and he was already in possession of a large sum 

^ See this document in Speliades, i. 36, and the observations on Hyp- 
silantes's indecision in Rizos Neroulos, Histoire de V Insurrection Orecque, 282. 
Tricoupi, i. 55, who writes in the spirit of equity and good faith, quotes 
the words as they are given in a short proclamation of Hypsilantes to the 
Moldo-Vallachians, dated 23d February (7th March) 1821, published by 
Photeinos, p. 33. The passage is modified in the long proclamation, dated 
the 24th February (8th March), printed by Speliades, which corresponds very 
nearly with that published by Philemon in his recent work entitled AoKlfuotf 
irtpl rrjs 'EAAt^i^ik^s 'Eirovairrcio-fwf, iL 79; but in this the passage is entirely 
omitted. A comparison with other sources, however, proves that more than 
one of the documents printed by Philemon have been subjected to unfair 
manipulation. Compare the allusion in the proclamation to the Greeks in the 
principalities as that document is printed by Philemon, ii. 85. 



HYPSILANTES IN MOLDAVIA, 145 

of money.^ A considerable body of troops, consisting a d. 1821. 
of soldiers who had served in the Russian and Servian 
wars, might have been assembled in a few days by an 
energetic leader with active lieutenants. The Hetairists 
had already secured the support of the ablest officers 
in the command of the troops under arms in both 
principalities; and as Alexander Soutzos, the hospo- 
dar of Vallachia, died a few weeks before Hypsilantes 
crossed the Pruth,^ the whole military force in the two 
principalities might have been concentrated on the 
banks of the Danube. The number of Greek sailors 
at Galatz would have enabled a man of promptitude 
to secure the command of the river by a fleet of gun- 
boats. The civil and military administration might 
have been more easily centred in the hands of the 
commander-in-chief of the army in a camp before 
Ibrail, than at Yassi or^B ucharest. By repealing every 
monopoly and commercial restriction, the goodwill of 
the landed proprietors, as well as of the merchants 
and seamen, would have been gained. By rapid move- 
ments and vigorous attacks, the few Turkish troops 
then in the Dobrudsha might have been dispersed, 
and all the fortresses below Galatz taken. The whole 
course of the Danube from Orsova to the sea would, in 
all probability, have been in the possession of a daring 
soldier who had known how to conduct a national re- 
volution, before the Othoman government had moved ' 
a single soldier ; but Alexander Hypsilantes had neither , 
the hand, the head, nor the heart capable of conduct- j 
ing a daring enterprise. He neither centralised the ad- ■ 
ministration, nor concentrated the army, nor collected 
military stores, nor formed magazines. In short, he did 

* Rizos NeroTilos, InttMrect. Grecque, 295. 

' Alexander Soutzos, the hospodar of Vallachia, was not of the same family 
as Michael Soutzos, the hospodatp of Moldavia. He died suddenly on the 1st 
February 1821. He was accused of having revealed as much as he had dis- 
covered of the plots of the Hetairists to the Turks, and it was thought that be 
had been poisoned by them ; but these reports have been denied. 

VOL. I. K 



-tmAT, Mi 



146 MASSACRE AT GALATZ. 

BOOK It nothing but play the prince and leave every matter of 
importance to chance. 

The Hetairists had prepared for vigorous action, 
and were looking anxiously for orders while Hypsi* 
lantes was preparing to cross the Pruth. Anarchy 
was the natural consequence of a band of conspira- 
tors being lefb without precise instructions and with- 
out any recognised chief. It is not surprising, there- 
fore, that the first deeds of the Eevolution brought dis- 
honour on the cause. Galatz is the principal port of 
Moldavia; several Turkish merchants resided in the 
town, and some Turkish vessels lay in the port. As 
in the Othoman empire foreign sovereigns retain the 
sole civil and criminal jurisdiction over their subjects, 
it naturally followed that in the principalities the 
sultan alone possessed any authority over the resident 
Mussulmans : a Turkish officer was therefore stationed 
at Galatz with a few guards, in order to enforce obedi- 
ence to the police regulations and fiscal laws of Mol- 
davia on the part of the Turks. A Greek named 
Karavia commanded the Christian troops in the service 
of the hospodar stationed at Galatz. Like Michael 
Soutzos and Rizos Neroulos, he was a member of the 
Hetairia, and being intrusted with the secrets of the 
conspirators, he availed himself of the vague communi- 
cations and the negligence of Hypsilantes in omitting 
to issue precise orders, to make an infamous attempt 
to enrich himself by plundering the Turks. He was 
an Ionian by birth, and had acquired some military 
-experience in the Eussian service, and some property 
in the service of Karadja, the hospodar of VaUachia. 

The night before Hypsilantes quitted the Russian 
territory, Karavia assembled the Hetairists and his 
band of mercenaries (called Arnaouts in the princi- 
palities, though composed of Greeks, Servians, and 
Bulgarians, as well as Albanians), and after informing 



MASSACRE AT YASSI. 147 

them that a revohition was about to take place under a. d. 1821. 
Russian auspices, he led them to attack the Turkish 
officer and his men. Some were surprised and mur- 
dered, but others succeeded in shutting themselves up 
in a house, which they defended for some time. Karavia 
then authorised his men to capture or murder the 
Turkish merchants in the town, and began to break 
open and plunder their warehouses and take posses- 
sion of their ships. Turks of every rank, merchants, 
soldiers, and sailors, were surprised and murdered in 
cold blood. The native population of Galatz took no 
part in this infamous transaction ; they neither stained 
their hands with blood, nor disgraced themselves by 
robbing their guests. Indeed, the cruelty of Kara- 
via and the licentiousness of his Amaouts, terrified 
•the Moldavians, who saw little prospect of enjoying 
either order or security under the government of the 
Hetairists.^ 

The sanguinary and revengeful passions awakened 
by the assassination of the Mussulmans at Galatz 
spread rapidly over the whole province, in consequence 
of the misconduct of Hypsilantes and the timidity of 
Michael Soutzos. About fifty Othoman soldiers were 
stationed at Yassi as a guard of honour. They had 
no duty but to uphold the dignity of the suzerain by 
the mere fact of their presence at the court of the 
hospodar. Before Hypsilantes entered the city, the 
hospodar persuaded the Bash Besly aga to order his 
guards to lay down their arms, under a promise that 
their persons and property should be protected. The 

^ The most accurate account of the revolution in the transdanubian pro- 
'yinces is in Gordon's History of the Greek Revolution, He obtained a large 
number of original documents from one of Hypsilantes's principal officers, and 
he was acquainted both with the country and the leading men. Compare 
the account of the affair at Galatz circulated at the time, as ^pven in a 
curious work published in lithography at Bucharest, with the indication, 
Leipsic, 1846, Ot "A^Aot r^s iy Bhaxia 'EWrivueris ^EToyturrJurws rh 1821, 
avYYpa(p4vT€S irapdi HKia *tor€ty6, p. 29, with that of ^iKiifAwVy irtpl rris 'EAA. 
.'Eirai'. i. 126, and Gtordon, i. 100. 



CHAP. II. 



148 HYPSILANTES'S PKOCEEDINGS. 

BOOK II. Turks were not inclined to resist the Hetairists, for 
they shared the general opinion that they formed the 
vanguard of a Russian army. Michael Soutzos ordered 
the Othoman soldiers to remain in their quarters and 
the Turkish merchants to be imprisoned, under the 
pretext that this measure was necessary to insure 
their safety. Yet as soon as the news of the murders 
at Galatz reached the capital, both the Othoman sol- 
diers and the Turkish merchants were murdered in 
cold blood, under the eyes of the hospodar and of 
Alexander Hypsilantes, the commander-in-chief, with- 
out these princes making an eJSEbrt to save their lives, 
or uttering a word of reprobation at this disgraceful 
violation of a sacred promise. Hypsilantes had even 
■ the weakness and the wickedness to approve of the 
murders of Karavia at Gralatz, and thus ratify those 
which he had witnessed at Yassi, 

The consequence of this misconduct was that simi- 
lar assassinations were committed in other places, and 
the Albanian and Greek soldiers considered that they 
were authorised to rob and 'murder every Mussulman 
whose property excited their cupidity, or whose con- 
duct aflforded a pretext for revenge. Much disorder 
ensued, the difficulty of enforcing discipline was in- 
creased, and every captain of a company took the 
liberty of acting without orders. 

The treasury of the Hetairia at Yassi contained a 
much smaller sum than Hypsilantes had expected to 
find in it. His own ignorance of financial administra- 
tion rendered him helpless, and his counsellors could 
suggest nothing better than following the example of 
Karavia's Amaouts, and plundering the rich. Hypsi- 
antes, therefore, commenced his administrative opera- 
tions by seizing a wealthy banker, whom he accused 
of being hostile to the Revolution, and of concealing 
funds belonging to the Hetairia. The first accusation 



FURY OP THE TURKS. 149 

was not a crime, and the second was false ; but Paul a. d. 1821. 
Andreas was glad to pay the prince several thousand 
pounds to escape out of his hands.^ This act of extor- 
tion alarmed the native boyards and all the wealthy 
Roumans, who, afraid of being robbed by the Greeks, 
availed themselves of every opportunity of escaping 
into Eussia and Austria. 

The murders committed by Karavia, without secur- 
ing any military advantage, inflicted a severe blow on 
the cause of the Hetairists. A panic terror seized the 
people in all the towns on the southern bank of the 
Danube, and the Turkish inhabitants and Othoman 
garrisons were roused from the apathy in which they 
were living, and the state of neglect in which they had 
been left by the sultanas government. As the news 
of the murders at Galatz and Yassi flew from one city 
to another, embellished with a hundred, horrid exag- 
gerations, the Mussulmans everywhere flew to arms ; 
and it may be truly said that the most efficient 
support of Othoman domination at this crisis was* 
the cruelty of the Greeks, not the energy of Sultan 
Mahmud. The wickedness of the Hetairists proclaimedj 
the Revolution at its commencement to be a war off 
extermination. The Mohammedans accepted the de4 
cision of their enemies with ferocious joy, for they\ 
deemed that it made their cause the cause of justice ] 
and of God. They took up arms to avenge the murder y 
of their brethren, and to defend their race and thei/ 
religion from bloodthirsty aggressors. \ 

While the Turks were preparing with unusual 
promptitude for war, Hypsilantes was trifling away 
his time at Yassi in the silliest manner. He conferred 
high military titles on his followers : captains at the 

^ Gordon says 160,000 ducats, erroneoualy for piastres, L 100; but 
Tricoupi reduces the sum to 60,000, about £2000 sterling at the then rate of 
exchange, L 54. 



150 REVOLUTION IN VALLACHIA. 

BOOK n. head of a hundred men were made generals, and in 
^"^' "' this way acquired an opportunity of proving that they 
were equally unfit for both offices. Karavia was re- 
warded for bringing indelible disgrace on the enterprise 
by being named a general. The extreme folly of Hyp- 
silantes in promoting the members of his suite was 
rendered more offensive by his omitting to confer any 
military distinction on the three ablest officers in the 
principalities, who were actually at the head of con- 
siderable bodies of efficient troops. These men were 
Theodore Vladimiresko^ a Vallachian boyard; Savas, 
a Greek of Patmos ; and GeorgaE, ofl3!^SrpuB.-~Ihey 
I were all Hetairists, and the neglect with which they 
were treated inspired Vladimiresko and Savas with 
suspicions that Hypsilantes and his phanariot advisers 
wished to supersede them in their commands. So 
rapidly did the prince reveal the weakness of his 
character, that during his stay at Yassi not a single 
Moldavian of any rank joined his standard.^ 

After allowing two months to pass unemployed, 
when every day ought to have been commemorated 
by exploits, Hypsilantes reached Bucharest on the 9th 
of April 1821. 

The three military chiefs neglected by the com- 
mander-in-chief were the real men of action in this 
unfortunate revolution. 

Georgaki of Olympus had been commandant of the 
Arnaout guard in Vallachia at the death of the hos- 
podar Alexander Soutzos. He was a man of courage 
and good sense, who had acquired some military expe^ 
rience in the Eussian service, and who was enthu- 
siastically devoted to the cause of Greece, without 
having formed any precise ideas concerning the means 
by which her liberty could be secured, lake most of 
his countrymen, his predominant idea was hatred of 

^ RizoB Neroulos, Histoire de rinsurrection Qrtcqut, 292. 



GEOKGAKI, SAVAS, VLADIMIRESKO. 151 

the Turks, and to secure a victory over his enemies heA.D. 1821. 
was ready to forge chains with which Eussia might 
bind both Turks and Greeks. He was a sincere patriot, 
but no politician. His influence over the Greek and 
Albanian soldiers in the principalities was great, for 
he was acknowledged to be their bravest leader ; but 
he had no sympathy with the Rouman population, and 
he was not liked by the native boyards. 

Savas of Patmos was a mere mercenary captain, but 
he was a man of cunning, courage, and ambition, who, 
under an able and energetic chief, might have been 
rendered an active and daring officer. He had been 
appointed commandant of the garrison of Bucharest 
by the regency which administered the government of 
Vallachia after the death of Alexander Soutzos. Savas's 
confidence in the cause of the Hetairists had been 
greatly diminished by their proceedings from the time 
Hypsilantes crossed the Pruth until he arrived at 
Bucharest. He believed he was distrusted ; and a new 
hospodar, Skarlatos Kalleniakes, having been appointed 
by the Porte, he conceived hopes of advancing his 
interests better by allying himself with the Phanariot 
hospodar, who was sure of being supported by the 
sultan, than with the princely adventurer, who seemed 
to have little chance of receiving any effectual support 
from Eussia. 

Theodore Vladimiresko was a lesser boyard, who had 
risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Russian 
service, and obtained the cross of St Vladimir, from 
w^hich he took his surname. He had as deep-rooted 
and as patriotic an aversion to Othoman domination 
as any Greek ; but he had also a strong aversion to 
the Greeks as the agents of Turkish oppression in his 
country. He had joined the Philik^ Hetairia because 
it was a society of the orthodox, which he hoped might 
be useful in delivering his countrymen from the state 



152 PROCEEDING IN VALLACHIA. 

BOOK iL of bondage in which they were living ; but he had no 

'- — intention of becoming a passive instrument of Greek 

intriguers. He was ambitious, cruel, and suspicious, 
without either the dashing courage of Greorgaki or the 
plausible manners of Savas. His deceitful conduct 
warranted the Greeks in regarding him as a traitor to 
their cause; but if Yallachian historians had alone 
written the history of the enterprise of the Hetairists 
with the fixed purpose of lauding nationality as the 
first of political virtues, Vladimiresko woiild have been 
\ . represented as a patriot and a hero. 
' ' * Hypsilantes reached Bucharest with only two thou- 
sand troops under his immediate orders. But he was 
abeady surrounded by a court and a crowd of adven- 
turers, seeking to advance their fortunes by crowding 
his antechamber, and by treating him with Oriental 
servility. There was no military system in his army ; 
and at Bucharest the conduct of his troops persuaded 
even the unwarlike Roumans that he was utterly unfit 
for the task he had undertaken. A few days after his 
arrival, everybody inquired with alarm how the en- 
terprise was likely to terminate. The infatuation of 
Hypsilantes still led him to expect success from the 
interference of Russia, and not from his own exer- 
tions ; but many of his followers began to perceive 
that Russia, like Hercules, would in all probability be 
in no hurry to assist a Uz y waggoner throniorh the 
muddy road into which he had voluntarily plunged. 
In the mean time, while Hypsilantes was waiting to 
receive the gift of a throne, he amused himself and his 
mimic court by taking into his service a company of 
comedians, and plundering the treasury of the monas- 
tery of Maryeni to fit up a theatre.^ 

The greatest disorder already reigned among the 
troops in both principalities. The soldiers were left 

^ Gordon, L 106. 



SACRED BATTALION. 153 

without pay, and at times without rations, so that a. n. 1821. 
they lived at free quarters among the peasantry ; and 
all discipline was relaxed. A numerous staJSf of oflBcers, 
in rich and fantastic dresses, hastened to and fro in 
the streets of Bucharest from morning to night, appa- 
rently intent on business, but without producing any 
result. Secretaries transmitted arbitrary requisitions 
for money and provisions to every district from which 
anything could be extracted ; and Hypsilantes had 
himself the impudence to issue orders to prepare quar- 
ters for a Russian army, which he declared the em- 
peror had placed under his command. 

The only corps formed by the Hetairists, whose dis- 
cipline and good conduct merits praise, was a regiment 
of volunteers called the Sacred Battalion. It was com- 
posed of about five hundred young men of the higher 
and middle ranks, full of enthusiasm for the cause of 
liberty. They adopted a black uniform, and placed 
the effigy of a death's head on their caps as a sign of 
their oath that they would die or conquer. Theirs, 
however, was no vain boast. 

" Kousing the vengeance death alone can quell, 
They rushed into the fight, and, foremost fighting, fell." 

Unfortunately, many of these young men were ill fitted 
to encounter the hardships of a campaign, by their 
extreme youth and their previous habits. Yet, though 
they suffered severe privations on the march, they 
behaved with spirit and order, and were everywhere 
praised by the peasantry for their discipline. 

Georgaki of Olympus had also an efficient body of 
cavalry under his orders, but its number did not 
exceed two hundred well-mounted troopers. 

The garrison of Bucharest, imder the command of 
Savas, amounted to a thousand men, and composed an 
efficient corps of veteran mercenaries. 



CHAP. II. 



154 PROCEEDINGS IN VALLACHIA. 

BOOK II. Vladimiresko was encamped at the monastery of 
Kotratzani, in the immediate vicinity of the capital, 
with three thousand pandours, or Vallachian light 
cavalry. His force was in good order, and he had 
adopted prudent arrangements for securing ample sup- 
plies of provisions and military stores. A good deal 
of intrigue was going on among all who possessed any 
share of civil or military power in Vallachia. Savas, 
as commandant of the garrison of Bucharest, had been 
ordered by the regency to defend the capital against 
Vladimiresko, who had commenced an insurrection in 
Little Vallachia immediately after the death of Alex- 
ander Soutzos, at the instigation of the Hetairists, in 
order to distract the attention of the Othoman govern- 
ment. But the conduct of Hypsilantes in Moldavia 
having convinced Vladimiresko that the prince was 
too incompetent to have been selected by the Russian 
cabinet as the leader of a revolution, he advanced 
towards Bucharest, in order to watch the progress of 
events, and preserve his own position as an indepen- 
dent Vallachian chief. On the 29th of March, while 
Hypsilantes was trifling away his time on the road 
between Yassi and Bucharest, Vladimiresko encamped 
before the Vallachian capital, and published a procla- 
mation to the inhabitants, breathing a spirit of Rouman 
patriotism, declaring that he came to aid them as the 
champion of his native land, and inviting them to 
send deputies in order to discuss with him the measures 
to be adopted for laying before the Porte a detailed 
statement of the evils they suffered from the rapacity 
of the phanariots. It was evident that Vladimiresko 
had abandoned the cause of the Hetairists. 
/ When Hypsilantes reached Bucharest, neither Vladi- 
I miresko nor Savas would acknowledge him as com- 
\ mander-in-chief. Both distrusted him, and both were 
aware of his incapacity : but as they distrusted and 



PEOCEEDINGS IN VALLACHIA. 155 

hated one another, both opened communications with a.d. ism. 
him, hoping to render his influence subservient to the ' 

furtherance of their own projects. 

The sultan had now assembled a considerable number 
of Turkish troops on the southern bank of the Danube. 
Hypsilantes had only one chance of tenninating his 
enterprise with honour. He might still beat up the 
quarters of the enemy before they could concentrate 
a force sufficient to overwhelm the principalities like 
an avalanche. Instead of taking the field, he com- 
menced a series of intrigues with the boyard and the 
Patmian, in which each of the three negotiators en- 
deavoured to cheat the other two. This wretched 
scene of cunning was brought to a termination by 
an event that would alone have sufficed to ruin the 
enterprise. The news arrived at Bucharest that the 
patriarch of Constantinople had issued an anathema 
against the Hetairia, and cursed Hypsilantes and his 
cause. The enterprise of Hypsilantes was no longer 
an orthodox cause, and the Koumans were eager to 
express their detestation of a scheme which they attri- 
buted to Greek ambition. The scandalous behaviour 
of persons in the prince's suite, and the want of discip- 
line among his troops, disgusted the VaUachians, who 
saw that the corps of Savas and Vladimiresko behaved 
in an orderly manner, and respected the property of 
the citizens.^ 

While the feelings of the Rouman population were 
in this state, the news arrived that Eussia disclaimed 
all complicity with the Hetairists, and that the Emperor 
Alexander reprobated the conduct of Hypsilantes. A 
congress of European sovereigns which met at Lay- 
bach declared that the members of the Holy Alliance 
were hostile to all revolutionary movements ; and the 
Russian emperor, to afibrd a proof of his reprobation 

^ Tricoupi, i. 61. 



156 ANATHEMA OF THE PATRIARCH. 

BOOK II. of the movement in the transdanubian principalities, 
^^^^Ii]t^ announced his determination to preserve peace with 
the sultan, and consented to the entry of Othoman 
troops into the country for the purpose of suppressing 
the troubles caused by the insane pjqjficLj^fLHypsi- 
lantes. At the same time he dismissed Hypsilantes 
from the Russian service. 

The anathema of the patriarch and the policy of 
the Russian emperor awakened open opposition to the 
Hetairists on the part of the clergy and the natives, 
and encouraged Savas and Vladimiresko to treat the 
assumption of supreme power by Hypsilantes as an idle 
pretension, which they admitted only to advance their 
own private interests. They both opened secret com- 
munications with the sultan's officers, though neither 
of them appears to have attached any importance to 
the fact that the sultan was, by the constitution of the 
orthodox church of Constantinople, the legal supporter 
of the patriarch's authority. Many boyards, who had 
hitherto believed that the enterprise of Hypsilantes 
would eventuaUy receive Russian support, now fled to 
Austria, and, before quitting the principalities, trans- 
mitted to the Porte strong declarations of devotion to 
the sultan's government, and gave strict orders to 
their stewards to throw every obstacle in the way of 
the Hetairists, and afibrd every facility to the advance 
of the Othoman troops. 

The decision of the Emperor Alexander was an- 
nounced to the boyards of Moldavia at Yassi on the 
day Hypsilantes entered Bucharest ; and he received 
the news of his own dismissal from the Russian service, 
and of the consent of the Russian government to the 
advance of the Othoman troops, a day or two later, by 
letters from Nesselrode and Capodistrias, written by 
order of the emperor. These letters upbraided him for 
his folly in commencing the Revolution, and for his 



RUSSIA DISCLAIMS THE REVOLUTION. 157 

falsehood in making use of the emperor's name in a a. h. isa. 
manner both unbecoming and untrue. He was ordered j 
to lay down his arms immediately, as the only repara- 
tion he could make for the many evils he had created by 
his unreasonable ambition. From this moment it was 
evident that the Eevolution was hopeless, and it was 
clearly the duty of Hypsilantes to terminate his mili- 
tary and political career as speedily, and with as little 
injury to the principalities as possible. Had he frankly 
communicated the contents of the documents trans- 
mitted to him by the Russian embassy at Constan- 
tinople to his principal oflBcers, and concerted openly 
and honourably with Savas and Vladimiresko the 
measures necessary to be taken for preserving order 
and securing a general amnesty, he might still have 
saved thousands from ruin and death, and his own 
name from dishonour. But his vanity was so extra- 
vagant, and his incapacity so depIorableTlhafe he per- 
sisted in his habit of dec^itl 

The policy "of Kussia was known to everybody in 
Bucharest a few hours after the prince had read his 
letters. Georgaki of Olympus and the principal officers 
of Hypsilantes's troops waited on him to know the 
precise nature of the communications he had received, 
in order to decide on their future operations. They 
were received with the ceremonial of a royal court. 
Hypsilantes listened to their request with an aJSEected 
air of condescension and self-satisfaction, but he could 
not prevent an expression of pettishness revealing itself 
in his reply ; and he had the baseness to assure the 
officers that, though the Emperor Alexander deemed it ( 
necessary to disapprove of his conduct openly, to pre- } 
serve peace in Europe, his imperial majesty had pri- 
vately ordered Capodistrias to inform him that the 
Hetairists were not to lay down their arms until they 
were informed of the issue of proposals in favour of 



158 HYPSILANTES'S DECEITFUL CONDUCT. 

BOOK in the Greeks, which the Russian minister at Constan- 

'—■ tinople was instructed to lay before the Porte. He 

informed them also that, under the circumstances, he 
ihad no intention of attacking the Turks, and that he 
believed the Othoman troops at Rutshuk and Silistria 
would not invade the principalities. When he made 
'. these statements, he knew that every word he uttered 
was false. 

Hypsilantes was now at the head of a small and 
irregular army, almost entirely destitute of artillery, 
but with this force he took the field. Yet even then, 
instead of hastening to the Danube to cover Bucharest, 
and gain honour at least by some brilliant exploit, he 
crept away towards the Austrian frontier. His pro- 
ceedings induced both Savas and Vladimiresko to 
suspect that he was playing some secret game for his 
own advantage, of which they were to be the dupes. 
They resolved to imitate the example, and turn the 
troubled aspect of public affairs to their own profit at 
his expense. Both of them carried on active negotia- 
tions with the Othoman commander at Rutshuk. Savas 
expected to obtain promotion by betraying the prince 
into the hands of the Turks. Vladimiresko is said to 
have believed that, by balancing between the different 
parties, he might at last succeed in inducing the Porte 
to name him hospodar of Vallachia. If this accusation 
be true, he must have been a worthy rival of Prince 
Alexander Hypsilantes in military diplomacy. 

The consent of Russia to the suppression of the 
Revolution by Othoman troops, made it necessary for 
Hypsilantes to fight immediately, or escape rapidly. 
He had so completely neglected military business 
while he was at the head of his army, that on entering 
on the campaign he was almost without ammunition, 
and to supply the want he commenced active opera- 
ticms by plundering the stores of Vladimiresko of six 



HYPSILANTES'S MILITARY OPERATIONS. 159 

thousand pounds of powder. The troops behaved as a.d. isa. 
ill as their leader : they plundered the baggage of the 
metropolitan bishop, and of several boyards, who were 
fleeing for safety to the Austrian territory. 

The Turks, who had assembled considerable forces 
at Ibrail, Silistria, Giourgevo, and Widin, were no 
longer likely to encounter any serious opposition in 
marching to Yassi and Bucharest. On the 27th of 
May they reached Bucharest, and the pasha of Silis- 
tria entered it on the 29th. Savas, though in negotia- 
tion with the Turkish authorities, followed the revolu- 
tionary army in hopes of finding an opportunity of 
making the prince prisoner, and delivering him into 
the hands of the pasha of Giourgevo. Vladimiresko 
also followed the movements of Hypsilantes; for by 
recognising him as commander-in-chief, he had com- 
promised his own position as an independent Val- 
lachian leader. The movements of Hypsilantes indi- 
cate that his object in taking the field was to prevent 
the Othoman cavalry *%utting off his retreat to the 
Austrian frontier. 

Hypsilantes had formed a camp at Tergovisht, where 
he now threw up intrenchments, and declared that he 
would await the attack of the Turks. But Vladimir- 
esko having made dispositions for marching into Little 
Vallachia, where he expected to maintain himself with 
advantage until he had brought his negotiations with 
the Othoman oflBcers to a favourable termination, Hyp- 
silantes became so alarmed that he ordered Vladimir- 
esko to be arrested, or slain as a traitor. A conspiracy 
of Hetairists had been already formed among the 
officers in the Vallachian army, in consequence of the 
dissatisfaction felt at his communications with the 
Turks. A part of the correspondence of the Vallachian 
chief with the kehaya of the pasha of Giourgevo had 
-been intercepted, and placed in Hypsilantes's hands. 



160 ARREST OP VLADIMIRESKO. 

BOOK lu The prince showed this correspondence to Georgaki, 

— ^ and upbraided him with having initiated Vladimiresko 

into the secrets of the Hetairia, telling him that it was 
his duty to. remedy the evils produced by his impru- 
dence, which could ouly be done by arresting the 
traitor. Georgaki, who was a brave and loyal cha- 
racter, undertook the task without hesitation. While 
at Piteshti, he was invited by a party in the VaUachian 
camp at Goleshti to assist them in putting an end to 
the authority of Vladimiresko ; and on receiving this 
invitation, he hastened forward with a body of cavalry. 
A council of officers was assembled to receive a com- 
munication of the greatest importance ; and when the 
assembly met, Georgaki boldly accused Vladimiresko of 
treachery, and declared that he was sent to summon 
him to answer for his conduct before the prince as 
commander-in-chief of the army. Vladimiresko, who 
despised Hypsilantes, and regarded Georgaki as his 
friend, did not consider that he exposed himself to 
much danger by submitting to the arrest, and return- 
ing to Hypsilantes's camp in company with Georgaki. 
He knew that many of his own officers were dissatis- 
fied with his conduct, and he feared that, if he refused 
to justify himself voluntarily, they might have deserted 
his cause openly. He counted on the attachment of 
his soldiers, and the inferior officers of the VaUachian 
army, as a sufficient guarantee for his personal safety. 
Though cruel and selfish, he was not an adept in 
treachery and falsehood, and his conscience reproached 
him for intriguing with the Turks when he listened to 
the language of truth and honour, simply and frankly 
uttered by Georgaki, whom he had always admired 
and respected. He felt that he had violated his duty 
to his country, which probably afiected him far more 
than any vidatxon of his oath to the Hetairists. 
Hypsilantes still lingered at Tergovisht when Vladi- 



HIS MURDER. 161 

miresko was brought before him. Though himselfA.D. 1821. 
meditating the treacherj of abandoning his followers, 
he repraachedlihe Vallachian chief for his treachery to 
the Hfita ilia in rude and oppr obrious language.' " V ladi- 
miresko retorted that he had^sefved Eis country better 
than his accusers, and excused his correspondence with 
the Turks, by asserting that the intrigues of Savas had 
compelled him to countermine that officer. Instead 
of ordering Vladimiresko to be tried by a court-martial, 
Hypsilantes pretended to pardon him ; but two nights 
after he allowed some of his Greek partisans, who 
were the most determined enemies of Rouman nation- 
ality, to hurry the Vallachian chief out of the town, 
and to murder him with their swords and yataghans.^ 
The incapacity of Hypsilantes prevented his deriving 
any advantage from this assassination, though it in- 
creased his little army by an addition of four thousand 
men, four pieces of artillery, a considerable supply of 
ammunition, and a well-filled military chest. 

Savas, alarmed at finding that all his dealings with 
the Turks were known, quitted Hypsilantes with his 
whole force, and joined the Othoman troops. 

The Hetairists were now in danger of being sur- 
rounded by three divisions of the Turkish army ad- 
vancing from Bucharest, Giourgevo, and Widin. On 
the 8th of June the advanced guard from Bucharest 
engaged a body of Hetairists near Tergovisht, and both 
parties claimed the victory. Hypsilantes, however, 
moved off to Piteshti with such precipitation that he 
lost twelve waggons, laden with biscuit, and part of the 
baggage of his army, in the river Dimbovitza ; and one 
corps abandoned the line of march, and retreated to 
Kimpolunghi. The Othoman troops occupied Tergo- 
visht, and the prince pursued his march northward to 
Rimnik. Hia jjigyements were jp evidently., without 

^ Compare Gordon, 1. 113; Tricoupi, i. 149; and Photeinos, 132. 
VOL. 1. L 



162 BATTLE OF DRAGASHAN. 

BOOK II. any military object, that his followers became per- 

'^- fina/^Arl fhc^t V^ig^wjj porgpy^gJ^Qafpf j aloDe OCCUpied Ms 

thoughts. After remaining three days at Rimnik, on 
the Oltar he resolved to attack a body of Turkish 
cavalry which had advanced from Kraiova and taken 
post at the village of Dragashan, about thirty miles 
from his camp. The force under his command 
amounted to four thousand infantry, twenty-five hun- 
dred cavalry, and four guns. 

On the 19th of June 1821, Prince Nicolas Hypsi- 
lantes, at the head of the sacred battalion, supported by 
Karavias, with five hundred cavalry and four guns, 
took up a position before the Turkish post at Draga- 
shan. Georgaki sent forward a strong body of Valla- 
chian infantry to occupy the road to Kraiova, and thus 
cut ofi" the retreat of the Turks. The revolutionists 
required rest, for they had made a long march over 
heavy ground wet with rain. Georgaki, who was the 
superior officer, resolved to attack the enemy next 
morning ; and to prevent the Turks from escaping to 
Kraiova, he strengthened the Vallachian infantry with 
a body of horse. As soon as these arrangements were 
completed, he despatched an orderly to the head- 
quarters of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, urging the 
commander-in-chief to hasten forward and secure the 
glory of the day. The envy of Karavias frustrated the 
prudence of Georgaki. He hated the Olympian, be- 
cause in the hour of danger all men's eyes were turned 
on that gallant soldier, and he now resolved to rob him 
of what seemed to the less experienced Cephaloniat an 
^ easy victory. Karavias succeeded in persuading Ni- 
j colas Hypsilantes, who was as weak as his brother, to 
■ disobey the precise orders of their superior officer, and 
'to advance with the sacred battalion and the artil- 
lery to attack the Turks, assuring him that, with the 
support of the cavalry, of which Karavia had five 



BATTLE OF DRAGASHAN. 163 

hundred in advance, it would be easy to fitorm a. d. 182l 
Dragashan. 

The Turkish force amounted to eight hundred men. 
Its officers were fully aware of their dangerous position, 
and were anxiously watching for an opportunity to 
escape, when they perceived the sacred battalion ad- 
vance to attack them. They immediately saw that, if 
they could destroy it before it could receive succour, 
they might still succeed in effecting their retreat. The 
sacred battalion was composed of brave and enthusi- 
astic youths, but their bodies were not hardened by 
active life, and they had not yet acquired the steady 
discipline of veterans. Wearied with a fatiguing 
march, and stiff with a short rest, they were suddenly 
formed, and led hurriedly forward to attack the enemy. 
The Turkish cavalry was drawn up, waiting an attack ; 
but it was carefully concealed behind the buildings of 
the village, which covered it from the fire of the 
artillery. When the moment was favourable, the Turks 
pounced from their concealment on the Greeks. Gal- 
loping furiously, with loud shouts, in the intervals be- 
tween the companies, before the sacred battalion could 
form squares, they broke its order in a dozen places 
by a heavy fire of pistols and carbines. But though 
broken, the men behaved with courage ; and, true to 
their oath, they fell bravely fighting round their 
standard. Very different was the conduct of Karavias 
and the cavalry; they fled without crossing sabres 
with the Turks, and spread terror among the troops in 
the rear, by the exaggerated accounts they gave of the 
Othoman forces, as an excuse for their cowardly be- 
haviour. 

Georgaki, after terminating all his arrangements for 
the morrow, was preparing to take some rest when he 
heard the sound of guns. Assembling a few officers, 
and placing himself at the head of his own veteran 



"164 FLIGHT OF HYPSILANTES. 

BOOK II. troopers, he galloped to the field, and, by an impetuous 
^^^' "' charge on the dispersed Turks, recovered the standard 
of the sacred battalion, and recaptured two guns. The 
Othoman cavalry soon rallied, and, securing two of the 
guns they had captured, and about forty prisoners, 
they prepared to attack Georgaki, who was obliged to 
retire, after saving about one hundred men of the 
sacred battalion, and forming a rear-guard to protect 
the Greek army, which was seized with a panic. The 
Vallachians, on the road to Kraiova, dispersed, each 
J ^^, \ man seeking his own home. This trifling engagement 
• -.\ . \ terminated the military career of Prince Alexander 
''>''. .c^"* \ Hypsilantes. He was .About nine miles in ^e rear 
\ ' ' when he received the first news of ^Ts "deleat, and he 

fl^d^mthout delay to Rimnik, where he was soon fol- 
lowed by his brother Nicolas and the other fugitives-^ 
Hypsilantes now began to fear that the Hetairists, 
and some of those who had followed his fortunes with- 
out being allowed to enter his apartments by the 
" sacred staircase,'^ which he reserved for his friends 
and the dignitaries of his court,^ would detain him in 
Vallachia by force, in order to negotiate for their 
common safety. He had, however, resolved to make 
his escape with his own suite into Austria ; and to efiect 
this object, he resorted to his usual systesaJifdegeit and 
falsehood. I t is even said th at he forged- letters^^an- 
nounci ng that th e Emperor ofAustria had declared war 
with the sultan, and that the generaT (commanding in 
TraiTsjTvaniardesired to hold a conference w;tL Prince 
Hj^silantes on thelrontier.^ Tt Is certain that he com- 
muriicafed^^larnewT^t'o IbHbse about him, and ordered 
public rejoicings in his camp to celebrate the event. 

^ An idea of the different accounts of the affair of Dragashan which were 
circulated among the Greeks, may be formed by comparing Gordon, i. 120, and 
Tricoupi, i. 163, with Photeinos, 153. 

' Photeinos, 137, mentions the dissatisfaction which this '' sacred staircase" 
caused among the Greek officers who were not phanariots. 



FLIGHT OF HYPSILANTES. 165 

He even carried bis hypocrisy so far as to order a a. d. 1821 
solemn service of thanksgiving to God to be celebrated 
in the church of Kosia, amidst repeated volleys of 
musketry.^ Under cover of this trick, he escaped with 
his two brothers and a few of his personal friends to 
the Austrian territory, on the 26th of June. With his ^^^-^ 
usual fatuity and presumption, he promised the troops 
whom he abandoned, that he would send an aide-de- 
camp to conduct them to the quarters assigned to them 
in Austria, in virtue of the arrangements he had con- 
cluded. But as soon as thjs wretched adventurer found 
himself in safety, he issued an order of the day, to which 
he afl&xed a false date, as if it had been written at 
Eimnik, In this document he heaps insulting accusa- 
tions on the Greeks and Eoumans, who had supported 
his cause, naming several as fools, traitors, and cowards, 
and speaking of his own exploits with bombastic self- 
gratulation.^ 

The flight of Hypsilantes was the last scene of the 
drama enacted by the Philike Hetairia in the princi- 
palities, where its machinations succeeded, by the rash 
ambition of its supreme head and the utter incapacity 
of its members, in bringing great calamities on the 
people, and in laying the foundations of an anti-Greek 
feeling, which has ended in depriving the Greeks of all 
political power in those provinces. 

The fate of Hypsilantes hardly deserves to be re- 
corded. Austria treated him as a Kussian deserter, 
and would readily have surrendered him to be tried 

^ Compare Gordon, i. 122, and Tricoupi, i. 167. 

* Tricoupi, i. 168, and Philemon, Greek MevoltUionj u. 184, give what is 
doubtless a correct version ; but Photeinos, 160, publishes another text, which 
appears to have circulated in Vallachia, where he wrote. The diflTerence, though 
verbally great, does not alter the sense. Philemon conceals the fact that the 
date is false. On the 8th (20th) June, Hypsilantes was not at Rimnik, but | 
within the Austrian frontier. The individuals named were probably deserving I 
of blame, but surely their leader, who abandoned his own soldiers, was not en- | 
titled to reproach them. For dates, the books of the Austrian police ore a 
better authority than the writings of Hypsilantes. 



0H4P. XI. 



166 OPERATIONS IN MOLDAVIA. 

BOOK II. and shot by a Kussian court-martial, had the Emperor 
Alexander felt the slightest wish to make a military- 
example. But as the emperor had no wish to punish 
one whom he considered sufficiently punished by the 
disgraceful issue of his enterprise, he conveyed an in- 
timation to the Austrian government, that the prince 
would be left at its disposal. Austria, always_hqstile 
to revolutions, and irritated by, the xepoxts which Hyp- 
silantes had spread of her having declared wm with the 
sultan, retained him as a prisoner until the year 1827. 
He was then released, and died at Vienna in the fol- 
lowing year. The public career of Prince Alexander 
J Hypsilantes offers not one single virtuous or courage- 
! ous deed on which the historian can dwell with satis- 
': faction. He was a contemptible leader, and a worthless 
• man. 

The traitor Savas was disappointed of his reward. 
He was invited to Bucharest by the pasha of Silistria, 
and when he waited to receive wealth and honour for 
his devotion to the sultan, he was beheaded for having 
connived at the treason of the Hetairists. 

In Moldavia, the sultan's authority was re-established 
without difficulty. As soon as the boyards heard that 
Kussia disclaimed all connection with the Hetairists, 
they deposed Michael Soutzos, who fled to Eussia, 
without making an effort to uphold the cause in which 
he had embarked. But a Greek named Peutedekas, 
who had been deputed by Hypsilantes to direct the 
administration and forward supplies to the army, arriv- 
ing at Yassi shortly after the flight of the deposed 
hospodar, assembled a few troops, and took possession 
of the government in defiance of the boyards. Prince 
George Cantacuzenos, who came to Moldavia from 
Hypsilantes's army, because he pretended to have it in 
his power to draw supplies of money and provisions 
from his estates in Bessarabia, acted as lieutenant- 



AFFAIR AT SKULENI. 167 

general. He stationed himself near the Russian a. D.1821. 
frontier, and when the Othoman troops entered Yassi 
on the 25th of June, he deserted his troops, and placed 
his own person in security by crossing the Pruth. 

The only military exploits of the Greeks in the prin- 
cipalities, were those which were performed after the 
commander-in-chief had escaped into Austria, and his 
lieutenant-general into Russia. The officers, who had 
retired to Skuleni with Cantacuzenos, refused to follow 
him in his flight over the Pruth. They declared that 
they had sworn to defend the cause to the last, and 
that they could not abandon it without a battle, in 
which there was always a chance of victory for brave 
men. They said that it was no disgrace for civilians 
to retire from the dangerous position they occupied, 
but military honour commanded soldiers to remain. 
The lieutenant-general paid no attention to their ob- 
servations. 

About four hundred men, Greeks, Albanians, and 
Servians, intrenched themselves, as well as the time 
and their means allowed, at Skuleni, on the banks of 
the Pruth, where they were attacked on the 29th of 
June by a strong body of Othoman troops, who brought 
up six guns to play on their camp. Nothing could 
surpass the valour with which the Christians defended 
their position. The Turks made several attempts to 
storm it under cover of the fire of their artillery, but 
were repulsed. Their grape-shot and rifles, however, 
gradually thinned the numbers of their enemies. 
Russian officers who viewed the engagement from the 
left bank of the Pruth, declared that the Greeks behaved 
like veteran troops. At last the number of the de- 
fenders became insufficient to man the intrenchments. 
The Othomans redoubled their assaults, the fire of their 
guns was concentrated on one point, and a body of 
cavalry, covered by a round of grape from the artillery 



OHAP. II. 



168 DEATH OF GEORGAKI. 

BOOK II. and a heavy fire of musketry, charged over the earth- 
works into the midst of the camp. Those who were not 
killed on the spot plunged into the river, and many 
gained the Eussian bank in safety. This gallant affair 
at Skuleni terminated the Eevolution in Moldavia. 

The Turks, after their victory at Dragashan, occupied 
all Little Vallachia, where order was easily established. 
Most of the Hetairists in the principality escaped over 
the Austrian frontier, but a few bands of irregulars 
retreated eastward through Vallachia, attempting to 
reach Moldavia, from whence they expected to gain the 
Eussian frontier. Georgaki was one of those who re- 
fused to follow the example of Hypsilantes. Collect- 
ing a number of determined men, who resolved neither 
to owe their lives to Austrian protection nor to Turkish 
mercy, he proposed to fight his way to the Eussian 
frontier. Once in Eussia, he had no doubt that he 
would soon find means to transport himself and his 
companions to Greece, where he now learned that the 
battle of freedom could alone be fought. He was 
joined by a Macedonian captain, named Pharmaki, who 
was at the head of two hundred and fifty men. 

The two chiefs were surrounded by the Turks long 
before they could gain even the Moldavian frontier, for 
the indiscipline and misconduct of Hypsilantes^s troops, 
and the exactions of the Hetairists in levying contri- 
butions, had created a feeling of animosity in the 
breasts of the Eouman population. The consequence 
of this was that the Turkish officers were accurately 
informed by the peasantry of every movement of Georg- 
aki and Pharmaki, while those leaders could obtain no 
information concerning the position and movements 
of the Turkish troops. After many almost incredible 
marches and hairbreadth escapes, the Greek chiefs were 
at last completely surrounded by their enemies, and 
blockaded in the monastery of Seko. All provisions 



TERMINATION OF THE ENTERPRISE. 169 

were cut off; every road was barricaded, and no possi- a. d. 1821. 
bility of escape remained. The Turks offered terms of 
capitulation, which were rejected. Georgaki occupied 
a belfry, which stood at a short distance from the 
principal building. With a few soldiers he defended 
the entrance of the monastery, but the upper part of 
the belfry tower being of wood, was set on fire, and its 
garrison had no choice but to rush through a heavy fire 
of the enemy to gain the main building, to perish in 
the flames, or to surrender at discretion : what really 
occurred in the belfry is not known with certainty. 
Georgaki had repeatedly declared, as danger became 
more and more imminent, that he would never submit 
to the Turks. It is certain that he threw open the 
door of the belfry, and invited all who wished to 
escape to run as quickly as possible to the monastery. 
Immediately after, the powder-chest exploded. One 
man only escaped.^ 

Pharmaki defended the monastery for a fortnight, 
until both his provisions and ammunition were ex- 
hausted. The Turks were extremely anxious to make 
a few prisoners, and after a long negotiation, they per- 
suaded Pharmaki to surrender with about twenty men 
on the 4th October. Thirty-three Greeks who refused 
to trust the promises of the Turkish officers, that their 
lives would be spared, escaped on the night previous to 
the surrender, and gained the Austrian frontier. What- 
ever promises were made by the Turkish officers, were 
as usual disclaimed by the sultan as soon as his enemies 
were in his power. The soldiers were put to death as 
soon as an order for their execution could arrive from 
Bucharest. Pharmaki was sent to Constantinople, 
where he was tortured and then beheaded. 

Thus terminated this ill-judged attempt to make a / 1 
Greek revolution in foreign provinces, without offering f • 

^ Tricoupi, i. 166. Philemon, Qreek Bevoltdion, ii 208. 



170 TERMINATION OF THE ENTERPRISE. 

BOOK II. to the native population any guarantee for a better 

'—^ administration of justice, or any prospect of increasing 

the liberties of the nation. The Eoumans, long op- 
jpiessed by their phanariot princes, had strong reasons 
; for detesting the enterprise, which, if successful, seemed 
/ likely to render the Greek domination in the principali- 
I ties perpetual, by placing them under the powerful pro- 
I tection of Kussia. Fortunately both for the Eoumans 
I and the Greeks, their nationalities escaped that strangu- 
lation which would have been the inevitable eflfect of the 
rapid extension of Kussian power in European Turkey 
at this period. Unfortunately the conduct of Hypsi- 
lantes and the Hetairists sullied the national character 
of the Greeks with a deep stain, which was only par- 
tially eflfaced by the noble conduct of the troops at 
Skuleni and the patriotic devotion of Georgaki. It 
was reserved for the native land of the Hellenic race 
to prove that Greece could still arm heroes in her cause. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION IN GREECE. 



** 'Efiol 8' ayii>y 58' ovk h^pSmurros icdXai 
"NciKTiS iraXauas ^X^e, ffitv XP^^V 7* M^"* 
"EoTTiKa 8* l^y6^ l^vata' ^ir* i^upyaafiivois, 
OC^o) 8' iirpa^ay Kcd rdS' ovk kpv4\iroiiai 
'As fi^T€ ipe6y€iv fi'iyr* kfiivfirdai fiSpoy.^* 

AiVx^Aow *Ayafi4fUfw, 1877-1881. 

"What I did, I did 
Not with a random inconsiderate blow, 
But from old hate, and well matured by time. 
Here, where I struck, I take my rooted stand 
Upon the finished deed. The blow so given, 
Was with wise forethought so by me devised 
That flight was hopeless, and defence was vain." 

Professor Blackie^s Translation of JSsckylus, 

Extermination of the Turks in Greece — Preparations op the Othoman 

GOVERNMENT — OPERATIONS OP THE HeTAIRISTS IN THE MOREA — THB 

Archimandrite, Greoorios Dieaios — Attempt op primates to defer the 
INSURRECTION— Hostages summoned to Trifoutza by the Turks — Warn- 
ing letter forged by toe Greeks — First insurrectional movements in 
the Peloponnesus — ^Turks at Ealavryta surrender, and are murdered 
— Character op Petrobey — ^Taking op Kalamata, and first Tb Deum 
FOR victory — Outbreak at Patras — Extermination op the Moham- 
medan POPULATION IN Greece — Character and biography op Theodore 

KOLOKOTRONES — HiS PRAYER AT ChRYSOVITZI — REVOLUTION AT SaLONA, 
AND CHARACTER OP PaNOURLA.8— SaLONA AND LiVADEA TAKEN — CHARACTER 

OP DiAKos — Murder of Mohammedans — Acropolis op Athens besieged 
— Revolution at Mesolonghi — Vrachori taken, and Turks and Jews 
massacred — Revolution in the islands — Oligarchy and system of 

TRADE AT HyDRA — SpETZAS FIRST PROCLAIMS THE REVOLUTION — PSARA 

FOLLOWS — Insurrection at Hydra headed by Economos — First cruise 
OF THE Greek fleet — Murder of the Sheik-el-islam— Fall of Economos 
— Othoman fleet quits the Dardanelles—Greeks prepare fire-ships 
— Turkish line-op-battle ships burned off Mitylbne — Eydonies backed 
BY THE Greeks — Squadron under Miaou lis on western coast of Greece. 

It would require Shakespeare^s richness of language 
to give adequate expression to the intensity of passion 
with which the modem Greeks rose to destroy the 
power of their Othoman masters. 



CBAP. III. 



172 TURKISH POPULATION. 

BooKiL In the month of April 1821, a Mussulman popula- 
tion, amounting to upwards of twenty thousand souls, 
was living, dispersed in Greece, employed in agriculture. 
Before two months had elapsed the greater part was 
slain — men, women, and children were murdered with- 
out mercy or remorse. Old men still point to heaps of 
stones, and tell the traveller, " There stood the pyrgos 
(tower) of Ali Aga, and there we slew him, his harem, 
and his slaves ;" and the old man walks calmly on to 
plough the fields which once belonged to Ali Aga, 
without a thought that any vengeful fury can attend 
his path. The crime was a nation's crime, and what- 
ever perturbations it may produce must be in a 
nation's conscience, as the deeds by which it can be 
expiated must be the acts of a nation. 

The feeling that a great social convulsion was at 
hand became general both among the Mussulman and 
Christian population of the Morea towards the end of 
1820. The prolonged resistance of Ali Pasha per- 
suaded every class that a revolution was inevitable, 
yet both Mussulmans and Christians carefully avoided 
every act tending to accelerate the outbreak. Each 
party seemed to be waiting for a signal from a dis- 
tance. 

The Greeks were unwarlike. The Turks were dis- 
persed over the country in single families or in small 
towns, and without local leaders. Both parties habit- 
ually postponed adopting a decisive line of conduct. 
Procrastination is quite as characteristic of Greek 
bishops and primates as of Turkish pashas and agas. 
The Greeks expected aid from Kussia — the Turks 
looked to the sultan for orders and for assistance. The 
Greeks, who were preparing for a revolution, formed 
no magazines of provisions, and collected no military 
stores. The Turks, who deemed an insurrection of the 
Christians inevitable, neglected to repair their for- 



TURKISH PREPARATIONS. 173 

tresses, lay up stores of provisions, and fill the cisterns a. d. 1820. 
with water in the strong castles scattered over the 
face of the country, which were capable of being ren- 
dered impregnable to insurgents without discipline and 
without artillery. 

During the summer of 1820, however, Sultan 
Mahmud was so much alarmed by the reports he 
received concerning the state of the Christian popula- 
tion in Greece, that he sent an officer to the Morea, 
with orders to put the principal fortresses in a state of 
defence. With the exception of Tripolitza, all these 
fortresses were situated on the sea-coast, and in all 
there was a Mussulman population accustomed to bear 
arms. They might all have been repaired and pro* 
visioned simultaneously ; but the Turks considered 
that their fleet could bring succour at any time, and 
the armed Mussulmans were confident that no Chris- 
tian subject of the Porte would dare to meet them in 
the field. The sultan's order was not carried into execu- 
tion, though it is possible that he believed the contrary. 

In the month of November 1820, Khurshid Pasha 
arrived in the Morea, with strict orders to watch the 
machinations of the Greeks and the intrigues of the 
Russian consular agents. He reported that in his 
pashalik there was no immediate danger of any dis- 
turbance ; and the sultan, finding that Ismael was 
conducting the operations against Ali Pasha with 
great incapacity, instructed Khurshid to take the com- 
mand of the army before Joannina, and leave a deputy 
to govern the Morea during his absence. Khurshid 
quitted Tripolitza in January 1821, leaving Mehemet 
Salik as his kaimakam, a young man of an arrogant 
disposition and no military experience. The garrison 
of Tripolitza was soon after strengthened by a rein- 
forcement of a thousand Albanians. 

The Philike Hetairia had made more progress in the 



CHAP. IIL 



174 HETAIRISTS IN THE MOREA. 

BOOK II. Morea than in the other parts of Greece. Many of 
the higher clergy, the primates, and the men possess- 
ing local influence, had been initiated during the years 
1819 and 1820 ; but the misconduct of some of the 
travelling agents, or apostles (as they were called), and 
the imprudence with which they admitted crowds of 
members, in order to receive fees, frightened the 
primates. Their distrust in the direction of the society 
was increased by an order to remit all the pecuniary 
contributions collected in Greece to the treasury at 
Constantinople. The impolicy of this order, at a time 
when it was a matter of the greatest urgency to collect 
stores in the mountains of Greece, where the Turks 
could hardly watch, and would be unable to control, 
the movements of the people, was so apparent that the 
Moreot Hetairists determined to establish a local 
treasury, and to investigate the mystery in which the 
direction of the society was enveloped. An active 
correspondence was carried on between the Hetairists 
in Greece and those in Constantinople and Russia, 
through the agency of the Russian consulate at Patras, 
which insured both secrecy and safety. In the autumn 
of 1820 the Moreots were informed that Prince Alex- 
ander Hypsilantes had assumed the supreme direction 
of the Hetairia, and that seven local ephors were 
appointed to conduct the business of the society in 
Greece. A local treasury was also constituted under 
the control of the ephors. This appears to have been 
the wisest measure ever adopted by the supreme direc- 
tion, and it was forced on it by the common sense of 
the Moreot Hetairists. The conspiracy in Greece was 
now fully organised. Germanos, the Metropolitan 
Bishop of Patras, who has left memoirs of the Greek 
Revolution, was the most distinguished member among 
the ephors.^ 

^ 'Tiro^K^fiOTo Tepi rris ^Eirauetardtrtws t^j *EWdSos. *AB^iv(U5, 1887. 



THE ARCHIMANDRITE GREGORIOS DIKAIOS. 175 

The confidence of the Greek Hetairists in the a. d. 182o. 
judgment of Prince Alexander Hjrpsilantes was soon 
shaken by the conduct of one of his agents. The 
most active apostle of the supreme direction in the 
Morea at this time was the Archimandrite, Qregorios 
Dikaios, commonly called Pappa Phlesas, a most un- 
clerical priest, but a bold conspirator. The licentious 
conduct, the carelessness of truth, and the wasteful 
expenditure of this man, rendered him unfit for any 
secret business where prudence was required. The 
Archbishop of Patras accuses him of shameful dis- 
honesty, declaring in his Memoirs that the archiman- 
drite sold eighty barrels of gunpowder, which were 
sent from Smyrna to Poros shortly before the outbreak 
of the Revolution.^ Pappa Phlesas spent the money in 
riotous living and travelling ; and wherever he went 
he announced that Russia would soon declare war 
with Turkey, and send an army to deliver Greece 
from the Othoman yoke. To his intimate associates 
he revealed the plan of the " Grand Project," which 
included the assassination of the sultan and the confla- 
gration of Constantinople as a part of its programma 
In the state of affairs in Greece, neither the discourses 
nor the financial co-operation of such an agent could 
do any good. Yet this man, with all his vices, proved 
that he possessed both patriotism and courage by his 
honourable death. After inflicting many deep wounds 
on political morality by his shameless peculations, and 
on the orthodox Church by his barefaced profligacy, 
he fell on the field of battle, fighting gallantly to arrest 
the progress of Ibrahim Pasha, as will be recorded in a 
future page. 

It is difficult for those who travel from London to 
Constantinople in a week, to form any idea of the dif- 
ficulty of obtaining information which existed in the 

1 Pp. 9, 22. 



176 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HETAIRISTS. 

BOOK iL East durinff the first thirty years of the present cen- 

CHAP. Ill* •/ •/ X 

'■ — tury. Little could be learned with accuracy concern- 
ing the events that happened in the nearest province, 
and the wildest reports were circulated, and obtained 
credence even among men of education. Newspapers 
were unknown, and private correspondents had rarely 
access to authentic sources of information. The 
Hetairists, therefore, found all men ready to believe 
their wildest assertions. We need not therefore be 
surprised to find that, in the Morea, the Greeks were 
universally persuaded that a Eussian fleet would 
appear in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1821, 
and land an army to expel the Turks from Greece. 
The confidence inspired by this conviction was so 
great, that the primates deemed it necessary to adopt 
some precautions to allay the popular effervescence. 
They felt that they were exposed to become the vic- 
tims of the precautionary measures which the Othoman 
government habitually adopted to prevent insurrec- 
tions. They feared that they should be suddenly 
arrested, and carried off to Tripolitza as hostages for 
the tranquillity of their countrymen. 

The Turks heard the reports which were current, 
and were quite as much alarmed as the primates. They 
called on the kaimakam at Tripolitza to take measures 
for preventing an insurrection of the Christians. At 
this crisis the leading Hetairists in the country round 
Fatras held a meeting at Vostitza, the ancient jEgium, 
in the month of February 1821, to decide on the 
course they ought to pursue. The assembly was a 
revival of the Achaian League. Many bishops and 
primates were present. Fappa Fhlesas attended the 
meeting, and when urged to be more cautious in his 
proceedings, he ridiculed the terror of the primates, 
persisted in his assertion that Kussian aid was at 
hand, and pleaded the commands of Hypsilantes as 



ATTEMPT TO DEFER THE OUTBREAK. 177 

his authority for urging on the people. The principal a d. 182i. 
members of the assembly resolved to imprison him in 
a monastery, but no one ventured to arrest the im- 
petuous priest. At last the meeting decided on send- 
ing two messengers to obtain accurate information 
concerning the projects of the supreme direction of 
the Hetairia, and the nature of the support it was to 
receive from the Russian government. One of these 
messengers was sent to Ignatius, the Archbishop of 
Aota, who was living at Pisa in Tuscany, and who 
was supposed to be well acquainted with the intentions 
of the Eussian cabinet. The other was deputed to 
confer with Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, and ascer- 
tain the real extent of his military preparations. The 
agents of the supreme direction had already fixed the 
6th of April as the day on which the Revolution was 
to break out simultaneous in every province and city of 
the Othoman empire in which the Greeks were numer- 
ous. The assembly of Vostitza now decided that in the 
Morea the outbreak should be adjourned until the 
ephors received answers to their communications from 
Ignatius and Hypsilantes. 

Matters had already gone too far for the people to 
stop at the beck of the bishops and the primates. No 
fears for the personal safety of a 'few could now damp 
the general enthusiasm. The Hetairists at Vostitza did 
not entirely neglect to prepare for the Revolution which 
they wished to delay. They raised among themselves 
the sum of £2000 sterling by a private subscription, 
and they deputed several monks of Megaspelaion to 
collect money in order to purchase arms and ammu- 
nition. But their counsels displayed more selfishness 
and timidity than was justified at a moment when 
even prudence dictated enthusiasm and boldness as 
the only safe policy. Indeed, it must be recorded here, 
as on many ftiture occasions, that the Greek Revolu* 

VOL. I. M 



CHAP. III. 



178 HOSTAGES SUMMONED TO TRTPOLITZA. 

. BOOK II. tion was emphatically the work of the people. The 
leaders generally proved unfit for the position they 
occupied, but the people never wavered in the contest. 
From the day they took up arms they made the vic- 
tory of the orthodox church and the establishment of 
their national independence the great objects of their 
existence. 

As soon as the kaimakam of Khurshid had received 
suflScient reinforcements, he summoned the principal 
members of the Greek clergy and the primates to 
a meeting at Tripolitza. He gave as a pretext for 
the assembly, that he wished to concert measures for 
counteracting the intrigues which Ali Pasha was car- 
rying on among the Greek population, and which 
threatened to endanger public tranquillity. If the 
Greeks obeyed his summons, he resolved to detain 
them as hostages ; if they disobeyed, he believed 
that he was now strong enough to arrest and punish 
them. 

The bishops and primates of the Morea usually met 
twice a-year at Tripolitza, to receive the communica- 
tions of the Othoman government from the pasha, and 
concert concerning measures of taxation and police. 
The meeting at Vostitza having decided that no move- 
ment was to take place until the return of the messen- 
gers sent to Pisa and St Petersburg, several bishops 
and primates obeyed the orders of the kaimakam, 
hoping to deceive the Turks, for whose stupidity the 
Greeks have a great contempt, and expecting to obtain 
permission to return home before any general insur- 
rection occurred. Others, however, did not consider 
it prudent to trust their persons in the hands of 
the Turks. Germanos, the Archbishop of Patras, 
the Bishop of Kernitza, and the primates of Patras, 
Vostitza, and Kalavryta, fearing lest the Turks had 
procured some evidence of their conspiracy, sought 



WARNING LETTER FORGED. 179 

pretexts for delaying their journey. Germanos was at a. d. 182i. 
last compelled to set off, but he halted at Kalavryta, 
where he was joined by several primates, and a plan 
was devised to gain more time. The metropolitan 
and his friends forged a letter purporting to be a 
warning from a friendly Turk at Tripolitza ; for though 
they were ready to consign every Mussulman in Greece 
and Constantinople to destruction, they thought it 
natural enough that a Mussulman should have some 
feeling of humanity towards them. This forged letter 
declared that the kaimakam had resolved to put several 
Greeks of influence to death, in order to prevent a 
general insurrection of the Christians, by depriving the 
people of their leaders. It was contrived that this 
letter should be delivered after the party had quitted 
Kalavryta, The letter was read in the presence of 
servants and muleteers. The clergy and the primates 
affected the greatest terror. A consultation was held 
by the roadside, and the whole party set off to the 
monastery of St Laura. 

The general opinion in Greece is, that on reaching 
the monastery of St Laura they proclaimed the Revo- 
lution. But this is not correct. They sought to allay 
the suspicions of the Turks of Kalavryta and Vostitza, 
by informing them of the receipt of the forged letter, 
and by asking them to guarantee their personal safety 
at Tripolitza. In the mean time, to avoid being arrest^ 
in a body, they dispersed, and each began to collect 
armed men for his defence. This was not difficult, as 
the apostles of the Hetairia had persisted in fixing the 
6th of April as the day on which the Revolution was 
to commence. 

Various acts of brigandage were committed, in 
the confidence that impunity would soon be secured. 
The Turks discovered that several mills recently re- 
paired by the Greeks near Dimitzana were not destined 



CHAP. II I. 



180 FIRST OUTBREAK. 

BOOK II. to grind com, but were actively employed in manu- 
facturing gunpowder. 

The first insurrectional movements took place at 
the end of March 1821. On the 25th, three Turkish 
couriers carrying letters from the kaimakam to Khur- 
shid, which were supposed to contain a pressing demand 
for additional troops, were waylaid by the Hetairists, 
and slain at the village of Agridha, in the valley of the 
Krathis. On the following day, eight Albanian Mus- 
sulmans, engaged in collecting the haratch, were mur- 
dered, by a Hetairist of some local influence, near the 
lake of Phonia.^ Soliotes, so called from being a native 
of the village of Soli, in the valley of the Krathis, after 
having murdered the haratch-coUectors, increased his 
band to three hundred, and attacked sixty Albanian 
Mussulmans who had just landed at the khan of 
Akrata, and were on their way to join the ranks of 
their countrymen in garrison at Tripolitza. The Alba- 
nians were attacked at Bersova, and defended them- 
selves vigorously. Twenty were killed, and the rest 
were compelled to lay down their arms. 

The events connected with Germanos and the pri- 



1 Mr Tricoupi's account of the commencement of the Revolution in Achaia 
is sometimes inaccurate. As he rarely cites his authorities, he often takes the 
liberty of transcribing them when they are Greek, and of translating them 
literally when foreign. The event mentioned in the text affords an example. 
The Archbishop Germanos in his Memoirs writes thus, p. 16 : — " ^vyxpovws 
AWoi Ka\afipvTivo\ iipov^vtrav 96w cnraxi^fs Tpnro\ir(id>Tai €*s tA X^P^^ '''®^ 
Ai$apr{iod, koI irdXiy HWoi els rhy ipevchv robs ru<fnoxapar(lB€s.** This Mr Tri- 
coupi transcribes, i. 77, " ^vyxp6v<as i<f>ov€^a'av xai S6o SiratSes TpnroKir (ru- 
ral KOT^ TO AifidpTffi, x<^P^^^ '''^^ KoXajSp^Jrav, *E<f>ov€697iaay Kod rives Tv<prox<a^ 
paralies iv rf X^P^V "^^ KopwOlas ipoviq** The word Tw^oxoparo'iScf proves 
the plagiarism. The archbishop uses the term, as the Greeks generally em- 
ployed it, to mark contempt and hatred for the soldiers employed in collect- 
ing the haratch from the peasantry, as is mentioned above at page 22. In a 
grave historian the word gypsy-haratchers becomes vituperative personality, 
imputing bad character to excuse murder. Mr Tricoupi calls these afi&iirs 
mere acts of brigandage {Krfffrpucd), but brigands do not select detachments of 
sixty well-armed Albanian mercenaries, on their way to seek service, with 
empty purses. Phrantzes and Speliades, ^Avofiyrifioveifiara, vol. i. p. 59, give a 
more correct account of these events. 

Soliotes became an officer of some distinction, and his friends boasted that 
he was the first who shed Turkish blood during the Revolution in Greece. 



ATTEMPT TO MURDER SEID AGA. 181 

mates of Achaia have often been cited as the firstA.D. 1821. 
revolutionary movements. But the truth is, that the 
people, at the instigation of the Hetairists, took up 
arms boldly while their superiors were temporising. 
Asimaki Zaimes, the silent primate of Kalavryta, con- 
sidering that his friends were carrying their evasions 
too far, endeavoured to force them to take a decided 
course by an act of brigandage.^ He had several 
armed Christians in his service, and he sent two to 
waylay Seid Aga of Lalla, who was transporting a con- 
siderable sum of money. Kyr Asimaki thought that 
an act of highway robbery of this nature would put 
an end to the indecision of his countrymen. Seid Aga 
escaped from the ambuscade, and carried his treasure 
to Tripolitza, where his report confirmed the prevail- 
ing rumours that the Greeks had taken up arms. The 
Mussulman rabble rose in tumult, and would have put 
to death the bishops and primates who had already 
arrived, had not the kaimakam saved them by lodging 
them in the house of the Hasnadar aga. 

Arnaout-oglou, the voevode of KaJavryta, was on 
his way to Tripolitza when he heard of the attack on 
Seid Aga. He immediately turned back, and gave 
the alarm to the Mussulman population of Kalavryta. 
The Turks hastily collected their families and their 
most valuable movables in several large houses which 
appeared capable of defence ; for they were convinced 
that the long-talked-of insurrection of the Greeks had 
commenced. On the 2d of April the outbreak became 
general over the whole of the Morea. On that day 
many Turks were murdered in diflFerent places, and 
all communication by the great roads was cut off. 

^ Kyr Asimaki, as his countrymen called him, carried his silence so far 
that a modem Greek historian tells us that he often remained in society 
smoking his pipe for hours without uttering a single word. He was a coun- 
terpart, in the Oriental style, of the Laird of Dumbiedykes, whom the Duke of 
Argyll had seen thrice tipsy, and only heard speak once. The attack on 
Seid Aga was made on the 29th of March. 



CHAP. III. 



182 TURKS OF KALABRYTA SURRENDER. 

BooKiL On the 3d of April 1821, the Mussulmans of Kala- 

CHAP. m. »■ 

vry ta surrendered to the Greeks on receiving a promise 
of security. That promise was soon violated. About 
three hundred fell into the hands of the Greeks ; and 
in the month of August, Colonel Raybaud found that 
the greater part of the men had then been murdered, 
and that the women and children were dispersed as 
slaves or domestic servants in the houses of the 
Greeks.^ Arnaout-oglou, who was the representative 
of one of the wealthiest Mussulman families in the 
Morea, and who had lived on terms of intimacy and 
apparent friendship with several primates, was left in 
a state of abject destitution, while his former friends 
were members of the Greek government, and were 
wasting the revenues of their country in unseemly 
extravagance. He regained his liberty at an exchange 
of prisoners in 1825. 

More decisive operations took place at the same time 
in Messenia. Petrobey of Maina, Theodore Koloko- 
trones, and Niketas, were the actors in these events. 
Theodore Kolokotrones and Anagnostaras, both cele- 
brated chiefs of klephts, had returned secretly to the 
Morea, in order to prepare for the general insurrection. 
The Othoman authorities, hearing that they were lurk- 
ing in Maina, sent a message to Petros Mavromichales, 
the bash-bog or bey, requesting him to arrest them. 
As Maina was under the jurisdiction of the capitan- 
pasha, and the bey acted as his lieutenant, the pasha 
of Morea could not do more than invite Petrobey's 
co-operation in the measures which it was resolved to 
adopt for the purpose of maintaining order among the 
Christians. The Turks entertained no doubt of Petro- 
bey's fidelity. His rank was supposed to insure his 

^ Mimoires sur la Orice pour servir d VHUtoire de la Ouerre de VlndSpm- 
dance. Par Maxime Raybaud. 2 vols. Paris, 1824. Vol. i. p. 365. This work 
is one of the best on the early events of the Revolution. 



PETROBEY. 183 

attachment to the authority of the sultan, from which a. d. 1821. 
it was . derived, and it was known that one of his 
brothers had embraced the Mohammedan religion, and 
risen to be a pasha. 

Petrobey had been early initiated into the Hetairia. 
He was a restless, vain, bold, and ambitious man — 
lavish in expenditure, and urged to seek change by a 
constant want of money. He was deficient in abi- 
lity, but more prompt to form courageous resolutions 
than most of his countrymen in high station. His 
frank, joyous disposition, and his numerous family of 
sons, brothers, and nephews, who were active and 
daring men, gave him great personal influence. He 
sent one of his sons to Tripolitza to allay any suspi- 
cions which the kaimakam might have adopted ; but 
he continued to protect Kolokotrones and Anagnos- 
taras, and to assist the machinations of the Hetairists. 
At this time another of Petrobey's sons was at Con- 
stantinople, where he resided as a hostage for his 
father's fidelity, according to the custom of the Turks. 
Both escaped to Main a, either through the negligence, 
the prudence, or the humanity of their guardians. 
Had Petrobey been a man of capacity, he might have 
placed himself at the head of the Greek Revolution, 
and rendered himself either the president of a Greek 
republic or the prince of a Greek state ; but his habits 
of self-indulgence made him always sacrifice the future 
for the present. He neglected to make any political 
use of his great personal influence, and of the official 
authority he held among the warlike population of 
Maina. 

The Hetairists had sent a supply of ammunition to 
be concealed in the recesses of Mount Taygetus. The 
voevode of Kalamata, hearing that bodies of armed 
Greeks had assembled on the flanks of the mountain 
towards Messenia, and that long trains of pack-horses 



184 TAKING OP KALAMATA. 

BOOK II. returned with heavy loads from the shore of Maina to 

CHAP. III. , •' 

the villages in his neighbourhood, considered that the 

insurrection was on the eve of breaking out. He called 
together the resident Turks, and they resolved to re- 
tire with their families to Tripolitza. It was already 
too late. 

Murad, a Mussulman on friendly terms with the 
Christians, was the first who departed with all his 
family. He was stopped on the road by Niketas and 
slain. His widow and children were driven back to 
Kalamata. This happened on the 2d of April, and 
served as a signal for a general rising of the Chris- 
tians in Messenia. In a few hours many Turkish 
families were surprised and murdered. 

About noon on the following day, Kalamata was 
besieged by two thousand Greeks, led by Petrobey 
and Murzinos, another Maniat chief, and accompanied 
by Anagnostaras, Kolokotrones, and Niketas. On the 
4th the place capitulated. The Turks received solemn 
promises that their lives would be protected, but these 
promises were given as a lure to prevent desperate 
men offering an obstinate resistance. The prisoners 
were soon dispersed among their captors to serve as 
domestic slaves, and before many months elapsed the 
men had all been slain. Phrantzes, an ecclesiastic and 
I a Hetairist, but one of the most candid historians of 
I this early period of the Eevolution, owns, in the pro- 
verbial expression of Greece, that the moon devoured 
them.^ 

On the 5th of April 1821, the first solemn service 
of the Greek Church was performed as a thanksgiving 
for the success of the Greek arms. The ceremony was 
on the banks of the torrent that flows by. Kalamata. 
Twenty-four priests officiated, and five thousand armed 
men stood round. Never was Te Deum celebrated 

1 " Tohs Kar^iftayc rh <l>fY/dpi" — Phrantzes, i. 835. 



FIRST TE DEUM OF THE GREEKS. 185 

with greater fervour, never did hearts overflow with a.d. I821. 
sincerer devotion to Heaven, nor with warmer grati- 
tude to their Church and their God. Patriotic tears 
poured down the cheeks of rude warriors, and ruthless 
brigands sobbed like children. All present felt that 
the event formed an era in Greek history ; and when 
modem Greece produces historians, artists, and poets, 
this scene will doubtless find a niche in the temple of 
fame. 

Two days after this memorable celebration, Petrobey, 
as commander-in-chief of the first Greek army in the 
field, published a proclamation, in conjunction with a 
few primates who assumed the title of the Senate of 
Messenia. This document was addressed to all Chris- 
tian nations : it declares that the Greeks were deter- 
mined to throw off the Othoman yoke, and solicits 
the aid of Christendom in giving liberty to suffering 
Christians.^ 

The Albanian Mussulmans of Bardunia abandoned 
their towers as soon as they heard of the murder of 
Murad Aga by Niketas. About sixty families fled to 
Monemvasia ; the others retired more leisurely to Tri- 
politza. They passed through Mistra on their way. 
The unwarlike Turks of that city were thrown into a 
state of frantic consternation by this retreat of the 
warlike Barduniots. The whole Mussulman popula- 
tion hastened away with their co-religionists ; and as 
they had no time to carry off their property, they de- 
posited their most valuable movables in the houses of 
their Christian friends. The night was passed by the 
Turks in anguish, but by the Albanians in refreshing 
sleep. At daybreak, the well-mounted Albanians pur- 
sued their journey. They were followed by the Turks 

^ Qordon, i. 183, gives a tranalation, with tbe correct date, 9th April 
(28th March) 1821. Tricoupi, i. 868, gives the original, but the date is mis- 
printed. 



186 OUTBREAK AT PATRAS. 

BOOK II. of Mistra who possessed horses, or had succeeded in 

CHAP. III. -. .,.. , T. , ., T-fc 

purchasing or m hiring them during the night. But 

many families, old men, women, and children, lingered 
behind, and were murdered on the road. The popula- 
tion of Laconia was estimated at 110,000 Christians 
and 15,000 Mussulmans. It is impossible to ascertain 
the exact number murdered in attempting to escape 
to Monemvasia and Tripolitza, or surprised before they 
could quit their dweUings ; but it was at the time 
supposed to amount to two-thirds of the whole. . 

The outbreak of the Revolution at Patras took place 
on the 4th of April. Hostilities were commenced by 
the Turks in consequence of the arrival of some fugi- 
tives from Kalavryta, and a party of Albanians from 
the Castle of Lepanto. On the 6th, numerous bodies 
of armed Greeks arrived, under the direction of the 
Archbishop Germanos and several other leaders. One 
party carried before its leader the heads of five Turks 
who had been murdered at Vostitza. On the follow- 
ing morning, divine service was performed by the 
archbishop ; and all the Greeks assembled took an oath 
to deliver their country from the Turks, or die in the 
attempt. Enthusiasm was not wanting, but anarchy 
rendered it unavailing. The primates, the city popu- 
lation, and the lonians, who hastened to take part in 
the contest, conducted their military operations with 
singular awkw^ardness and incapacity. They were 
unable to form an eflfectual blockade of the small 
citadel which overlooks the town, and the insurgents 
who attacked the Albanian Mussulmans of Lalla so 
mismanaged their movements that they allowed that 
small but warlike tribe to eflfect their retreat to Patras. 
This addition to the garrison of the citadel saved that 
fortress at the commencement of the Kevolution, and 
the Turks found means to keep possession of it during 
the whole war. 



EXTERMINATION OF THE TURKS. 187 

The Greeks soon gathered in considerable numbers a. d. 1821. 
on the hills round all the fortresses held by the Turks, ' 

and endeavoured to cut oflF their communications with 
the surrounding country. They were still unable to 
meet their enemies in the field. On the 11th of April 
they suffered a defeat near Karitena, and on the 15th 
a still more serious rout at Patras. But their deter- 
mination to prosecute a mortal combat was in no way 
diminished by these checks. 

In the mean time the Christian population had at- 
tacked and murdered the Mussulman population in 
every part of the peninsula. The towers and country 
houses of the Mussulmans were burned down, and their 
property was destroyed, in order to render the return 
of those who had escaped into fortresses- hopeless. 
From the 26th of March until Easter Sunday, which 
fell, in the year 1821, on the 22d of April, it is supposed 
that from ten to fifteen thousand souls perished in cold 
blood, and that about three thousand farmhouses or 
Turkish dwellings were laid waste. 

The fury of slaves who rend their bonds, and the 
fanaticism of religious hatred, have in all ages hurried 
men to the perpetration of execrable cruelties. Homer 
told his countrymen that slavery robs man of one-half 
of his humanity ; and three thousand years have not 
made men much better, though they have made Greeks 
a good deal worse than they were then. The extermi- 
nation of the Turks by the Greeks in the rural districts 
was the result of a premeditated design. It proceeded 
more from the vindictive suggestions of Hetairists and 
men of letters, than from the revengeful feelings of the 
people, or the innate barbarity of the klephts. Most of 
the historians of the Greek Eevolution have recoiled 
from recording the crimes which the people perpe- 
trated, but a nation's cause is best served by writing 
its history in the spirit of Thucydides and Tacitus. 



rl88 EXTERMINATION OF THE TURKS, 

BOOK li" The Hetairists were generally civilians ; of the 

CHAP. lit. , , ^ *' 

apostleB few became military leaders. They were men 

in a secondary social position ; and, like men who be- 
lieve that their merits have been overlooked, they were 
/ irritable and violent. Destitute of the generous cour- 
' age and the warm feelings that would have enabled 
them to lead their countrymen to battle, they employed 
all their eloquence to instil the fiercest desire of ven- 
geance in every Greek breast. It was their policy to 
render peace impossible by what they called baptising 
the Revolution in blood. They awakened implacable 
hostilities, and left it to others to find the means of 
gaining victories. In a mortal struggle, they believed 
that the cause of the Christians was sure of ultimate 
success. They inculcated the necessity of exterminat- 
ing every Turk, because the Turkish population in 
Greece was small, and could not be renewed. They 
knew that the Greeks were far too numerous to be 
exterminated by the Turks, even should Turkey pro- 
duce a Mussulman Philik^ Hetairia. The slaughter of 
men, women, and children was therefore declared to 
be a necessary measure of wise policy, and popular 
songs spoke of the Turks as a race which ought to 
disappear from the face of the earth.^ 

The military incapacity of the Hetairists and pri- 
mates threw the conduct of the war into the hands of 
the chiefs of klephts. This was a sad misfortune for 
the nation, as it perpetuated a state of anarchy in the 
army of Greece during the whole of the Eevolution. 
The military system that prevailed in the Morea will 
be best described by giving an account of the career of 

^ A song in everybody's mouth at this time, said — 
** TovpKos fiif fietvri *s rhy Mwped 
Mi7$i 's rhy K6afioy 5Xoi/." 
Phrantzes, ii. 377, note, mentioning that the Moreot Turks were useful to Ibra- 
him Pashft as guides when he invaded the Morea, remarks, ** ^v' ain-^ rovrw, 6t 
"EXXriyes flxoy dUaioy v^ fi^ a^lauffi (tovra iroidpi, ix r&y UeKowoyyiia'luy 
*06w/jiaywy'* — ^a strong opinion for a Christian priest 



THEODORE KOLOKOTRONES. 189 

a distinguished leader. Theodore Kolokotrones offers a-d. i82l 
the best type of the class. He became the head of a ~~~^ 
considerable political party ; he has left memorials 
that throw considerable light on his personal character 
and conduct; and general attention was so long fixed 
on his proceedings that he can already be tried before 
the great tribunal of public opinion.^ 

Theodore Kolokotrones was fifty years old at the 
commencement of the Eevolution. Age had somewhat 
tamed the violence of his passions without lessening 
his personal vigour, and both his physical and mental 
qualities fitted him to be a leader of irregular bands. 
A large head, a bold countenance, a steady eye, and a 
profusion of black hair, gave some dignity to an aspect 
that did not conceal looks of cunning and ferocity. 
His powerful frame exceeded the middle size, and his 
voice had the volume of sound required in mountain 
warfare. He possessed constitutional good health, and 
that self-complacency which produces habitual good- 
nature. His manners had a degree of roughness well 
suited to conceal his natural cunning; and he had 
adopted an appearance of boisterous frankness as a veil 
for his watchful duplicity. He possessed a persuasive 
style of discourse, and by selecting common popular 
phrases he gave pointed expression to his sound sense, 
and rendered his speeches more effective by their con- 
trast with the Hellenic affectation of his lettered rivals. 
He was orator enough to lead his audience to a desired 
conclusion by a well-told fable, and to misguide their 
passions by a cleverly-selected apophthegm. But with 
these good qualities he had many defects. Nurtured 
as a brigand, he could never distinguish very clearly 
right from wrong, justice from injustice ; and he had 
an instinctive aversion to order and law. His patri- 
otism was selfish, and his occasional acts of magnani- 

^ Ai'fiyrja'is ^vfifidyrwy rris 'EAAijytK^s ♦wA.^s airo 1770 iws 1886. 



190 THEODORE KOLOKOTRONES. 

BOOK II. mity cannot efface the memory of his egoistical ambi- 

'^^^' "'' tion and sordid avarice during the period of his greatest 

power. He received from nature a clear intellect and 

a hard heart, and his education and experience in life 

corrupted without enlarging his feelings. 

The family of Kolokotrones followed the profession 
of arms from the time the Othomans conquered the 
Morea in 1715, acting alternately as local police-guards 
and brigands. When the capitan-pasha Hassan Ghazi 
subdued the Albanians and re-established order in 
1779, the father of Kolokotrones was compelled to 
seek refuge in Maina, where he was slain by a detach- 
ment of Turkish troops in the following year. 

The young Kolokotrones was nurtured among the 
civil broils of the Maniats ; but at the age of fifteen 
he settled in the district of Sambazika, on the northern 
slope of Mount Taygetus, and at twenty he married 
the daughter of the proestos of Leondari. For seven 
years he Hved on his wife's property, acting generally 
as one of the rural guards of the district. But the 
peasants observed that he was a man of the musket, 
and not of the plough. He was frequently accused of 
poaching in the sheepfolds of the neighbouring villages, 
and at last some acts of brigandage against the Greek 
cultivators of Emblakika (the Stenyclerian plain) 
caused the pasha of the Morea to give orders for hia 
arrest. This decided his fate. At the age of twenty- 
seven he became a brigand by profession. 

For nine years he lived an irregular life, sometimes 
supporting himself by robbery, and sometimes shel- 
tering himself from the vengeance of his enemies by 
taking service as a local guard with some primate or 
abbot of a monastery. But the Greek peasantry of 
the Morea were at last so tormented by the rapacity 
and cruelty of the klephts that they invited the Turks 
to assist in hunting them down, and both primates and 



KOLOKOTRONES ASSISTS ALI PHARMAKI. 191 

monasteries were obliged to abandon the brigands to a.d. issl 
their fate. Dad well, during his travels, witnessed some 
of the operations by which the klephts were destroyed.^ 
Several members of Kolokotrones's family were slain. 
The bands were aU broken up, and Theodore Koloko- 
trones, finding that there was no safety for him even 
in Maina, fled to the Ionian Islands in 1806. In his 
Memoirs he complains of the suffering caused by the 
.filth of long-worn garments as rivalling the pangs of 
hunger.^ Those who have seen a Greek army at the 
end of a summer campaign with unwashed fustineUos, 
must feel some surprise at this declaration on the part 
of a brigand. 

When Kolokotrones escaped to Zante, the Ionian 
Islands were under the joint protection of Russia and 
Turkey; but the Russians protected the brigand, though 
the enemy of their ally. During the war which broke 
out between Russia and Turkey soon after, Koloko- 
trones cruised in what he called a privateer, and others 
a pirate boat ; but falling in with two Othoman ships, 
he was in danger of terminating his career at the yard- 
arm, when an English frigate, heaving accidentally in 
sight, saved him. England was then at war with 
Turkey, and the frigate (the Sea Horse) immediately 
engaged the Turks, and enabled Kolokotrones to sheer 
liifi: 

In the year 1808 he performed the exploit which 
added most to his reputation as a military chief. Ali 
Pharmaki, the most powerful aga of Lalla, was attacked 
by Veli Pasha of the Morea. The fathers of Ali Phar- 
maki and of Theodore Kolokotrones had formed an alli- 
ance of brotherhood during the troubled times which 
preceded and followed the victory of Hassan Ghazi. 
Ali and Theodore had never met, but so many reci- 
procal services had been rendered by daring klephts and 

1 Travels in Greece, ii 353, 372. ' Aiiryvans, 29. 



192 KOLOKOTRONES ASSISTS ALI PHARMAKI. 

iBooK II. turbulent LaUiots, that the tie of brotherhood was the 
'^^^' "'' strongest obligation on the honour of a klepht. The 
power of Veli Pasha, and still more that of his father 
Ali Pasha, the old lion of Joannina, intimidated the 
Albanian Mussulmans, and Ali Pharmaki could not 
find a single ally. His tower at Lalla was on the point 
of being besieged, and his own followers and relations 
were insufficient to defend it. He remembered his 
family alliance with Kolokotrones ; and as a last resource 
he sent to Zante to claim the assistance due by their 
fathers' ties of brotherhood. Kolokotrones recognised 
the obligation as a sacred duty, even though urged by 
a Mussulman, for the partisans of orthodox Kussia had 
not then inflated the bigotry of the Greeks to the degree 
of rendering religion an apology for the violation of 
every principle of private morality and national honour. 
Kolokotrones collected sixteen good soldiers among his 
ancient companions, and hastened to shut himself up 
with Ali Pharmaki in his tower at Lalla. Veli attacked 
the place without artillery, and was repulsed. He then 
wasted several weeks in blockading it, but the local 
chieftains and his Albanian mercenaries were more 
anxious to prolong the contest than to capture Ali 
Pharmaki, so that the besieged found opportunities of 
renewing their supplies of provisions and ammunition. 
The discontent of a powerful party in his own camp 
at last compelled Veli to make peace with Ali Phar- 
maki, who, however, insisted as a condition of his sub- 
mission that Kolokotrones and all his followers should 
be allowed to return to Zante in safety. The honour- 
able conduct of Kolokotrones on this occasion gained 
him a high reputation among the Mussulmans, as well 
as among the Christians in Greece. 

After the Ionian Islands were ceded to France, Kolo- 
kotrones kept up his connection with the Morea, and 
became a dealer in cattle, which were imported in con- 



ENTERS THE ENGLISH SERVICE. 193 

siderable numbers for the use of the troops. When a. d. i82i. 
the English took possession of Zante in 1810, he en- 
tered their service. He was almost forty years of age, 
and as he had no sympathy with the English character 
nor with British policy, his conduct was entirely 
guided by his personal interests. He received high 
pay from England, and the improvement of his social 
position enabled him to carry on his intrigues in the 
Morea with more effect. His reason and his prejudices 
aUke taught him to regard Eussia as the only sincere 
ally of Greece and the only irreconcilable enemy of 
Turkey, which the Greeks generally are very apt to 
consider as one and the same thing. Kolokotrones 
entered the English service as a captain, and was pre- 
sent at the assault of Santa Maura, where the Greek 
regiment gained no laurels. He was subsequently 
promoted to the rank of major, but his military ser- 
vice gave him no tincture of military knowledge, and 
he remained ignorant of tactics and insensible of the 
value of discipline. After the peace, he remained two 
years on the staflF, drawing pay and doing nothing. 
He was then reduced, and returned to his old profes- 
sion of a cattle-dealer. 

The Russians had not overlooked his talents, and he 
was connected with all the projects formed under 
Eussian auspices to prepare for insurrections against 
the Turks. He was early initiated into the secrets of 
the Hetairia. 

On the 15th of January 1821 he left Zante to join 
those who were preparing for the outbreak. Landing 
at Kardamyle, in Maina, he remained concealed in the 
house of Murzinos, one of the most powerful chieftains 
on the coast, waiting the signal for the general rising 
of the Christians. It has been mentioned that he was 
present at the taking of Kalamata. On the 6th of 
April he quitted the Maniats, in Messenia, to seek an 

VOL. I. N 



<:HAP. III. 



194 PRAYER AT CHRYSOVITZI. 

BOOK II. independent sphere of action at Karitena. His band 

/ •11 ATI TTT ■^ * ■m M ■m ««• 

consisted of 300 men, but of these only thirty were 
under his own immediate command. He assumed, 
however, the chief direction ; and, on his march through 
the plain of Leondari, he ordered all the peasants to 
take up arms, enforcing his orders with threats to burn 
the dwellings of the tardy. He passed the ruins of 
Megalopolis, repeating the name of Epaminondas. 
But he knew nothing of the personal virtues and pro- 
found tactics of that great man ; nor, had he known 
them, would he probably have felt a wish to imitate 
them, though the peculiar circumstances in which 
Greece was placed rendered those virtues and that 
science the qualities best adapted to make their pos- 
sessor the hero of the Revolution, and to insure its 
speedy success. 

Karitena was soon invested by 6000 men, but on 
the 11th of April a corps of 500 Turkish cavalry from 
Tripolitza attacked and dispersed this force, which was 
destitute of order. Kolokotrones was compelled to 
escape with such precipitation that he lost his rifle, 
and reached Chrysovitzi alone. A small church of 
the Panaghia stands at the entrance of the village. 
He entered it, and prayed for the deliverance of Greece 
with a fervour that remained impressed on his mind to 
his dying day. In the enthusiasm of his devotion he 
imagined that he received a revelation announcing 
that his prayers were granted, and he rose reanimated, 
and with all his vigour restored. Kolokotrones was 
too brave to conceal the circumstances of his flight, 
and too much of a veteran to complain of a panic 
among young soldiers ; but the facility with which 
he saw 6000 armed men dispersed by 500 cavalry in- 
spired him with a great contempt for the courage of 
the peasantry. This contempt became very prevalent 
among the military classes during the Revolution, 



REVOLUTION AT SALONA. 195 

though it was as unjust as it was impolitic. But most a.d. 1821. 
of the captains and soldiers attributed the successes of 
the Christians, often very erroneously, to the strata- 
gems of brigands and the valour of armatolL Yet a 
careful study of the history of the Eevolution has estab- 
lished the fact, that the perseverance and self-devo- 
tion of the peasantry really brought the contest to a 
successful termination. When the klephts shrank 
back, and the armatoli were defeated, the peasantry 
prolonged their resistance, and renewed the struggle 
after every defeat with indomitable obstinacy. 

In the Morea, the Greeks were soon masters of all 
the open country, and the whole Christian population 
was in arms. But in continental Greece the armatoli, 
whose warlike habits and military knowledge would 
have insured equal success though against more for- 
midable Turkish forces, remained for some time luke- 
warm. Many of their captains were interested in 
upholding the sultan's authority, for they were draw- 
ing high pay in his service. Many Christian soldiers 
were unwilling to quit Khurshid's camp until the 
fall of Joannina, for the seraskier had promised to pay 
all arrears due to his troops as soon as he gained pos- 
session of Ali's treasures. These circumstances, and 
the distrust felt in the leading Hetairists, rendered 
the armatoli slow to join the Revolution. But national 
feelings and religious antipathies could not be long re- 
pressed by personal interests. 

The Albanian Christians of the Dervenokhoria took 
up arms on the 4th of April. Their primate, Hadji 
Meleti, who enjoyed great personal influence, was a 
member of the Hetairia. The example of Megaris in- 
duced the Albanian peasantry of Attica and Bceotia 
to join the cause. 

Salona (Amphissa) was the first town in continental 
Greece of which the insurgents gained possession. As 



196 PANOURIAS OF SALONA. 

BOOK II. soon as the news that the people were in arms at 
"^^^ "'' Kalavryta reached Galaxidhi, Panourias, who had 
served in Ali Pasha s troops, persuaded the primates 
of Salona to proclaim the independence of Greece, and 
summon all the Christians to throw off the Turkish 
yoke. The direction of a revolutionary movement 
could not have fallen into worse hands. Panourias 
had been a robber before he became a soldier, and he 
remained always a chief of brigands, not a leader of 
warriors. He had acquired some knowledge of the 
fiscal and military system by which Ali Pasha had 
extorted money and maintained his troops, and he 
employed this knowledge at Salona for his own profit. 
General Gordon has correctly described him as a type 
of the klephtic chiefs, whose influence proved so deeply 
injurious to the success of the Greek arms and to the 
progress of Greek liberty. These extortioners retarded 
the progress of the Revolution northward by their rapa- 
city, which terrified several of the Christian communi- 
ties on Pindus, Olympus, and Ossa, where there were 
many armed men to oppose the advance of the revolu- 
tionary forces. Gordon's words ought to be carefully 
weighed by those who desire to form a correct idea of 
the causes of the success and failure of the Greeks in 
their early military operations in continental Greece. 
He says, " Panourias was the worst of these local des- 
pots, whom some writers have elevated into heroes ; 
he was, in fact, an ignoble robber hardened in evil. 
He enriched himself with the spoils of the Mohamme- 
dans of Salona and Vostitza ; yet he and his retinue 
of brigands compelled the people to maintain them at 
free quarters, in idleness and luxury, exacting not 
only bread, meat, wine, and forage, but also sugar and 
coffee. Hence springs the reflection that the Greeks 
had cause to repent their early predilection for the 
klephts, who were almost all (beginning with Kolo- 



SALONA AND LIVADEA TAKEN. 197 

kotrones) infamous for the sordid perversity of their a. d. i82i. 
dispositions/' ^ 

The Turks of Salona retired into the ruins of the 
castle built by the Counts of Soula on the remains of 
the impregnable citadel of Amphissa.* They were im- 
mediately blockaded by the Christians in the country 
round, including the sailors from the flourishing town 
of Galaxidhi. After some skirmishing, the Turks were 
cut off from the water, though an abundant stream 
gushes out just below the rock on which the castle 
stands ; and on the 22d of April they surrendered, on 
receiving a promise that the Greeks would spare their 
lives. Yet before many days elapsed they were mur- 
dered, with other Mussulmans from Loidoriki and 
MaJandrino. A few only were spared to serve as do- 
mestic slaves. 

Livadea was the principal town in Eastern Greece, 
on account of the wealth and social position of its 
Christian population, though it contained only about 
ten thousand inhabitants, of whom eight hundred were 
Mohammedans. The town was a vacouf, and the civil 
government was administered by a voevode, who 
farmed the revenues from the imperial mosques. The 
military command was in the hands of the dervendji- 
pasha, who kept an officer with a small guard gene- 
rally as a garrison to guard the defiles of Phocis. 
During the latter part of Ali Pasha's administration, 
the Greek primates possessed more influence than the 
Othoman authorities. The resident Mussulmans were 
poor. 

When the news reached Livadea that the Greeks 
had blockaded Salona^ the place was occupied by a de- 
tachment of Mussulman Albanians and by a small 
body of annatoli. The Mohammedans, being far in- 

^ Gordon, History of (he Greek Eevolution, L 400. 
^ Livy, xxxvii 5. 



CHAP. III. 



198 DIAKOS. 

BOOK II. ferior in numbers to the Christians, retired into the 
deserted castle above the town, which is said to have 
been built by the Catalans while they were masters 
of the duchy of Athens and Neopatra. They were 
immediately besieged by the Christian population, 
strengthen^ by the arrival of many armatoli, who 
remained in the villages on Parnassus and Helicon, 
unable to continue in the service of Ali Pasha, and 
not having been admitted into that of the seraskier. 

Diakos became the military leader of the Christians, 
a man justly celebrated for Iris courage and patriotism. 
He was a native of the village of Mussonitza, on the 
northern slope of Mount Vardhousi (Korax). His 
baptismal name was Athanasios, and though called 
" the deacon,'' he had never received orders, nor did 
he wear a beard. In early youth he was placed in the 
monastery of Aghios Joannes, at Artotina, where he 
grew up a strong active lad, fonder of the mountain 
air than of his book, though he learned to write intel- 
ligibly, but with little attention to grammar and ortho- 
graphy. To avoid the infamous persecution of the 
voevode of Loidoriki, who saw him on a visit to the 
monastery, he quitted that sanctuary, and the hegu- 
menos recommended him to the protection of a cele- 
brated klepht, Skaltzodemos. Diakos soon gained the 
goodwill of his new companions, and his reputation 
for courage became so celebrated, that a few years 
after, when he separated from Skaltzodemos, Ali Pasha 
admitted him into the ranks of the armatoli as an 
officer. When the sultan proclaimed Ali a rebel, Odys- 
seus was intrusted with the command of the armatoli 
stationed at Livadea, and it was his duty to defend 
the triodos and the roads leading to Salona by Delphi, 
Diakos was his lieutenant. Odysseus made no attempt 
to resist the advance of Pehlevan Pasha. He fled to 
the Ionian Islands, and Diakos, seeing the forces of Ali 



MOHAMMEDANS MURDERED. 199 

dispersed, remained in privacy without seeking to enter a. d. i821. 
the seraskier s service. He appears to have had some 
knowledge of the approaching Kevolution. The mo- 
ment he heard of the movement of his countrymen he 
joined those who were besieging the castle of Livadea. 

The Mohammedans defended that place until the 
25th of April, when want of provisions and water 
compelled them to surrender at discretion, and men, 
women, and children were all slain. The victors thought 
only of dividing the spoil ; but Diakos exerted himself 
with some eflfect to save a part of the booty for the 
purchase of military stores. 

About this time eight hundred Mohammedans were 
exterminated in the district of Talanti. 

The whole Christian population of Eastern Greece, 
Albanian and Greek, was now up in anna The ad- 
vanced spring had drawn many Turks into the country 
to inspect the state of the crops, to make their arrange- 
ments as spahis or farmers of the tenths, and for sub- 
letting the pasture-lands, or removing the flocks to 
their summer quarters. The majority were surprised 
and butchered. Prom Cape Sunium to the valley of 
the Sperchius, in hundreds of villages, Mussulman 
families were destroyed, and the bodies of men, women, 
and children were thrown into some outhouse, which 
was set on fire, because no orthodox Christian would 
demean himself so far as to dig a grave for the carcass 
of an infidel. The Turkish inhabitants of Thebes and 
of several villages in Boeotia and Eubcea escaped into 
the fortress of Negrepont. 

Athens was a town of secondary importance in Greece, 
fallen as the other towns of Greece then were. In popu- 
lation it was equal to Livadea ; but one half was of 
the Albanian race, and both the Christian and Mus- 
sulman inhabitants were an impoverished community, 
consisting of torpid landed proprietors and lazy petty 



CHAP. III. 



200 ATHENS. 

BOOK II. traders. Yet Athens enjoyed a milder local adminis- 
tration than most towns in Greece. It formed a fiscal 
appanage of the Serail. Its ancient fame, and the ex- 
isting remains of its former splendour, rendered it the 
resort of travellers, and the residence of foreign consuls, 
who were men- of higher attainments than the com- 
mercial consuls in most of the ports of the Othoman 
empire. 

The Mussulmans of Athens formed about one-fifth 
of the population. They were an unwarlike and in- 
offensive race. The voevode's guard consisted of sixty 
Mussulman Albanians, who were the only soldiers in 
the place. The Greeks were not more enterprising or 
courageous than the Turks. 

The first reports of a general insurrection of the 
Christians caused the Mohammedans to transport their 
families and their valuable movables into the Acro- 
poKs, and to fill the empty and long-neglected cisterns 
with water. On the 23d of April the Turks seized 
eleven of the principal Christians, and carried them 
up to the Acropolis as hostages. This act irritated the 
Athenians, who sent messengers inviting the Albanian 
villagers of Mount Fames to come to their assistance. 
On the night of the 6th of May, the people of Men- 
idhi and Khasia, who represent the Achamians of old, 
though they are Albanian colonists of a recent date, 
scaled the wall of the town near the site now occupied 
by the royal stables. About sixty Mussulmans were 
surprised in the town and slain. Next day the Acro- 
polis was closely blockaded. Hunger and thirst com- 
mitted great ravages among the besieged as summer 
advanced, but they held out obstinately, and on the 
1st of August 1821 they were relieved by Omer 
Vrioni. 

The real military strength of Greece lay in the popu- 
lation of Etolia and of Pindus. But for some time the 



MESOLONGHI. 201 

armatoli resisted the solicitations of the apostles of the a. d. 1821. 
Hetairia, and refused to take up arms against the sultan. 

Mesolonghi was the first place in Western Greece 
that joined the Eevolution. On the 1st of June the 
few Albanian soldiers in the place retired, and next 
day the inhabitants of Mesolonghi and of the neigh- 
bouring fishing-town of Anatolikon proclaimed them- 
selves parts of independent Greece. The resident Mus- 
sulmans were arrested and confined as prisoners. As 
usual, most of them were murdered in . a short time. 
Only the families of the higher ranks were spared. 
The men were crowded together in one room, the 
women and children in another. But even this lasted 
for a brief period. The men who had been spared dur- 
ing the first massacres were afterwards deliberately 
put to death, and the women and children were dis- 
persed as slaves in the families of the wealthier Greeks. 
Colonel Raybaud saw a few of the men still alive in 
the month of August 1821, but these were aU mur- 
dered shortly after.^ Dr Millingen describes the state 
in which Lord Byron found the women and children 
at the commencement of 1824 : " The wife of Hussein 
Aga, one of the Turkish inhabitants of Mesolonghi, 
imploring my pity, begged me to aUow her to remain 
under my roof, in order to shelter her from the brutality 
and cruelty of the Greeks. They had murdered all 
her relations and two of her boys. A little girl, nine 
years old, remained to be the only companion of her 
misery.^^^ This woman and a few more, with their 
children — in all, twenty-two females — ^then formed the 
sole remains of the Mussulman population of Meso- 
longhi. They were all sent by Lord Byron to Previsa. 

Vrachori, the capital of the province of Karlili, was 
the most important town in Western Greece. It con- 

^ Compare Tricoupi, i. 298, with Raybaud, i. 294 and 365. 
* Millingen, Memoirs on the Affairs of Greece j p. 99. 



202 TREACHEEY OF ALBANIANS. 

BOOK iL tained five hundred Mussulman families, among whom 
— — ^ were several great landed proprietors whose ancestors 
had received grants of the estates of the Prank nobles 
at the time of the conquest. The town is situated in 
a fertile district, on the high-road between Joannina 
and Lepanto, and at the commencement of the Kevo- 
lution it was occupied by a garrison of three hundred 
Albanian Mussulmans. It contained about six hun- 
dred Christian inhabitants and two hundred Jewish. 

On the 9th of June, Vrachori was attacked by two 
thousand armatoli, who entered the Greek quarter, 
and, by burning several Turkish houses, compelled the 
Mussulmans to intrench themselves in some large 
isolated dwellings, whose courtyards were surrounded 
by high walls. In a few days, the arrival of Vama- 
kiotes, Tzonga, and some other captains of armatoli, 
increased the number of the Greek troops to four 
thousand. The besieged were soon without provi- 
sions. 

The Albanians then separated themselves from the 
resident Turks. Nourka, their chief, was derven-aga 
of Karlili, and on terms of intimacy with many cap- 
tains of armatoli. The Albanians were poor and war- 
like — the Turks rich and defenceless. Nourka oflFered 
to retreat with his band, if the Greeks would allow 
him to retire unmolested with his followers, carrying 
away their arms and all their property. The Greek 
leaders consented to these terms ; but Nourka and his 
Albanians were not satisfied with their own property, 
and determined to appropriate to themselves as much 
as they could carry of the wealth of the Turks and 
Jews, in order that it might not fall into the hands of 
the Greeks. During the night, they plundered the 
Turks and tortured the Jews to collect money and 
jewels ; and having secured the connivance of some of 
the Greek chiefs, they passed through the blockading 



JEWS AND MUSSULMANS MURDERED. 203 

force, and gained a long march before their escape was a d. issi. 
generally known in the Greek camp. 

The Turks and Jews had expected to purchase the 
protection of the captains of armatoli with the riches 
which the Albanians had carried off. As soon as they 
could venture to do so, they informed the Greeks of 
Nourka's treachery, and laid down their arms on re- 
ceiving a promise of personal safety. That promise 
was immediately violated. The massacre commenced 
with the Jews. Men, women, and children were slain 
in cold blood, with circumstances of atrocious cruelty. 
The poorer Mussulmans next shared the same fate, and 
only a few of the wealthiest of all the five hundred 
families that inhabited Vrachori escaped, through the 
protection of Vamakiotes and Tzonga.^ 

The inhabitants of Zapandir, a small Mussulman 
hamlet about two miles from Vrachori, seeing that no 
promise could bind the Greeks, refused to listen to any 
terms, and defended themselves valiantly until their 
chief was killed. Worn out with hunger and fatigue, 
they at last surrendered at discretion, and were put to 
the sword. Only a few Albanian soldiers in the place 
were allowed by the armatoli to retire to Arta. - 

During the summer, the troops of Khurshid Pasha 
made two attempts to penetrate into Achamania by 
the passes of Makrynoros, but both were defeated. 
The second was repulsed on the 30th of June. 

Thus, in about three months, the Christians had 
rendered themselves masters of the whole of Greece 
to the south of Thermopylae and Actium, with the 
exception of the fortresses, and these were all blockaded. 
Had they understood the value of military discipline, 
they would in all probability have succeeded in ex- 

1 The author has heard a distinguished Greek chief narrate the atrocities 
then committed, and boast of the part he took in instigating the soldiers to 
commit them. It was in the presence of General Gordon, who was known to 
be writing a history of the Reyolution. 



CHAP. III. 



204 GREEK ISLANDS. 

BOOK II. pelling the Turks from Greece before the end of the 

era Alt tii ■'• ^^ ^ t m ^ 

year, for the fortresses were inadequately supplied, 
both with ammunition and provisions.^ 

It has been already mentioned that nationality was 
a secondary feature of the Greek Kevolution at its 
commencement. The Greeks furnished the greater 
part of the soldiers who fought against the sultan, but 
Albanian ships and Albanian sailors formed two-thirds 
of the Greek navy. 

Those who believe that revolutions are invariably 
produced by the material oppression of governments 
must be at a loss to point out the proofs of their theory 
at Hydra, Spetzas, Psara, and Kasos, or to trace the 
Kevolution in those islands to its true causes. Under 
the sultan's government the four islands enumerated 
were lightly taxed, and allowed to regulate their inter- 
nal aflfairs like independent republics. Fewer restric- 
tions were placed on personal liberty and on commer- 
cial enterprise than in most Christian countries. The 
local magistrates were elective, the taxes were collected 
by Christians, and there were no resident Mussulmans. 
In few countries did the mass of the population live 
more at ease. Yet the Albanians and Greeks of these 
islands were as discontented under the sultan's govern- 
ment in 1821, as the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands 
are under the protection of Queen Victoria in 1858. 
Their advancing civilisation had inspired them with a 
longing for political independence. They believed 
that the possession of civil and religious liberty would 
render every private citizen virtuous, and every com- 
mercial speculation prosperous. 

Early in the eighteenth century the sultans began 
to perceive that their treaties with the Christian 

1 The following fortresses remained in the hands of the Turks : In the 
Morea— Tripolitza, Nauplia, Corinth, Patras, with the castle of the Morea, 
Navarin, Modon, Coron, and Monemvasia. In continental Greece— Athens, 
Zeituni, Lepanto, and the castle of Romelia, and Vonitza. In Euboea— Negre- 
pont and Eanystos. 



RISE OF THE COMMERCIAL NAVY. 205 

powers had conceded privileges to foreigners which AP. i82i , 
were ruinous to the commercial interests of their own 
subjects. Turkish and Greek traders were liable to 
higher duties, both of import and export, than strangers. 
When the sultans became desirous of reviving native 
commerce, they discovered that the first thing to be 
done was to protect the traders against the exactions 
of their own officials. They attempted to do this by 
exempting some barren islands from the fiscal admin- 
istration of the empire. Under this protection colonies 
of Albanian seamen settled at Hydra and Spetzas, and 
colonies of Greek seamen at Psara and Kasos, who 
built ships and formed self-governing communities. 
In this way a considerable commercial navy grew up 
under the Othoman flag almost unobserved by Christian 
powers; and when the Revolution broke out, these four 
islands were populous and flourishing. The Albanians 
of the two first, who were much more numerous, dif- 
fered considerably in manners and character from the 
Greeks of the other two. The Hydriots were the most 
sincere ; the Psarians were the most courteous. 

Two rocky promontories on the continent, Tricheri 
on Mount Pelion, and Galaxidhi on the Gulf of Corinth, 
were also commercial towns, possessing ships and en- 
joying self-government and many privileges under the 
sultan's protection. 

In 1821 the commercial navy of Greece, Albanian 
and Greek, consisted of nearly 350 brigs and schooners 
of from 60 to 400 tons, besides many smaller vessels, 
the whole manned by upwards of 12,000 sailors.^ 

^ The following appears to be an accurate account of the naval force of 
Greece in 1821 : — 

Hydra contained 4000 families, with 115 ships exceeding 100 tons. 

Spetzas „ 1600 „ „ 60 „ „ 

Psara „ 1200 „ „ 40 

Kasos „ 1500 „ „ 15 „ „ 

Tricheri „ 400 ,, „ 30 yessels of various sizes. 

Galaxidhi „ 600 „ „ 60 „ „ 

The number of vessels between 60 and 100 tons in all Greece was supposed 
to amount to 200, and there were many decked boats in every island and port. 



BOOK II. 

CHAP. HI. 



206 PSARA. 

Psara was inhabited by 6000 souls. Its geogra- 
phical position enabled it to watch the ocean-paths to 
the greatest commercial cities of the sultan's dominions. 
The indefatigable activity of its seamen, and the illus- 
trious deeds of one of its sons, Konstantine Kanares, 
have given it an honourable position in Greek history. 

" She made herself a name — a name to live, 
While wisdom, in self-government displayed, 
And valour, such as only in the Free 
Shall among men be honoured." 

The government of Psara was democratic ; all the 
citizens voted at the election of the magistrates, and 
among the lively and intelligent Greeks of the island 
the individual merits of each were recognised as titles 
to civic rank. Both the people and the government 
formed a strong contrast to those of Hydra, where 
wealth created a false kind of chieftainship, and the 
national traditions of the Albanian pharas were trans- 
muted into feelings of party animosity. In Psara 
every man who possessed a house, who shared in the 
risks of a trading voyage, or who supported a family, 
though he might be only a private sailor, attended the 
annual assembly of the people, and gave his vote for 
the election of forty councillors. These councillors 
chose the demogeronts or magistrates, who held office 
for a year, and who consulted the councillors on all 
affairs of importance. 

The government of Hydra was very diflferent, as has 
been already narrated, being in the hands of rich olig- 
archs, and administered by twelve primates.* 

The system of trade was the same in all the islands. 
The captains were as ignorant of the science of navi- 
gation as the sailors, but they were experienced pilots 
and good seamen. When such men were intrusted 
with valuable ships and rich cargoes, it was necessary 

^ See Book i chap. ii. p. 40. 



SYSTEM OF TRADE. 207 

that their interests should be deeply engaged in the a.d.182i, 
success of the speculation, stimulated to constant watch- 
fulness, and directly promoted by a quick voyage. 
But not only the captain — all on board also received a 
portion of the gain. The owner of the ship, the capi- 
talist who purchased the cargo, the captain, and the 
sailors, were all partners in the success of each voyage, 
according to a settled rate. The division was made 
after deducting the capital invested in purchasing the 
cargo and the price of the ship's provisions. Then five 
per cent was set apart for the municipal treasury at 
Hydra, and one per cent for the church and monastery. 
The remainder was divided into a fixed number of 
shares; the ship received its proportion as freight, the 
capitalist his share as profit, and the captain and sailors 
their respective shares as wages. Even the cabin-boy 
received a half or quarter share, as the case might be. 
Thus everybody was interested in performing a quick 
and safe voyage, and reaching the port of destination 
with an undamaged cargo. The consequence was, that 
the Albanian and Greek ships performed the quickest 
passages and realised the largest gains of all those that 
navigated the Mediterranean. 

This system had its inconveniences as well as its 
advantages. While it encouraged the crews to extra- 
ordinary exertions, it introduced a degree of equality 
and a habit of consulting those on board which proved 
an insurmountable obstacle to the introduction of 
naval discipline during the war with the Turks. No 
diflScult or dangerous enterprise could be undertaken 
without assembling all the quartermasters and old sea- 
men on the poop, and discussing the project. Some- 
times a second council was held before the mast before 
the captain's orders were obeyed. 

The general peace of 1815 caused a great reduction 
in the price of grain on the continent of Europe, and 



208 SPETZAS PROCLAIMS THE REVOLUTION. 

BOOK iL a fall of freights in the Mediterranean. In the year 

CHAP. III. O •' 

1820 the gains of the Albanian Islands, which had the 

principal share in the carrying trade of grain between 
the Black Sea ports and those of Italy, France, and 
Spain, were still further reduced by an abundant har- 
vest in Western Europe, and by the fear of a war 
between Kussia and Turkey. Many ships remained 
unemployed at Hydra and Spetzas. The sailors were 
discontented ; and all classes began to look for relief 
to the revolutionary projects which had been dissemi- 
nated among the people by the apostles of the Hetairia 
and by the agents of Ali Pasha. Towards the com- 
mencement of 1821 the revolutionary spirit had made 
great progress in all the naval islands. 

Spetzas was the first to proclaim its independence 
as a part of the Greek state. Several of the primates 
were members of the Hetairia. Their ships were rot- 
ting in the port — the sailors were clamouring for pay. 
Every Christian had of late made it a part of his creed 
that the Othoman empire was on the eve of dissolution. 
Everybody declared that a Russian war was inevit- 
able. Ali Pasha employed the whole disposable force 
of the sultan. The Turks were despised as much as 
they were hated. Enthusiasm for civil and religious 
liberty animated every rank of society, and a general 
insurrection of all the orthodox in European Turkey 
would, according to the assurance given by numbers 
of political adventurers, soon insure the success of a 
revolution in Greece. 

A public meeting of the whole population was held 
at Spetzas on the 7th of April, and the flag of inde- 
pendent Greece, bearing the cross rising above the 
crescent, was hoisted on the highest mast in the port. 
Eight brigs were immediately fitted out to cruise off 
the coast of the Morea ; and these vessels, knowing that 
an Othoman corvette of twenty-six guns and a brig of 



PSARA JOINS THE REVOLUTION. 209 

sixteen guns, greatly under-manned, were waiting at a. d. 
Milos to receive the annual contingent of sailors from 
the Albanian islands, sailed thither, and captured them 
by surprise. The Mussulmans on board were carried 
to Spetzas, where many were murdered in cold blood, 
and others were tortured with such horrid cruelty, that 
shame has induced the Greeks to throw a veil over this 
first victory of the Greek navy, in order to conceal the 
crimes which accompanied it. 

Psara followed the example of Spetzas, but it did 
not join the Ke volution untU the 23d of April. The 
Psarians then commenced a series of depredations 
which made them a terror to all the Mussulman popu- 
lation on the sea-coast. The Turks were preparing an 
expedition in Asia Minor to relieve their countrymen 
in the Morea. Their preparations were rendered 
abortive by the destruction of a large transport laden 
with military stores, and by the capture of four small 
vessels carrying two hundred troops and a supply of 
provisions, destined for Nauplia. The Psarian schooners 
ran down the whole coast from Tenedos to Khodes, 
destroying or capturing every vessel that could not 
gain a secure port. By paralysing the attempts of 
the Turks to send supplies to Greece, these operations 
facilitated the reduction of Monemvasia and Navarin. 

While the Spetziots and Psarians were fighting the 
battles of liberty, the primates of Hydra were resist- 
ing the wish of the people to join the Revolution. At 
Hydra, as we have seen, wealth alone gave rank and 
power — the distinction of the different ranks of society 
was there strongly marked. The proportion of large 
ships was greater than in the other islands, and at this 
time the number of destitute was proportionably in- 
creased, so that the stagnation of commerce, which 
had put an end to speculative voyages, caused much 
sufi^ering among the families of the sailors. The people 

VOL. 1. -^ " 



210 STATE OF HYDRA. 

^BooK II. called loudly for revolutionary measures. The primates 
..J^IlHL opposed a change, which would put them to the ex- 
pense of fitting out their ships for an unprofitable and 
dangerous service. In vain the patriots of Spetzas 
and Psara urged them to hoist the Greek flag. A 
popular insurrection terminated their opposition by 
setting aside their authority. On the 28th of April 
the people proclaimed the independence of Hydra, and 
its union with the Greek state. 

This insurrection affords an insight into the social 
condition of the Albanian islanders. The captains of 
ships, who were not themselves shipowners, formed a 
middle class, whose influence was not inconsiderable, 
particularly when want of employment rendered their 
interests identical with those of the people. Antonios 
Economos, an unemployed captain, who was a member 
of the Hetairia, commenced enrolling a band of volun- 
teers when the apostles transmitted the final signal for 
an outbreak. On the night of the 8th of April he 
assembled his followers, and at daybreak they rang the 
bell which was sounded to convoke public meetings. 
Economos attended the assembly surrounded by a 
body of armed men, and invited the sailors to take 
possession of the ships in the port, and proclaim the 
Kevolution in Hydra. 

The demogeronts for the current four months were 
Lazaros Conduriottes, Ghika Ghiones, Demetrios Tsam- 
ados, and Vasili Budures. The governor or bey, named 
by the capitan-pasha, was George Bulgares the younger. 
These men, instead of holding their usual meeting at 
the monastery and communicating directly with the 
people, were so intimidated by the insurrection, which 
they knew well was directed against their treasure- 
chests, that they abandoned their posts and left Eco- 
nomos master of the field. He immediately installed one 
of his own partisans, Nicolas Kokovila, as governor. 



INSURRECTION OP ECONOMOS. 211 

The people were emboldened by this easy victory to a. d. 1821. 
declare, without any circumlocution, that their first 
business was to obtain money. Three days were spent 
in the most degrading negotiations, and all parties dis- 
played the most revolting selfishness. The wealthy 
primates tried to diminish the demands of the dema- 
gogues by gaining over some of the unemployed 
captains to act as their advocates, while the popular 
leaders endeavoured to impose as large payments as 
possible on their personal enemies. In the end the 
people collected and divided among themselves the 
sum of 30,000 dollars. On the 12th of April, these 
affairs of personal interest having been arranged, the 
people felt less animosity towards the primates; and the 
popular leaders, in order to retain their ascendancy, 
found it necessary to direct public attention to the 
Kevolution. 

Two Spetziot vessels appeared off the port, bearing 
the flag of Greece, and Economos seized the occasion 
to propose that the ships in the port of Hydra should 
be armed without delay, and a proclamation issued 
throwing off the sultan's authority, and announcing 
that Hydra formed a part of the Greek state. The 
oligarchs availed themselves with prudence of the op- 
portunity which was thus presented of recovering their 
influence. They opened direct negotiations with the 
captains and sailors who had previously served in their 
ships. The pressing wants of the populace having 
been relieved by the distribution of the money ex- 
tracted from the primates, individual interests and 
connections again operated, and private sympathies 
and party feelings came into play, Economos, who 
observed the reaction, made a vain attempt to deprive 
the shipowners of the right of selecting the captains 
to command their ships. He desired to form a revolu- 
tionary committee, whose members should exercise the 



212 HYDRA JOINS THE REVOLUTION. 

BOOK II. whole executive government; but the character of his 

OHAP. III. . 

associates was well known, and did not inspire suffi- 
cient confidence. Fear, interest, and patriotism now 
combined to make both parties anxious for a recon- 
ciliation. After some concessions it was effected ; 
concord was restored, the proclamation of indepen- 
dence was viewed as the ratification of a general 
amnesty ; and on Sunday the 29th of April a solemn 
service was performed in the church, and the Greek 
flag was then hoisted on all the ships at Hydra. 

Spetzas, Psara, and Hydra lost no time in concerting 
common operations, and a Greek fleet soon assembled 
under the command of Jakomaki Tombazes, a Hydriot 
primate of some nautical science. He was an amiable 
and judicious man, but he was deficient in decision, 
and habitually sought the advice of others, listening 
often to those who had less knowledge and courage 
than he possessed himself He could not comprehend 
that an imprudent measure, executed with promptitude 
and vigour, is in war more effective than a wise 
measure feebly and slowly carried out. He was one of 
the few men of rank in Hydra, at the commencement 
of the Kevolution, who treated strangers with kindness ; 
and an English Philhellene of the highest character, 
whose praise was only given where it was due, said of 
him emphatically, that he was a worthy and honourable 
man.^ 
^ The enterprise which promised the greatest success 
to the Greek fleet was an attack on the Othoinan ships 
then cruising off the coast of Epirus. They were 
ill-manned, and so unprepared to resist, that they 
would in all probability have fallen into the hands of 
the Greeks. A naval victory in the western seas 
would have weakened Khurshid's army to such a 
degree that he would have been unable to send succours 

^ Note of Fi-auk Abney Hastings, in the author^s possession. 



CRXTISE OF GREEK FLEET. 213 

to Patras and Tripolitza ; it would have revived the a. d. 182i. 
courage of the partisans of Ali Pasha, roused the Chris- 
tians to take up arms in many districts where they 
remained quiet, and perhaps enabled the Greeks, with 
the assistance of the SuUots, to gain possession of 
Previsa and Arta. 

Unfortunately, just as the fleet was about to sail 
for Epirus, Neophytos Vambas arrived at Hydra, and 
induced the primates to change its destination with 
the lure of the conquest of the rich island of Chios. 
Vambas was a Chiot ; he was a scholar and a patriot, 
but he was a pedant and a visionar}^ During the 
early period of the Kevolution he obtained considerable 
political influence by attaching himself to Prince 
Demetrius Hypsilantes. Nature intended him for a 
professor, not a politician. His ignorance of the busi- 
ness of active life ; his incompetence to judge men's 
characters ; his persuasion that all men could be directed 
by general maxims ; and his own inability to appre- 
ciate the value of times and circumstances, and to 
seize the opportimities they afforded, rendered him an 
unsafe counsellor, and made his political career injurious 
to his country. 

The first cruise of the Greek navy was productive of 
no important result. Many prizes were made, and the 
sailors gained a good deal of booty ; but no discipline 
was introduced into the service, and the little order 
that had previously existed in the ships while they 
were merchantmen was relaxed. Kegulations for the 
equitable distribution of prize-money were adopted by 
universal suffrage before the fleet sailed, and it was 
decided that a proportion should be set apart for the 
public treasury, in order to meet the general expendi- 
ture of the war in which the nation was engaged. 
These regulations were disregarded by the crews which 
succeeded in capturing prizes ; they cheated their com- 



CHAP. IIL 



214 • MURDER OF THE SHETK-EL-ISLAM. 

BOOK II. panions, and defrauded the public. Their piratical 
conduct, and particularly the plunder of an Austrian 
vessel at Tinos, caused them to be regarded with fear 
by all the commercial states in the Mediterranean ; and 
the cabinets of Europe watched suspiciously the pro- 
ceedings of a powerful naval force, in which no disci- 
pline prevailed, and which set all public and private 
law at defiance. 

The disorderly conduct of the Greek navy, and par- 
ticularly of the Hydriot ships, during this cruise, must 
be attributed in part to the wilful neglect of the 
primates. They tolerated the criminal proceedings of 
the sailors that they might win them over from the 
party of Economos. They winked at every licence for 
the purpose of gaining their own selfish ends. One 
particular capture deserves to be noticed, because it 
occurred under circumstances where a little firmness 
on the part of the officers would have saved Greece 
from a load of infamy, and prevented the Turks from 
excusing many of their subsequent cruelties with the 
name of vengeance. 

Two Hydriot brigs, commanded by Sachturi and 
Pinotzi, captured a Turkish vessel with a valuable 
cargo, among which were some rich presents from Sul- 
tan Mahmud to Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt. A 
recently deposed Sheik-el-Islam, or patriarch of the 
orthodox Mussulmans, was a passenger on board, ac- 
companied by all his family. It was said that he was 
on the pilgrimage to Mecca. He was known to have 
belonged to the tolerant party in the Othoman govern- 
ment. There were other Turkish families in the ship. 
The Hydriots murdered all on board in cold blood ; 
helpless old men, ladies of rank, beautiful slaves, and 
infant children, were butchered on the deck like cattle. 
An attempt was afterwards made to extenuate this 
unmerciful conduct, by asserting that it was an act of 



FALL OF ECONOMOS. .215 

revenge. This assertion is false. Those who per- a. d. i82i. 
petrated these cruelties did not hear of the execution 
of their own orthodox patriarch until after they had 
murdered the orthodox patriarch of their enemies. The 
truth is, that both by land and sea the war commenced 
as a war of extermination. Fanatical pedants talked 
of reviving the glories and the cruelties of classic 
times as inseparable consequences of Greek liberty. 
They told how the Athenians had exterminated the 
inhabitants of Melos, and how the Spartans had put 
all their Athenian prisoners to death after their victory 
at jEgospotamos. 

The manner in which the immense booty taken by 
Sachturi and Pinotzi was divided, proved as injurious 
to the Greek cause as the barbarous ferocity displayed 
in acquiring it. The crews refused to conform to the 
national regulations which had been adopted before 
going to sea. Violent dissensions arose with the 
crews of other ships entitled to a share of the booty, 
and the quarrels that ensued became so violent that 
several ships quitted the fleet and went off cruising on 
their own account. All united action became impos- 
sible ; and thus the best opportunity of striking a 
decisive blow while the Turks were still unprepared 
for resistance was allowed to escape. 

The wealth gained by the sailors diminished the 
influence of the popular faction under the leading of 
Economos, and afforded the oligarchs an opportunity 
of re-establishing their power. The demagogue had 
made use of the selfishness of the saUors to win au- 
thority, by offering greater allurements to their selfish- 
ness ; the oligarchs now deprived him of all power. 
Neither party addressed themselves to the better feel- 
ings of the people, who, if they had found worthy 
leaders, would not in all probability have been found 
wanting in patriotism and honour ; but, as it hap- 



CHAP. I IT. 



216 • FALL OF ECONOMOS. 

BOOK II. pened, the passions of a turbulent population were 
excited instead of being restrained. The ambition 
of the oligarchs and of the demagogue was equally 
unprincipled. 

When the Hydriot ships returned from their first 
cruise, Economos saw that his only hope of maintain- 
ing himself in the position he had assumed was by 
placing himself at the head of a patriotic party. He 
therefore proposed to enforce the wise and equitable 
regulations voted by common consent before the fleet 
put to sea, and demanded that a portion of every prize 
should be set apart for the national service. The 
primates opposed this just and prudent measure be- 
cause it was advocated by Economos, and supported 
the sailors in their unjust misappropriation of the 
whole booty. They paid dearly in after days for this 
desertion of their country's cause to gain their party 
objects. Economos found himself without partisans, 
for no one trusted his patriotism, and he learned too 
late that honesty is the best policy, even in politics. 
The band of bravos who had joined him when he 
excited the people to plunder the rich, now adhered to 
the primates, who supported the sailors in plundering 
the national treasury. These bravos were an institu- 
tion in the community of Hydra, and they knew that 
the oligarchs were always sure to want their ser- 
vices, while the demagogues could easily dispense with 
them.^ 

The oligarchical party made an attempt to assas- 
sinate Economos, instead of driving him from power 
by a public vote. The attempt failed, but a violent 
tumult ensued, in which the democratic party was 
defeated by a fire of musketry from the houses of 
the primates, and a few rounds of grape from the ships 
in the port. Economos escaped in a boat, but was 

' See an anecdote at p. 89. 



SAMOS JOINS THE REVOLUTION. *217 

captured before he could reach the Morea. He wasA.D.i82i. 
saved from the veugeance of the primates by the 
sailors, who allowed him to retire to Kranidi ; but he 
was subsequently arrested, and imprisoned in a monas- 
tery near the lake of Phonia. From this confinement 
he escaped shortly after the taking of Tripolitza. On 
his way to Hydra, where the people, informed of his 
escape, were anxiously waiting for his arrival, he was 
assassinated at Kutzopodi, near Argos, by order of the 
primates. 

The Samiots joined the Revolution as early as lay in 
their power. A Spetziot vessel anchored off Samos on 
the 30th of April. The people of Vathi immediately 
took up arms, and murdered all the Turkish families 
in the place. The primates of the island, however, 
succeeded in saving the lives of the Mussulmans who 
resided in Chora, with the aga and cadi. They were 
hurried into boats, and landed safely on the opposite 
shore of Asia Minor. Samos was then declared inde- 
pendent, and united with the Greek state. Its inhabit- 
ants lost no time in preparing to carry on the war 
vigorously, by making descents on the coast of Asia 
Minor. 

The Othoman fleet quitted the Dardanelles on the 
3d of June. It consisted of only two line-of-battle 
ships, three frigates, and three sloops of war, and was 
very ill manned, and altogether in bad condition. The 
Greek fleet had already put to sea on its second cruise. 
One division, under Andreas Miaoulis, a name destined 
to become one of the most renowned in the annals of 
the Revolution, consisting of twelve brigs, sailed to 
blockade Patras and watch the Othoman squadron on 
the coast of Epiras. The principal division, con- 
sisting of thirty-seven sail, under Jakomaki Tombazes, 
cruised in the Archipelago, to wait for the Othoman 
fleet. 



CHAP. 



218 OTHOMAN FLEET SAILS. 

BOOK II. On the 5th of June the Greeks fell in with one of 
the Turkish line-of-battle ships off the north of Chios. 
It fled, and anchored in the roads of Erissos. The 
Greeks who pursued it passed in succession far astern, 
and fired their broadsides without producing any effect. 
It was necessary to devise some other mode of attack, 
and it was resolved to make use of fire-ships. 

The exposed situation of Psara, the difficulty of 
sustaining a contest with the large ships in the sul- 
tan's navy, and the danger of an attack from the 
whole Othoman fleet, had been the subject of much 
deliberation among the Psarians. The destruction of 
the Turkish fleet, at Tchesme was naturally much 
spoken of, and the success obtained by the three fire- 
ships of the Kussians inspired the Psarians with high 
hopes.^ It was resolved to fit out several fire-ships 
at Psara ; but with the usual dilatory habits of the 
Greeks in carrying even their wisest resolutions into 
execution, not one of these was ready to accompany the 
fleet when it sailed. 

After the Turkish line-of-battle ship had been can- 
nonaded ineffectually at her anchorage in the bay of 
Erissos, a council of captains was held on board Tom- 
Lazes' ship. As there was some danger of the enemy 
putting to sea and escaping before a fire-ship arrived 
from Psara, various projects for his destruction were 
discussed. Some proposed cutting the cable during 
the sea-breeze, and letting the Turk drift ashore. 
Tombazes observed that an English naval officer, with 
whom he had spoken, told him that fire-ships would 
prove their best means of attacking the line-of-battle 
ships and heavy frigates of the Othoman navy. It 
has been erroneously supposed that Tombazes consi- 
dered this as the first suggestion of the use of fire- 

^ Greece under Othoman Domination^ p. 318. 



TQRKISH LINE-OE-BATTLE SHIP BURNED. 219 

ships by the Greeks.^ The Psarian admiral, Apostoles, a. d. 1821. 
then said, that it was not necessary to wait for the 
arrival of the fire-ships from Psara, as there was more 
than one of his countrjrmen in the fleet who had 
served with the Russians at Tchesm^ and knew how to 
prepare a fire-ship. The word was passed for any 
person acquainted with the method of preparing fire- 
ships to come on board the Admiral. A teacher of 
navigation at Psara, who was serving as captain's 
secretary in one of the Psarian vessels, answered the 
summons, and undertook the task. His name was 
John of Parga, but he was generally known by the 
nickname of Patatuka, which is a term of contempt 
used by the Greek seamen to designate the northern 
merchantmen, with their heavy tops and small topsails, 
and to depreciate the nautical science of those who 
navigate with small crews. A Psarian, named John 
Theodosios, gave up his vessel to be converted into a 
fire-ship, on receiving a promise of forty thousand 
Turkish piastres, to be paid by the treasuries of the 
three naval islands ; and volunteers came forward to 
man her for a bounty of one hundred dollars each. 
This brulottOy or fire-ship, was soon ready, but it was 
manoeuvred timidly, and burned uselessly. 

On the 6th of June the cannonade was resumed, but 
at too great a distance to inflict any injury on the 
Turk, though the Greeks lost one man killed and two 
wounded. A second fire-ship was prepared, but a stiff" 
breeze during the night prevented the Greeks from 
making use of it. 

On the 7th one of the fire-ships fitted out at Psara 
joined the fleet, and on the morning of the 8th the 
Turk was again attacked. The second fije-ship, pre- 

Tricouprs account of this council, i. 275, has caused a good deal of dis- 
cussion in Greece, and it is corrected by Eotzias : *Evap6p0(i>(ris r&v iv rp 2. 
TpiKoiirri Iffropiif irepl rwy "VapioivSv vpayjJArwv larropoufifvofv ^h N. Kor^ia. 



220 TURKISH LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIP BURNED. 

BOOK II, pared in the fleet by John of Parga, was commanded 
''"^' '"' by a Psarian named Pappanikolo, and manned by 
eighteen sailors. The fire-ship which arrived from 
Psara failed, in consequence of the timidity of those on 
board, who fired the train too soon. Pappanikolo dis- 
played greater skill and courage in his bold enterprise, 
and he was well supported by his crew. He ran his 
ship under the bows of the Turk, and did not light 
the train until she was firmly fixed. He then jumped 
into his boat and rowed off to the Greek fleet. The 
flames mounted into the sails of the fire-ship in an 
instant, for both the canvass and the rigging were 
saturated with turpentine, and they were driven 
by the wind over the bows of the line-of-battle ship, 
whose hull they soon enveloped in a sheet of fire. The 
flames and the dense clouds of smoke which rushed 
along the deck and poured in at the ports, rendered it 
impossible to make any effort to save the ship, even 
had the crew been in a much better state of discipline 
than it was. The cable was cut, and two launches fuU 
of men left the ship. Many of the sailors jumped 
overboard and swam ashore ; but it is supposed that 
between three and four hundred persons perished. 
About 11 A.M. the magazine exploded, and left her a 
complete wreck. This conflagration was the naval 
beacon of Greek liberty. 

The remaining ships of the Othoman fleet were so 
terrified by the disaster of their consort, that they 
sought safety within the Dardanelles. The moment 
was favourable for a daring enterprise. The Turks 
were astounded and unprepared. But Tombazes was 
not a man of energy, and the Greek fleet was not dis- 
posed to obedience ; so this opportunity of striking a 
great blow was allowed to pass unemployed. Tom- 
bazes anchored at Moschonnesia, near Kydonies. He 
appears to have taken this injudicious step at the solici- 



KYDOKIES DESTROYED. 221 

tation of those who wished to facilitate the escape of a.d. 1821. 
some wealthy Greek families. But it is possible that 
he shared the delusive expectations of those who be- 
lieved that a million of orthodox Christians would take 
up arms in Asia Minor at the appearance of the Greek 
fleet. 

Kydonies was a commercial town, which supported 
within itself, or in the adjoining villages, a prosperous 
Greek population of thirty thousand souls.^ It had 
only existed for forty years, and owed its flourishing 
condition to the privileges conceded to it by the sultan. 
Its municipal authorities were elected by the people, 
and the local administration was controlled by the 
bishop and the primates. No maritime city on the 
coast of the Mediterranean enjoyed a higher degree of 
civil liberty. But after the massacre of the Turks at 
Galatz and Yassi was known to the Mussulmans in 
the neighbourhood, the zealots became eager to plunder 
the wealthy inhabitants of Kydonies as a profitable 
revenge. The pasha of Brusa, alarmed for the safety 
of a place which contributed largely to the revenues of 
his pashalik, was desirous of protecting the Greeks, 
and to effect this he stationed a corps of his own 
guards in the vicinity, with strict orders to prevent 
any irregular troops from entering Kydonies. But 
the execution of the Greek patriarch by the sultan's 
order was assumed by all fanatical Mohammedans to 
be a licence to them to plunder and murder all ortho- 
dox Christians; and the bands of Turkish militia who 
were marching to suppress the insurrection on the 
Danube, sought eagerly for an opportunity to sack a 
wealthy Greek town like Kydonies. The news of the 
destruction of the Turkish line-of-battle ship on the 

1 The Turkish name of KydoDies was Haivalee, -which, like the Greek, signi- 
fies a quince. Gordon, i. 297, says it contained 3000 stone houses, several 
handsome churches, an episcopal palace, 40 oil-mills, 30 soap-works, two mag- 
nificent hospitals, and a celebrated college, founded in 1813. 



222 KYDONIES DESTROYED. 

BOOK II. coast of Mitylene gave them an additional incitement. 

*^°^' "'' To protect the place, the pasha of Brusa ordered his 
kehaya to take up his quarters, with a strong body of 
guards, in the town. The wealthy inhabitants felt 
that they were no longer safe. Their protectors would 
probably make them purchase life with the sacrifice of 
their property, and put some of them to death, accord- 
ing to the Othoman forms of justice, in order to pre- 
serve tranquillity. If the militia succeeded in entering 
the place, they were sure of being plundered, and, if 
not murdered on the spot, of being sold as slaves. 
They naturally looked out for any chance of escape. 
On the 14th of June they sent a deputation to Tom- 
bazes, begging him to assist and protect their embark- 
ation on board the Greek fleet. On the same day the 
guards of the kehaya took up their quarters in the 
town. On the following day the embarkation com- 
menced. 

The launches of the Greek ships arrived at day- 
break, armed with swivels, and manned by select crews. 
A party of eighty Romeliot soldiers was landed on the 
beach to protect the families who embarked. The 
kehaya in the mean time made his own arrangements 
for preventing the escape of the wealthy citizens, whom 
he regarded as pledges for the tranquillity of the 
Christian population. He occupied some houses near 
the beach, and endeavoured to drive off* the Romeliots 
and the boats of the fleet by. opening on them a heavy 
fire. The Kydonians, fearing lest their escape should 
be prevented, occupied some houses in rear of the 
Turks, and began to skirmish with them. The swivels 
of the launches, the rifles of the Romeliots, and the fire 
of the Kydonians, soon cleared a safe line of retreat to 
the beach. But the firing served as a signal to the 
Turks to commence plundering the town. The shops 
in the bazaar were first emptied ; private houses were 



KYDONIES DESTROYED. 223 

then ransacked, and at last women and children were a.d. 
seized, to be sold as slaves. An unparalleled scene of 
confusion ensued, but the disorder enabled as many as 
the boats would hold to escape without difficulty. 
The Turks, however, in order to prevent those who 
lived at a distance from the sea from reaching the 
beach, set fire to several houses in the middle of the 
town. The Greeks, to stop the advance of the Turks, 
set fire to other houses, and fire being used as a species 
of intrenchment by both parties, before night arrived 
the greater part of Kydonies was in ashes. 

On the day of this catastrophe, the Greek fleet saved 
about four thousand persons, and on the following day 
one thousand more were brought oflf to the ships. 
Tombazes behaved with great humanity. He received 
seven hundred persons on board his corvette, and did 
everything in his power to alleviate their sufferings. 
He had a kind heart, though he was a phlegmatic man. 
But his example was not followed by many of his 
countrymen. Wealthy families were compelled to pur- 
chase a passage to the nearest Greek island by giving 
up the greater part of the property they had saved. 
Not a few of those whose houses at Kydonies had been 
filled with servants, were henceforth obliged to gain 
their bread as menials even in Greece. Those who 
were unable to escape to the Greek fieet, were either 
murdered or enslaved. The slave-markets of Brusa, 
Nicomedia, Smyrna, and Constantinople, were for some 
months crowded with young Greeks from Kydonies ; 
and if mere physical wellbeing were the great object 
of man's existence, these slaves might be regarded as 
more fortunate than many of their countrymen who 
preserved their liberty. 

On the 22d of June 1821 the Greek fleet returned 
home to secure its plunder and divide its gains. The 
sailors did not even wait until the month for which 



224j squadron under MIAOULIS. 

BOOK II. they had received payment in advance had expired. 

CHAP. Ill* ___ ^ X */ * 

— '■ — ' The honours of the cruise were won by the Psarians, 
in consequence of the bold exploit of Captain Pappa- 
nikolo. The booty gained was very great, but unfor- 
tunately no small portion of it was extorted from the 
fugitives who fled from their native homes in Asia 
Minor. 

The squadron which sailed westward under the com- 
mand of Miaoulis performed no exploit of importance. 
At its approach, a Turkish corvette and four brigs 
quitted Patras, and retired under the guns of Lepanto, 
where the Hydriots did not venture to attack them. 
Cutting-out was not an exploit practised in Greek naval 
warfare. An attempt to destroy them with fire-ships 
failed. The Greek squadron passed through the Dar- 
danelles of Lepanto into the gulf of Corinth during 
the night, and returned again, without suffering any 
loss from the formidable castles at these narrow straits. 
The presence of this squadron, however, roused the 
Etolians to take up arms. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE POLICY AND CONDUCT OF SULTAN MAHMUD IL 

" Qui sequum statnerit, parte inauditft alter&, etiam 
si sequum statuerit, hand sequus faerit." 

PoLicT or Sultan Mahmud— Suppressive measures and first EXEC?unoNS 
OF Greeks — Execution of the Patriarch Grbgobios— His oharactieb — 
Massacres of Greeks — Sultan restores order— Cruelties of Turks 
AND Greeks — ^Rupture with Russia— Difficui/ties of Sultan Mahmud 
IN 1821 — Measures adopted to suppress the Greek Revolution — 
Order re-established in Aorapha, among the Yallaohian population 
ON Mount Pindus — Rapacity of the Greek troops — Insurrection 
ON Mount Pelion suppressed — Revolution in the free villages of the 
Chalcidice — Among the monks of Mount Athos — Suppressed bt Aboul- 
ABAD Pasha of Saloniki — Insurrection in the Macedonian mountains 
— Sack of Niausta — Success of Sultan Mahmud in maintainino order. 

During the Greek Revolution, Sultan Mahmud gradu- 
ally revealed to the world the full extent of his abili- 
ties, and the unshaken firmness of his character. His 
conduct has been justly condemned as combining 
Mussulman bigotry with the immemorial ferocity of 
the Othoman race ; but experience seemed to prove 
that cruelty was the most effectual instrument for 
governing Oriental nations, and Sultan Mahmud knew 
how to temper his cruelty with policy. The Greeks 
entertained the project of exterminating the Mussul- 
mans in European Turkey ; the sultan and the Turks 
believed that they could paralyse the movements of the 
Greeks by terrific cruelty. Both parties were parti- 
ally successful 

VOL. I. p 



CHAP. IV. 



226 POLICY OP SULTAN MAHMUD. 

BOOK II. Sultan Mahmud is represented by the historians of 
the Greek Revolution as an inhuman monster. They 
have even attributed to him the project of exterminat- 
ing his Christian subjects, which is said to have been 
discussed and rejected by two of his predecessors, the 
ferocious Selim I. and the vicious Ibrahim. The 
Greeks have given him the epithet of " the butcher." 
Yet his conduct was guided by political principles, 
which in the year 1821 were considered prudent at 
Constantinople, and which would not have been con- 
sidered unmerciful by Louis the Great or our James 
II., if applied to men whom they considered rebellious 
heretics. The acts of Sultan Mahmud were not the 
result of personal fury, they were the deliberate acts of 
a sovereign, regulated by the laws and customs of the 
Othoman empire. He treated the rebellious janissaries 
with even greater severity than the insurgent Greeks. 
Some excuse also might be urged for his passion, if he 
allowed revenge to increase the number of his victims 
after he discovered " the grand project " of the hetai- 
rists to assassinate himself and his ministers, and to 
burn his arsenal and his capital. He then tolerated 
massacres of the Greek population at Constantinople 
and Smyrna, which he might have suppressed by a 
vigorous exercise of his authority. But even in these 
cases, it ought not to be overlooked that his position 
was extremely diflficult. He was suspected by the 
janissaries of hostility to their corps, and he knew that 
his enemies were the persons most active in inciting 
the fanatics to attack the Christians. Sultan Mahmud 
was one of those despots (not unknown on the thrones 
of Christian monarchies) who believed that Heaven 
had invested him with a divine right to rule his 
subjects. He was lawgiver and sovereign, caliph and 
sultan. It was his duty to punish rebelliop, and to 
avenge the blood of the innocent Mussulmans who 



SUPPRESSIVE MEASURES. 227 

had been slaughtered as martyrs at Galatz, at Yassi, a. d. 182i. 
and in Greece. As Britons, we must remember the ' 

cry for vengeance which arose in our hearts when we 
heard of similar atrocities committed on our country- 
men and our kindred in India. 

When the plots of the hetairists were first discovered 
by the Turks, they were treated very lightly by Halet 
Eflfendi, the sultan's favourite counsellor. But when 
the news arrived that the Prince of Moldavia, one of 
Halet's creatures, had joined the rebels, the Othoman 
government was awakened to a sense of the danger of 
a revolution among the Greeks, and the sultan's 
confidence in Halet Effendi was shaken. The first 
measures of precaution were not violent. All Greeks 
who were not engaged in business were ordered to quit 
Constantinople, and search was made for arms in the 
houses of suspected persons. But when the sultan 
obtained some information concerning the grand pro- 
ject of the hetairists, he ordered all true believers to 
arm in defence of their religion, and summoned the 
patriarch and synod of Constantinople to excommuni- 
cate Alexander Hypsilantes, Michael Soutzos, and the 
rebels beyond the Danube, who were responsible for 
the murder of many helpless Mussulmans. This act 
of excommunication, signed with the usual formalities 
on the communion-table, was immediately issued as a 
proof of the loyalty of the orthodox church to its pro- 
tector the sultan. 

Any good effect which the promptitude of the 
clergy might have produced on the Othoman govern- 
ment was destroyed by the flight of Michael Soutzos's 
brother, and several other phanariots, who were for- 
tunate enough to learn the news of the invasion of 
Moldavia before it reached the Porte. During the 
time which elapsed between the 12th and the 20th 
of March, many wealthy Greeks escaped secretly to 



CHAP. IV. 



228 FIRST EXECUTIONS. 

BOOK II. Odessa, and in ships bound to diflferent places in the 
Mediterranean. These departures, and a general be- 
lief that an insurrection of the orthodox population of 
the empire would be supported by a declaration of war 
by Russia, caused great alarm among the Mussulmans 
in European Turkey. On the 21st of March the sultan 
was informed of the massacres at Galatz and Yassi, 
and on that day the grand vizier ordered seven Greek 
bishops to be arrested, but at the same time to be treated 
with all the respect due to their high rank. 

On the 26th of March the Turks in Constantinople 
mustered in arms, and a considerable number of 
irregular troops were brought over from Asia. On 
the 3d of April, the very day on which the Christians 
in the Morea commenced the general massacre of the 
Mussulman population, the first execution of Greeks 
took place at Constantinople. Several hetairists whose 
complicity in the grand project was inferred on what 
the Othoman government considered satisfactory evi- 
dence, were executed. Some days after, sixteen hetai- 
rists of inferior rank were also executed. But it was 
not until the sultan received reports of the murder of 
thousands of Mussulman families in Greece, that his 
vengeance fell heavy on the Christians. He then 
ordered the grand vizier to select a number of Greeks 
invested with official rank, and regarding them as 
hostages for the good conduct of their countrymen, 
he commanded that they should be publicly executed 
in the manner best calculated to strike terror into 
the hearts of their co-religionaries. The recognisances 
of these men were held to be forfeited, and they were 
sacrificed as an expiation for the blood of the slain 
Mohammedans. On the 16th of April the dragoman 
of the Porte, Murusi, was beheaded in his official dress, 
and during the following week several Greeks of dis- 
tinction were beheaded, and others hung. 



EXECUTION OF THE PATRIARCH GREGORIOS. 229 

At last an execution took place which caused aAD. i82i. 
thrill of horror from the centre of Constantinople to 
the mountains of Greece and the palaces of St Peters- 
burg. On Easter Sunday, the 2'2d of April 1821, the 
Patriarch Gregorios was executed, or, as the orthodox 
say, suffered martyrdom, by order of the sultan, as an 
accessory to the rebellious scheme of the hetairists. 

Shortly after sunset on Saturday evening, the whole 
quarter of the phanar was occupied by patrols of 
janissaries, who were stationed there to preserve order 
during the unseemly tumult with which the Greeks 
desecrate their ceremonies in commemoration of our 
Saviour's death and resurrection. At midnight, the 
Patriarch Gregorios performed the usual service in his 
cathedral church, surrounded by the clergy. At the 
earliest dawn, the new dragoman of the Porte, Aris- 
tarchos, attended by an Othoman secretary of the 
reis-effendi, entered the patriarchate, and invited the 
patriarch to a meeting in the hall of the synod, to 
which the leading members of the clergy, the archonts 
of the nation, and the heads of the Greek corporations, 
were already convoked. The patriarch appeared. A 
firman was read, declaring that Gregorios the Moreot, 
having acted an unworthy, an ungrateful, and a 
treacherous part, was degraded from his office. Orders 
were immediately given for electing a new patriarch, 
and after the rejection of one candidate. Eugenics, 
bishop of Pisidia, was chosen, and received his investi- 
ture at the Porte with the usual ceremonies. 

While the new patriarch was assuming the insignia 
of his official rank, the deposed patriarch was led to 
execution. He was hung from the lintel of the gate 
of the patriarchate, with a fetwa, or sentence of con- 
demnation, pinned to his breast. The old man met 
death with dignified courage and pious resignation. 
His conscience was at ease, for he believed that his 



230 CONDUCT OF THE G&ANP VIZIER. 

BOOK II. duty as a Christian priest required him to conceal 

CHAP IV 

'—^ from an infidel sovereign the existence of an orthodox 

conspiracy, of which he may have obtained detailed 
information only in the confessional. His only error 
may have been that of voluntarily placing himself at 
the head of the Greek Church by accepting the patri- 
archate after he knew of the existence of the schemes 
of the hetairists, and when his official engagements 
to his sovereign were in direct opposition to his patri- 
otic sentiments, and what he considered his Christian 
duties. 

Three of the bishops, who had been previously 
arrested, were also executed on Easter Sunday. 

In the evening, the grand vizier, Benderli Ali, 
walked through the streets of the phanar, attended by 
a single tchaous. On reaching the gate of the patri- 
archate, he called for a stool, and sat down for a few 
minutes, looking calmly at the body hanging before 
him. He then rose and walked away without utter- 
ing a word. Othoman justice is deeply imbued with 
the principle that men in high office are hostages to 
the aultan for order in his dominions, and they ought 
to expiate crimes of the people which are attributed 
to their nieglect. Several circumstances tended to make 
the Patriarch Gregorios peculiarly culpable in the 
eyes of Sultan Mahmud. He had allowed the family 
of Murusi to escape to the detested Muscovites ; he 
had connived at the flight of Petrobey's son to join 
the rebellious Greeks ; and a hetairist had been arrested 
having in his possession letters of the patriarch mixed 
up with letters of Hypsilantes' agents. 

The body of Gregorios remained publicly exposed 
for three days. It was then delivered to the Jews to 
be dragged through the streets and cast into the sea. 
This odious task is rendered a source of horrid gratifi- 
cation to the Jewish rabble at Constantinople, by the 



CHARACTER OF THE PATRIARCH GREGORIOS. 231 

intense hatred which prevails between the Greeks andA.D. isai. 
the Jews throughout the East. The orthodox, who 
regarded Gregorios as a martyr, watched the body, 
and at night it was taken out of the water and con-r 
veyed in an Ionian vessel to Odessa, where the Rus- 
sian authorities welcomed it as a holy relic, which the 
waters had miraculously cast up to strengthen the 
faith, perhaps to animate the bigotry, of the sultan's 
enemies.^ The body was interred with magnificent 
ecclesiastical ceremonies and much military pomp. In 
Christendom it was supposed that the Jews had been 
ordered to ill-treat the body of Gregorios, in order to 
inflict an additional insult on the Christian religion ; 
but this was a mistake. This outrage on humanity 
was then a part of Othoman criminal justice, and 
it was inflicted alike on Mussulmans and Christians. 
About a year after the execution of the deposed 
patriarch, Hassan Bairaktar, of the 21st oda of janis- 
saries, headed a mutinous band of Mussulmans, who 
plundered many Christian families. He was shot re- 
sisting a patrol appointed to protect the Greeks, and 
on the 22d of June 1822 his body was dragged through 
the streets of Constantinople by the Jews, and cast 
into the sea. 

Gregorios was a man of virtue, and his private char- 
acter commanded the respect of his countrymen. His 
talents for conducting official business induced the 
Othoman government to place him three times on the 
patriarchal throne ; and on the last occasion he was 
called to his high office expressly that he might employ 
his acknowledged influence to preserve tranquillity 
among an excited population animated by the rebellion 
of Ali Pasha of Joannina, and by the prospect of a 

^ The funeral oration delivered at Odessa by the presbyter and economps, 
Konstantinufl Economos, was published at St Petersburg in 1824 in Greek and 
Qennan. 



232 MASSACRES OF THE GREEKS. 

BOOK II. Eussian war. Gresorios was therefore fully aware of 

CHAP. IV. •! •!• • 1 1 r» 1 • • 

the responsibmties and dangers of the position he 

assumed. He was versed in the intrigues of the divan 
and of the phanariots. . He knew that a great con- 
spiracy of the orthodox existed ; and there is no doubt 
that, like most of his countrymen, he believed that 
Eussia would throw her shield over the rebels. He 
took up a false position as patriarch, which ought to 
have shocked his moral feelings. In executing him 
Sultan Mahmud actfed in strict conformity with the 
laws of the Othoman empire. Every Mussulman re- 
garded him as a perjured traitor. Every Greek still 
cherishes his memory as a holy martyr. 

Various circumstances at this time made it a matter 
of policy with several influential classes among the 
Turks to encourage religious bigotry, and inflame the 
fury of the populace of Constantinople against the 
Christians. Sultan Mahmud was suspected, both by 
the ulema and the janissaries, of a design to curtail 
their wealth and diminish their privileges. They 
seized the opportunity now offered for embarrassing his 
government. They openly called on all true believers 
to revenge the Mussulmans whom the Christians had 
murdered, and they magnified the numbers of the 
slain. The sultan and his ministers were intimidated 
by the threatening aspect of the tumult which was 
created. A revolution seemed impending among the 
Turks, as an immediate result of the revolution among 
the Greeks. To calm the spirit of insurrection, and 
tranquillise the minds of the janissaries. Sultan Mah- 
mud deemed it necessary to admit three members of 
the corps to permanent seats in the divan on the 5th 
May 1821. 

Anarchy, or something very near anarchy, prevailed 
at Constantinople for three weeks. Bands of the 
lowest rabble, headed by agents of the ulema, and by 



MASSACRES OF THE GREEKS. 233 

insubordinate janissaries, paraded the quarters of the a. d. 1821. 
capital where the Christians resided, and visited the 
villages on the Bosphorus, robbing and murdering the 
rayahs. The patriarchate was broken open, and the 
monks escaped by the roof, and found the means of 
reaching some Turkish houses in the neighbourhood. 
To the honour of the Mussulmans it must be recorded 
that they concealed the Christian ecclesiastics from the 
fury of the mob. 

Sultan Mahmud is said to have viewed the first 
outbreak of Mussulman bigotry with satisfaction. He 
interpreted it as a proof of enthusiastic attachment to 
his person and government, and as a testimony of 
patriotic zeal for the dynasty of Othman. He dis- 
trusted both Halet Effendi, hitherto his favourite min- 
ister, and Benderli Ali, his grand vizier, whom he con- 
sidered too favourable to the Greeks, and too fear- 
ful of Kussia. He suspected them of advocating a 
policy of moderation, in order to serve their own selfish 
ends. 

On the 15th of May, Salik Pasha succeeded Benderli 
Ali in the office of grand vizier, and the ezecutions of 
the Greek clergy and archonts immediately recom- 
menced. Four bishops, previously arrested, and who 
had hitherto been spared, were now hanged in different 
villages on the European side of the Bosphorus, from 
Amaout-keni to Therapia. Numbers of Christians 
escaped daily from Constantinople in foreign vessels. 
The Porte adopted measures to prevent the departure 
of its subjects without passports. On the 20th of 
May the patriarch informed the orthodox subjects of 
the sultan, that every five families were to give 
mutual security for all the members of which they 
were composed, and that if any individual quitted the 
capital without a passport from the Othoman authori- 
ties, the heads of families were to be severely punished. 



234 MASSACRES OF THE GREEKS. 

BOOK n. This was surpassing the severity even of the Russian 
- — — ^ police, and ought to have satisfied the Greek historian, 
Tricoupi.^ 

At Smyrna greater disorder prevailed than at Con- 
stantinople. Bands of brigands and fanatics, who had 
taken up arms in Asia Minor under the pretext of 
marching against the rebellious Christians on the banks 
of the Danube, entered Smyrna, where they knew there 
was a large Christian population, and where they 
consequently hoped to obtain both booty and slaves 
without any fighting. The Greeks in the city and in 
the surrounding villages were attacked and plundered 
as if they had been a hostile population. Fathers of 
families were murdered ; women and children were 
carried off and sold as slaves. Many Turks of rank 
attempted in vain to put a stop to these atrocities. 
The moolah of Smyrna and several ayans were slain, 
for defending the Christians, by the Mussulman mob. 
The strongest representations on the part of the ambas- 
sadors of the European powers could only obtain the 
adoption of measures tending to protect foreigners. 
The Christian subjects of the sultan were left exposed 
to the attacks of lawless brigands, and some weeks 
were allowed to elapse before the military officers of 
the sultan made any effort to restore order. 

At Smyrna the massacre of the Greeks was repeated 
when news arrived of the cruelties committed by the 
Christians after the taking of Tripolitza. 

Similar scenes of pillage and murder were enacted in 
most of the principal cities of the empire which con- 
tained a considerable Greek population. At Adrian- 
ople, a deposed patriarch, Cyril, was put to death, and 
his execution served as a signal for the fanatics to 
plunder the Greeks in that city and in the neighbour- 
ing towns and villages. At Saloniki, at Cos, at Rhodes, 

1 See page 125. - 



SULTAN EESTORES ORDER. 235 

in Crete, and in Cyprus, the Greeks were plundered a. d. 182i. 
and murdered with impunity. For several months ■ 

during the year 1821, Greece and Turkey presented a 
succession of scenes so atrocious that no pen could 
venture to narrate their horrors. The Turks have 
always been a bloodthirsty race, indifferent to human 
suffering, and they had now terrible wrongs to avenge. 
The Greeks had by long oppression been degraded into 
a kind of Christian Turks. It is impossible to form a 
correct estimate of the number of Greeks who were 
massacred by the Turks : some have considered it as 
great as the number of Mussulmans murdered in 
Greece. 

The sultan could not long forget that the wealth and 
intelligence of the Christian rayahs contributed to fill 
his treasury. He had gratified his revenge, but he 
wished to avoid weakening his own strength. The in- 
gratitude of the dignified clergy and wealthy phana- 
riots on whom he had conferred high office, appeared 
to merit the severest punishment; but he felt that the 
cruel treatment of the common people compromised the 
order of society, and threatened to diminish the im- 
perial revenues. He determined to re-establish order 
and security of property ; and the rare energy with 
which he carried his measures into immediate execu- 
tion, enabled him to do so most successfully. He 
proved to the Christians that they could live in secu- 
rity, and continue to gain money, under his govern* 
ment ; and he persuaded a considerable portion of the 
Greek race to separate themselv^ from the cause of 
the Revolution, and remain tranquil under his protection. 
While policy suggested that terror was the most effec- 
tual weapon for crushing rebellion, no monarch ever 
inflicted punishment with greater severity than Sultan 
Mahmud ; but as soon as he felt satisfied that humanity 
would enable him to combat the progress of the Greek 



236 CRUELTY BOTH OF TURKS AND GREEKS. 

BOOK II. Revolution with greater efficacy in those regions into 

CHAP IV. , ^ •' ^ 

— ^ which it had not yet spread, he acted both with mode- 
ration ^nd prudence. Unfortunately, both the Turks 
and Greeks in arms considered that the results of their 
cruelty proved the wisdom of inhumanity. By de- 
stroying the native Mussulmans in Greece, the Christi- 
ans had destroyed their most dangerous enemies, and 
converted what might have been a civil war into a 
national struggle for independence. The Turks, by 
cutting off the heads of the leading Greeks in their 
power, had checked the progress of the Revolution, and 
retained one-half of the Greek population in subjection 
to the sultan. 

A few examples of the manner in which the war was 
carried on will show the spirit of both the belligerents. 
The Othoman fleet, while passing near the island of 
Samothrace, embarked seventy of the inhabitants. 
They were accused of joining the Revolution, because 
the sailors of the Greek fleet had landed on the island, 
and collected a supply of provisions. Twelve of these 
poor islanders were hanged at Constantinople for the 
purpose of intimidating others. It was impossible to 
suppose that they had committed any crime deserving 
so severe a punishment. 

The Greek fleet, having captured some Turkish mer- 
chantrvessels, sent one hundred and eighty prisoners to 
Naxos, where they were treated as slaves. .For some 
time they were employed by the Greeks of the island 
as domestic servants or farm-labourers, and they were 
generally well treated by their masters. But one after 
another they were waylaid and murdered. As the 
Greek proverb expresses it, the moon devoured them ; 
and when a French man-of-war arrived to carry off the 
survivors, only thirty were found alive. 

About forty Turks, of whom five only were men, 
were allowed by the Greeks of Laconia to escape to 



RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA. 237 

Cerigo, where they expected to find protection under a. d. 1821. 
the English flag ; but they were murdered in cold blood 
by the Ionian peasantry, who had no wrongs inflicted 
by Othoman tyranny to plead as an apology for the 
assassination of Mussulman women and children. The 
indignation of the British government was roused, and 
five Cerigots were tried, condemned, and executed for 
these murders. 

During the whole period of the Revolution the Greeks 
displayed a fiercer animosity to the Mussulmans than 
the Turks to the Christians. Gordon, a warm phil- 
hellene, observes, " Whatever national or ^individual 
wrong the Greeks may have endured, it is impossible 
to justify the ferocity of their vengeance, or to deny 
that a comparison instituted between them and the 
Othoman generals, Mehemet Aboulaboud, Omer Vrioni, 
and the Kehaya Bey (of Khurshid), would give to the 
latter the palm of humanity. Humanity, however, is 
a word quite out of place when applied either to them 
or to their opponents.''^ 

The Christian sovereigns who had ministers at the 
Porte, and especially the Emperor of Russia, who had 
already constituted himself the protector of the ortho- 
dox subjects of the sultan, were reproached with their 
callousness to the sufierings of the Greeks. Several 
Europeans residing at Constantinople and at Smyrna 
were murdered by fanatics and brigands, yet the re- 
monstrances of the ambassadors were treated with 
neglect by Sultan Mahmud. Under the circumstances 
it was thought by many that the Christian powers 
ought to have withdrawn their representatives from 
Constantinople. But these philanthropists overlooked 
a fact which forced itself on the attention of the 
Emperor Alexander I. It was, that the conduct of the 
Othoman government proved that the sultans hand 

^ History of the Greek RevoltUiorif i. 313. 



OHAP. IV. 



238 RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA, 

BOOK II. was heavy on the Greeks, not because they were 
orthodox Christians, but because they were rebels : 
and the policy of the Russian autocrat was quite as 
hostile to a democratic revolution as that of the sultan 
was. But the Baron Strogonoff, the Eussian minister, 
did not allow the execution of the Patriarch Gregorios 
to pass without strong complaints. The Porte, how- 
ever, replied, that he had been justly condemned and 
executed according to law ; that his complicity in a 
conspiracy to overthrow the authority of his lawful 
sovereign had been proved by irrefragable evidence ; 
and that he had been deposed from his ecclesiastical 
dignity with the usual forms before he had been pun- 
ished for his crimes. To all this the Eussian minister 
could offer no reply. 

When the declaration published by the emperors of 
Russia and Austria and by the king of Prussia at Lay- 
bach on the 12th May 1821, against revolutionary 
principles, was made known to Sultan Mahmud, he 
viewed it as an engagement of these powers not to 
protect the Greek rebels. In this interpretation of the 
policy of the Christian powers he was confirmed by 
the assurances of several foreign ministers, and he 
availed himself of the opportunity which was thus 
afforded him of improving his position. He ordered 
all vessels quitting Othoman ports to be searched, in 
order to prevent the departure of Turkish subjects 
without passports. This being entirely in accordance 
with the principles of police adopted by Christian 
states, admitted of no objection on the part of Russia. 
But at the same time an embargo was laid on all grain 
ships passing the Bosphorus, and the sultan insisted 
on enforcing his natural jurisdiction over all his Chris- 
tian subjects who pretended to a foreign nationality, 
by obtaining passports from foreign ambassadors while 
they continued to reside in Turkey. The Russian 



RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA. 239 

minister objected to these measures ; and oh the 18th a. n. 1821. 
of July 1821 he presented to the Porte an ultimatum, " 

in which the emperor demanded that the ill-treatment 
of the orthodox should cease, and that the churches 
which the Turks had wantonly destroyed should be 
rebuilt at the sultan's expense. No reply was vouch- 
safed to this document, which exceeded the limits of 
international diplomacy on some points. The Russian 
minister then broke off his relations with the Porte, 
and embarked to sail for Odessa. This spirited con- 
duct alarmed the Othoman ministers, who then sent 
an answer, which Baron Strogonoff declined receiving, 
as the Eussian embassy had already quitted Constan-^ 
tinople. The reply to the Russian ultimatum was 
transmitted to St Petersburg. 

In this reply the Porte argued that the Greeks, as 
well as all other orthodox Christians and the orthodox 
Church, had always been objects of the sultan's espe- 
cial protection. That the Treaty of Kainardje had not 
been violated by the Porte, and that rebellion must be 
punished by a sovereign, whether the rebels be Greeks 
or orthodox priests. The Emperor Alexander was 
reminded that his predecessor, Peter the Great, had ; 
put a patriarch to death ; and the sultan now de- 
manded, as a proof of the emperor's disapproval of the 
rebellion of the Greeks and the lawless conduct of the 
hetairists, that his imperial majesty should deliver up 
the traitorous hospodar of Moldavia, Michael Soutzos, 
to receive the merited punishment of his ingratitude 
and treason. 

The Porte sought also to mollify the hostile feelingd 
of Russia, and to avoid a war by removing the embargo 
on grain ships from Russian ports. Yet when Baron 
Strogonoff had an interview with the Emperor Alex- 
ander near Odessa, in the month of August, it was 
generally supposed by Russians as well as Greeks that 



240 SULTAN MAHMUD's DIFFICULTIES. 

BOOK II. a declaration of war would soon take place. The policy 
^^^'"'' of the Eussian cabinet at this time was misunderstood 
in the East. The Emperor Alexander was resolved not 
to encourage rebellion, and he consequently persisted 
in avoiding war. He therefore took no further mea- 
sures to coerce the sultan, and Russia did not resume 
her diplomatic relations with Turkey until George 
Canning brought the affairs of Greece before the cabi- 
nets of Europe, and succeeded in inducing Russia and 
France to co-operate with Great Britain in establishing 
peace between the Greeks and Turks. 

The difficulties of Sultan Mahmud's position in 1821 
would have terrified a man of a less determined cha- 
racter ; and when he was about to commence operations 
against the insurgent Greeks, prudence might have 
suggested that a war with so powerful an enemy as 
Russia was to be avoided at every risk. But the 
sultan saw the importance of separating the cause of 
the Greek Revolution from the cause of the orthodox 
church, and of defining clearly the political opposition 
which placed the principles of the Russian cabinet in 
hostility with those of the insurgent Greeks. He 
. succeeded, however, more in consequence of the mode- 
ration of the Emperor Alexander than through his own 
sagacity or boldness. Yet for a considerable time he 
continued to be surrounded by other difficulties, and 
many persons well acquainted with the state of the 
Othoman empire considered these difficulties to be in- 
surmountable. In his capital the janissaries were sedi- 
tious, and the ulema discontented. The enthusiasm of 
the Mussulman feudatories required to be excited, and 
the bigotry of the Mussulman populace required to be 
restrained. The rebellion of Ali Pasha of Joannina 
still occupied a large portion of the sultan's naval and 
military forces. The pasha of Acre was in a state of 
rebellion. The Druses were in arms against the sultan's 



MEASURES AGAINST THE GREEKS. 241 

officers. An Othoman army was occupied in Vallachia a. d. 1821. 
and Moldavia, and the garrisons of the fortresses on the 
Danube required to be increased, on account of the 
threatening masses of troops which Russia had collected 
in her southern provinces. Amidst all these troubles, 
the true believers were appalled by the news that the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina were threatened by 
an army of Wachabites ; and the sultan, in this crisis, 
found himself obliged to declare war against the Shah 
of Persia, in consequence of the incursions which were 
made into the eastern provinces of the Othoman empire. 
Yet, with all these embarrassments, and with disorder 
in every branch of the public administration. Sultan 
Mahmud never swerved from his determination of 
crushing the Greek Revolution by force of arms. His 
first care was to strengthen his authority in Thrace and 
Macedonia, and to extinguish the flames of rebellion 
from Mount Athos to Olympus. The prudent measures 
adopted by Khurshid had prevented many of the arma- 
toli from joining their countrymen at the commence- 
ment of the Revolution, when their defection would have 
inflicted a severe wound on the power of the sultan. 
Khurshid saw immediately that, if the insurgent 
Greeks could succeed in engaging the Christian popu- 
lation of Agrapha to embark heartily in their cause, 
they would secure the co-operation of the whole of 
the armatoli of Pindus and Olympus, interrupt the 
communications of the Othoman army before Joan- 
nina, with its supplies at Larissa and Thessalonica, 
compel him to raise the siege of Joannina, and allow 
Ali Pasha to place himself at the head of a revolution 
of -the Mussulman Albanians. The fate of the Otho- 
man empire depended as much on the prudence of 
Khurshid as on the firmness of Sultan Mahmud. Any 
error of the seraskier might have thrown all European 
Turkey into a state of anarchy, an<i compelled the 

VOL. I. Q 



242 MEASURES AGAINST THE GREEKS. 

BOOK II. Emperor Alexander to interfere for the protection of 

CTf AP TV ^» 

'—^ the lives of several millions of orthodox Christians of 

the Sclavonian race. 

Khurshid augmented the garrisons of Frevisa and 
Arta, and by so doing he checked the progress of the 
Suliots, and kept open his commanications with the 
Othoman fleet, and with the Ionian Islands and the 
Adriatic. He stationed about two thousand men at 
Trikkala and Larissa, under the command of Moham- 
med Dramali, to support the dervenagas and hold the 
armatoli of Pindus and Olympus in check. The timely 
arrival of reinforcements of Mussulman Albanians in 
these districts prevented the Greek armatoli from 
taking up arms when they heard of the execution of 
the patriarch Gregorios, and the massacres of their 
countrymen at Constantinople and Smyrna. The 
prudence of Khurshid, after the insurrection broke out, 
was as remarkable as his neglect of all precautions 
before its commencement. 

During the year 1821, Sultan Mahmud succeeded in 
suppressing the revolutionary movements of the Greeks 
in most of the provinces in European Turkey beyond 
the limits of the present kingdom of Greeca The 
Christians took up arms in Agrapha, in the valleys of 
the Aspropotamos and of the river of Arta, on Mounts 
Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus, in the Macedonian moun- 
tains overlooking the plain of the Vardar, in the Chal- 
cidic^ of Thrace, and on Mount Athos. In all these 
districts the Greeks were defeated, compelled to lay 
down their arms, and induced to resume their ordinary 
occupations. The fact that they remained peaceful 
subjects of the sultan during the whole period of the 
revolutionary war, and that, when peace was established, 
and they obtained permission to emigrate to liberated 
Greece, they refused to avail themselves of the liberty of 
becoming subjects of King Otho, refutes the assertion 



REVOLUTION SUPPRESSED IN AORAPHA. 24S 

of those Greek historians who declare that cruelty and a. d. 1821. 
oppression were the prominent features of Sultan ~'- ^- 
Mahmud's government. The cruelty which represses 
anarchy is never considered to be intolerable by the 
agricultural population, to whom it secures the peace- 
able enjoyment of their property. 

In Agrapha the insurrection commenced at the end 
of June. The Mussulman Albanians in garrison at 
Rendina were expelled by the armatoli, who, in com- 
pany with the peasant proprietors of the district, de- 
scended into the plain of Thessaly, where they burned 
Loxada and some neighbouring villages inhabited by 
Koniarides, a Turkish agricultural tribe, which is said 
to have entered Europe as allies of the usurper Canta- 
cuzene, and to have settled in this district when he was 
dethroned. The Agraphiots were soon attacked by the 
Othoman troops in Larissa, and driven back into their 
mountains. The reinforcements sent by Khurshid 
enabled the Mussulmans to recover possession of Een- 
dina, and to restore the state of things which existed 
before the outbreak. Stamati Gatsu was appointed 
captain of the Greek armatoli of the district. Though 
he had been one of the leaders in the foray into Thes- 
saly, he remained faithful to the sultan. His loyalty 
was secured by liberal pay, and his conduct was closely 
watched by a dervenaga with a body of Mussulman 
Albanians. 

The Vallachian villages of Syrako and Kalarites, in 
the valley of the river of Arta, were garrisoned by a 
body of Albanians under Ibrahim Premeti. The posi- 
tion is of great importance to those who wish to com- 
mand the road from Metzovo to Joannina. The 
Vallachian population of this district consists of a 
sturdy, industrious, and wealthy race, but not of war- 
like habits. The people were instigated to take up 
amas, when they heard of the insurrection in Agrapha, 



244 VALLACHS OF THE ASPROPOTAMOS, 

BOOK II. by their primates, and by John Kolettes, a citizen of 

'— Syrako, who had been physician to Mukhtar Pasha, and 

who acquired celebrity as one of the most influential 
political leaders of the Greek Revolution. The primates 
of the Vallachian villages summoned to their assistance 
a body of armatoli, under the command of Ehangos, 
and succeeded in driving out the Albanians. But 
Khurshid, alarmed for his communications with Thes- 
saly, sent the Mussulmans powerful reinforcements, 
which enabled Ibrahim Premeti to drive back the ar- 
matoli of Rhangos, and to regain possession of Syrako 
and Kalarites. The conduct of this Albanian officer 
was extremely prudent, and he succeeded in restoring 
tranquillity and order in the district over which his 
authority extended. 

Nearly simultaneously with the insurrection of the 
Vallachian population in the valley of the river of Arta, 
the Vallachian population in the parallel valley of tL^ 
Aspropotamos took up arms. About three thousand 
men, under the command of Nicolas Sturnari, prepared 
to invade Thessaly; but the armatoli of Agrapha, having 
akeady made their submission to the sultan, joined a 
body of Mussulman Albanians, and compelled the 
Vlachokhoria to remain at home on the defensive. In 
the mean time the Turks of Trikkala guarded the passes 
of Klinovo and Portais, and a body of Albanians de- 
tached from Khurshid's camp, and, reinforced by a 
portion of Ibrahim Premeti's troops, advanced into the 
valley of the Aspropotamos on the 12th of August. 
The Turks of Thessaly forced the pass of Portais at the 
same time. The Aspropotamites, surrounded on all sides, 
made their submission, delivered up their arms, and 
received tickets of protection from Khurshid, who de- 
clared a general amnesty, reinstated every man in his 
private property, and restored to the communities the 
full exercise of all their privileges. Considerable credit 



RAPACITY OP THE GREEK TROOPS. 245 

is due to the seraskier for his military combinations and a. d. 182i. 
political moderation during these operations ; but his 
success in re-establishing the sultanas authority over the 
Christian population in the range of Pindus was un- 
questionably greatly assisted by the rapacity of the 
insurgent leaders and of the Greek troops who entered 
these districts. They plundered friends as well as foes, 
and carried off the working oxen of the Christian 
peasantry as well as their sheep and goats. 

The progress of the Greek Kevolution to the north 
was arrested quite as much by this shameful miscon- 
duct as by the prudent measures of Sultan Mahmud 
and the decisive operations of Khurshid Pasha. The 
Christian population of Mount Pindus, whether Greek, 
Albanian, or Vallachian, were taught to look with aver- 
sion on the revolutionary troops, whom they designated 
as klephts or brigands, and not as armatoli or guards. 
At this period it was a maxim of the insurgents, that 
the people ought to be forced to take up arms by the 
destruction of their property, and they carried their 
maxim into practice in a revolting manner, by appro- 
priating the property of the people to their own use in 
the process of destruction. Neither the civil nor mili- 
tary leaders of the Eevolution reflected that the de- 
struction of property must prove more injurious to 
the Greeks than to the Turks. The Greeks could only 
draw their resources from the land they occupied ; the 
Turks could carry on the war with supplies brought 
from a distance. When, therefore, a desert frontier 
was created, that deserted line of country, which soon 
extended from Makrynoros to Thermopylae, placed an 
impassable barrier to the progress of the Greeks north- 
wards, while it afforded additional security to the sultan 
in maintaining his authority among the Greek popula- 
tion beyond this line. 

Zagora (Mount Pelion) was a prosperous district in- 



248 INSURRECTION ON MOUNT PELION; 

BOOK II. habited by Greeks, who enjoyed the privilege of local 
''°^' self-go verninent and an elective magistracy. But 
about the commencement of the Greek Kevolution it 
suflfered much from the weight of taxation, and from 
the failure of the crops of silk and oil in the preceding 
year. The people were starving, and the population 
was dense. Twenty-four village communities on the 
mountain contained forty-five thousand inhabitants. 
Lekhonia alone contained some resident Turkish fami- 
lies. The town of Tricheri, situated on a rocky isthmus 
at the entrance of the Gulf of Volo, was inhabited by a 
maritime population, who owned many vessels engaged 
in the coasting trade between Greece, Saloniki, Smyrna, 
and Constantinople.^ 

Anthimos Gazas, a leading member of the Hetairia^ 
resided in Zagora as a teacher of Greek, and many of 
the inhabitants were initiated into the secrets of the 
society. When the Greek fleet arrived off the coast 
people immediately proclaimed their independence. 
On the 19th of May, a body of armed men entered 
Lekhonia, slew the aga, and put to death six hundred 
Mussulmans, murdering alike men, women, and children. 
But instead of marching instantly to surprise Volo, 
which might have been taken without difficulty, and 
the possession of which could alone secure the liberty 
of their country, they wasted their time quarrelling 
about the division of the property of the murdered 
Turks. The Greeks of Mount Pelion had been long a 
prey to party discord, and their municipal institutions 
had tended to nourish and to display violent dissen- 
sions. The slaughter of the Turks animated all their 
evil passions, and harmony was banished from their 
counsels. They succeeded, however, after losing some 
precious time, in constituting a government, to which 
they gave the name of the Thessalo-Magnesian Senate, 

- ^ See page 205. 



INSURRECTION ON MOUNT PELION. 247 

and at last assembled a military force to blockade Volo. a. d. i821. 
The people, however, displayed neither enthusiasm in 
the cause of national liberty nor valour in defending 
their local independence. 

The first operation of Dramali from his camp at 
Larissa, during the summer of 1821, was to attack the 
insurgents of Mount Pelion. He moved forward to 
relieve Yolo, and the Greeks raised the blockade at his 
approacL About four thousand Turks then pene- 
trated into the mountain and encamped in the princi- 
pal villages, where they committed the direst cruelties, 
to avenge the slaughter of their countrymen murdered 
at Lekhonia, as well as to gratify their native ferocity. 
When they retired, they carried off many women and 
children, whom they sold in the slave-markets of Lar- 
issa and Saloniki. The men generally succeeded in 
concealing themselves in the ravines and forests, where 
the Turks did not venture to pursue them. Anthimos 
Gazas, and the leaders of the insurrection, escaped to 
Skiathos and Skopelos. Dramali allowed all the vil- 
lages to make their submission, restored their local 
magistracies, and famished the people with tickets of 
protection, for which, however, his officers often exacted 
sums of money. Four villages on the cape of Tricheri 
set his authority at defiance, fortified the isthmus, and 
maintained their independence. Many armatoli and 
klephts sought refuge within these lines at Tricheri, 
and made frequent forays both against the Turks of 
Thessaly, and against their countrymen who had re- 
ceived pardon and protection from Dramali. The 
great expedition of the Turks from Thessaly into the 
Morea, secured them impunity during the year 1822 ; 
and it was not until 1823 that Tricheri was subdued. 
The capitan-pasha then granted it an amnesty, on con- 
dition that it should surrender all its vessels and receive 
a Turkish garrison. 



CHAP. IV. 



248 FREE VILLAGES OF THE CHALCIDIC6. 

BOOK II. In no part of Greece were the facilities for commenc- 
ing the Revolution, or for defending the national inde- 
pendence, greater than in the peninsula to the east of 
the Gulf of Thessalonica, called anciently Chalcidic^. 
The population was almost entirely of the Greek race, 
and its villages enjoyed the title of the Free Villages 
(Eleutherokhoria), on account of their many privileges. 

A confederation of twelve villages, called Madem- 
khoria, or mining villages, occupied the central and 
mountainous portion of the peninsula, stretching north- 
ward from the isthmus that connects Mount Athos 
with the Chalcidic^. Silver mines were once worked 
on a considerable scale by the Othoman government in 
this district. Nizvero was the seat of the local admin- 
istration, and the residence of a Turkish bey, who 
dwelt in the Mohammedan quarter, with a guard of 
twenty-five soldiers. This Mohammedan quarter was 
about half a mile distant from the body of the village 
occupied by the Christians, where the Greek magis- 
trates of the district held their meetings, and where 
the bishop of Erissos, or, as he was usually called, of 
Aghionoros, resided. 

A similar union of fifteen villages, in the more fertile 
region to the westward, was called the Khasikakhoria. 
Polygheros was the village where the deputies of this 
confederation held their meetings, for the repartition of 
taxes, and for carrying on the local administration. 

The peninsula of Kassandra orPallene formed another 
union of villages under the inspection of an Othoman 
voevode who resided at Valta. 

The three peninsulas of Kassandra, Longos, and 
Athos, running out into the Egean Sea, form three cita- 
dels, which might easily secure, to a maritime people like 
the Greeks, the complete command of the whole of the 
Chalcidic^. Of these, the most remarkable is Mount 
Athos, now called Aghionoros, or the Holy Mountain, 



ATHOS, OR THE HOLY MOUNTAIN. 249 

With very little exertion it might have been rendered a. d. i82l. 
impregnable by land ; and it is almost inaccessible to 
an invader by sea. 

No spot was better adapted to the operations of the 
Hetairists than the Holy Mountain, had the Hetairists 
really been men of counsel and action. But to com- 
mand Basilian monks, some glow of religious en- 
thusiasm and a sincere love of civil liberty was 
absolutely necessary. No counterfeits could escape 
detection among the ascetics ; and, unfortunately, 
personal egoism, political ambition, and religious in- 
difference were marked characteristics of the chiefs of 
the Hetairia. They never trusted the monks, and the 
monks never trusted them.^ 

Mount Athos is a high wooded ridge of about 
thirty miles in length, running out into the sea, and 
rising at its extremity in a bold peak, towering over 
the Egean to the height of six thousand three hundred 
and fifty feet. The isthmus that connects this rocky 
peninsula with the Mademkhoria is hardly a mile 
and a half broad ; and the remains of the canal of 
Xerxes, which Juvenal thought fabulous, stiU afford 
considerable facilities for defending it. It might easily 
have been rendered impregnable against any attack 
of irregular troops, by constructing a few of the 
redoubts used by the Greeks and Turks in their war- 
fare. Twenty large monasteries have been built round 
the base of the great peak. Their walls are con- 
structed with the solidity of fortresses, and within 
they contain large and well-filled magazines of pro- 
visions. Several have large courts flanked with towers, 
capable of defence, and communications with secluded 
creeks, where boats can find a shelter. The rocky 
coast and the sudden storms, like that which destroyed 

* ** Xlphs Toirois fi^ h6<r€Tf trlffriv [x^re fts rhy ayi^aToUt hffKiiiTiKdnarov koX 
^iKoy^viararov Ka\6yripoVf olht els robs arreyohs 4^l\ovs avrc^i^."— Philemon, 
•EXA. Eirw., i. 62. 



250 ATHOS, OR THE HOLY MOUNTAIN. 

BOOK II. the fleet of Mardonius, render a blockade by sea 

OHAP* IV, •' 

— — - extremely difficult. Some dependent monasteries and 
innumerable hermitages are scattered over the penin- 
sula. A village of monks^ called Karies, is situated 
near the centre, where the deputies of the great monas- 
teries meet to manage the civil administration of the 
whole mountain commimity ; and an Othoman gover- 
nor, with a guard of only twenty soldiers, resided there, 
to perform the duties of police. A weekly market was 
held at Karies. 

When the Revolution broke out, the Holy Mountain 
was regarded by the orthodox of the Levant as a seat 
of peculiar sanctity. It was celebrated in the tradi- 
tions of the Bulgarians, Vallachians, Albanians, and 
modern Greeks as sacred ground, hallowed by a 
thousand miracles of saints. In the nunds of the 
common people in Greece it held a more revered place 
than the echoes of Marathon and Salamis, for it moved 
their daily sympathies far more than the dim visions 
of Hellenic history. When the Western traveller ex- 
pressed his admiration of the ruins of Sunium to the 
Greek mariner, he was often astonished to hear his 
boatmen exclaim, " What would you say if you saw 
the stupendous monasteries on the Holy Mountain V 

Many monks had been initiated into the mysteries 
of the Hetairia. At the commencement of the Eevolu- 
tion about six thousand monks inhabited the mountain, 
but several hundreds were probably absent managing 
the farms which the monasteries possessed in the Chal- 
cidic^ and other places, or travelling about collecting 
alms. It is not worth while to point out in detail 
the measures which ought to have been adopted to 
secure the independence of Mount Athos, to support 
the Revolution in the Chalcidice, to threaten Thessal- 
onica, and to interrupt the communications of the 
Turks along the Thracian coast. The Greek popula-^ 



REVOLUTION IN THE CHALCIDICfi, 251 

tion of the Chalcidic6 could have maintained eight a. d. 1821. 
thousand anned men. The monks might have added 
to these a body of two thousand enthusiastic warriors. 
Supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions might 
have been prepared on the Holy Mountain. The Greek 
naval force commanded the sea, and the configuration 
of the peninsulas doubled the efficiency of a fleet com- 
posed of small vessels. Nothing was wanting to se- 
cure success but constancy and prudent leaders. The 
incapacity and presumption of the Hetairists, the sel- 
fishness of the leading primates, and the lukewarmness 
of the influential abbots, joined to the general aversion 
to military organisation which springs from the intense 
egoism of the Greek character, neutralised all the ad- 
vantages which the insurgents might have enjoyed. 

The first revolutionary movements in the ChsJcidic^ 
were mere acts of brigandage. As soon as the invasion 
of Moldavia by Hypsilantes was known, bands of armed 
Christians, sent out by the Hetairists, began to infest the 
roads. Mussulman travellers and Othoman couriers 
were plundered and murdered ; but the people did not 
take up arms and proclaim their independence mitil the 
month of May, Yussuf Bey of Saloniki, warned by 
the sultan of the danger of a general insurrection, had 
demanded hostages from the Christian communities* 
Finding that his orders were disobeyed, he sent troops 
to enforce his demand and conduct the hostages to 
Saloniki. When the Turkish soldiers approached 
Polygheros, the primates called the people to arms, and 
commenced the Revolution on the 28th of May, by 
murdering the Turkish voevode and his guards. Yussuf 
revenged this act by beheading the bishop of Kytria, 
and by impaling three poestoi who were in durance at 
Saloniki. Many Christians in that city were impri- 
soned. The Mussulmans, and even the Jews, were in- 
vited to take up arms against the Greeks, who, it was 



252 CHALCIDICfi SUBDUED. 

BOOK II. Baid, were preachins: a war of extermination against 

CHAP. TV. ' * O ^ ^ ^ O 

all who were not of their own religion. 

The inhabitants of the Free Villages assembled an 
armed force, and compelled the Othoman troops to 
retire to Saloniki ; but they neglected to profit by 
their first successes, and did not even adopt any plan 
of defence. 

In June, the Turks, having received reinforcements 
from the Sclavonian Mussulmans in the north of Mace- 
donia, attacked the Greek insurgents. Emmanuel Papas 
had assumed the title of General of Macedonia. He 
had no military knowledge, and was defeated by the 
Mussulmans, who drove the Greeks from Vasilika and 
Galatista. The defeated troops fled within the penin- 
sulas of Kassandra and Athos. Yussuf attempted to 
force the isthmus of Kassandra, which the insurgents 
had fortified with intrenchments, but was repulsed 
with some loss. Yussuf was as ignorant of war, and 
carried on his military operations with as little judg- 
ment, as Emmanuel Papas. He was superseded by 
Aboulabad, who was appointed pasha of Saloniki. 

Aboulabad was a soldier, and prepared his measures 
with some military skill, while he executed them with 
energy. Yet he was unable to assemble a force suffi- 
cient to make a decisive attack on the Greek intrench- 
ments at Kassandra until the month of November. 
He then carried them by storm. Most of the soldiers 
escaped with their leader. Captain Diamantes, on board 
the vessels anchored near the Greek lines. The people 
were abandoned to the mercy of the pasha, who cap- 
tured about ten thousand souls, chiefly fugitives from 
the Free Villages. Of these it is said that the Turkish 
troops sold four thousand women and children as slaves. 
Many men were massacred in cold blood, but Aboula- 
bad exerted himself with success to save the lives of 
the Christian peasants. The sultan's commands were 



THE HOLY MOUNTAIN SUBDUED. 263 

strict, and his own interest led him to avoid as much a.d. 182I. 
as possible depopulating a district which yielded a con- 
siderable revenue to his pashalik. During the whole 
period of his government he treated the peasantry with 
moderation, even in matters relating to taxation ; but 
he indulged his cruelty, or what he called his love of 
justice, by torturing the chiefs of the insurgents who 
fell into his hands with inhuman barbarity. 

The re-establishment of the sultan's authority over 
the religious communities of Mount Athos required to 
be effected by prudence rather than force. Ab soon as 
the monks joined the revolt of the Free Villages, they 
took into the pay of their • community about seven 
hundred soldiers, and arms were found for about two 
thousand monks. Aboiilabad knew that this force was 
sufficient to defend the isthmus against the troops he 
was able to bring into the field ; and that, even should 
he succeed in forcing the isthmus, many of the large 
monasteries were strong enough to resist his attacks. 
He resolved, therefore, to try negotiation. 

The leading monks had favoured the Hetairia, be- 
cause they had been induced to believe that it was a 
society countenanced by the Russian cabinet. When 
they discovered that they had been grossly deceived by 
the apostles, they ceased to wish well to the Greek Re- 
solution. Like most established authorities possessing 
exclusive privileges, they were averse to change. They 
could not shut their eyes to the anti-ecclesiastical 
opinions of the political and military chiefs of the in- 
surgents, nor to the fact that monks were losing favour 
with the people through the causes which produced the 
Revolution. The most influential members of the mo- 
nastic community, consequently, ventured to suggest 
that the sultan was more likely to protect the ancient 
privileges of the Holy Mountain than the chiefs of the 
Greek republic. They contrasted the anarchy that 



CHAP. XV. 



254 SACK OP NIAUSTA. 

BOOK n. prevailed wherever the Greeks commanded, with the 
order observed by the sultan's officers, Aboulabad 
had at this time acquired a great reputation for his 
clemency. Many of the Greek proprietors in the Free 
Villages owned that they owed their lives to his pro- 
tection after the storming of Kassandra. He had sub- 
sequently granted an amnesty to the inhabitants of 
Longos on their delivering up their arms. He now 
promised an amnesty to the monks of the Holy Moun- 
tain if they would deliver up all the arms in their pos- 
session, engage to pay the sultan an annual tribute of 
two million five hundred thousand piastres, and admit 
an Othoman garrison to reside at Karies. These terms 
were accepted, and on the 27th of December 1821 the 
troops of Aboulabad took up their quarters on the Holy 
Mountain. This occupation put an end to the Greek 
Revolution in the Chalcidic^ and its three adjoining 
peninsulas. 

The submission of Mount Athos enabled Aboulabad 
to turn his attention to the Greek population in the 
mountains between the mouths of the Haliacmon and 
the Axius. Zaphiraki, the primate of Niausta, was the 
most influential Greek in this district. He was a man 
of considerable wealth ; he had opposed Ali Pasha in 
intrigue, and held his ground ; and he had assassinated 
an apostle of the Hetairia, Demetrios Hypatros, to make 
himself master of secrets which might affect his interest. 
Aboulabad ordered him to send his son as a hostage to 
Saloniki. Zaphiraki had already concerted measures 
for taking up arms should he be driven to extremity. 
He now invited Gatsos and Karatassos, the captains of 
armatoli at Yodhena and Yerria, to meet him. These 
three chiefs proclaimed the Revolution, and, as usual, 
commenced their operations by murdering all the Mus- 
sulmans on whom they could lay hands. At Niausta, 
men, women, and children were butchered without 



SACK OF NIAUSTA. 266 

mercy. The Greek chiefs then marched out to call the a d. issi. 
Christian population to arms ; but the Bulgarians, who 
form the great bulk of the agriculturists, showed no 
disposition to join the cause of the Greeks. The Revo- 
lution was therefore propagated in these mountains by 
burning down the houses of the Christian peasantry, 
and by plundering their property. 

These insane proceedings were soon cut short. At 
the first rumour of the outbreak Aboulabad marched 
to Yerria, and as soon as a sufficient supply of ammu- 
nition arrived, he pushed forward to attack Niausta. 
On the 23d of April he dispersed the troops of Karatas- 
SOS after some trifling skirmishing, and he immediately 
summoned the town to surrender at discretion. His 
offers were rejected, and he carried the place by storm. 
Zaphiraki, Gatsos, and Karatassos were driven with 
ease from their ill-placed intrenchments, and fled with 
a few followers. Passing through Thessaly as armatoli, 
and avoiding notice, Karatassos and Gatsos succeeded 
in reaching Greece in safety* Zaphiraki attempted to 
conceal himself in the neighbourhood, but his cruelty 
had made him so many enemies, that few were willing 
to assist him, and he was tracked by the Turks and 
slain. 

Aboulabad allowed his troops to plunder Niausta, 
and permitted the Mussulmans of the surrounding 
country to avenge the murder of their co-religionaries 
on the unfortunate inhabitants, who had been driven 
to revolt by their primate, and who had taken no part 
in the cruelties committed by the armatoli. On this 
occasion the Turks rivalled the atrocities committed by 
the Greeks after the capture of Navarin and Tripolitza. 
The cruelties perpetrated by Aboulabad were so horrid 
as to make the description sickening. The wives of 
Zaphiraki and Karatassos were tortured, in order to 
force them to become Mohammedans, with as much in- 



CHAP. IV. 



256 SULTAN MAHMUD's SUCCESS. 

BOOK II. humanity as was ever perpetrated by the Inquisition, 
They resisted with unshaken firmness, and were at last 
murdered. The wife of Gatsos only escaped similar 
tortures by abjuring Christianity. 

An expedition, sent by Prince Demetrius Hypsilan- 
tes from Greece to rouse the inhabitants of Mount 
Olympus to take up arms, arrived oflF the Macedonian 
coast a few days after the storming of Niausta. It was 
completely defeated by the troops of Aboulabad, who 
attacked the Greeks immediately after they landed.^ 

Early in the year 1822, the officers of the sultan 
had succeeded in re-establishing his authority over the 
whole of the Greek population in European Turkey to 
the north of Joannina and Mount Pelion ; and the 
sultan governed the insurgent districts, which were re- 
duced to submission, with so much moderation and 
firmness, that they never again showed any disposition 
to revolt, and during the whole course of the Greek 
Revolution after the year 1822, they enjoyed as much 
tranquillity and prosperity as they had enjoyed before 
the rebellion of Ali Pasha. 

The difficulties which Sultan Mahmud overcame at 
this period of his reign were certainly very great, and 
his success in maintaining the integrity of the Otho- 
man empire is really wonderful. He was himself the 
sole centre of adhesion to the many nations, religions, 
and sects that lived under his sway. Not. only the 
Greeks, the Albanians, the Servians, and the Vallachi- 
ans, but even the Arabs and the Egyptians, showed, a 
disposition to throw off his authority. The old feudal 
institutions of the Turkish population had decayed. 
The sandjak beys and the dere beys were generally 
either rebels or robbers. The military organisation of 

^ Tricoupi, ii. 1 86, mentions, that on this occasion the wife of Captain Dia- 
mantes and several other women were escaping with infants, whose cries, they 
feared, might reveal to the Turks their place of concealment In order to 
escape^ they strangled their children. 



SULTAN MAHMUD's SUCCESS. 257 

the Othomans was utterly corrupted. The janissaries a. d. i82i. 
were shopkeepers, and the spahis were tax-gatherers. 
The ulema had rendered the administration of justice 
an establishment for the sale of injustice. Universal 
discontent rendered the Mussulmans quite as rebellious 
as the Christians. Sultan Mahmud seemed to be the 
only man in Turkey who was labouring honestly to 
avert the ruin of the Othoman empire. No sense of 
duty, no patriotic feeling, no common interests, no 
social ties, and no administrative bonds, united the 
various classes of his subjects in such a way as to 
secure harmonious action. He could depend on no 
class even of his Mohammedan subjects, and during 
the whole course of the Greek Revolution he was unable 
to dispense with the political services of those Greeks 
who were willing to accept employment in the Otho- 
man government. He was compelled to make use of 
the Greeks in civil and financial business, to arrest the 
progress of their insurgent countrymen, while he em- 
ployed the Turks and Albanians to oppose them with 
arms. And in the midst of all the passions which 
bigotry and mutual atrocities had awakened, he suc- 
ceeded, after one short burst of passion, in protecting 
the wealth of his Christian subjects from the avidity of 
the Mussulmans. 



VOL. 1. R 



BOOK THIRD. 

THE SUCCESSES OF THE GREEKS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREECE AS AN INDEPENDENT 

STATE. 



" Echoes which have slept 
Since Athens, Lacedsemon, were themselves. 
Since men invoked. By those in Marathon, 
Awake along the Egean." 



Victory of the Greeks at Valtetzi — Capitulation op Monehvasia — 
Capitulation of Navarin and MASSACfRE op the Turks — Fraudulent 

DIVISION OF the booty — TaKINO OF TrIPOUTZA AND CAPITULATION OF THK 

Albanians — The heroine Bobolina — Sack of Tripoutza — Anarchy it 
PRODUCED — Cruise of the Othoman fleet in 1821 — Violation op 

NEUTRALITY AT ZaNTE — RETURN OF THE OtHOMAN FLEET TO CONSTANTI- 
NOPLE— KOLOKOTRONES PREVENTED FROM BESIEGING PaTRAS — SURRENDER 

OF Corinth— Resources of the Greeks for carrying on the war — 
Administrative organisation which arose with the Revolution — 
Advantages and disadvantages of the communal system existing in 
Greece— A Peloponnesian Senate formed — Arrival, character, and 
conduct op Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes — He claims absolute power 
— Arrival of Alexander Mavrocordatos — Organisation of Continen- 
tal Greece— The Greeks demand a central government — Hypsilantes 
CONVOKES A National Assembly — The antagonistic positions of the 
National Assembly and the Peloponnesian Senate — Prince Demetrius 
Hypsilantes deserts the popular cause — The Peloponnesians make 
their Senate independent— The constitution of Epidaubus. 



The numbers of the Christians who had taken up arms 
in Greece, enabled them immediately to blockade all 



VICTORY AT VALTETZI. 259 

the fortresses occupied by the Turks. And the insur- a. d. i82i. 
gents endeavoured to gain possession of them by mili- 
tary operations as rude as those by which the Dorians 
invested the Achaian cities in the heroic ages. Strong 
positions were taken up in the nearest mountains, and 
all the defiles by which supplies could be obtained 
from a distance were closely watched, while, in the 
mean time, the country under the walls was laid waste 
by nocturnal forays. The improvidence of the be- 
sieged soon rendered this mode of attack effectual. 
Famine and sickness made terrible ravages in the 
ranks of the Mohammedans, crowded together without 
preparation and without precaution. 

The first decisive victory of the insurgents was gained 
at Valtetzi, one of the blockading positions held by 
the Greeks to watch Tripolitza, but about eight miles 
distant from that city, and situated on the hills that 
overlook the south-western corner of the great Arca- 
dian plain. The kehaya of Khurshid Pasha, Achmet 
Bey, had recently arrived at Tripolitza with a rein- 
forcement of eight hundred cavalry and fifteen hundred 
infantry. He had marched from Patras along the 
southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, penetrated 
through the Dervenaki to Argos, and crossed Mount 
Partheniua in defiance of the Greek troops. But when 
he reached Tripolitza he found the Turks in want of 
everything, and he saw that unless he could break up 
the blockade and open up regular communications 
with Messenia, the place would soon be untenable. 

On the 24th of May 1821 he made a vigorous 
attack on the Greek post at Valtetzi, which was forti- 
fied with more than ordinary care. The Turkish force 
was supported by two guns, but the engagement in 
reality was nothing more than a severe skirmish of 
irregulars. The chief strength of the Turks consisted 
in a body of twelve hundred cavalry, and the rocky 



260 MONEMVASIA TAKEN. 

BOOK III. eminence on which the Greeks were intrenched ren- 

— ^ dered this force useless. The Albanian infantry was 

not much more numerous than the Greek troops they 
attacked, but they attempted to mount the hill crowned 
by the stone walls behind which the Greeks were 
posted, with courage. A well-directed fire from marks- 
men, who fired coolly from their well-covered positions, 
compelled the Albanians to fall back with severe loss. 
The whole day was consumed in partial and desultory 
attacks, for the Albanians could not approach near 
enough to make any general attempt to carry the 
place by storm. The Turks were at last compelled to 
commence their retreat to Tripolitza. The Greeks, 
who had anticipated this movement, hastened to profit 
by it. They cut off the baggage from the cavalry, 
and hung on the flanks and rear of the infantry for 
some time. 

In this affair about five thousand Turks and three 
thousand Greeks were engaged, and four hundred 
Turks and one hundred and fifty Greeks were killed. 
But the victory was so decidedly in favour of the 
Greeks that the battle of Valtetzi destroyed the military 
reputation of the Turks in the Morea, and broke the 
spirit of the garrison of Tripolitza. Soon after the 
Greeks followed up their success by occupying the 
rocky eminences called Trikorpha, which overlook Tri- 
politza, within rifle-shot of the western wall. 

Monemvasia was the first fortress that capitulated 
to the Greeks. The place was to them impregnable ; 
but want caused dissensions among its defenders. The 
Turks made proposals for a capitulation, and Prince 
Demetrius Hypsilantes (a younger brother of the great 
Hetairist), who had been appointed on his arrival in 
the Morea commander-in-chief of the Greek army, but 
who persisted in acting as lieutenant-governor of 
Greece in the name of his brother, the unfortunate and 



MONEMVASIA TAKEN. 261 

incapable Alexander, appointed Prince Gregorios Can- a d. 1821. 
tacuzenos to take possession of Monemvasia in his own 
name. To this order the Peloponnesian Senate objected 
with justice. A blockade of four months had been 
carried on entirely at the expense of the people. 
Neither Prince Alexander Hypsilantes and the Hetair- 
ists, nor Prince Demetrius and the other princes who 
had arrived in Greece, had assisted in reducing the 
place. Monemvasia consequently must be occupied 
in the name of the Greek government, and must be 
surrendered to the leaders of the blockading force con- 
jointly with the officer deputed by Demetrius Hypsi- 
lantes. Such was the decision of the Peloponnesian 
Senate, and to it Hypsilantes was compelled to yield ; 
but he did not lay aside his viceregal pretensions and 
his foolish vanity. In this case his injudicious con- 
duct caused a feeling of distrust among the leaders of 
the blockading force before Monemvasia, which pro- 
duced very unfortunate consequences. 

Monemvasia was given up to the Greeks on the 5tb 
of August 1821. The Turks surrendered their arms, 
and were allowed to retain their movable property. 
The Greeks engaged to transport them to Asia Minor 
in three Spetziot vessels, which had maintained the 
blockade by sea. The Turks were bound to pay a 
fixed sum for their passage. In virtue of this capitu- 
lation, about five hundred souls were conveyed to 
Scalanova. But a body of Greek soldiers, principally 
Maniats, opposed the execution of the capitulation to 
the utmost of their power. They murdered several 
Turks who were on the point of embarking, and they 
plundered the property of families who had already 
embarked. Prince Gregorios Cantacuzenos and many 
officers present did everything in their power to put 
a stop to this violation of the first military conven- 
tion concluded by the Greeks, but their interference 



262 TURKS OF NAVARIN MURDERED. 

BOOK III. was viewed with jealousy, and was only partially suc- 

cessful. 

The surrender of Navarin followed soon after, and 
was attended with far greater atrocities. Hyp- 
silantes sent a Cephaloniot civilian in his suite to 
act as his deputy. The Peloponnesian Senate sent 
Nikolas Poniropoulos. The agent of Hjrpsilantes was 
an honourable man, without ability or experience, 
Poniropoulos was an unprincipled intriguer — a type 
of the worst class of Moreot officials. He boasted 
some years later to General Gordon "of his address 
in purloining and destroying a copy of the capitula- 
tion given to the Turks, that no proof might remain 
of any such transaction having been concluded.'' ^ 

Before Navarin capitulated, many Turkish families 
had been compelled by hunger to escape out of the 
place, and throw themselves on the mercy of the 
Greeks of the neighbourhood, with whom they had 
once been connected by ties of mutual kindness. Sad 
tales are told concerning their fate. 

On the 19th of August 1821, starvation compelled 
those who remained in the fortress to capitulate. They 
gave up all the public property in the fortress, and all 
the money, plate, and jewels belonging to private indi- 
viduals. They were allowed to retain their wearing 
apparel and household furniture. The Greeks en- 
gaged to transport them either to Egypt or to Tunis. 
When the capitulation was concluded, the agent of 
Hypsilantes left the Greek camp to procure vessels ; 
Poniropoulos remained to take advantage of his ab- 
sence. A Greek ship engaged in the blockade anchored 
in the harbour, and the money and valuable property 
of the Turks were carried on board. While this was 
going on, disputes arose concerning the manner in 
which the persons of females were searched for gold 

1 Gordon, i. 231, note. 



FRAUDULENT DIVISION OF BOOTY. 263 ' 

and jewels. A general massacre ensued ; and, in the a.d. 1821. 
space of an hour, almost every man, woman, and child, ' 

who was not already on board ship, was murdered. 

A Greek ecclesiastic, Phrantzes, who has left valu- 
able memoirs of the events in the Morea during the 
first years of the Eevolution, was present, and has 
given a description of the scenes he witnessed. Women, 
wounded with musket-balls and sabre-cuts, rushed to 
the sea, seeking to escape, and were deliberately shot. 
Mothers robbed of their clothes, with infants in their 
arms, plunged into the water to conceal themselves 
from shame, and they were then made a mark for 
inhuman riflemen, Greeks seized infants from their 
mothers' breasts and dashed them against the rocks. 
Children, three and four years old, were hurled living 
into the sea and left to drown. When the massacre 
was ended, the dead bodies washed ashore, or piled on 
the beach, threatened to cause a pestilence. Phrantzes, 
who records these atrocities of his countrymen with 
shame and indignation, himself hired men in the Greek 
camp, and burned the bodies of the victims with the 
wrecks of some vessels in the harbour, in order to save 
the place from the efiects of so many putrid bodies 
remaining exposed to an autumn sun.^ 

The Greeks having deliberately deceived the Turks 
by a treacherous treaty, immediately set to work to 
cheat one another out of a share in the booty. It had 
been stipulated that the spoil was to be divided into 
three equal parts ; one-third for the national treasury, 
one-third for the troops, and one-third for the ships 
employed in the blockade. Both the government and 
the soldiers were defrauded of their shares. Two 
Spetziot vessels, belonging to Botases and Koland- 
rutzos, as soon as they had embarked the valuables of 
the Turks and a few of the wealthiest families, sailed 

^ Phrantzes, vol. i. p. 400. 



264 TAKING OF TRIPOLITZA. 

BOOK III. off, and never gave any account of the greater part of 
^^' ^ the booty in their possession. This conduct caused 
much recrimination between the Greek soldiers and 
the Albanian sailors ; but it was asserted that the 
Spetziots bribed the primates and the captains to 
abandon the cause of the national treasury and of the 
poor soldiers. This base conduct of their leaders 
damped the enthusiasm of the people of Messenia, who 
became so lukewarm in the cause of the Revolution, 
that they neglected to concert any effectual measures 
for blockading Modon and Coron, of which the Turks 
retained possession. 

The surrender of Tripolitza was retarded by the 
measures which the chiefs of the blockading army 
adopted to get possession of the money and jewels of 
the Turks without being obliged to share the booty 
with the national treasury and the private soldiers. 
Their first speculation was to establish a trade in pro- 
visions, which they sold to the starving Turks at 
exorbitant prices, while they prolonged the negotia- 
tions for a capitulation. Kyriakuli Mavromichales, a 
brave and patriotic officer, put an end to these scan- 
dalous proceedings by bringing on a severe skirmish, 
and threatening to storm the walls. The soldiers also 
began to perceive the object of their leaders, and to 
clamour at their avarice. 

If Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes had been present 
at the surrender of Tripolitza, as commander-in-chief 
of the Greek army, he would have gained the honour 
of the conquest, and his disinterestedness would, in all 
probability, have enabled him to protect the cause of 
order. He had some personal virtues which aU men 
respected, and which would have obtained for him the 
support of the best Greek soldiers at this important 
time. But, most unfortunately for the cause of Greece, 
Hypsilantes allowed himself to be persuaded to quit 



TAKING OF TRIPOLITZA. 265 

the camp before Tripolitza by the selfish Moreot leaders, a. d. i821; 
just at the moment it became certain that the place 
could not hold out for many days. The object of Hyp- 
silantes was to prevent the Turks landing within the 
Gulf of Corinth on the northern coast of the Morea. 
Most of the foreign oflScers in Greece accompanied him ; 
and as soon as he departed, Kolokotrones and the 
greedy chieftains commenced negotiations with the 
Albanians, who formed part of the garrison of Tripo- 
litza, and struck private bargain-s for selling their pro- 
tection to wealthy Turks. 

Petrobey became nominally the commander-in-chief 
of the besieging army after Hypsilantes's departure, but 
he possessed no authority. It was now known over 
all Greece that the fall of Tripolitza was inevitable, and 
crowds of armed peasants hurried to the camp to share 
in the plunddr of the Turks. The booty gained at 
Monemvasia and Navarin had demoralised the whole 
population. On the 27th of September, a conference 
was held to treat concerning a capitulation. The 
Greek chiefs offered to allow the Turks to retire with 
their families to Asia Minor on receiving forty millions 
of piastres, a sum then equal to £1,500,000 sterling. 
There was no possibility of collecting so large a sum ; 
and as the Greeks demanded, moreover, that the Turks 
should deliver up their arms, the besieged had no guar- 
antee that they would escape the fate of their country- 
men at Monemvasia and Navarin, for they could neither 
trust the promises of the chiefs nor the humanity of 
the troops. The Turks therefore made a counter-pro- 
position. They oflfered to give up everything they 
possessed, except their arms, and a small fixed sum in 
money, and demanded permission to occupy the passes 
of Mount Parthenius, in order to secure their safe re- 
treat to Nauplia. The Greek chiefs refused these terms, 
as every hour of the increasing famine within the walls 



266 THE SPETZIOT HEROINE BOBOLINA. 

BOOK HI. increased their profits. The kehaya bey proposed to 
''°^' '' the garrison to cut its way through the besiegers and 
gain Nauplia ; but the Moreot Mussulmans had no 
longer horses to carry off their families, and without 
their knowledge of the country the other troops feared 
to make the attempt. 

The Greeks now concluded a separate capitulation 
with the Albanian Mussulmans under the command of 
Elmas Bey. These mercenaries were fifteen hundred 
strong, and they had suffered so little during the block- 
ade that they were still fit for the severest service. 
The Greeks regarded them as dangerous enemies. 
They were experienced in mountain warfare, and would 
have preferred fighting their way home against any 
odds rather than surrendering their arms, or a single 
gold piece from the treasure they carried in their belts. 
To them the misery of the Turks was a matter of in- 
difference. The great business of their lives was to 
amass money abroad, and to carry it back safely to their 
native villages in Albania. 

While the negotiations with the Albanians were 
going on, the Greek chiefs employed the time in con- 
cluding separate bargains with wealthy Mussulmans, 
who delivered to them money and jewels on receiving 
promises of protection, ratified by the most solemn 
oaths. The widow of a Spetziot shipowner, named 
Bobolina, gained notoriety by her conduct in these 
bargains. She had displayed both energy and patriot- 
ism at the commencement of the Eevolution ; and a 
ship, of which she was the proprietor, was engaged in 
blockading Nauplia. She now came up to the camp 
before Tripolitza, to obtain a share of the booty at the 
surrender of the place. Petrobey and Kolokotrones 
allowed her to enter the city, in order to persuade the 
Turkish women to deliver up their money and jewels, 
as the only means of purchasing security for their lives 



SACK OF TRIPOUTZA* 267 

and their honour. In the mean time the Greek chiefs a. d. 1821. 
treated with the Mussulmans from their respective 
districts^ and the Maniats concluded private bargains 
with the Barduniots. 

The Greek soldiers at last became aware that their 
chiefs were engaged in a conspiracy to defraud them 
of the booty which had been held out to them as a 
lure to prosecute the blockade for six months without 
pay. A feeling of indignation spread through the 
camp, and it was resolved by tacit consent to put an 
end to the treacherous proceedings of the chiefe by 
entering the place either by surprise or storm. An 
opportunity occurred on the 5th of October 1821. A 
few soldiers contrived to gain an entrance at the Argos 
gate, and to seize one of the adjoining towers, from 
which they displayed the Greek flag. 

In a few minutes the whole Greek army rushed to 
the walls, which were scaled in several places and the 
gates thrown open. A scene of fighting, murder, and 
pillage then commenced, unexampled in duration and 
atrocity even in the annals of this bloody warfare. 
Human beings can rarely have perpetrated so many 
deeds of cruelty on an equal number of their fellow- 
creatures as were perpetrated by the conquerors on 
this occasion. Before the Greek chiefs could enter the 
place, the whole city was a scene of anarchy, and the 
misconduct of the Greek chiefs had rendered them 
powerless to restore order or to arrest the diabolical 
passions which their own avarice and dishonourable 
proceedings had awakened in the breasts of their fol- 
lowers. 

When the tumult commenced, the Albanians under 
Elmas Bey formed under arms in the immense court- 
yard of the pasha's palace. Their warlike attitude 
alarmed the Greek chiefs, who succeeded in preventing 
their falling on the dispersed Greeks, and persuaded 



268 SACK OF TRIPOLITZA. 

BOOK III. them to march out of the place and take up their 
°°^^ '' quarters at Trikorpha, in the strong position occupied 
by Kolokotrones during the blockade. They were sup- 
plied with provisions, and on the 7th October they 
commenced their march to Vostitza, where they crossed 
the gulf to Lepanto, and, hastening through Etolia, 
reached Axta in safety/ 

The citadel of Tripolitza surrendered from want of 
water on the 8th of October, and Kolokotrones gained 
possession of all the treasure it contained. The official 
return of the artillery and ammunition found in the 
town and the citadel gives a contemptible idea of the 
military operations of this long siege. Of thirteen 
brass guns only two 6-pounders remained serviceable ; 
and of seventeen iron guns, only three 9-pounders. 
There were found in the place only 855 shot of all 
calibres, and ten packets of grape ; and the powder- 
magazines were entirely empty. 

Colonel Raybaud, a young French officer of talent 
and candour, who commanded the Greek artillery 
during the siege, and who was the only foreigner of 
rank and character who was present when the Greek 
troops entered the place, has recoimted the scenes of 
horror and disorder which prevailed for three days.* 
In a plain narrative he describes the acts of barbarity 
of which he was an eyewitness. Women and children 
were frequently tortured before they were murdered. 
After the Greeks had been in possession of the city for 
forty-eight hours, they deliberately collected together 
about two thousand persons of every age and sex, but 
principally women and children, and led them to a 
ravine in the nearest mountain, where they murdered 
every soul.^ 

1 See page 114. 

» Mimoires 8ur la Or^e, i. 463, 480. 

' The writer saw heaps of unburied bones bleached by the winter rains and 
summer suns in passing this spot two years aftei* the catastrophe ; the sixe of 



SACK OF TRIPOLITZA. 269 

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes returned to Tripolitza a. d. 1821. 
nine days after the capture of the place. The Turks 
had made no attempt to effect a landing on the north- 
ern coast of the Morea, so that his absence had been 
unnecessary. He was laughed at for being out of the 
way by those who had profited by his absence, and 
his troops were discontented at being deprived of all 
share in the booty made at Tripolitza. His authority 
as commander-in-chief had been destroyed by his 
absence, and nobody henceforward would obey his 
orders, unless when they themselves thought fit to 
do so. 

General Gordon, who returned to Tripolitza with 
Hypsilantes, and whose familiarity with the Turkish 
language enabled him to converse with those who were 
spared, estimates the number of Mussulmans murdered 
during the sack of the town at eight thousand souls.^ 
Many young women and girls were carried off as slaves 
by the volunteers who returned to their native places, 
but few male children were spared. 

The women of Khurshid Pasha's harem, and a few 
Turks of rank, were spared, in expectation of a high 
ransom. A few of the garrison, with some Moreot 
Turks, availing themselves of the confusion that pre- . 
vailed among the Greeks, kept together under the 
kehaya bey, and, cutting their way through the con- 
querors, gained one of the gates, and marched off to 
Nauplia without being pursued. 

The loss of the Greeks was estimated at three hun- 
dred slain in casual encounters. Many Turks surren- 
dered on receiving a promise that their lives should be 
spared, but those who were capable of bearing arms 

many of which attested the early age of a part of the victims. See Ray baud, 
i. 483, and QordoD, i. 245. Speliades also describes these cruelties, and the 
murder of the Greek proesstos Soteros Kougias, who was also inhumanly tor- 
tured, i. 246. 

^ Compare Gordon, i. 244 and 289. 



270 ANARCHY IN GREECE. 

BOOK III. were sent out of the city, under the pretence of quarter- 
- ^^' ' ing them in the neighbourhood, where greater facilities 
existed for obtaining provisions, and they were mur- 
dered during the night. Some prisoners were spared 
for a short time in order to bury the bodies of their 
slaughtered countrymen, which were putrefying by 
thousands, exposed in almost every house and garden. 
Even this precaution was too long neglected. The air 
was already tainted with deadly miasma, and a terrible 
epidemic soon broke out among the Greeks. The 
disease, generated by similar causes in other towns 
and villages, spread over all Greece ; and, before the 
end of the year 1821, it is said to have carried oflF 
more Christians than fell by the hands of the Turks 
in the whole Othoman empire. 

The circumstances which accompanied the taking 
of Tripolitza neutralised all the advantages which 
might have resulted from the conquest of the capital of 
the Morea. Anarchy prevailed both in the civil and 
military aflfairs of the country. All respect for supe- 
riors, and all self-respect, ceased. Hjpsilantes lost his 
personal influence as well as his military authority. 
During his short absence from the army, he had wit- 
•nessed the destruction of the flourishing town of 
Galaxidhi from his camp on the Achaian hills without 
being able to succour the sufferers or avenge their 
losses. The troops lost all confidence both in his 
judgment and his good fortune. Kolokotrones, who, 
before the exhibition he made of his avarice and dis- 
honesty in cheating the troops of the booty at Tripo- 
litza, had a fair chance of becoming the leader of the 
Revolution, lost the moral influence he had accidentally 
gained, and relapsed into a klephtic captain and party 
chief. Most of the other leaders forfeited the confi- 
dence of the soldiers by similar conduct. When they 
defrauded their own followers, it is not astonishing 



OTHOMAN FLEET. 271 

that they were faithless to the Turks, to whom theyxD. 1821. 
sold promises of protection. The plunder obtained 
was very great, and some Moreot captains became 
chieftains by their success in appropriating to their 
own use the property of murdered Mussulmans. Mus- 
tapha Bey of Patras, and other opulent men, were 
known to have been murdered, after large sums had 
been extorted from them as a ransom for their lives.* 
The retribution for these crimes was immediate. Those 
who had despised every obligation of duty, morality, 
and religion, could no longer appeal to law and reason. 
Anarchy directed the future career of the Greek Revolu- 
tion. The struggle which a minority of honest men 
and sincere patriots sustained in order to establish 
order, proved ineflfectual ; yet the mass of the people, 
though misguided and misgoverned, continued to de- 
fend their religious and political independence without 
faltering. 

The Othoman fleet made a successful expedition 
during the summer of 1821. The Albanian islanders 
allowed their ships to return to Hydra and Spetzas in 
the month of August. This season is considered by 
the Turks as the most favourable for naval operations, 
as the winds in the archipelago are fresh without being 
violent. The capitan-bey, Kara Ali, sailed from the 
Dardanelles with three line-of-battle ships, five frigates, 
and about twenty corvettes and brigs, but his force was 
soon increased by the junction of the Egyptian and 
Algerine squadrons. After throwing supplies of provi- 
sions and ammunition into the fortresses of Coron and 
Modon, which saved them from falling into the hands 
of the Greeks, he reached Patras on the 18th of Sep- 
tember. The reinforcements with which he strength- 

1 Tricoupi, ii 139, mentions that the few Turks who were spared at the 
taking of Tripolitza were murdered subsequently at Argos, on suspicion of 
being privy to the escape of one of their number. 



272 GALAXIDHI DESTROYED. 

BOOK III. ened the garrison, enabled Yussuf Pasha to reduce the 

''^''' '' Lalliots to some degree of subordination, and to break 

up the blockade which the Greeks had formed. 

On the 1st of October, Ismael Gibraltar, the com- 
mander of the Egyptian squadron, was sent into the 
Gulf of Corinth to destroy the vessels at Galaxidhi. It 
has been already mentioned that Prince Demetrius Hyp- 
silantes witnessed this catastrophe/ The inhabitants 
of Galaxidhi were the principal shipowners on the west- 
ern coast of Greece. They possessed about sixty vessels 
of various sizes, of which forty were brigs or schooners. 
At this time almost the whole Galaxidhiot navy was in 
port ; and, with the strange improvidence which cha- 
racterised the proceedings of both Greeks and Turks in 
this war, no measures had been adopted to defend the 
town or the anchorage. The contempt which the 
Greeks entertained for the Turkish fleet, was not 
abated by the terrible disasters it inflicted on them. 
Their ignorance of the first elements of the art of v^ar 
made them place far too much confidence in their 
knowledge of seamanship and naval manoeuvres as a 
means of baffling the operations of the Othoman navy. 
They consequently neglected to defend their ports, and 
the Turks, profiting by their neglect, destroyed their 
fleets at Galaxidhi, Kasos, and Psara. 

Ismael Gibraltar possessed sufficient naval skiU to 
take advantage of the superiority of his artillery. He 
silenced the Galaxidhiot battery, and cannonaded the 
town without coming within the range of the Greek 
artillery, and his fire was on this account more than 
usually accurate. The soldiers whom the Galaxidhiots 
had hired to assist them in defending the beach, fled 
during the night, and the inhabitants were obliged to 
follow their example. The Algerines landed in the 
morniog, plundered the houses, massacred most of those 

Page 270. 



VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY. 273 

who had remained behind, and carried off a few pri-A.D.i82i. 
soners. The town, the boats on the beach, and the 
vessels which were aground, were burned. But thirty- 
four brigs and schooners were found ready for sea, and 
were carried off by the Turks. 

The season was now so far advanced that Kara Ali 
resolved to return to Constantinople in order to enjoy 
his triumph and exhibit his spoil. He quitted Patras 
and put into Zante for news, where he learned to his 
dismay that a Greek fleet of thirty-five sail had put to 
sea under Miaoulis, to attack him on his return. He 
made the best arrangements in his power to prevent 
the Greeks retaking his Galaxidhiot prizes, and sailed 
with a firm determination to decline an engagement if 
possible. 

On the 12th of October, an Algerine brig, having 
separated from the fleet, was surrounded by eighteen 
Greek brigs ; but it refused to surrender, and made 
suoh a gallant resistance that the Hydriots did not 
venture to run alongside and attempt to carry her by 
boarding. The Algerines, aware that, if their ship 
became unmanageable, she would be burned and they 
would all perish, ran her ashore near the southern cape 
of Zante. The fight between the gallant Algerine and 
his numerous assailants had been witnessed by thou- 
sands of refugee Moreots and Zantiot peasants, who, 
when the Mussulmans landed, began to fire on them. 
Two English officers, with a guard of twenty men, had 
been sent from the town to enforce obedience to the 
quarantine regulations, which were then observed with 
great strictness by all the Christian powers in the 
Mediterranean. The Greeks were ordered to retire ; 
but they refused, and, continuing to attack the Turks, 
they soon came into collision with the English. The 
officer commanding, hoping to intimidate the people, 
ordered his men to fire over the heads of the crowd. 

VOL. I. s 



CHAP. I. 



274 VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY. 

BOOK III. The Zantiots immediately replied by firing on the 
troops. The English were compelled to retire to a 
neighbouring house, leaving one man dead behind. 
The house was besieged, and a skirmish was kept up 
until fresh troops arrived. The Zantiots had two 
killed as the soldiers were forcing their way to the 
house, and they mangled the body of the English 
soldier which fell into their hands, with frightful fero- 
city, to revenge this loss. 

The Algerines said that they had been pursued by 
the Greek fleet, and that they had several men wounded 
after their vessel was ashore. The pursuit, however, 
did not prevent their landing a number of wounded 
men on a raft, which they constructed from spars and 
planks ; and the violation of neutrality on the part of 
the Greek fleet was a trifling matter, and would have 
passed unnoticed had the lonians not fired on the 
Turks. 

The death of the two lonians caused great animosity 
between the Greeks and the English in the Ionian 
Islands. The lonians pretended that the neutrality 
which the English observed ought to have prevented 
their interfering in the combat between Greeks and 
Turks. For several years the conduct of the English 
government and of the English military was systema- 
tically calumniated by what was called the Philhellenic 
press over the whole continent of Europe, and most of 
the calumnies found a ready credence. The pride of 
English PhUhellenes prevented their replying to the 
false accusations brought against their country and 
their countrymen. But it would have been impossible 
for the authorities in the Ionian Islands to have pre- 
served order among a Greek population, inflamed with 
national enthusiasm, eager for revolution, and ready 
to resist the law, unless they had punished severely 
the death of an English soldier in the execution of his 



KBTURN OF THE CAPITAN-BEY. 275 

duty, and the wanton attack on the subjects of aA.D. I821. 
friendly sovereign seeking protection on neutral tern- 
tory. Martial law was proclaimed ; five Zantiots were 
tried for firing on the English troops, convicted, and 
executed ; a proclamation was issued by the Lord 
High Commissioner, forbidding the entry of either 
Othoman or Greek men-of-war into any Ionian port, 
unless driven in by stress of weather. 

A day or two after the loss of the Algerine brig, 
the Greeks lost a brig which they were compelled to 
run ashore at Katakolo, and which the Turks succeeded 
in getting afloat and carrying off as a prize. The 
Turkish and Greek fleets engaged, and a great deal of 
ineffective cannonading ensued. Kara Ali, who would 
not risk losing any of his prizes, was driven back to 
Zante, where he embarked the survivors of the crew 
of the Algerine brig, and at last sailed with a favour- 
able wind, which carried him safely through the Archi- 
pelago. He entered the port of Constantinople in 
triumph, towing his thirty-five Galaxidhiot prizes, and 
displaying thirty prisoners hanging from the yard-arm 
of his flag-ship. The sultan considered the results of 
this naval campaign as extremely satisfactory, though, 
when he compared the force of the capitan-bey with 
that under Miaoulis, he could not consider it as hon- 
ourable to the Othoman navy. Kara Ali, who had 
hitherto only held the rank of capitan-bey, was re- 
warded with that of capitan-pasha. 

Kolokotrones was the only man in the Morea who 
possessed the talent and energy to take advantage of 
the fall of Tripolitza for the national advantage ; but 
his selfishness had destroyed his influence over the 
great body of the troops. Had his countrymen felt 
any confidence in his honour at this moment, he would 
have been raised to the chief command. Unfortu- 
nately, the trust was considered too great for his 



276 KOLOKOTRONES FAILS AT PATRAS. 

BOOK III. honesty, whatever it might be with reference to his 
'^^' '' capacity. He himself perceived that he had lost the 
public esteem, and he was anxious to regain his repu- 
tation. He claimed some credit for having persuaded 
the Albanians under Mmas Bey to desert the Turks. 
He asserted that he would be able to induce the Lal- 
liots, with whom he had amicable relations, to abandon 
Yussuf Pasha, and perhaps to surrender the castle of 
Patras. He proposed, therefore, marching immediately 
to besiege that fortress. It is not improbable that, had 
Kolokotrones received proper support, his plan would 
have been successful, for the Lalliots were at open feud 
with Yussuf Pasha. 

Kolokotrones marched from Tripolitza to invest 
Patras, which had been relieved from blockade by 
the arrival of the fleet under Kara Ali, His force, 
which consisted at first of only his personal followers, 
amounting to about a hundred men, was increased as 
he moved westward, until he mustered about two 
thousand in the plain of Blis. A report was spread 
that Patras was on the eve of capitulating to Kolo- 
kotrones, and crowds of armed men hastened to share 
the expected plunder. The selfishness of the primates 
and capitans, who had hitherto ineffectually attempted 
to blockade Patras, now thwarted him in all his pro- 
jects. His own selfishness at Tripolitza was avenged 
by that of his rivals. He might have repeated the 
words of Macbeth — ■ 

" This even-handed justice 
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice 
To our own lips." 

The intrigues of Germanos, the Archbishop of Patras, 
and Andreas Zaimes, induced the Greek government 
to recall Kolokotrones, under the pretext that his ser- 
vices were more necessary elsewhere ; and thus the 



SURRENDER OP CORINTH. 277 

only man who could have induced the Turks in Patras a. d. i82i. 
to capitulate was compelled to retire, precisely because 
it was supposed that he had sufficient influence to 
cause a capitulation to be respected. The Achaians 
were soon punished for their selfishne^. The Greek 
troops were defeated in an attempt to establish them- 
selves amidst the ruined houses of the town, and the 
besieged were enabled to strengthen their position by 
completing the destruction of all the buildings in the 
vicinity of the castle which afford any cover to the 
Greeks, or could interrupt the communications of the 
garrison with the sea. 

The fortress of Corinth capitulated on the 22d of 
January 1822. The Albanians of the garrison, who 
were only a hundred and fifty, had previously con- 
cluded a separate convention with the Greeks, which 
permitted them to retire from the place with their 
arms and baggage. They hired four vessels to trans- 
port them over the gulf, but they were plundered of 
their property by the Greeks, and many were murdered. 
The Turks who remained in the Acrocorinth gave up 
their arms and property to their besiegers on condi- 
tion of being allowed to retain a small sum of money, 
and to hire neutral vessels to transport them to Asia 
Minor. On the 26th of January the Greek troops took 
possession of the Acrocorinth, and the Turks encamped 
at Kenchries to wait for shipping. Before neutral 
vessels arrived, they were attacked by the Greeks and 
murdered. The conquerors had expected to find a 
considerable treasure in the Acrocorinth. Kiamil Bey, 
who was the wealthiest Turkish landlord in Greece, 
was supposed to have laid up there a fabulous amount 
of money. They were disappointed. If Kiamil Bey 
had ever possessed any very considerable hoard of 
ready money, it had been expended during the sieges 
of Tripolitza and Corinth. The Greeks, however, would 



CHAP. I. 



278 RESOURCES OP THE GREEKS. 

BCK)K III. not believe the word of the bey, and they tortured 
him in the cruelest manner. 

The repeated examples of treachery on the part of 
the Greeks caused the Turks in the remaining fortresses 
to defend theftiselves with incredible fortitude. Con- 
vinced that no promises of the Christians would be 
kept, they determined to endure every privation rather 
than capitulate, and they now began to display un- 
usual energy and sagacity in obtaining supplies of 
provisions. 

In the Morea the Othomans still possessed the for- 
tresses of Nauplia, Coron, Modon, and Patras, with the 
castle of Rhion. 

The Greeks, from an insurgent populace, had now 
become an independent nation. They had assembled 
large bodies of armed men, and blockaded simulta- 
neously a number of Othoman fortresses. The manner 
in which they were supplied with the resources neces- 
sary to keep a large force in the field, deserves to be 
described. In the first place, the improvidence of the 
Othoman authorities allowed an immense amount of 
public property to fall into the hands of the insurgents. 
A great part of this property was easily converted into 
money, and a large fund was thus placed at the dis- 
posal of those local leaders who assumed the command 
in different districts. In spite of the confusion that 
prevailed in Greece during the year 1821, the exports 
were considerably increased. The sums expended for 
military purposes escape the attention of the historian, 
from not being collected in a central treasury, or sys- 
tematically employed on a general and preconcerted 
plan. Each locality collected and expended its own 
resources; and either from ignorance or selfishness, the 
local primates, proesti, and captains, took no steps to 
lay the foundation of an organised administration for 
that portion of civil, financial, and military business 



RESOURCES OF THE GREEKS. 279 

which requires a central direction. It was undoubtedly a. d. I821. 
more from want of capacity and honesty in the clergy, """*' 
the primates, and the military chiefs, than from any 
deficiency in a supply of men and money on the part 
of the people, that order, publicity, and responsibility 
were not introduced in the conduct of national busi- 
ness. The peasantry everywhere displayed zeal and 
disinterestedness in giving up all the Turkish property 
to be employed for the public service. Both peasants 
and private soldiers served for some months without 
pay; and both were for some time eager to see the public 
money collected by the civil and military leaders em- 
ployed in forming a corps of regular troops, and in 
purchasing a train of artillery. The terrible effects of 
Russian discipline and Russian artillery on the Otho- 
man armies had been witnessed by many Greeks, and 
was the theme of many fabulous narratives in every 
Greek cottage. Had any man of ability and honesty 
succeeded in forming a corps of regular troops before 
the primates and captains succeeded in appropriating 
the revenues of their respective districts to their own 
purposes, such weak and ill-provided fortresses as 
Patras, Lepanto, Coron, and Athens, could not have 
held out many weeks, and must have fallen long before 
the end of the year 1821. 

Unfortunately, the position in which the local autho- 
rities of the Greek population was placed at the first 
outbreak of the Revolution, rendered them averse to 
the formation of a central government. They feared 
that the direction of any general government that 
could then have been established would fall into the 
hands of the Hetairists, and in the Hetairists they had 
lost all confidence. The local authorities, trusting 
perhaps too much both to their abilities and good 
principles, wished to command the armed men and ad- 
minister the finances of their districts. The result was. 



280 RESOURCES OP THE GREEKS. 

BOOK III. that the necessities of the Revolution enabled most of 
^^°^' '' them very soon to become little dictators. They either 
commanded the anned force themselves, or appointed 
its officers and directed its movements without paying 
much attention to the orders of the central govern- 
ment which was at last constituted, and they collected 
the public and local revenues from the people, and 
expended them as they thought fit, without giving 
any account either to the government or the nation. 

The rapid success of the Greeks during the first 
weeks of the Revolution threw the management of 
much civil and financial business into the hands of 
the proesti and demogeronts in office. The primates, 
who already exercised great official authority, instantly 
appropriated that which had been hitherto exercised 
by murdered voevodes and beys. Every primate strove 
to make himself a little independent potentate, and 
every captain of a district assumed the powers of a 
commander-in- chief. The Revolution, before six months 
had passed, seemed to have peopled Greece with a 
host of little AU Pashas.^ When the primate and the 
captain acted in concert — supposing they were not, as 
sometimes happened, the same person — they collected 
the public revenues ; administered the Turkish pro- 
perty, which was declared national; enrolled, paid, 
and provisioned as many troops as circumstances re- 
quired, or as they thought fit ; named officers ; formed 
a local guard for the primate of the best soldiers in 
the place, who were thus often withdrawn from the 
public service ; and organised a local police and a local 
treasury. This system of local self-government, con- 
stituted in a very self-willed manner, and relieved 

* Polybius, iv. 56, § 13, givea the Greeks a bad character in money trans- 
actions ; and I am afraid we must say of the primates and captains, in spite 
of their patriotism, what has been maliciously said of the American mission- 
aries at Athens, in spite of their piety — 

" Satan now is wiser than of yore, 
And tempts by making rich, not making poor." 



REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATION. 281 

from almost all responsibility, was soon established as a. d. i82i. 
a natural result of the Kevolution over all Greece. 
The sultan's authority, which had been the only link 
that bound together Christians and Mussulmans in 
the Othoman administration, having ceased, every pri- 
mate assumed the prerogatives of the sultan. For a 
few weeks this state of things was unavoidable, and to 
an able and honest chief or government it would have 
facilitated the establishment of a strong central autho- 
rity ; but by the vices of Greek society it was perpe- 
tuated into an organised anarchy. 

In the midst of this political anarchy, the communal 
institutions of Greece, which the Othoman government 
had used as an administrative engine for financial 
purposes, while they supported the power of the oli- 
garchs, contributed also to preserve order among the 
people. There is, perhaps, no feature more remarkable 
in the Greek Eevolution, and none so conclusive in 
proving that religious, more than political feeling, 
impelled the people to take up arms, than the fact 
that, during the whole period of the war with the 
sultan, the administrative organisation of civil and 
financial business remained practically the same in 
free Greece as in Turkey. No improvement was made 
in financial arrangements, nor in the system of taxa- 
tion ; no measures were adopted for rendering pro- 
perty more secure; no attempt was made to create 
an equitable administration of justice ; no courts of 
law were established ; and no financial accounts were 
published. Governments were formed, constitutions 
were drawn up, national assemblies met, orators de- 
bated, and laws were passed according to the political 
fashion, patronised by the liberals of the day. But no 
effort was made to prevent the government being 
virtually absolute, unless it was by rendering it abso- 
lutely powerless. The constitutions were framed to 



CHAP. 



282 REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATION. 

BOOK III. remain a dead letter. The national assemblies were 
nothing but conferences of parties, and the laws passed 
were intended to fascinate Western Europe, not to 
operate with eflfect in Greece. 

The first administrative exigency of the Revolution 
was to supply the bodies of armed men who assembled 
to blockade the Turkish fortresses with regular rations 
and abundant stores of ammunition. The success of 
the Revolution would have been nearly impossible, 
unless an effective commissariat had arisen conjointly 
with the concentration of the blockading forces. This 
commissariat was found existing in the municipal 
authorities ; its magazines consisted of an abimdant 
provision of grain and other produce which was found 
in the public and private storehouses of the Turks all 
over the country. Ammunition was obtained by sell- 
ing a portion of this produce. The waste that took 
place under this system of commissariat was incredible 
and unavoidable. During the first two months of the 
war, thousands of rations were issued to men where 
the presence of troops was useless, merely because a well- 
filled magazine of provisions existed in the district; and 
millions of cartridges were fired off at the public ex- 
pense, where no Turk could hear the noise of these 
patriotic demonstrations. 

But whatever may have been the inconveniences 
and abuses of the communal system, there can be no 
doubt that the existence of a local Christian magis- 
tracy prevented the Greeks from being at first quite 
helpless, and it concentrated the strength of the popu- 
lation in countless energetic attacks on the dispersed 
Mussulmans. The attachment of the inhabitants, 
whether of the Greek or the Albanian race, to their 
native district, is the element of patriotism in Greece. 
The associations of family and tribe are strong ; but 
unless orthodoxy coincides with nationality, the feel- 



ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. 283 

iugs of general patriotism are weak. The connec- a d. 1821. 
tion of the individual with his municipal chiefs was 
strongly marked' and clearly defined. The reciprocal 
obligations and duties were felt and performed, tinder 
this aspect, the conduct of the population of Greece 
during the early period of the Eevolution is worthy of 
admiration ; it displays great perseverance and un- 
flinching patriotism. In the wider sphere of political 
and military action, the influence of the people unfor- 
tunately ceased, and we see ignorance, presumption, 
and selfishness in statesmen and genersds rendering 
the energy of the people nugatory. From some cir- 
cumstance which hardly admits of explanation, and 
which we must therefore refer reverentially to the will 
of God, the Greek Revolution produced no man of 
real greatness, no statesman of unblemished honour, 
no general of commanding talent. Fortunately, the 
people derived from the framework of their existing 
usages the means of continuing their desperate struggle 
for independence, in spite of the incapacity and dis- 
honesty of the civil and military leaders who directed 
the central government. The true glory of the Greek 
Eevolution lies in the indomitable energy and unwea- 
ried perseverance of the mass of the people. But 
perseverance, unfortunately, like most popular virtues, 
supplies historians only with commonplace details, 
while readers expect the annals of revolutions to be 
filled with pathetic incidents, surprising events, and 
heroic exploits. 

The active energy of the communal system, and the 
great authority it exercised over the people, ofiered 
an obstacle to the consolidation of any imperfect and 
defective scheme of governmental centralisation ; but 
these very circumstances would have increased the 
power of any central government which acquired the 
respect and confidence of the nation. Men of ability 



284 MISCONDUCT OP THE PRIMATES. 

BOOK III. and honesty would have sought to lay the foundation 

CHAP. I. •' O •/ 

'— of a central administration on the existing communal 

institutions. They would have embodied these into 
the fabric of the state, and would not, as Greek states- 
men did, have sought to construct a powerful central 
authority by annihilating the influence of every com- 
munal magistracy. 

Another disadvantage resulted from the communal 
institutions of Greece, which must, however, be attri- 
buted to the character of the Greeks who administered 
the system, and not to the system itself. The Greeks 
are ambitious, intriguing, and presumptuous, and few 
are restrained by any moral principle in seeking self- 
glory and self- advancement. No men are, conse- 
quently, less adapted to bear sudden elevation, or to 
be intrusted with great power. When the Eevolution, 
therefore, suddenly invested local magistrates with 
extraordinary powers, many communes became a scene 
of waste, peculation, and oppression. Civil contests 
arose, and open hostilities ensued. The low morality 
and unbounded ambition of political adventurers from 
Constantinople and other cities in Turkey increased 
these disorders. Bishops, primates, and captains began 
to imitate the pride and display the injustice of cadis, 
voevodes, and beys. The national revenues were di- 
verted from carrying on the war, and expended in 
maintaining the households or the personal followers 
of these oligarchs. No petty archont could walk the 
streets of Tripolitza without being followed by a band 
of armed men. 

The primates and higher clergy flattered themselves 
that the expulsion of the Turks would constitute them 
the heirs of the sultan's power. Their conduct soon 
isolated them from popular sympathy, and they saw 
the military ofl&cers, whom they had expected to em- 
ploy as tools, invested with the greater part of the 



PELOPONNESIAN SENATE. 285 

power they were desirous of seizing. They forgot that a. d. 1821. 
the Othoman empire was a military government. The ' 
people became early clamorous for a legal government 
Bold demagogues and intelligent patriots called for 
the creation of a responsible executive. The oligarchs 
were forced to yield. On the 7th of June 1821 a 
Peloponnesian Senate was constituted, and invested 
with dictatorial powers, which were to continue until 
the taking of Tripolitza. This Senate was nothing more 
than a committee of the oligarchs ; it was appointed 
by a few of the most influential among the clergy 
and primates, with the co-operation of several of the 
most powerful military chiefs, at a meeting held in 
the monastery of Kaltetzi. No meeting of deputies 
popularly elected took place. The people who had 
taken up arms to conquer their independence were 
excluded from a share in electing their rulers. The 
consequence was, that the feelings of the people were 
deeply wounded, and the wound festered far more 
than politicians generally supposed. Nevertheless, even 
strangers who visited Greece in 1823 could observe 
that the central government of Greece was then gene- 
rally regarded by the agricultural population as alien 
in sentiment, and unworthy of the nation's confidence. 
The arrival of two Greeks of rank modified in some 
degree the consequences of the proceedings at Kaltetzi. 
On the 22d of June, Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes 
arrived at the Greek camp before Tripolitza, where he 
was welcomed as commander-in-chief by the whole 
army. Demetrius formed a favourable contrast to his 
brother Alexander, in his moral and military conduct ; 
but he was inferior to him in personal accomplishments 
and almost as deficient in judgment and political dis- 
crimination. His stature* was small, his appearance 
insignificant, his voice discordant, his manner awkward, 
and his health weak ; yet with these physical defects he 



286 PRINCE DEMETRIUS HYPSILANTES. 

BOOK III. had manly sentiments, undaunted courage, and sincere 
^^^' '' patriotism. His principles were those of an honourable 
man, and his feelings were those of a gentleman. Un- 
fortunately, he had neither experience nor tact in con- 
ducting public business. 

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes laid claim to the 
authority of a viceroy in Greece. He assumed that his 
brother Prince Alexander, as supreme head of the 
Hetairia, had been appointed Prince of Greece, and he 
pretended to be empowered to act as lieutenant- 
governor of the country for his brother. The preten- 
sion was foolish, and it was put forward in a foolish 
way. Nevertheless, as he was supposed, when he arrived, 
to be the herald of Russian aid, he received an enthusi- 
astic reception from the people and the troops. His 
inexperience and incapacity prevented his availing 
himself of that enthusiasm, either to consolidate his 
own power or to benefit the cause of Greece. He 
might easily have employed the authority it gave him 
with the people to compel the soldiers to receive some 
elementary organisation, and the power it gave him 
over the soldiers to restrain the disorders of the cap- 
tains. Power was conferred on him, which, if wisely 
used, might have rendered him the Washington of 
Greece. Since *' vanquished Persia's despot fled,*' no 
Greek had stepped into aii "easier patKTo"true"^lory. 
But like a weak despot, instead of using the authority 
in his hands, he demanded additional powers, of which 
circumstances rendered it impossible for him to make 
any use, and of which in no circumstances could he 
have made a good use. He required that the Pelopon- 
nesian Senate should be formally abolished, and that 
the whole executive power should be placed in his 
hands as lieutenant-governor until the arrival of his 
brother. The Senate and the primates opposed these 
demands, which were supported by the military. 



HYPSILANTES SUPREME RULER. 287 

Much intriguing ensued ; the blockade of Tripolitza a.d. 1821. 
and the general interests of Greece were neglected by 
both parties. Men took to wrangling with so much 
goodwill, that they neglected the subject of the contest 
in the pleasures of the dispute, and the business seemed 
every day farther from any termination. At last, 
Hypsilantes made a bold move to rouse the soldiers 
and the people to declare that his cause was theirs, and 
thus put an end to all opposition. He suddenly quitted 
the camp before Tripolitza, declaring that all his eflTorts 
to serve Greece were useless, for they were paralysed 
by the ambition and the selfishness of the senators and 
the primates. His departure, as he had foreseen, made 
the soldiers take up arms. Some of the primates were 
in considerable personal danger, and would have been 
murdered had they not been protected by the captains. 
The Senate yielded. A deputation was sent to invite 
Hypsilantes to return, and he was brought back in 
triumph from Leondari. 

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes was now in possession 
of all the power which could be conferred on him, but 
it soon became apparent that neither he nor those 
about him knew how to employ it. He made no 
attempt to give the troops any organisation even with 
regard to their commissariat. He did not even create 
a central civil administration, which would have enabled 
him to keep the military power he had acquired over 
the captains in his own hands. At this moment the 
formation of a regiment of infantry, a squadron of 
cavalry, and a battery of light guns, would have enabled 
him to organise Greece, for he had the people and the 
soldiers devoted to his person, and eager to be ruled 
by a single chief. Everywhere he was saluted as the 
Aphendi, or lord of the country. The supreme autho- 
rity of the Hetairia still exercised a magic influence 
over men's minds, and he was universally regarded as 



288 HYPSILANTES SUPREME RULER. 

BOOK III. an agent of Eussia ; for it was argued that, unless the 
,^^^L±^ Eussian government wished to support the Eevolution, 
the Eussian police would never have allowed him to 
pass the frontiers. Both Petrobey and Kolokotrones 
were disposed to act under his orders, and they might 
easily have been rendered most efficient, and at the 
same time responsible, supporters of his administration. 
But Hypsilantes was bewildered with the power he 
had assumed, and Kolokotrones, who soon discovered 
his incapacity, could not resist the temptation of pro- 
fiting by it. 

The advisers of Hypsilantes were men as destitute 
of practical experience as he was himself. The self- 
government which existed among the Greeks of the 
Morea was at variance with what they had heard and 
seen of administration in France and Eussia. They 
excited dissatisfaction by openly expressing their con- 
tempt for what they called the Turkish system. Yet 
they were utterly incompetent to create a central 
system complete enough to supplant, or powerful 
enough to override, this despised system. 

When Hypsilantes returned to the camp before Tri- 
politza, he was so imprudent as to allow the Pelopon- 
nesian senators to remain at Vervena. They soon re- 
covered their previous authority, and, with the assist- 
ance of the other primates, began to undermine the 
power of the prince, who, with inexplicable ignorance, 
left all their agents and partisans in office over the 
whole country, and consequently permitted them to 
remain practically the only central executive authority. 
Partly by their intrigues, and partly by his ignorance 
of the duties of a supreme ruler, before Hypsilantes 
had been six weeks at the head of the government, the 
camp was more than once without provisions. Hyp- 
silantes could neither form nor execute any project to 
relieve himself from his difficulties. He waited for 



INTRIGUES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN SENATE. 289 

others to perform the duties of his station. Instead of a. d. i821. 
acting himself, he wrangled with Germanos, the arch- 
bishop of Patras, Delyiannes, and Charalambes, for 
infringing his authority. The military chieftains pro- 
fited by his neglect. They acted in his name, and 
employed it to establish their own influence in diflFerent 
municipalities, from which they contrived to secure re- 
gular supplies to their own followers. Brigand chiefs 
and ignorant captains became in this way the posses- 
sors of those powers of which Hypsilantes had deprived 
the Senate and the primates, and which escaped from 
his own hands, from his incompetency to create a 
central administration. The original usurpation of the 
Peloponnesian Senate and this incapacity of Hypsi- 
lantes added strength to the causes of discord and 
internal anarchy which soon became a prominent 
feature of the Eevolution. The thoughts of public men 
received a vicious direction, and public business was 
conducted in a secret and underhand manner. 

An instructive comparison might be made between 
the prudence of Washington in his camp before 
Boston in 1775, and the ineptness of Hypsilantes in 
his camp before Tripolitza in 1821. The first requisite 
for military success is military discipline; and the man 
who cannot introduce and maintain this sufl&ciently to 
secure order, is unfit to command armies.^ The diflS- 
culty of converting a national militia into a regular 
army is great ; but enough has been said to show that 
many circumstances were favourable to the enterprise 
in the Morea, Washington flogged the citizens of the 
United States who infringed the laws of military 
order ; Hypsilantes might have hanged primates and 
captains who disobeyed his orders : and had he known, 
like Washington, how to temper severity with justice 

^ Hypsilantes formed a small corps of regulars, but made no attempt to or- 
ganise the irregulars a& Capodistrias did. 

VOL. I. T 



290 ALEXANDER MAVROCOEDATOS. 

BOOK III. and command the respect of liis soldiers, he might 

'— have formed a Greek army, and saved Greece from 

anarchy. 

Disorder and dissension were gaining ground when 
Alexander Mavrocordatos, then called Prince Mavro- 
cordatos both by himself and others, arrived at the 
camp of Trikorphas on the 8th of August 1821. His 
long political career has rendered him the most cele- 
brated statesman of the Greek Revolution. When he 
joined the Greeks, it required no great discrimination 
to observe that both Hypsilantes and the primates 
were acting unwisely, and advancing into false positions 
from which it would be difficult for them to retreat 
with honour. In such a complication Mavrocordatos 
would not act a subordinate part ; and to escape from 
factions, whose errors he could not rectify, he obtained 
the political direction of the Revolution in Western 
Greece, and quitted the camp on the 9th of September. 
About the same time Theodore Negris, an active, able, 
intriguing, ambitious, and unprincipled phanariot, was 
charged with the political organisation of Eastern 
Greece. 

When Mavrocordatos reached Mesolonghi, he con- 
voked a meeting of deputies from the provinces of 
Acarnania, Etolia, Western Locris, and that part of 
Epirus which had joined the Revolution. Negris held 
a similar meeting of deputies from Attica^ Boeotia, 
Megaris, Phocis, and Eastern Locris, at Salona. At 
Mesolonghi a senate was constituted to conduct the 
executive government ; at Salona a corresponding 
assembly was called the Areopagos. Both assemblies 
were under the guidance and direction of civilians, who 
knew very little of the existing institutions and first 
wants of the country they attempted to organise. 
Instead of strengthening the municipalities and dis- 
ciplining the municipal authorities, they created new 



ORGANISATION OP CONTINENTAL GREECE. 291 

officers to represent the central power, vainly expect- a n. 1821. 
ing to use the military chiefs as their subordinate 
agents. Several of the members of these senates were 
Greeks, educated in the universities of Western Europe ; 
others were phanariots, educated in the sultan's service. 
All placed more confidence in their own scientific 
maxims than in the practical experience of the local 
magistrates and captains. They were fond of talking, 
fond of writing, stiff in their opinions, and dilatory in 
their actions. Both demogeronts and captains soon 
perceived that they were eloquent in ignorance, that 
they carried on a mass of unnecessary and unintelli- 
gible correspondence, and that, when once they went 
wrong, they could never be set right. 

In so far, however, as these assemblies were steps 
towards national union, and to the formation of a 
central government, they were useful. But their im- 
mediate tendency was to weaken the authority of any 
general government ; for in both the constitutions 
which they adopted, provisions were inserted, encroach- 
ing on its necessary powers. Nor was this done on 
any systematic plan by which Greece might have been 
formed into a federal state. In the constitution of 
Western Greece, Mavrocordatos attempted to conceal 
his ambition, by an article which declared in vague 
terms that the Senate, and the administrative arrange- 
ments it created, should cease as soon as a permanent 
general government was established. But in Eastern 
Greece the constitution boldly circumscribed the autho- 
rity of the Greek government even in military matters. 
Both these constitutions were crude scholastic produc- 
tions, ill suited to the temper of the people, to the actual 
state of civilisation, to the existing institutions, and to 
the exigencies of the time. The enemies of Mavrocor- 
datos and Negris justly blamed their legislation as a 
phanariot manoeuvre to gain political power, and as 



292 DEMAND FOR A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. 

BW)« III. positively injurious to the liberties of the people, in sc 
'— far as it elevated barriers between the municipal insti- 
tutions of the country and the central executive. 

In Western Greece the prudence of Mavrocordatos 
gained him many personal friends, and created a poli- 
tical party in his favour ; but in Eastern Greece the 
restless ambition of Negris caused him to lose the 
support of his political associates. The invasion of the 
Turks also threw absolute power into the hands of un- 
principled and rapacious military chiefs, like Panouria 
and Odysseus, and reduced the Areopagos to perform 
the duties of paymaster and commissary. 

The four great divisions of liberated Greece — the 
Morea,the islands, the eastern and the western provinces 
of the continent — were compelled to meet the first de- 
mands of the Revolution by local arrangements. But 
the events of the year 1821 convinced all alike of the 
necessity of establishing a central government. The 
conquest of Tripolitza was the term fixed for the dis- 
solution of the Peloponnesian Senate. But the weak- 
ness of Hypsilantes, the ambition of the primates and 
captains, and a general spirit of party, perpetuated the 
evils which had been fostered by the senators. The 
administration of the public revenues remained in the 
same hands, and they were diverted from carrying on 
the war against the Turks. Large bodies of men were 
kept under arms, but these men were engaged in sup- 
porting local governors and tax-gatherers. 

In autumn, however, the Greeks demanded that a 
national assembly should be convoked, in a tone that 
enforced attention. Party intrigues absorbed the whole 
activity of the oligarchs, who were beginning to enjoy 
the fruits of partial success in the midst of serious 
danger. Germanos, the archbishop of Patras, made 
himself conspicuous by his luxury and pride. He 
strove to form a league of Moreot primates, who ex- 



HYPSILANTES CONVOKES A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. 293 

pected to rule the Peloponnesus by means of its own a. d. i82i. 
provincial administration. 

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes, seeing himself for- 
saken by the military chiefs, as well as opposed by the 
primates, now for the first time recognised the right of 
the people to a voice in the formation of their own 
government and laws. He supposed that the popular 
enthusiasm with which he had been welcomed, still 
existed. He forgot all that he had done to forfeit the 
people's confidence. In virtue of the supreme authority 
he possessed, he issued a proclamation summoning a 
national assembly to meet at Tripolitza in November. 
But even in performing this popular act, he neutralised 
the favourable impression it might have produced, by 
signing the document as the lieutenant-general of his 
brother Alexander, instead of issuing it as the elected 
chief of the Greek nation. The military misconduct 
and the disgraceful flight of his brother were already 
the theme of universal reprobation. But in spite of 
the strange perverseness of Demetrius Hypsilantes, the 
object of his proclamation coincided so completely 
with the wishes of the nation, that deputies were every- 
where elected. Tripolitza was infested by the fearful 
epidemic which has been already mentioned. The 
meeting of the national assembly was transferred to 
Argos, where it took place in December 1821. But 
Argos was soon so crowded by the armed bands who 
followed thePeloponnesian oligarchs, that it was deemed 
an unfit place for a national assembly, which was trans- 
ferred again to Piada, a small town about three miles 
west of the site of Epidaurus. In consequence of the 
fashion adopted by the modern Greeks, of acting history 
with great names, instead of making it by noble deeds, 
this first national assembly is called the assembly of 
Epidaurus. 

The primates and captains of the Morea were re- 



294 HYPSILANTES DESERTS THE POPULAR CAUSE. 

BOOK III. solved to peld as little of the power they enjoyed to a 
'^^' '' central government as possible. They took their mea- 
sures with promptitude, and carried them into effect 
with decision. Before the national assembly published 
the constitution of Greece, and elected an executive 
government, the oligarchs of the Morea reconstituted 
the Peloponnesian Senate, and enacted a local constitu- 
tion, which invested it with a direct control over the 
financial and military resources of the Peloponnesus. 
They took a lesson from the proceedings of Mavrocor- 
datos and Negris, who had created political influence 
by means of provincial constitutions ; but their supe- 
rior knowledge of the administrative machinery then in 
action, enabled them to draw up a more practical con- 
stitution, and establish a more efficient senate. Among 
other unconstitutional powers with which this senate 
was invested, it was authorised to name the deputies 
who were to represent the people of the Peloponnesus 
in the national assembly. It deserves to be noticed 
that the members from the rest of Greece did not pro- 
test against this violation of the principles of popular 
freedom. 

It may, however, be doubted, whether the Pelopon- 
nesian oligarchs would have succeeded in this illegal 
proceeding had Demetrius Hypsilantes not deserted 
the popular cause. His jealousy of Mavrocordatos at 
this time appears completely to have obscured the small 
portion of judgment he ever possessed, and to have 
concealed from him the iniquity of coalescing with 
men whom, in a public proclamation, he had recently ac- 
cused of beiug eager to oppress the Greek people and 
to govern as Turkish ofl&cials. His conduct strength- 
ened the Moreot primates and captains, but it entirely 
destroyed his own political influence, and greatly in- 
jured his personal reputation. 

The organisation of the Peloponnesian Senate forms 



INDEPENDENCE OF PELOPONNESIAN SENATE. 295 

an important and interesting feature in the history of a,d. i821. 
the Greek Eevolution. It was the principal cause of 
the failure of the constitution of Epidaurus, and of the 
nullity of the executive government of Greece which 
that constitution created. The members of this Senate 
were really self-elected, and it circumscribed the legal 
powers of the central government under cover of ar- 
rangements to protect local liberties. The provincial 
constitution of the Peloponnesus pretended to create 
a subordinate provincial administration, but it really 
organised an independent executive government. It 
assumed an absolute control over the municipalities, 
and rendered all local authorities responsible for their 
financial and fiscal acts to the Peloponnesian Senate, 
not to the Greek government. This Senate was allowed 
to arrogate to itself the right of judging traitors, dis- 
missing oflScials, ratifying the election of captains of the 
militia, whom the people were allowed to elect, and of 
appointing generals to command the troops of the 
Peloponnesus. With the concurrence of the captains ■ 
and general thus named, it claimed the right of naming 
an archistrategos or commander-in-chief of the whole 
Peloponnesian forces, which in this way were kept as 
a distinct army, separated from the Eomeliat armatoli, 
who formed the real military strength of liberated 
Greece. The ambition of Kolokotrones appears to have 
suggested this most unmilitary arrangement. It contri- 
buted, with other causes, to prevent the Peloponnesian 
armed bands from bearing almost any share in the , 
warlike operations in continental Greece. The Senate 
also fixed the pay of the soldiers and officers of the 
Peloponnesian army, thus securing their obedience. It 
is true that the constitution required the nomination 
of the archistrategos to be submitted to the approval 
of the legislative assembly, but the consent of a legis- 
lative assembly to the appointment could only be re- 



296 INDEPENDENCE OF PELOPONNESIAN SENATE. 

BOOK III. garded as a formal ratification. It could never be re- 
''°^' '' fused without the risk of a civil war. 

Many of the objectionable provisions of the con- 
stitution of the Peloponnesian Senate were verbally 
transcribed from the constitution which Mavrocor- 
datos had introduced in Western Greece, but the oli- 
garchs of the Morea carried them into effect in a 
different spirit from that in which they had been drawn 
up. In Western Greece, it was expressly stipulated 
that they were to cease when a central government 
was established ; in the Peloponnesus, on the contrary, 
they were to operate as a check on the authority of 
the central government.^ 

The worst feature of these local constitutions was 
common to all. They all authorised provincial autho- 
rities to maintain armed bands to enforce their orders 
and defend their power. This provision perpetuated 
and legalised a state of anarchy. The Peloponnesian 
Senate carried this abuse to the greatest extent. It 
was empowered to keep up a guard of a thousand men 
at a moment when every man in Greece capable of 
bearing arms ought to have been sent to the banks of 
the Sperchius, or the passes of Makrynoros.^ 

It is not necessary to enter into further details to 
explain how the Moreots paralysed the national assem- 
bly at Piada, and rendered the constitution of Epi- 
daurus and the executive government of Greece inef- 
fectual. The primates and military chiefs, by their 
coalition with Demetrius Hypsilantes, were enabled to 
retain a complete command over the fiscal resources 
of the Morea, which then formed the great bulk of the 
national revenues. The executive government was 
comparatively powerless. Men of sagacity must have 

^ The laws and constitutions of Greece during the Revolution have been pub- 
lished by Mr Mamouka, Under-Secretary of State, in eleven volumes. For the 
constitution of the Peloponnesus, see voL i. p. 107 ; of Western Greece, i. 21. 

* Mamouka, i. 117. 



CONSTITUTION OF EPIDAUEUS. 297 

Been that the constitution of Epidaurus was a dead a. d. i821. 
letter as long as the constitution of the Peloponnesus 
existed ; yet Mavrocordatos and other men of talent 
allowed their ambition to blind them to the evil effects 
of promulgating a political constitution merely to 
witness its violation^ and of acting as an executive 
body without exercising the powers of a national 
government. If they feared to make an appeal to the 
people in favour of representative institutions, lest the 
appeal should prove a signal for commencing a civil 
war, it was their duty to lay aside their ambitious 
schemes, to convert the Peloponnesian Senate into a 
national executive, by compelling it to undertake the 
conduct of the central executive of all Greece, and thus 
concentrate public attention on its proceedings. By 
taking a different course, they created two antagonistic 
administrations of nearly equal force. 

Accidental circumstances diminished the personal 
influence of Mavrocordatos at the first assembly of the 
deputies of Greece, by bringing him on the scene 
under disadvantageous circumstances. He had just 
made himself ridiculous by an attempt to play the 
general On quitting Mesolonghi to attend the na- 
tional assembly, he crossed the gulf to the Greek camp 
before Patras. He arrived with a good deal of mili- 
tary parade, bringing with him some pieces of artillery 
and fifteen hundred stand of small -arms. He was 
attended by another phanariot, Prince Constantine 
Caradja. The Achaians had already been successful 
in several skirmishes with the garrison of Patras, but 
Mavrocordatos, who knew nothing of military matters, 
did not know how to profit by these successes. The 
consequence was, that they rendered both him and the 
besiegers extremely negligent, and by alarming the 
Turks rendered them extremely vigilant. Suddenly, 
while Mavrocordatos was pluming himself on the 



298 CONSTITUTION OF EPIDAUEUS. 

BOOK III. favourable effect which his success in Western Greece 

'— had produced on the Moreots, the garrison of Patras 

made a general attack on the positions of the be- 
siegers. The whole blockading army fled, and Mavro- 
cordatos fled with it, leaving the artillery and arms 
which he had brought over from Mesolonghi, and the 
whole personal baggage of himself and his suite, in the 
hands of the Turks. He arrived at Argos in such a 
state of destitution as gave point to the sneers of his 
enemies, who attributed his disaster to his misplaced 
vanity in attempting to rival the mihtary reputation 
of Hypsilantes. 

The constitution of Epidaurus was proclaimed on the 
13th of January 1822, the new year's day of Eastern 
Christians. It was the work of Mavrocordatos and 
Negris, who were assisted by an Italian refugee, named 
Gallina. It must be looked upon rather as a state- 
ment of the political principles, ratified by national 
consent, than as a practical organic law of the new 
Greek state. Its provisions are excellent, but they 
are the enunciation of vague maxims. It does nothing 
to connect the existing institutions of the country 
with the central administration it created. Those who 
framed it probably thought more of its effect in West- 
ern Europe than of its operation in Greece. For prac- 
tical government they trusted, with their national 
self-confidence, to their own talents. It has, however, 
the merit of proclaiming rehgious liberty, of aboUshing 
slavery, and declaring that judicial torture was illegal. 
But it adopted no arrangements for enforcing financial 
responsibility on the municipal authorities who fingered 
public money, nor for restraining the fiscal rapacity of 
the proesti and the military exactions of the captains. 
No attempt was made to improve the morality of the 
rulers of the country, by furnishing the people with 
some information concerning the enormous amount of 



CONSTITUTION OF EPIDAURUS. 299 

Turkish property which had become national, norA.D. 1821. 
concerning the manner in which it was expended or 
administered. 

The central government of Greece, established by 
the constitution of Epidaurus, consisted of a legislative 
assembly and an executive body. The names of seve- 
ral distinguished men appear neither in the one nor 
the other ; there can be no doubt, therefore, that this 
National Assembly was employed to throw the power 
of which it could dispose into the hands of a party. 

The executive body consisted of five members. 
Prince Alexander Mavrocordatos, after acting as pre- 
sident of the National Assembly, was named President 
of Greece, The executive was authorised to appoint 
eight ministers. The power of naming ofiicials to 
civil, military, and financial employments was vaguely 
expressed in order to avoid a conflict of competency 
with the provincial senates and the government of the 
naval islands. A good deal was done by the Greeks 
at Epidaurus to deceive Europe ; very little to organ- 
ise Greece. 



CHAPTER IL 

THE PRESIDENCY OP MAVROCORDATOS. 



E2 8' oKOv^iw Scvrcpa fio7p\ 

3r€^oy Sijuoroy d^dcjcroi.'* — Putsar. 

Han's highest good is virtue to achieve ; 
His next, the fortune to obtain renown. 
Who in one wreath this double prize can weave. 
Hath set upon his brow life's brightest crown. 



The charaoteb and politioal position of Alexander Mavrocordatos — 
Affairs of Eub(ea, and death of Elias Ma vromichales— Conduct of 
Odysseus at Kartstos — Affairs of Chios, and invasion of the isi.and 
BT THE Sahiots— Prompt measures of the sultan — Massacres of the 
Chiots— Greek fleet puts to sea — Constantinb Kanaris burns the 
flag-ship op the capitan-pasha — Devastation of Chios — ^Thb President 
Mavrocordatos assumes the chief command in Western Greece — 
Treachery of Qooos— Defeat at Petta — Effects of this defeat — 
Death of Kyriakules Ma vromiohales— Capitulation of Suliots — 
Affairs of Acarnania — Sieqb of Mesolokghi — Defeat of the Turks. 

A VAULTING ambition prompted Alexander Mavrocor- 
datos to assume the supreme authority in Greece, 
when circumstances demanded greater abilities and a 
firmer character than he possessed, in order to execute 
the duties of the oflSce with honour to the leader and 
advantage to the country. He has perhaps a better 
claim to be considered a statesman than any other 
actor in the Revolution ; but even his claim to that 
high rank is very dubious. Such as he was, history 
exhibits plainly in his conduct, and his conduct reveals 



PRESIDENCY OP MAVROCORDATOS. 301 

his character. He was himself always making a mystery a. d. 1822. 
of public business, and a parade of administrative trifles ; 
but nations have no secrets in their proceedings, and 
the mists of adulation which once surrounded the first 
president of Greece have long vanished. Of him it can 
be said with great truth. Major privato visus, dum 
pHvatus fuity et omnium consensu capax imperii^ nisi 
imperasset. 

The superiority of Mavrocordatos over the rest of 
his countrymen must have been really great ; for, in 
his long political career, he has been five times called 
from an inferior or a private station to occupy the 
highest rank in the administration of Greece. In 
every case he made shipwreck of his own reputation, 
and left public affairs in as bad a position as he found 
them, if not in a worse. 

It is, however, no inconsiderable honour to have 
been elected the first president of liberated Greece by 
the voice of a free people, and to have so comported 
himself that even when he forfeited the nation's confi* 
dence he retained a place in the people's esteem. His 
presidency was a period of misfortune to himself and 
to the central government, and the misfortune was 
caused by misconduct and wilful errors. Yet the year 
1822 was a period of glory to Greece; and had he 
known how to perform the duties of the presidency, 
some part of that glory would have been reflected on 
him and on the government of which he was the head. 
Partly from causes over which he had no control, his 
administration opened with disaster, and in conse- 
quence of his perverse and mistaken ambition, it ter- 
minated in calamity. The sad catastrophe of Chios 
cast a dark shade over the dawn of his government. 
The defeat of Petta brought disgrace on his personal 
administration. The first was an unavoidable misfor- 
tune, as far as Mavrocordatos was concerned, but for 



302 DEATH OF ELIAS MAVROMICHALES. 

BOOK III. the second he was solely and entirely responsible. He 
'^^' "' deserted his duty, as President of Greece, to act as 
governor-general of its western provinces, and he as- 
sumed the command of an army to make political 
capital of military success, without possessing one 
single quality that fitted him for a soldier. 

The first misfortune which happened to the Greeks 
in 1822 was the death of Elias Mavromichales, the 
eldest son of Petrobey. He was invited by the pro- 
vincial government of Eastern Greece to take the com- 
mand of the troops engaged in blockading the Acro- 
polis of Athens ; but when he arrived at the Athenian 
camp, he was persuaded to accept the chief C9mmand 
of an army which was destined to besiege Karystos. 
Elias preferred active operations in Euboea to the dull 
routine of watching the starving Turks at Athens. 
He marched to Kalamos, and crossed the channel to 
Kastelli, accompanied by his uncle Kyriakoules and 
six hundred Maniats. 

Before his arrival at the camp of the Euboeans, the 
people of Kumi had elected Vasos to be their captain, 
a native of Montenegro, who, after passing his life in 
menial occupations, or as an ordinary klepht, had 
quitted Smyrna to join the Revolution and push his 
way as a soldier. Vasos was a man of a fine athletic 
figure, well suited to distinguish himself in personal 
brawls ; but he was ignorant of military affairs, and 
never acquired any military experience beyond that 
which is required for a brigand chief. Elias Mavro- 
michales displayed on this occasion far more generosity 
and patriotism than Hypsilantes and Mavrocordatos in 
similar circumstances. Without seeking to make his 
rank as a general appointed by the central govern- 
ment, and his invitation by a provincial conunittee of 
Euboea, a ground for insisting on receiving the chief 
command, he removed all cause of dissension by allow- 



DEATH OF ELIAS MAVROMICHALES. 303 

ing Vasos, though a stranger and an untried soldier, a. d. 1822. 
to share his authority. 

At the solicitation of the people of Euboea it was 
resolved to attack a body of Turks posted in the village 
of Sfcura without waiting for reinforcements, though 
they were hourly expected. The allurements of ava- 
rice prevailed over the suggestions of prudence. The 
Turks had collected considerable quantities of grain at 
Stura, which was occupied by only about a hundred 
men. 

To insure success in this attack, it was necessary 
for the Greeks to occupy the pass over Mount Dia- 
kophti. This would have prevented Omer Bey of 
Karystos, an active and enterprising officer, from bring- 
ing assistance to the small garrison in Stura. The 
Greeks were fully aware of the importance of seizing 
this position ; yet, in consequence of the utter want of 
military discipline, and the divided command, added 
to their natural habit of wasting the time for action 
in debate, the occupation of the pass was put oflf for a 
day. One body of troops marched to attack Stura, 
and another to occupy the pass of Diakophti. 

Omer Bey had not lost time like the Greeks. The 
moment he heard that a body of Greek troops had 
crossed the channel, he hastened to secure the pass, 
and the Greeks found him already intrenched in a 
strong position. After routing the troops opposed to 
him, he hastened forward to defend his magazines at 
Stura. 

In the mean time Elias Mavromichales had entered 
Stura, but the Turks in garrison had shut themselves 
up in the stone houses round the magazines, and made 
a determined resistance. While the skirmishing was 
going on the advanced guard of the troops from 
Karystos arrived, and the Greeks were driven out of 
the place. Elias, with a few men, kept possession of 



304 SIEGE OF KARYSTOS. 

BOOK III. an old windmill, which he defended valiantly, expect- 
"'^^^ "' ing that his uncle and his colleague, Vasos, would be 
able to rally the fugitives and return to engage the 
Turks. In an hour or two, perceiving that the defeat 
was decisive, he attempted to cut his way through the 
enemy sword in hand, but was shot in the attempt. 
Two only of his followers escaped. This aflfair occurred 
on the 24th of January 1822. 

The death of Eli^ Mavromichales was generally 
lamented. He had shown some military talent, as 
well as brilliant courage, which was a characteristic 
of many members of his house. No chief was more 
beloved by the soldiers, for no other was so attentive 
to their welfare and so disinterested in his personal 
conduct. He was strongly imbued with that youthful 
enthusiasm which seeks glory rather than power. 

Shortly after the death of Elias Mavromichales, the 
fugitives were reinforced by the arrival of Odysseus 
from Attica with seven hundred men, many of whom 
were armatoli. The Greek army rallied under this new 
leader, and advanced to Stura, which was abandoned 
by the Turks. But the Greeks found the magazines 
empty ; for Omer Bey, instead of pursuing his enemy, 
had prudently employed his time in conveying the 
grain at Stura within the fortress of Karystos. 

The siege of Karystos was now formed, and the 
besiegers cut oflF the water which is conveyed into the 
town by an aqueduct. The Greek army was three 
thousand strong, and great expectations were enter- 
tained that Omer Bey would be compelled to capitu- 
late. But about the middle of February, Odysseus, 
who had not been able to obtain the sole command, 
suddenly abandoned his position, and marched away 
without giving any previous notice of his movement 
to the other chiefs of the blockading army. He pre- 
tended that he was compelled to move because his 



CONDUCT OF ODYSSEUS. 305' 

troops were left without provisions ; but the want of a. d. 1822. 
provisions certainly did not oblige him to keep his " 
movements a secret. His desertion alarmed the re- 
mainder of the army, and the Greeks retired from 
before Karystos. The army of Euboea was soon after 
broken up. The Turks of Negrepont and Karystos, 
finding no troops in the field to oppose them, sallied 
out of these fortresses, and levied taxes and contribu- 
tions over the greater part of the island during the 
year 1822. 

The conduct of Odysseus was supposed to be the 
result of treasonable arrangements with Omer Bey. 
Like some other captains of armatoli, Odysseus felt 
doubts of the ultimate success of the Revolution, and 
had no enthusiasm for liberty. His feelings were those 
of an Albanian mercenary soldier, and he had no con- 
fidence in the talents of the Greek civilians who took 
the lead in public affairs. He entertained a settled 
conviction that the Revolution would terminate in 
some compromise; and as Ali of Joannina was his 
model of a hero, he pursued his own interest, like that 
chieftain, without submitting to any restraint from 
duty, morality, or religion. His character was a com- 
pound of the worst vices of the Greeks and Albanians. 
He was false as the most deceitful Greek, and vindic- 
tive as the most bloodthirsty Albanian. To these vices 
he added excessive avarice, universal distrust, and fero- 
cious cruelty. The most probable explanation of his 
conduct at Karystos seems to be, that, on one hand, 
he was jealous of the chiefs with whom he was acting, 
and that, on the other, he suspected some manoeuvre 
of his enemy Kolettes, who was then acting as minister 
at war at Corinth. He knew that Mavrocordatos was 
seeking to increase the power of the central govern- 
ment, and that the members of the Areopagos of 
Eastern Greece, which still continued to exist, were 

VOL. I. u 



CHAP. II. 



306 STATE OF CHIOS. 

BOOK iTi. labouring to prevent his gaining a predominant in- 
fluence in Attica. Odysseus had already formed the 
project of acquiring an independent provincial com- 
mand in Eastern Greece corresponding to that once 
exercised, or supposed to have been exercised, by cap- 
tains of armatoH. And he was inclined to leave it to 
the chapter of accidents whether he was to exercise 
this power as a general of Greece, or as an officer of 
the sultan. In spite of the military anarchy that 
reigned in Greece, public opinion was strong enough 
to derange his plans. 

No calamity during the Greek Revolution awakened 
the sympathy and compassion of the civilised world 
more deservedly than the devastation of Chios. The 
industrious and peaceable inhabitants of that happy 
island were mildly governed, and they were averse 
to join the Revolution, in which, from their unwarlike 
habits, they were disqualified from taking an active 
part. By an insurrection against the sultan they had 
everything to lose, and nothing to gain. In both 
cases their local privileges would be diminished, if 
not entirely lost. Their municipal administration was 
already in their own hands; their taxes were light, 
and they were collected by themselves. The Chipts 
justly feared that the central government of Greece 
would increase the burden of taxation, and that 
Hydriots, Maniats, or Romeliat armatoli, would prove 
severer tax-gatherers than village magistrates. Even 
at the first outbreak of orthodox enthusiasm, when 
Russian aid was universally expected, the people of 
the island refused to take up arms. Admiral Tom- 
bazes appeared off Chios with the Greek fleet during 
its first cruise, and vainly invited the inhabitants to 
throw off the Othoman yoke, and avenge the martyr- 
dom of the patriarch Gregorios. 

This attempt of the Greek fleet to excite an insur- 



PREPARATIONS OP THE TURKS. 307 

rection alarmed Sultan Mahmud, and the Othoman a. d. 1822: 
government deemed it necessary to disarm the ortho- 
dox, and to strengthen the Turkish garrison in the 
citadel, where the archbishop and seventy of the prin- 
cipal Greeks were ordered to reside as hostages for the 
tranquillity of the island. The fortifications were re- 
paired, provisions and military stores were collected, 
and the citadel was put in a state of defence. Prudence 
now forbade the Greeks to invade Chios, unless they 
had previously secured the command of the sea ; for 
it was impossible to take the citadel without a regular 
siege, since the vicinity of the continent rendered a. 
blockade impossible even during the winter, when the 
Turkish fleet remained within the Dardanelles. 

Unfortunately for the Chiots, their wealth excited 
the cupidity of many of the ruling men in Greece, and 
stimulated adventurers to undertake the conquest of 
the island. The inhabitants were stigmatised for their 
treachery to the national cause, and in an unlucky 
hour Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes authorised a Chiot 
merchant named, like very many other Chiot mer- 
chants, Ralli, to undertake an expedition to Chios in 
conjunction with Lykourgos, a man who had obtained 
considerable influence at Samos. Lykourgos, who had 
practised medicine at Smyrna, was a bold adventurer. 
Availing himself adroitly of the general ignorance of 
political and military affairs among his countrymeUj 
he persuaded them to place the chief direction of public 
business at Samos in his hands. On the 2d of January 
1822, Hypsilantes, foreseeing that the presidency of 
Greece was about to pass into the hands of his rival 
Mavrocordatos, and perhaps deeming that the central 
government would be unable to support the expedi- 
tion to Chios with suflSicient energy, wrote a suggestion 
that it might be prudent to defer the enterprise. He 
only covered his own responsibility, without counter- 



308 INVASION OF CHIOS. 

BOOK III. manding the expedition. To this suggestion in favour 
^^!^Il!1l of delay, Lykourgos replied on the 1st of February, 
that he had put off the attack, but that he prayed 
fervently for a favourable opportunity for making the 
attempt, as he considered the conquest of Chios to be 
a sacred duty. The project was opposed, not only 
by the leading Chiots, but by the most intelligent 
Psarians. 

Lykourgos had only delayed his enterprise because 
his preparations were incomplete. In order to deceive 
the Psarians and the Chiots, he gave out that he was 
going to attack ScaJanova. The Turks, however, 
divined his object. Scalanova was secure, for it was 
occupied by a strong garrison. Fresh troops were 
therefore transported into the island of Chios, and 
Yehid Pasha found great difficulty in maintaining 
order among these bands, which were principally com- 
posed of volunteers, and who came, filled with Mussul- 
man enthusiasm, to combat infidels, and, what was 
more pleasant, to plimder them. Vehid Pasha behaved 
with great prudence in his difficult position. He per- 
suaded the Greeks to raise a monthly contribution of 
thirty-four thousand piastres, and he employed this 
sum in providing regular pay and liberal rations for 
the troops, and particularly for the volunteers. The 
Porte in the mean time ordered the pasha to send the 
three principal hostages to Constantinople, and to keep 
strict guard over the others. 

As soon as Lykourgos had completed his prepara- 
tions, he waited neither for the orders of Prince Deme- 
trius Hypsilantes, the lieutenant - governor of the 
supreme chief of the Hetairia, nor of Prince Alexander 
Mavrocordatos, the President of Greece. On the 22d 
of March 1822, he landed at Koutari with about 
twenty-five hundred men. After a trifling skirmish 
the invaders entered the town of Chios, where they 



SIEGE OF THE CITADEL. 309 

burned the custom-house, destroyed two mosques, and a.d. 1822. 
behaved more like a band of pirates than a body of 
national troops. Their military dispositions consisted 
in occupying the houses nearest the citadel with rifle- 
men, and beginning to form a battery on the command- 
ing position of Truloti. 

The time for invading Chios was extremely ill chosen. 
The Turkish fleet had abeady quitted Constantinople. 
Lykourgos and his followers were nevertheless sure of 
gaining considerable booty by their expedition, though 
that booty could only be won by plundering the sul- 
tan's Christian subjects. They hoped that accident 
would enable them to get possession of the citadel of 
Chios, and in case they should be compelled to retreat, 
they trusted to their own ability and to the stupidity 
of the Turks for effecting their escape. The contempt 
with which the Greeks viewed the Turks at this period 
seems hardly credible to those who calmly look back 
at the events of the contest. 

The siege of the citadel of Chios was commenced in 
form. Batteries were constructed not only on Truloti, 
but also on the beach of the port. They were, however, 
too distant to produce any eflvect, and the troops would 
not work at the trenches with sufficient regularity to 
make any progress with the attack. In the mean time 
the peasants crowded into the town from the villages 
in the mountains, and Lykourgos found himself at the 
head of a large force. But of that force he knew not 
how to make any use. Instead of devoting all his 
energy to the conquest of the citadel, he began to play 
the prince, and to organise a government. Taking up 
his quarters in the bishop's palace, he deposed the de- 
mogerontes, and appointed a revolutionary committee 
of seven ephors. Lykourgos did nothing, the ephors 
had nothing to do, and the camp became a scene of 
anarchy* 



CHAP. II. 



310 SIEGE OF THE CITADEL. 

fidoKiiL It was soon evident that a more competent com- 
mander and a more powerful force was required to 
enable the Greeks to take the citadel. A deputation 
was therefore sent by the inhabitants to Corinth to 
solicit aid from Mavrocordatos. Mr Glarakes, a man 
who had received his education in Germany, was at 
the head of this deputation.^ The Greek government 
furnished the Chiots with a few heavy guns and some 
artillerymen. Several Fhilhellenes also accompanied 
these supplies, to assist in directing the operations of 
the siege. But no Greek fleet was sent to prevent 
Turkish troops from crossing over from the Asiatic 
coast. The ephors had only succeeded in hiring six 
9mall Psarian vessels to cruise in the channel, and 
watch the Turkish boats at Tchesme. The disorderly 
conduct of the troops under Lykourgos compelled 
many of the wealthy Chiots to quit the island with 
their families. To prevent these desertions, as they 
were called, the officers imprisoned many wealthy in- 
dividuals, threatened them with ill usage on the part 
of the soldiers, and made them pay large sums of 
money, as a bribe to purchase protection from the ill 
usage with which they were threatened at the instiga- 
tion of these very officers. 

The attack on Chios excited more indignation than 
alarm at Constantinople. The sultan felt it as a 
personal insult which he was bound to avenge. The 
ladies of the harem called for the extermination of the 
rebels who were plundering their mastic gardens. The 
divan was incensed at the boldness of the enterprise, 
and resolved to spare no exertions to preserve so 
valuable an appanage of the court as Chios then 
formed. The Porte suddenly became a scene of activity, 

1 Qlarakes would have been a valuable citizeD in peaceful times. He was 
patriDtic and honest, but misplaced in his career by the Revolution, yet he held 
the office of Secretary of Statie for a long time during the Revolution, and Le 
was more than once a minister under King Otho. 



sultan's promptitude. 311 

which contrasted strongly with the apathetic indiflfer- a. d. 1822. 
ence of the Greek government at Corinth. Sultan 
Mahmud commenced his operations in the true Otho- 
man spirit, by ordering three of the Chiot hostages to 
be hanged, and a number of the wealthiest Chiot mer- 
chants in Constantinople to be thrown into prison. 

The Othoman fleet put to sea. The pashas on the 
coast of Asia Minor were ordered to hold the best troops 
they could assemble ready for embarkation, and the 
ports nearest to Chios were instructed to pass over 
boat-loads of troops and provisions to the citadel at 
every risk as long as the Greeks remained in the island. 
Though the ordinary commands of a despotic govern- 
ment are frequently neglected, the extraordinary and 
express orders of a despotic master are promptly obeyed. 
The ports of Asia Minor were soon crowded with troops, 
and the citadel was maintained in a good state of de* 
fence. 

The capitan-pasha, Kara Ali, arrived in the northern 
channel of Chios on the 11th April 1822. As he en- 
tered, a Turkish felucca belonging to his squadron got 
on shore, and was captured by the Greeks, who imme- 
diately put to death every soul on board. This act of 
barbarity was not sustained by the desperate courage 
which can alone excuse such a system of warfare. 
Next day, the capitan-pasha landed a body of seven 
thousand men to the south of the city. The Greeks 
made little exertion to prevent his landing, and fled 
from their intrenchments at the first approach of the 
Turkish troops. The victors plundered the town of 
whatever the lawless bands of Lykourgos had left, and 
a body of fanatic Mussulman volunteers, who had joined 
the expedition as a holy war against infidels, paraded 
the streets, murdering every Christian who fell into 
their hands. 

Lykourgos showed as little courage in irregular 



312 FLIGHT OF LYKOURGOS. 

BOOK III. warfare in the field as he had displayed military capa- 
^' "' city in the camp. After a feeble attempt to defend 
the village of St George to which he had retreated, he 
and his followers fled to the coast, and embarked in 
some Psarian vessels, abandoning the unfortunate 
Chiots whom they had goaded into rebellion, to the 
fury of the exasperated Turks. This fury, it must be 
mentioned, was increased by the deliberate murder of 
nearly all their prisoners by the Greeks during the 
whole period of the expedition. 

Lykourgos returned to Samos. The failure of the 
expedition was attributed to his incapacity and cowar- 
dice, which perhaps only rendered an inevitable failure 
a disgraceful defeat. But no one appears to have 
upbraided him with his cruelty and extortion, which 
inflicted so many calamities on the unfortunate inhabi- 
tants of Chios. The Samiots deprived him of all autho- 
rity, and drove him into exile. At a later period of 
the Revolution, however, he was reinstated in his autho- 
rity, being appointed governor of Samos by the pri- 
mates of Hydra, who found it impossible to levy an 
assessment of three hundred thousand piastres which 
had been imposed on the Samiots as a contribution 
towards the maintenance of the Greek fleet. The local 
knowledge of Lykourgos, and his influence over the 
democratic party among his countrymen, pointed him 
out as the fittest man to bring about a peaceftd arrange- 
ment ; and as the defence of Samos was necessary for 
the safety of Greece, and the Greek fleet could alone 
save Samos from the fate of Chios, his nomination was 
a prudent measure. He appears to have benefited by 
experience, for his conduct was firm and moderate. 

The vengeance of the Turks fell heavy on Chios. 
The unfortunate inhabitants of the island were gener- 
ally unarmed, but they were all treated as rebels, and 
rendered responsible for the deeds of the Greeks who 



MASSACRE OF THE CHIOTS. 313 

had fled. In the city the wealthier class often 8Uc-a.d. 1822. 
ceeded in obtaining protection from Turks in authority, 
which they purchased by paying large sums of money. 
In the mean time the poor were exposed to the venge- 
ance of the soldiers and the fanatics. The bloodshed, 
however, soon ceased in the town, for even the fanatic 
volunteers began to combine profit with vengeance. 
They collected as many of the Chiots as they thought 
would bring a good price in the slave-markets of Asia 
Minor, and crossed over to the continent with their 
booty. Many Chiot families also found time to escape 
to different ports in the island, and succeeded in em- 
barking in the Psarian vessels, which hastened to the 
island as soon as it was known that the capitan-pasha 
had sailed past Psara. 

Three thousand Chiots retired to the monastery of 
Aghias Mynas, which lies five miles to the southward 
of the city, on the ridge of hUls which bounds the rich 
plain. The Turks surrounded the building and sum- 
moned them to surrender. The men had little hope of - 
escaping death. The women and children were sure of 
being sold as slaves. Though they had no military 
leader, and were unable to take effectual measures for 
defending the monastery, they refused to lay down their 
arms. The Turks carried the building by storm, and 
put all within to the sword. 

Two thousand persons had also sought an asylum in 
the fine old monastery of Nea-Mone, which is about six 
miles from the city, secluded in the mountains towards 
the west. This monastery was built by Constantino 
IX. (Monomachos) ; and some curious mosaics, now 
almost entirely destroyed, still form valuable and inte- 
resting monuments of that flourishing period of Byzan- 
tine art.^ The Turks stormed this monastery as they 
had done that of Aghias Mynas. A number of the 

A.D. 1042-1054. 



314 MASSACRE OF THE CHI0T8. 

BOOK iiL helpless inmates had shut themselves up in the church. 
"^' The doors were forced open, and the Turks, affcer 
slaughtering even the women on their knees at prayer, 
set fire to the screen of paintings in the church, and to 
the wood-work and roofc of the other buildings in the 
monastery, and left the Christians who were not already 
slain to perish in the conflagration. 

Kara Ali did everything in his power to save the 
island from being laid waste and depopulated. He 
was anxious to protect the peasantry, for he knew that 
his merit in having defeated the Greeks would be 
greatly increased in the eyes of the sultan if he could 
prevent any diminution in the amount of taxation. 
He would fain have confined the pillage of the fanatic 
volunteers to the city, where he could watch their pro- 
ceedings, and deprive them of the slaves they might 
carry off when they quitted the island. On the 1 7th 
of April he invited the foreign consuls who remained 
in the city to announce an amnesty to the inhabitants, 
and on the 22d the French and Austrian consuls con- 
ducted the primates of the mastic villages to the city. 
The primates delivered up the arms possessed by the 
Christians as a proof of submission, and Elez Aga, the 
voevode, engaged to prevent any of the irregular bands 
of volunteers from entering Ids district. By these 
arrangements the mastic villages, whose fate particu- 
larly interested the sultan's court, were saved from 
plunder. But in the rest of the island the power of 
the capitan-pasha not being sustained by a well-organ- 
ised body of soldiers like that under the orders of Elez 
Aga, proved often insuflScient to protect the people. 

As soon as Sultan Mahmud heard of the success of 
his admiral, he ordered the Chiot hostages to be exe- 
cuted as an expiation for the insurrection. Four 
hostages and several merchants were hung at Constan- 
tinople, and the archbishop and seventy-five persons 



GREEK FLEET PUTS TO SEA. 315 

were executed at Chios by express orders from theA.D. 1822. 
Porte. This cruelty on the part of the sovereign '■ 

proves that the avarice of the Turkish soldiers, and 
not their humanity, saved the Christian women and 
children of Chios from the sad fate of the Mussulman 
women and children at Tripolitza. 

The president Mavrocordatos, the Greek government, 
and the Albanian primates of Hydra, were accused of 
both incapacity and neglect in not sending the Greek 
fleet to oppose the entrance of the capitan-pasha into 
the channel between Chios and the main. No spot 
could have been found more favourable to the opera- 
tions of the light vessels of the Albanians and. the 
Greeks, or for the use of fire-ships. At all events, the 
passage of irregular troops and constant supplies of 
provisions from the continent in small vessels would 
have been completely cut off. 

It was only on the 10th of May that the Greek fleet 
put to sea. It consisted of fifty-six sail. The squa- 
dron of each of the naval islands had its own admiral, 
but the chief command over the whole fleet was con- 
ceded by common consent to Andreas Miaoulis, who, 
though he had not yet performed any remarkable 
exploit, had given such proofs of sound sense and pru- 
dent firmness that his character secured him univer- 
sal respect; while the manner in which he displayed 
these qualifications, in combination with experience in 
seamanship, gave him a marked superiority over all 
the other captains in the motley assemblage of vessels 
called the Greek navy. Miaoulis deserved the place 
he obtained, and it reflects honour on the navy of 
Greece that the place was voluntarily conceded to him, 
and that he was steadily supported in it during all the 
vicissitudes of the war. But in the force under his 
command there was very little order and no discipline* 
Many of the captains performed their part as indivi*- 



316 KANARIS AND HIS FIRE-SHIP. 

BOOK III. duals bravely and honourabl\% but their ideas of their 

CHAP II •» ' 

- — — ^ duty were founded on their experience as merchant 
adventurers, not as national officers. Captains and 
often crews frequently assumed the right of acting 
independently when the admiral required their co- 
operation, or of violating his commands when they 
ought to have paid implicit obedience to his orders. 

The capitan- pasha passed the rhamazan at Chios. 
On the 31st of May Miaoulis appeared off the north 
channel ; and the Othoman fleet weighing anchor, an 
engagement took place at the entrance of the Gulf of 
Smyrna. The Greeks made use of fire-ships, but one 
which they directed against a Turkish line -of- battle 
ship was consumed ineffectually, and the battle termi- 
nated in an idle cannonade, which was renewed at 
intervals on the two subsequent days, without causing 
any damage to either party. The Greeks returned 
dispirited to Psara, and the capitan-pasha to his anchor- 
age at Chios. 

On the 18th of June, the last day of rhamazan in 
the year 1822, a number of the principal officers of 
the Othoman fleet assembled on board the ship of the 
capitan-pasha to celebrate the feast of Bairam. The 
night was dark, but the whole Turkish fleet was illu- 
minated for the festival. Two Greek ships, which had 
been hugging the land during the day, as if baffled by 
the wind in endeavouring to enter the Gulf of Smyrna, 
changed their course at dusk, when their movements 
could be no longer observed, and bore down into the 
midst of the Othoman fleet. One steered for the 80- 
gun ship of the capitan-pasha, the other for the 74 of 
the Eeala bey. Both these ships were conspicuous in 
the dark night by the variegated lamps at their masts 
and yards. The two Greeks were fire-ships. One was 
commanded by Constantine Kanaris, the hero of the 
Greek Revolution It is superfluous to say that such a 



KANARIS AND HIS FIRE-SHIP. 317 

man directed his ship with skill and courage. Calmly a. d. I822. 
estimating every circumstance of the moment, he ran ~ 

the bowsprit into an open port, and fixed his ship 
alongside the capitan-pasha, as near the bows as pos- 
sible so as to bring the flames to windward of his 
enemy. He then lighted the train with his own hand, 
stepped into his boat, where all the crew were ready 
at their oars, and pushed off as the flames mounted 
from the deck. The sails and rigging, steeped in tur- 
pentine and pitch, immediately blazed up, and the 
Turkish crews were far too much astonished at the 
sudden conflagration to pay any attention to a soli- 
tary boat which rowed rapidly into the shade. The 
flames driven by the wind rushed through the open 
ports of the lower and upper decks, and filled the great 
ship with fire roaring like a furnace. 

The other fire-ship was commanded by a Hydriot. 
This Albanian was less fortunate or less daring than 
his Greek colleague. His vessel was not so skilfully 
and coolly directed, or the train was fired with too 
much precipitation. Instead of holding fast to the 
line-of-battle ship against which she was directed, she 
drifted to leeward and burned harmlessly to the 
water's edge. 

On board the capitan-pasha's ship the scene was 
terrible. A quantity of tents piled up on the lower 
deck, near the ports where the fire first entered, took 
fire so quickly, and the flames rushed up so furiously 
through the hatches, that all communication between 
the different parts of the ship was cut off. No effort 
could be made to arrest the conflagration, or to sink 
the ship. Those on board could only save their lives 
by jumping into the sea. The awning catching fire 
rendered it impossible to work even on the quarter- 
deck. The few boats which were alongside, or which 
could be lowered, were sunk by the crowds that en- 



-CHAP. XI. 



318 6BEEK FLEET. 

3600KIII. tered them. The crews of the nearest ships were 
engaged in hauling off, and the progress of the flames 
was so rapid that when boats arrived they feared to 
approach. Fire was abready rushing out of every port 
below, and blocks were beginning to fall from the 
rigging. The ship was crowded with prisoners ; and 
the shrieks of those who could make no eflfort to escape 
struck all with horror who heard their cries. Kara 
Ali jumped into one of the boats that was brought 
alongside to receive him ; but before he could quit the 
side of his ship, he was struck by a falling spar and 
carried dying to the shore. 

The capitan-bey who succeeded to the command of 
the fleet, not thinking it safe to remain at Chios, and 
considering the naval operations terminated by the 
expulsion of the Greeks from the island, sailed for the 
Dardanelles. Though he was pursued by the Greek 
fleet he stopped at Erisso, and visited Kydonies with- 
out sustaining any loss. On the 2d of July he brought 
the Othoman fleet to anchor within the castles of the 
Dardanelles. 

The prudence of Miaoulis, and the skill with which 
he contrived to introduce some degree of order into 
the fleet under his command during this cruise, afibrded 
hope of further improvements in the Greek navy 
which were never realised. The skill of the captains 
in handling their ships received well-merited praise 
from all naval officers of every nation who witnessed 
their manoeuvres. But their ignorance of military 
science, and their awkwardness in the use of their 
imperfect artillery, did not allow them to derive any 
very decided advantage from their superior seaman- 
ship. The necessity of effecting a complete change in 
the naval system of the Greeks made a strong impres- 
sion on an English officer who served as a volunteer 
at this time, and who made several proposals to attain 



DEVASTATION OP CHIOS. 819 

the desired end by introducing steam-ships.^ His name a. d. 1822. 
was Frank Abney Hastings. '- 

The cruelties of the Turks at Chios were renewed 
after the destruction of the capitan-pasha's ship. The 
mastic villages which had hitherto escaped invasion 
were now laid waste. For many months the slaver 
markets of the Othoman empire, from Algiers to Tre- 
bizond, were supplied with women and children from 
Chios. Fortunately for the wretched sufferers, their 
known character for honesty and docility secured a 
high price, and insured their purchase by wealthy 
families, where they generally met with better treat- 
ment than slaves often receive from Christian masters. 

It is supposed that forty thousand persons were 
murdered or enslaved in the island of Chios during 
the year 1822, but this niunber must be exaggerated. 
About five thousand Chiots were absent from the 
island when it was invaded by the Samians. About 
fifteen thousand escaped before the arrival of the capi- 
tan-pasha. In the month of February 1822 Chios 
was said to contain nearly one hundred thousand inha- 
bitants ; in the month of August it was supposed that it 
did not contain more than thirty thousand.* Most of 

^ General Gordon says, i. 364, " It was then that Frank Hastings com- 
menced that course of honourable service which must ever connect his name 
with the emancipation of Greece." See also page 870, where it is mentioned 
that Hastings saved a vessel. He did so by going out on the bowsprit under 
a heavy fire of musketry. — Vol. ii. 441. Gordon adds, " If ever there was a 
disinterested and really useful Philhellene it was Hastings : he received no 
pay, and had expended most of his slender fortune in keeping the Karteria 
afloat for the last six months. . . . His ship, too, was the only one in the 
Greek navy where regular discipline was maintained." The sum expended by 
Hastings in the cause of Greece eventually exceeded £7000. 

* The accounts of the massacres at Chios differ chiefly in the numbers of 
those who are reported to have fallen victims to the cruelty of the Turks. 
Gordon says that fifteen thousand persons remained in the mastic villages. 
Tricoupi pretends that only eighteen hundred souls remained, which is a mani- 
fest error. It ia always difllcult, even when no feeling leads to exaggeration , 
to obtain accurate information concerning numbers. In 1853 the author was 
assured by persons at Chios who had access to the best means of information, 
that the population of the island did not then exceed forty-three thousand souls ; 
but others of equal authority said the number was sixty-six thousand, and 
that ten thousand more were absent gaining their livelihood abroad. 



320 DEVASTATION OF CHIOS. 

BOOK III. the Greek islands were filled with fugitives from Chios ; 

'— and many families who had lived in prosperous homes 

dragged out the remainder of their lives in abject 
poverty. Some who had succeeded in carrying off 
from their houses a few valuables, family jewels, and 
sums of money, were robbed by the Christian boat- 
men, who subsequently made a boast of having saved 
them from the Turks, and claimed rewards and grati- 
tude from Greece. 

The massacres of Chios excited just indignation in 
all Christian countries. It also opened the eyes of 
statesmen to the fact that the struggle between the 
Turks and Greeks was a war of extermination, which, 
if it continued long, would compel the goverments of 
Christian Europe to interfere. Many impartial and 
enlightened persons already deemed it impossible for 
Mussulmans and Christians to live together any longer 
in peace under the Othoman government. Their 
mutual hatred was supposed to have produced irrecon- 
cilable hostility. The immediate effect, therefore, of 
the sultan s cruelties in this case was to interest the 
feelings of all Uberal men and of aU sincere Christians 
in favour of the independence of Greece, as the only 
means of establishing peace in the Levant. Greek 
committees were formed to aid the arms of Greece, 
and subscriptions were collected to assist the suffering 
Chiots. No charity could be more deserved, for no 
sufferers were ever more guiltless of causing the cala- 
mities which had overwhelmed them. For generations 
the unfortunate inhabitants of Chios had been the 
peaceable and obedient subjects of the sultan. As a 
community they had been remarkable for order and 
patriotism. In their families they were distinguished 
by mutual affection, and as private individuals they 
were considered the most virtuous of the modem 
Greeks. Never, perhaps, had a better regulated society 



MAVROCORDATOS IN WESTERN GREECE. 321 

existed among so large a population, and never was a a. d. 1822. 
happy people suddenly struck with a more terrible 
catastrophe. 

Soon after Mavrocordatos heard of the calamity 
which had laid Chios waste, he left the direction of the 
Greek government to any man who might succeed in 
assuming it; or, to speak more correctly, he left the 
Greek government without any direction, and set off 
on an ill-judged military expedition into Western 
Greece. As long as he retained the office of President 
of Greece, it was his duty to remain at the seat of 
government, and perform the business of a sovereign. 
If he considered that he could be more useful as a 
general on the frontier, it was his duty to resign his 
civil office, and support the administration of his suc- 
cessor with his military influence. Of all the blunders 
committed by Mavrocordatos in his long political 
career, this was the greatest and the most reprehensible. 
It was absurd to think of directing the administration 
of a country, without roads or posts, from a comer of 
the territory ; and it was an unworthy and phanariot 
ambition which induced him to retain possession of a 
high office merely in order to exclude a rival for the 
post, without taking into account the serious injury he 
inflicted on the cause of order and good government. 
Even had Mavrocordatos been an able general, his 
error must have produced bad consequences in Greece ; 
but as he was destitute of every quality necessary to 
make a good soldier, his conduct brought disgrace on 
himself and calamity on the Greek government. 

It was absolutely necessary for the Greek govern- 
ment to make every exertion to carry on the war 
vigorously in Western Greece. The death of Ali Pasha, 
and the suppression of the Eevolution in Agrapha, in 
the chain of Pindus, in Thessaly, and in Macedonia, 
exposed Greece to be invaded by the whole of the 

VOL. I. X 



CHAP. II. 



322 MAVROCORDATOS IN WESTERN GREECE. 

BOOK III Othoman troops under the command of the seraskier 
of Eomelia. It became known early in the spring that 
the sultan was assembling two powerful armies, in 
order to invade Eastern and Western Greece simul- 
taneously. To direct these operations, Khurshid Pasha 
fixed his headquarters at Larissa, where he summoned 
all the ayans and timariots of Eomelia to join his 
standard. An army composed in great part of Alban- 
ians, under the command of Omer Vrioni, was intrusted 
with the attack on Western Greece. 

The first object of the Greek government was to 
support the Suliots, in order to enable them to keep 
possession of their native mountains, and thus retain 
a strong force on the flank of any Turkish army that 
might advance to force the pass of Makrynoros, or 
attempt to cross the Ambracian gulf. After much 
precious time had been wasted, it was at last resolved 
to send large reinforcements to the Suliots, and to 
make a powerful diversion in their favour by invading 
Epirus. What was most wanted to give efficiency to 
the operations of the Greeks was order. Instead of 
endeavouring to introduce order, Mavrocordatos in- 
creased the disorder by assuming the command of the 
army — if indeed it is permissible to designate the un- 
disciplined assemblage of armed men under a number 
of independent chiefs by the name of an army. 

When Mavrocordatos assumed the chief command 
in Western Greece, he was anxious to render his force 
efficient ; but he was so ignorant of the first elements 
of military organisation, that he neither knew what he 
ought to do nor what he ought to leave undone, so 
that his military operations were generally determined 
by accident. Before he quitted Corinth, which was 
then the seat of government, a decree of the legislative 
assembly invested him with extraordinary powers as 
governor-general and commander-in-chief in Western 



MAVROCORDATOS IN WESTERN GREECE. 323 

Greece, but limited his absence from the seat of govern- a n. 1822. 
ment to two months. " 

Mavrocordatos quitted Corinth in high spirits, at- 
tended by a band of enthusiastic volunteers, ready to 
dare every danger. About one hundred foreign officers 
had arrived in Greece to oflFer their services ; but in 
consequence of the neglect of military discipline on 
the part of the executive body, and indeed of the 
Greeks generally, they were allowed to remain unem- 
ployed. Not wishing to quit the country at the com- 
mencement of a campaign, they now offered to serve 
as simple soldiers, in order to teach the Greeks by 
experience the value of military discipline, and let 
them see what a small body of regular soldiers could 
perform. This noble offer was accepted without a due 
sense of its almost unexampled generosity. Mavrocor- 
datos, who had as insatiable a rapacity for honours, or 
rather titles, as Kolokotrones for coined money, made 
himself colonel of this gallant band, which was called 
the corps of Philhellenes. The first Greek regiment, 
six hundred strong, under Colonel Tarella,^ a body of 
Ionian volunteers, and a band of Suliots imder Marco 
!3otzares, also accompanied the president, who was 
joined at Mesolonghi by three hundred Moreots under 
the command of Geneas Kolokotrones, the second son 
of the old klepht, and by seven hundred Maniats. 
Kyriakoules Mavromichales had already been sent for- 
ward to open a communication with the Suliots by 
sea. 

Mavrocordatos marched from Mesolonghi with little 
more than two thousand men, and with only two light 
guns. His high-sounding titles and his dictatorial 

^ Prince Demetrios Hypsilantes, with all his inactivity, formed the first 
regiment of regular troops in Greece. He found in Balestos an able officer to 
discipline and command it. Had Balestos been properly supported, a good 
body of regular troops might have been formed, but unfortunately everything 
in Greece was made a question of personal jealousy or party passion. 



324 TREACHERY OF GOGOS, 

BOOK III. powers alanned the captains of armatoli, who viewed 

CHAP II 

— ^ his presence with jealousy, and showed no disposition 

to aid his enterprise. Some were already beginning to 
balance in their own minds the advantages to be 
gained by joining the cause of the sultan. Local inte- 
rests directed the conduct of others. It was the season 
of harvest, and many soldiers and petty officers were 
obliged to watch the collection of the tenths and the 
rents of national property, in order to prevent the 
officers of the government, the primates, or the cap- 
tains of armatoli, from cheating them of their pay. 
In a considerable part of Etolia and Acamania, some 
of the best soldiers in Greece were prevented from 
joining Mavrocordatos by the necessity of providing 
for their own subsistence. 

The avowed object of Mavrocordatos was to assist 
the Suliots ; and it must be remembered that, though 
this was wise policy, the cause of the Suliots was not 
then regarded by the people of Western Greece with 
any enthusiasm. That fierce Albanian tribe had not 
yet identified its cause with that of the independence 
of Greece. 

The Greek troops advanced to the neighbourhood of 
Arta, and Mavrocordatos established his headquarters 
at Kombotti. Gogos, the most influential chieftain in 
this district, had distinguished himself the year before, 
when the Turks were repulsed in their attempts to 
force the pass of Makrynoros. He now occupied the 
advanced position of Petta, on the left bank of the 
river of Arta, with about a thousand men. A blood 
feud had existed between Gogos and Marco Botzares ; 
for Gogos was the cause of the death, if he was not 
the actual murderer, of Botzares's father. But now a 
reconciliation was effected by the prudence of Mavro- 
cordatos and the patriotism of Botzares. Gogos, who 
was seventy years of age, was a brave soldier and an 



TREACHEKY OF (JOGOS. 325 

able captain of armatoli ; but he was full of the pas- a. d. 1822. 
sions nourished by a life spent in a tyrant's service, 
and, like most of the chiefs who had served Ali Pasha, 
he cared little for humanity, nationality, and liberty. 
He was also strongly imbued with Oriental prejudices. 
He hated all Franks, and disliked Mavrocordatos be- 
cause he lived much in the society of European officers, 
wore the Frank dress, and made a show of introducing 
military discipline. He was acute enough to observe 
that the principles of centralisation which Mavrocor- 
datos put forward (often very unnecessarily in theory, 
when it was out of his power to introduce them in 
practice) would ultimately diminish the authority and 
the profits of the chiefs of armatoli. Gogos likewise 
distrusted the success of the Eevolution; and this, 
added to his excessive selfishness, had induced him to 
open communications with the Turks of Arta, so that 
he was already engaged in negotiations with the agents 
of Omer Vrioni before Mavrocordatos arrived at Kom- 
botti. Mavrocordatos purchased the apparent sub- 
mission of Gogos to his authority as governor-general 
of Western Greece, by tolerating a dangerous degree 
of independent action on the part of the veteran chief- 
tain, and overlooking the secret correspondence which 
it was known that he carried on with the enemy. 

The Turks made an attack on the Greeks in their 
position at Kombotti with a strong body of cavalry, 
but they were repulsed in a brilliant manner by the 
regular troops. Shortly after, General Nermann, who 
acted as chief of the staff to Mavrocordatos, advanced 
with the regular troops, and occupied the position 
of Petta, while the commander-in-chief himself re- 
tired to the rear, and fixed his headquarters at 
Langada, about fifteen miles from the main body of 
his army. Only a hundred men remained to guard 
Kombotti, though that place protected his line of com- 



CHAP. II. 



326 DEFEAT AT PETTA. 

BOOK III. munication. While the Greeks were changing their 

• position, they beheld the first disastrous event of this 

campaign. As they marched along the hills, they saw 

three Turkish gunboats from Previsa destroy the small 

Greek flotilla in the gulf. 

The occupation of Petta was one of those ill-judged 
movements which incapable generals frequently adopt 
when they feel that their position requires immediate 
action, and yet are incapable of forming any definite 
plan. It rendered a battle inevitable, and yet no pre- 
parations were made for the engagement. Gogos 
seemed inclined to wait for the result of this battle to 
determine his future conduct. Until it was lost, he 
was therefore, to a certain degree, a supporter of the 
cause of Greece. 

The Turks had assembled a large force at Arta, and 
Petta is only about two miles from the bridge over 
the river which flows under the walls of that city. A 
victory in such a position was not likely to bring any 
decided advantage to the Greeks ; a defeat must in- 
evitably insure the destruction of their army. The 
Turks had six hundred well-mounted cavalry to cover 
their retreat, and guns to defend the passage of the 
bridge. The Greeks had thrown forward the whole 
regular force into the advanced position of Petta, ap- 
parently with the intention of pushing forward to the 
relief of Suli. Yet when that project was abandoned, 
the regular troops, who formed the main body of the 
Greek army, were left as its advanced-guard, without 
being covered by a screen of irregulars. 

General Nermann, who commanded at Petta in con- 
sequence of the absence of the commander-in-chief, 
though persuaded that the position of the troops was 
very injudicious, would not order the regular troops 
to quit their position without an express order from 
MavTocordatos. But as the position was exposed to 



DEFEAT AT PETTA. 327 

be attacked hourly, he wished at least to construct a. d. 1822. 
some fieldworks for his defence. A small supply of 
tools was obtained with some difficulty, but it could 
hardly be expected that the corps of PhUhellene officers 
should work at the spade under the burning sun of 
Greece in July, when the Greeks themselves seemed 
little disposed either to work or to fight. At this 
crisis the presence of Mavrocordatos at Petta might 
have smoothed every difficulty. He might have paid 
peasants, or, by his example, induced the Greek troops 
to labour; while the foreign officers, under such circum- 
stances, would willingly have set an example to the 
regular regiment and the Ionian volunteers. The pre- 
sence of Mavrocordatos was absolutely necessary in 
order to render Petta defensible, and Mavrocordatos 
was not present. 

The regular troops remained idle in their exposed 
and dangerous quarters. The news reached the camp 
that the Suliots were reduced to extremity. Marco 
Botzares determined to make a desperate attempt to 
cut his way through the Turkish posts at the head of 
his own little band, and encourage his countrymen to 
prolong their resistance until a decisive engagement 
should decide the movements of the Greek army. Bot- 
zares obtained the consent of Mavrocordatos to his 
rash scheme, and he counted on receiving vigorous 
support from Vamakiottes, who had eight hundred 
armatoli under his orders. Vamakiottes, however, gave 
Marco Botzares no assistance, and Gogos informed 
the Turks of his projected expedition; for Gogos hated 
the Suliots almost as much as he hated the Franks. 
The result was, tihat the attempt to penetrate through 
the Turkish lines was defeated, and the troops who had 
accompanied Botzares were compelled to return. He 
commenced his retreat from Plaka on the 12th of July. 

This failure determined Gogos to draw closer his re- 



328 DEFEAT AT PETTA. 

BOOK III. lations with the Albanians in Arta. His first overt act 

'—^ of treachery was a plot for separating the Philhellenes 

from the rest of the regular troops. The headlong 
courage and the well-managed rifles of these volunteers 
made them a redoubtable enemy ; and in case of their 
absence from Petta, the Turks expected to carry the 
Greek position by storm without difficulty. 

Colonel Dania, an experienced but rash officer, com- 
manded the corps of Philhellenes as lieutenant-colonel. 
He would only take his orders directly from Mavro- 
cordatos, and when he had no precise orders from the * 
commander-in-chief, he assumed the liberty of acting 
on his own responsibility. He resolved to support the 
movement of Marco Botzares, and neither the advice 
nor the commands of General Nermann could prevent 
his listening to the persuasion of Gogos, who urged him 
to go off in pursuit of a body of Albanian troops, in 
order to prevent these Mussulmans from attacking the 
Suliots, who had advanced from the Greek camp. The 
Ionian battalion followed Dania's example. The Al- 
banians were overtaken at Vrontza, on the road from 
Arta to Joannina; but the guides sent forward by 
Gogos gave sufficient warning to the enemy, by firing 
off their muskets, to allow them to decamp. Dania's 
troops, worn out by fatigue, and unable to obtain pro- 
visions, were now compelled to return, and they for- 
tunately decided on effecting their retreat so promptly, 
and executed it with such celerity, that they forestalled 
all interruption. Their unexpected return to Petta 
rendered part of the treacherous scheme of Gogos 
abortive. 

Geneas Kolokotrones chose this conjuncture to quit 
the headquarters of Mavrocordatos at Langada. His 
desertion at this momentous crisis was not authorised 
by any orders from the central government. He 
abandoned the Greek army before the Turks, in order 



DEFEAT AT PETTA. 329 

to serve the personal and party intrigues of his father a.d. 1822. 
in the Morea- The power of Mavrocordatos, as Presi- 
dent of Greece, Governor-General of Western Greece, 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces in Epirus, 
was so completely nominal, that he could not prevent 
this petty chieftain from deserting the army on the eve 
of a battle. 

Though a decisive engagement was now inevitable, 
it was evident that victory would bring little but glory 
to the Greek arms. The want of provisions rendered 
it impossible to advance to the relief of Suli, and the 
want of artillery rendered it impossible to attack Arta. 
On the other hand, defeat was sure to cause the total 
destruction of all the regular troops in the Greek ser- 
vice, who were imprudently thrown out in advance of 
the main body of the army. Prudence demanded that 
the Greeks should immediately faU back on the pass of 
Makrynoros. A retreat, however, could only be ordered 
by Mavrocordatos, and he was already far in the rear. 

The Turks in Arta were at this time commanded 
by Mehemet Keshid Pasha, well known to the Greeks 
during the war by the name of Eautayh^.^ On the 
16th of July he marched out of the town at the head 
of five thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry to 
attack the Greek army, which did not exceed three 
thousand men. The whole force of the pasha was 
directed against the advanced position of the Greek 
regulars at Petta. General Normann, from a misplaced 
sense of honour, persisted in occupying the first line, in 
opposition to the opinion of several experienced Euro- 
pean ofiicers, who were supported by the advice of 
Marco Botzares. It was argued that, if the Greek 
irregulars retarded the advance of the Turks by skir- 
mishing in the usual way in front of the regulars, a 
favourable moment might be selected for a decisive 

^ Reshid held a commaud at Eutaya (Cotyseium) before coming into Epirus. 



330 DEFEAT AT PETTA. 

BOOK TIL attack on those who advanced as assailants. This 
^^^' "' plan was rejected, and the corps of Philhellenes, the 
Greek regiment, and the Ionian volunteers, remained 
in their advanced position, supported only by two 
guns. The irregulars occupied a ridge of hiUs rising 
behind Petta, of which Gogos held the key by occupy- 
ing an elevation on the extreme right. 

The Turks made their dispositions leisurely, and 
drew out their whole force in the plain, in order to 
attack the position occupied by General Normann on 
three sides at the same time. Their first assault was 
made with some vigour, but it was repulsed without 
the regulars suffering any loss. The assault was re- 
newed in a series of desultory attacks for about two 
hours. During this time, Eeshid Pasha was marching 
a large body of Albanians to turn the Greek position 
from the north. As the movement of these troops, 
though concealed from General Normann at Petta by- 
intervening hills, was perfectly visible from the heights 
occupied by Gogos, this operation could only have been 
rendered successful by the treachery of that chieftain. 
A height visible from every part of the Greek position 
must have been left purposely unoccupied. This height 
was scaled by the Mussulmans, who planted the Otho- 
man standard on its summit. As soon as they received 
an answer to their signal from the troops in the plain, 
they descended, to throw themselves on the rear of the 
regulars with loud shouts. The troops of Gogos, in- 
stead of attacking these Albanians on their fiank, fled 
in the most shameful manner, and their flight spread a 
panic through the whole body of the Greek armatoli, 
who abandoned their positions in the wildest confusion. 
The small body of Albanians was thus allowed to pass 
directly over the ground which had been occupied by 
the Greek irregulars, and to fall upon Petta in the rear. 
On the other side, Eeshid Pasha, as soon as he saw 



EFFECTS OF THIS DEFEAT. 331 

his Albanians in possession of the key of the Greek a.d. I822. 
position, pushed forward strong bodies of infantry to 
attack Petta in front, and supported the assault by a 
brilliant charge of cavalry, which he led in person. 
The two field-pieces of the Greeks were taken ; the 
Philhellenes were surrounded, and most of them were 
immediately shot down ; but a few defended them- 
selves for a short time, and twenty-five forced their 
way through the Turks with fixed bayonets. The rest 
feU gallantly. The Greek regiment under Tarella, and 
the lonians under Panas, were both broken by the 
heavy fire of the infantry, followed up by charges of 
cavalry. More than half of their men lay dead on the 
field, and none allowed themselves to be taken prisoners. 
On this disastrous day four hundred of the best soldiers 
in Greece perished.^ 

The defeat at Petta was a severe blow to the progress 
of order in the Greek Revolution. It destroyed all con- 
fidence in political organisation as represented by 
Prince Alexander Mavrocordatos, and in military dis- 
cipline as represented by the corps of Philhellenes. 
Mavrocordatos made shipwreck of his political autho- 
rity ; art and science were banished from military 
operations, and the practices of brigandage regulated 
the tactics of the armies of Greece. The power of the 
central government ceased with the destruction of the 
regular troops. From this time until the arrival of 
Count Capodistrias, the whole public administration in 
liberated Greece was a scene of anarchy. The place of 
a central government was nominally held by the faction 
which could obtain possession of the largest share of 
the national revenues. 

^ The best account of the battle is by Baybaud, and his map is better than 
that of Gordon. Tarella was slain at the side of Dr Treiber, whose escape 
from the hospital is mentioned by Gordon. Treiber now holds the rank of 
chief of the medical staff of the Greek army, and enjoys the esteem of all who 
know him (1860). 



CHAP. II. 



332 EFFECTS OF THIS DEFEAT. 

BOOK III. The fate of the regular troops had also the misfor- 
tune to lead the Greeks generally to form a false esti- 
mate of the value of discipline in military operations. 
They did not observe the fact, which was, that two 
thousand Albanian infantry, supported by six hundred 
well-mounted cavalry, by gaining a dominant position, 
were enabled to destroy three corps of regular troops, 
which, when united, did not exceed eight hundred men, 
and that this success was entirely due to the circum- 
stance of five hundred infantry being unexpectedly 
brought to attack the rear of a position which was in- 
trusted to the defence of two thousand Greek irregulars. 
But the enemies of political order, the Komeliat captains 
of armatoli and the Moreot primates and chiefs of 
klephts, availed themselves of the blunders of Mavro- 
cordatos as a general, and of the misfortune of the 
regulars at Petta, to persuade the Greeks generally that 
military science was inapplicable to Greek warfare. 
The adoption of the bayonet and the tactics of a bat- 
talion were supposed to be sure means of devoting 
Greek soldiers to slaughter. This false doctrine found 
a responsive echo in the breasts of many who were sin- 
cerely devoted to their country^s cause. Mavrocordatos, 
without any military knowledge, supposed that he was 
a heaven-created general ; others, who had studied 
philology and medicine, were satisfied that, though they 
knew nothing of the duties of a soldier, they were fit 
persons to be captains of irregulars. The Greek char- 
acter is naturally averse to the restraints of discipline. 
Thus the rude military system of the Albanian race was 
imposed on the Greeks during their revolutionary war. 
The captains of armatoli reared by Ali Pasha, and the 
klephts of the Morea, men without any military rearing 
but that of robbers, became the virtu jd rulers of Greece. 
The Turks were allowed to precede the Greeks in re- 
forming their military system, and their adoption of 



DEATH OF KYRIAKULES MAVROMICHALES. 333 

regular troops contributed to turn the tide of success a d. 1822. 
in favour of Mohammedanism. 

After their victory, the Turks occupied Kombotti, 
but did not immediately advance to seize the pass of 
Makrynoros. Gogos attempted to conceal his treacher- 
ous conduct, and joined Mavrocordatos with the other 
fugitive captains of armatoli at Langada. But when 
the governor-general fled towards Mesolonghi, he openly 
deserted to the Turks, who confirmed him in his autho- 
rity as captain of armatoli in the district of Arta. 

KyriakulesMavromichales,who had landed at Splanga, 
on the coast of Epirus, found it impossible to commu- 
nicate with the Suliots. On the same day on which 
Reshid Pasha attacked the Greeks at Petta, Omer 
Vrioni ordered Achmet Bey and several other Albanian 
chiefs to attack the position of the Maniats. The day 
was marked as a fortunate one in the Turkish calendar. 
Kyriakules and Achmet Bey were both killed at the 
commencement of the engagement. The Greeks imme- 
diately abandoned their position, and, embarking the 
body of their leader, sailed to Mesolonghi, where the 
remains of Kyriakules Mavromichales were interred 
with due honour.^ 

The defeats at Petta and Splanga, followed by the 
defection of Gogos, rendered the position of the Suliots 
desperate. They had wasted the immense magazines 
of provisions and military stores which Ali Pasha had 
deposited in the impregnable castle of Kiapha. For- 
tunately for them, Omer Vrioni, who was now pasha of 
Joannina, was so anxious to get quit of such danger- 
ous neighbours that he granted them favourable terms 
of capitulation. The treaty was negotiated, and its 
faithful execution guaranteed by the British consul at 

1 General Gordon, who was personally acquainted with Kyriakules, says, 
" Greece lost in him one of her most skilful and dauntless warriors, and, by a 
singular coincidence, his old antagonist at Valtetzi, Achmet Kehaya, was 
killed in the same skirmish." — Vol. i. p. 398. 



334 AFFAIKS OF ACARNANIA. 

BOOK III. Previsa ; for the Suliots had heard so much of the vio- 
^^'^' "' lation of the treaties by the Greeks in the Peloponnesus, 
that they were afraid to trust the Turks. On the 1 6th 
of September 1822 the Suliots bade a final adieu to 
their native mountains. They received from the Turks 
the sum of two hundred thousand piastres, and retired 
with their families to the Ionian Islands, where they 
remained quietly for some time without taking part in 
the Greek Revolution. A few only departed secretly 
from Cephalonia, and joined Marco Botzares and other 
Suliots already serving in Western Greece. 

According to the plan of operations formed at the 
Porte, Reshid Pasha ought to have been able to co- 
operate with the Othoman fleet which visited Patras in 
July, to take on board Mehemet, who had been ap- 
pointed to succeed Kara Ali as capitan-pasha. But the 
pasha of Arta had not been able to pass Makrynoros ; 
and it was not until the middle of August that he 
ventured to transport his little army over the Ambra- 
cian gulf, and occupy Lutraki. Very little skill and 
activity on the part of the Greeks would have frus- 
trated this undertaking. A few gunboats would have 
insured to the Greeks the complete command of the 
Gulf of Arta, and the boats might have been manned 
by hardy fishermen from Mesolonghi. But there was 
no directing mind in Western Greece to employ the 
interval of inaction that followed the battle of Petta, 
while Omer Vrioni was forced to watch the Suliots, and 
Reshid was unable to act without his assistance. 

The people of Acamania, seeing that no preparations 
were made for their defence, fled to the Ionian Islands 
for protection. Thousands of families crossed over into 
the island of Kalamos, which the British authorities set 
apart as a place of refuge for the unarmed peasantry, 
who were allowed to enter it without being subjected 
to the expense and the embarrassments caused by the 



CIVIL BROILS AND TREACHERY. 335 

quarantine regulations, which were then enforced with a d. 1822. 
great strictness in the Mediterranean. At a later period, ^^^ 
when the devastations of the Albanians and the arma- 
toli had rendered Acarnania almost a desert, and de- 
prived its agricultural population of the means of sub- 
sistence, the British Government distributed many 
thousand rations daily to the starving Greeks, and 
many soldiers as well as peasants owed their lives to 
the benevolence of the English at Corfu. 

In the mean time, while Eeshid Pasha was preparing 
to invade Greece, the captains and primates, instead of 
uniting to oppose the Turks, quarrelled among them- 
selves for their shares of the national revenues. The 
district of Agrapha, or rather that portion which still 
adhered to the cause of the Revolution, was laid waste 
by the civil broils of Rhangos and Karaiskaki ; the 
province of Vlochos was the scene of a struggle for 
power between Staikos and Vlachopulos ; Kravari was 
pillaged alternately by Pillalas and Kanavos. Trea- 
chery also spread among the captains of armatoli. 
Varnakiottes, the captain of Xerromeros, Andreas Iskos, 
the captain of Valtos, Rhangos, and a primate called 
George Valtinos, all deserted to the Turks, and made 
their submission to Omer Vrioni. Mavrocordatos and 
Tricoupi were cognisant of the dealings of Varnakiottes, 
which they authorised with the vain hope of profiting 
by a semblance of treachery. They were foiled at this 
dishonourable game. While they were flattering them- 
selves that they were making use of Varnakiottes to 
cheat Omer Vrioni, that astute Albanian purchased the 
services of their agent, and showed himself an abler 
diplomatist than the wily phanariot or the selfish Mes- 
olonghiot. 

Omer Vrioni, having at last finished his business 
with the Suliots, marched southward at the head of 
six thousand men. He occupied the pass of Makry- 



336 SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI. 

BOOK III. noros, which he found unguarded, and was joined by 
''^^' Kiutayh^, who had now four thousand men under his 
command. The Othoman army reached the plain of 
Mesolonghi without meeting with any opposition ; but 
as the greater part of the country was without supplies, 
the Turks were dependent for their provisions on their 
magazines in Arta and Previsa until they could open 
communications with Patras^ and from thence with the 
Ionian Islands. 

The siege of Mesolonghi was commenced on the 6th 
of November 1 822. The aspect of affairs was extremely 
unfavourable to the Greeks. Gogos, Vamakiottes, Iskos, 
Ehangos, and Valtinos, had deserted their countrymen, 
and were serving the Turks. The people, however, 
everywhere remained true to the Revolution, and Mav- 
rocordatos redeemed his previous errors by resolving to 
encourage them in defending Mesolonghi with his pre- 
sence. When other civilians quitted the place on the 
eve of the siege, he declared that he would remain in 
the town as long as a man could be found to fight 
against the Turks. There were only about six hundred 
soldiers in the place, but the boatmen worked the guns 
in the batteries, and the people laboured to complete a 
line of fortifications. Mesolonghi was then protected 
by a low mud wall, with a ditch little more than six 
feet deep and about sixteen feet wide. Heavy rain 
had rendered the bottom of the ditch a soft mass of 
tenacious clay, which made it impassable to a man on 
foot. Fourteen guns were mounted on the ramparts ; 
but the flanking defences were very imperfect, and to 
an unmilitary eye it seemed easy for the besiegers to 
carry the place by storm. It is not impossible that 
this would have happened had the Turks attacked the 
place immediately on their arrival, for it would have 
been easy to fill up the ditch with fascines. They de- 
layed the assault, and, by skirmishing before the wall. 



SIEGE OF MESOLONGHT. 337 

revealed to the Greeks the great advantage they de- a.d. 1822. 
rived from their low rampart of mud. 

Mavrocordatos was accompanied by several ofl&cers 
who were able to teach the Mesolonghiots how to avail 
themselves of the peculiar advantages which their de- 
fensive works afforded, and how to place their guns in 
the best positions. The houses in the town were too 
low to suffer from a cannonade, and the shells of the 
enemy generally sank harmless in the mud of the un- 
paved streets and courts. Not a single person was 
killed by their explosion. 

The traitor chiefs who accompanied Omer Vrioni 
persuaded him that many Greeks in Mesolonghi were 
disposed to follow their example. Keshid Pasha in 
vain urged him to try an assault, but the Albanian 
pasha preferred negotiation. The Greeks profited by 
his delay. While they treated with him, they opened 
negotiations at the same time with Yussuf Pasha of 
Patras, who had sent over some vessels to blockade 
Mesolonghi by sea. 

On the 20th of November, the arrival of seven 
Hydriot brigs compelled the Turkish vessels to retire 
to Patras, and, three days after, one thousand men 
crossed over from the Morea under the command of 
Petrobey, Zaimes, Deliyani, and other leaders. The 
defenders of Mesolonghi then broke off their negotia- 
tions with the Turks, and sent Omer Vrioni a message, 
that if he really wished to become master of Mesolonghi, 
he might come and take it. He determined to make 
the attempt. The garrison was now increased to 
two thousand five hundred men, who were amply sup- 
plied with ammunition recently sent from Leghorn. 

The Turkish army did not now amount to eight 
thousand men. The Greeks of Acamania and Btolia 
had assembled in their rear, and were beginning to 
attack and plunder their convoys. Provisions and 

VOL. I. y 



S38 SIEGE 07 HES0L0K6HI. 

BOOK III. military stores were becoming scarce in their camp. 

CHAP. II 

'—^ Omer Vrioni, convinced of the impossibility of continu- 
ing the siege through the winter, at last resolved to 
make an attempt to carry the place by storm, and in 
case of failiure to raise the siege. 

The assault was made on Greek Christmas day (6th 
January 1823), at the earliest dawn. The storming 
party expected to surprise the Christians at their church 
ceremonies, but the besieged, warned by a Greek fisher- 
man in the pasha's service, were ready to receive their 
assailants. Two thousand two hundred well-armed 
men were either posted under cover on the ramparts, 
or concealed in the nearest Houses to act as a reserve. 
The storming party consisted of eight hundred Alban- 
ian volunteers. One division of the assailants attempted 
to scale the waU on its eastern flank, while another en- 
deavoured to penetrate into the town by wading through 
the shallow lagoon round the eastern extremity of the 
wall. The assault was masked by a heavy fire of 
musketry along the whole of the Turkish lines. The 
besieged cautiously watched the approach of the storm- 
ing columns, which were allowed to advance within 
pistol-shot ; they then poured a deadly voUey into 
their ranks. The eflfect of this fire was decisive. The 
storming parties, .which had expected to surprise the 
Greeks, were themselves surprised ; they broke, and 
fled in confusion. Desultory attempts were made by 
the Turks to renew the attack, and for some hours 
there was an incredible waste of ammunition on both 
sides. The loss of the Turks in the assault was said 
to have exceeded two hundred men. Most of those 
who were wounded in the lagoon perished in the water. 
The Greeks lost only four men killed. 

Six days after this defeat, Omer Vrioni broke up his 
camp and retired to Vrachori, from whence, after a 
short rest, he marched to Karvasera unmolested by the 



SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI. 339 

armatoK. Indeed, in his retreat from Mesolonghi, he a. d. 1822. 
met with no obstacie except the swollen torrent of the 
Achelous. In the camp he abandoned the Greeks 
found ten guns, four mortars, and a smaU quantity of 
balls and empty shells, but he carried off all his powder. 
Varnakiottes, distrusted both by the Turks and 
Greeks, fled to Kalamos, where he remained for some 
time under English protection. The other traitors, 
Iskos, Ehangos, and Valtinos^ soon deserted Omer 
Vrioni, and again joined their countrymen. 



CHAPTEK III. 

FALL OF ATHENS — DEFEAT OF DRAMALI — FALL 
OF NAUPLIA. 



"The strong warrant of an oath 
Marked with a blot, damned in the book of Heaven." 

—Richard II. 



Prsfarations of Sultan Mabmud fob bkconqubbinq Gbbece — Defen- 

8IYB MEASUBEB OF THB QbEEKS — ThEIB QUABREIB AND INTRIOUEft— ODTS- 

BBUS MUBDEBS NOUTZAS AND PaLABKAS — CAPITULATION OF ATHENS 

MaSSAOBE of men, WOMEN, AND OHILDBEN — EXPEDITION OF DbaMAU 

GOBINTH BETAKEN — TUBKISH PLANS OF CAMPAIGN— FiBST CAPITULATION OF 

Kaupua — FuoHT OF Gbeeks fbom Aboos — They defend the Labissa — 
Patbiotic conduct of Pbince Demetbius Htfsilantes — Numbers of the 
Gbeek fobces in the field — Defeat of Dbamali — Gbeeks bbtain 
possession of the Bubdjee — Opebations of the hostile fleets — Second 
capitulation of Nauplia— Tubkesh population of Naufua saved by 
Captain Hamilton of the Cambbian — Eanabis again destboys a 

TUBKISH LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIP— StATE OF THE NAVAL WABFABE BETWEEN 

THE Greeks and Tubks— State of affairs at Athens — Odysseus gains 
POSSESSION OF Athens — Concludes an armistice with the Tubks. 

The state of his relations with Eussia, and the de- 
struction of Ali Pasha's power, enabled Sultan Mahmud, 
in 1822, to make his first great effort for reconquering 
Greece. The success of his measures in suppressing 
the revolutionary movements over Macedonia, Thessaly, 
and Bpirus, persuaded him that the task would not be 
difficult. The plan of campaign which he adopted was 
well devised. 

The Greeks were blockading Nauplia, the strongest 
fortress in the Morea. Its relief was to be the first 
object of the campaign. A large army was assembled 



PLAN FOR RECONQUERING GREECE. 341 

at Larissa, under the venerable Khurshid, seraskier of a.d. 1822. 
Romelia. A second army under Omer Vrioni, the 
pasha of Joannina, was instructed to co-operate with 
the movements of the principal force. We have 
already seen that Omer Vrioni was entirely occupied 
during the whole year by the Suliots and the aflFairs of 
Acamania. The army of Khurshid was ordered to force 
the Isthmus of Corinth and advance to Nauplia, where 
it was to be joined by the Othoman fleet. After re- 
ceiving the necessary supplies of provisions and mili- 
tary stores, it was to march on to Tripolitza, and 
establish its headquarters in the great Arcadian plain. 
It was supposed that, the fleet having thrown reinforce- 
ments into the fortresses of Coron, Modon, and Patras, 
the army would find no diflSculty in establishing com- 
munications between these positions and the central 
camp ; and the Morea being thus cut up into several 
sections, and the population deprived of reciprocal 
support, would have been reduced to lay down their 
arms before winter arrived. The sultan overlooked 
the insuperable difficulties which the corruption of the 
Othoman administration presented to the execution of 
any plan which required activity and honesty on the 
part of many officials. The self-interest of each pasha 
suggested some modification in the execution of his 
instructions, and the subordinate officers sought to 
evade the performance of their duties, unless it was in 
their power to render the execution a means of gain. 

As soon as the horses of the Othoman cavalry had 
eaten green barley in spring, according to the imme- 
morial custom of the Turkish timariots, the seraskier 
ordered Dramali to advance into the valley of the 
Sperchius, and review the army. Before this was 
effected, the Greeks made an attempt to destroy the 
Turkish troops in Zeituni. 

The Areopagus of Eastern Greece acted as a kind 



342 DEFENSIVE MEASURES OF THE GREEKS. 

fiooK III. of executive committee of the central government. In 
" " "- the month of April 1822, it collected considerable sup- 
plies of provisions and ammunition, assembled about 
eight thousand men near Thermopylae, and hired thirty 
small vessels to act as transports in the Gulf of Zeituni. 
Odysseus was appointed commander-in-chief, and all 
the local chiliarchs and captains of municipal contin- 
gents either joined the army or held themselves ready 
to act as a reserve. 

The central government at Corinth decreed that 
three thousand Peloponnesians should march to rein- 
force the Romeliot troops. But the central government 
made no arrangements for carrying its decree into 
execution; for the attention of Mavrocordatos was 
then absorbed by the preparations necessary for his 
own campaign as commander-in-chief in Western 
Greece. Only about seven hundred Moreots, under 
the command of Niketas, marched to join Odysseus. 

The Greek army in Eastern Greece was divided into 
two bodies. The first division, under Odysseus and 
Niketas, embarked at Paleochori, on the shore at the 
foot of Mount Ejiemis, and, crossing the gulf, occupied 
the villages of Stelida and Aghia Marina. Instead of 
pushing rapidly forward to attack the Turks, they 
wasted their time in idleness, without even throwing 
up proper fieldworks at Stelida. The Turks were 
more active : they marched down from Zeituni to 
attack their enemies, and compelled the Greeks to 
abandon Stelida, and concentrate their whole force at 
Aghia, where they constructed an earthen redoubt, 
and remained inactive behind its mud walls for a fort- 
night. 

The second division marched by land to Patradjik 
(Hypata), but only gained possession of about one 
half of the town, and from this they were expelled by 
reinforcements from Zeituni. . 



ODYSSEUS AND THE AREOPAGUS QUARREL. 343 

Odysseus, finding that he could not venture to ad- a d. I822. 
vance beyond his lines at Aghia Marina, proposed to ^ 

abandon that position. Niketas approved of his reso- 
lution, but the members of the Areopagus who accom- 
panied the expedition opposed the evacuation of this 
useless post. An unseemly public discussion between 
Drosos Mansolas, a patriotic pedant, who knew nothing 
of military matters, and Odysseus, who, though he 
had no patriotism, had a good deal of military expe- 
rience, took place on the deck of one of the transports. 
But the imprudence and the inutility of keeping a 
considerable force in the lagoons at Aghia Marina were 
so manifest that the Areopagus was compelled to 
yield. It had persisted, however, so long as to destroy 
its authority in the army. The soldiers asserted that 
it wished to abandon them to be attacked by the 
whole Othoman army, and they were eager to punish 
those who wished them to win the glory and the 
immortality of Leonidas. The members of the Areo- 
pagus saved themselves, and the troops were relanded 
on the coast of Locris. 

When the supplies of provisions collected by the Areo- 
pagus were exhausted, the soldiers ceased to receive 
either pay or rations, and the army rapidly melted 
away. A few of the military chieftains who com- 
manded as captains of districts, according to the 
system of armatoliks as it had existed in the Othoman 
empire, alone kept their contingents together, and 
took up their stations on the line of mountains which 
runs from Mount (Eta along the channel of Euboea. 

The members of the Areopagus attempted to remove 
Odysseus from his command in Eastern Greece. He 
immediately resigned his commission as chiliarch in 
the army, and remained at the head of his troops as 
an independent chieftain. The central government 
sent officers to supersede him, but he took no notice 



344 INTRIGUES AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. 

OTA? m!' ^^ ^*® proceedings, and maintained his men by com- 

pelling the ephors of districts and the demogeronts of 

villages to supply him with rations and money from 
the national revenues and public taxes.^ 

Mavrocordatos and his partisans were guilty of a 
very mean intrigue, which brought discredit on their 
counsels, while it roused just animosities among their 
rivals. They elected Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes 
president of the legislative body. He possessed not 
one single qualification for the office, and he felt that 
the object was not to honour him, but to render him 
either useless or ridiculous. The prince was a brave 
soldier, and his rival was evidently desirous to exclude 
him from military employment, where it was certain 
he would not lose honour, and where he might recover 
power. Hypsilantes quitted the proflFered office, and 
joined the army in Eastern Greece as a volunteer. 
On his way he acted with his usual imprudence, dis- 
playing the standard of the Hetairia, and not the flag 
of the Greek state adopted by the national assembly 
of Epidaurus. He also issued orders in his own name, 
as if he still arrogated power to himself ftom being 
the lieutenant-general of the Hetairia, in defiance of 
the executive government of Greece. These preten- 
sions involved him in quarrels with the central autho- 
rities, and induced him to contract alliances with 
Odysseus, Niketas, and other military chiefs. Hypsi- 
lantes was a man of a very dull mind, and extremely 
slow in penetrating men's characters ; he never could 
persuade himself that the Hetairia was already a vision 
of the past ; nor could he believe that the Bussian 

^ Speliades, in his Memoirs, represents Eastern Greece at this time as a 
scene of innumerable selfish intrigues. He reports that almost every political 
and military chief was engaged in a plot to supplant or to assassinate some 
rival. He enjoyed better opportunities of acquiring accurate information on 
these topics than Tricoupi or Gordon. Compare ^Airouyfiuoy 96/10x0, i. 807, 314, 
315, 3i6, U9, 350. 



CONDUCT OF THE GREEK LEADERS. 345 

government was not on the eve of assisting the Greeks, a.d. 1822. 
and of assuming the direction of the Greek Revolution. 

It is difficult to trace the mazes of the intrigues 
carried on by the principal men in Greece at this time. 
There were many actors ; every actor had many pro- 
jects, and each actor modified his plans and his con- 
duct as circumstances and his personal views changed. 
Mavrocordatos, Hypsilantes, Kolokotrones, and Odys- 
seus were pursuing adverse schemes. Every subaltern 
officer and secondary politician had his own ends to 
gain. No one in office seemed to watch the storm that 
was gathering in Thessaly ; nor did any one appear to 
take any measures to ward off the blow which the 
Turks were about to strike at the independence of 
Greece. 

Mavrocordatos chose this ill-timed moment to make 
efforts to extend the arbitrary power of the central 
government, and his efforts were so ill-judged that 
the contests he awakened were contests of persons, and 
not of principles. John Kolettes was acting as minister 
of war, and he employed in that office the lessons he 
had learned at Ali Pasha's court, working with imper- 
turbable gravity and cunning to form a party which 
would require his assistance. His gravity and his 
portly figure gave him the appearance of a sagacious 
and honest man. To Mavrocordatos and his colleagues 
in the public administration he pointed out the evils 
of the Albanian military system, with which no man 
was better acquainted. To the captains and military 
chieftains with whom he transacted business as minister 
of war, he made himself appear as a personal friend 
and defender. Negris, who was chief secretary of state, 
concealed the slow action of Kolettes by thrusting 
himself forward as the champion of the central power. 

To destroy the authority of Odysseus in Eastern 
Greece was the first object of the executive body. 



346 ODYSSEUS MURDERS NOUTZAS AND PALASKAS. 

jpooK nt Alexis Noutzas and Christos Palaskas were sent to 
- — '- — - supersede him in the chief command, which he con- 
tinued to exercise. These men were the friends of 
Kolettes, and were nominated by his influence. Noutzas 
was a man of considerable talent, and having been 
secretary of Ali Pasha, exercised some authority over 
many Greeks who had served at Joannina. Palaskas 
was the Suliot whose defection has been mentioned,^ 
and who had subsequently served both England and 
Bussia. In the English service he attained the rank 
of captain ; and when the Greek light infantry was 
disbanded in 1818, he settled at Joannina. Alexis 
Noutzas was now named civil governor of Eastern 
Greece by the central executive, and intrusted with 
the control over the finances and commissariat. Pal- 
askas was destined to replace Odysseus in his military 
command. These appointments were kept secret, but 
Odysseus was perfectly informed of the intentions of 
government to remove him from his command, and 
his suspicious nature persuaded him that Mavrocor- 
datos and Kolettes had resolved to assassinate him. 
Noutzas and Palaskas, who were versed in the policy 
of Ali Pasha, seemed fit agents for this design. The 
two commissioners arrived at the camp of Odysseus 
at Drakospelia when they believed that chief was 
absent at Dadi. He had been duly informed of their 
movements, and he met them with polished hypocrisy, 
assuring them of a hearty welcome. After a banquet, 
they retired to sleep in a small chapel. The next 
morning was fixed for holding a conference at the head- 
quarters of Odysseus. During the night Noutzas and 
Palaskas were both murdered. The assassins and their 
patron were well known. The crime spread alarm 
over all Greece. The report that Odysseus was about 
to join the Turks was generally believed. The members 

1 Page Oa. 



CAPITULATION OF ATHENS. 347 

of the Areopagus sought refuge at Solona, where the a. d. 1822. 
spirit of the Galaxidhiots placed a check on the tyranny " 

of Panouria. Hypsilantes was summoned by the gov- 
ernment to return to the Peloponnesus, and obeyed 
the order. 

Public attention was diverted from the crimes of 
Odysseus, arid the anarchy which these crimes pro- 
duced in Eastern Greece, by the conquest of Athens. 
The capitulation of the Acropolis was an event of 
great moral and military importance to the Greek 
cause at this moment. The name of Athens magnified 
the success throughout the whole civilised world, and 
the possession of a fortress on the flank of the Turks, 
who might venture to invade the Peloponnesus, would 
enable the Greeks to embarrass their enemies. 

Omer Vrioni had relieved the Acropolis in the 
autumn of 1821. Before leaving Attica he supplied 
the garrison with provisions and military stores. But 
the besieged neglected to take proper precautions for 
securing a supply of water. They did not clean out 
their cisterns during the winter, and they trusted to 
the imperfect enclosure of the Serpendjee for the de- 
fence of the only good well they possessed.^ The 
winter proved extremely dry. The Greeks drove the 
Turks from the Serpendjee ; so that when the supply 
of water in the cisterns was exhausted, the garrison 
was forced to capitulate. 

The capitulation was signed on the 21st of June 
1822. The Turks surrendered their arms, and the 
Greeks engaged to convey them to Asia Minor in 
neutral ships. The Turks by the treaty were allowed 
to retain one-half of their money and jewels, and a 
portion of their movable property. The bishop of 
Athens, a man of worth and character, who was presi- 

^ The .Serpendjee is the enclosure indicated in Colonel Leake's plan, lying, 
between the rock of the Acropolis, the Odeon of Herodes Atticus, and the 
theatre of Bacchus. 



348 MASSACRE OF THE TURKS. 

BOOK in. dent of the Areopagus, compelled all the Greek civil 
'''^' '"' and military authorities to swear by the sacred myste- 
ries of the Oriental Church that they would observe 
strictly the articles of the capitulation, and redeem 
the good faith of the nation stained by the violation 
of so many previous treaties. 

The Mussulmans in the Acropolis consisted of 1150 
souls, of whom only 180 were men capable of bear- 
ing arms, so obstinately had they defended the place. 
After the surrender of the fortress, the Mussulman 
families were lodged in extensive buildings within the 
ruins of the Stoa of Hadrian, formerly occupied by 
the voevode. Three days after the Greeks had sworn 
to observe the capitulation, they commenced murder- 
ing their helpless prisoners. Two ephors, Andreas 
Kalamogdartes of Patras and Alexander Axiottes of 
Corfu, had been ordered by the Greek government to 
hasten the departure of the Turks. They neglected 
their duty. The Austrian and French consuls, Mr 
Gropius and M. Fauvel, on the other hand, did every- 
thing in their power to save the prisoners. They 
wrote to Syra during the negotiations to request that 
the first European man-of-war which touched at that 
port should hasten to the Piraeus. Unfortunately, be- 
fore any ship of war arrived, the news reached Athens 
that the Othoman army had forced the pass of Ther- 
mopylae. Lekkas, an Attic peasant, whose courage 
had raised him to the rank of captain, but who re- 
mained a rude Albanian boor, excited the Athenian 
populace to murder their Turkish prisoners, as a proof 
of their patriotic determination never to lay down 
their arms. The most disgraceful part of the transac- 
tion was, that neither the ephors nor the demogeronts 
made an eflfort to prevent the massacre. They perhaps 
feared the fate of the moolah of Smyrna.^ A scene of 

i Page 234. 



MASSACRE OF THE TURKS. 349 

horror ensued, over which history may draw a veil, a.d.1822. 
while truth obliges the historian to record the fact. 
The streets of Athens were stained with the blood of 
four hundred men, women, and children. From sun- 
rise to sunset, during a long summer day, the shrieks 
of tortured women and children were heard without 
intermission. Many families were saved by finding 
shelter in the houses of the European consuls. But 
the consuls had some diflSculty in protecting the fugi- 
tives ; their flags and their persons were exposed to 
insult ; and the Greeks were threatening to renew the 
massacre, when two French vessels, a corvette and a 
schooner, entered the Piraeus and saved the survivors. 

Three hundred and twenty-five persons who had 
found an asylum in the French consulate were escorted 
to the Piraeus by a party of marines with loaded 
muskets and fixed bayonets. The party was sur- 
rounded by Greek soldiers on quitting the town, who 
brandished their arms and uttered vain menaces against 
the women and children whom the French protected, 
while crowds of Athenian citizens followed the soldiers 
shouting like demoniacs. When this party of prisoners 
was safely embarked and the French vessels sailed, the 
Greeks appeared suddenly to become sensible of the 
baseness of their conduct. Shame operated, and all 
the Turks who remained in the Austrian and Dutch 
consulates were allowed to depart unmolested. Eng- 
land, being only represented by a Greek, was helpless 
on this occasion. Lekkas, who was the first to urge 
this massacre, was taken prisoner by the Turks visiting 
Attica as a spy, after the capitulation of the Acropolis 
in 1827, and was impaled at Negrepont. 

Sultan Mahmud invested Dramali with the com- 
mand of the army destined to invade Greece, and to 
increase his authority he created him seraskier. This 
promotion displeased the veteran Khurshid, who de- 



r:UAP. III. 



350 EXPEDITION OF DRAMALT. 

BOOK III. sired to retain the supreme direction of the whole 
Othoman force as the only commander-in-chief, and 
from the moment that Dramali was elevated to an 
equal rank and held an independent command, he be- 
came indifferent to the fate of his rival. Khurshid has 
been reproached with not giving the army of the 
Morea sufficient support; but we must remember that 
Dramali marched from Thessaly at the head of a force 
amply sufficient for aU the objects of the campaign. 
All Eastern Greece submitted to his authority, and he 
had it in his power to take proper measures for keep- 
ing open his communications with Zeituni and Larissa. 
The envy of Khurshid did not cause the negligence of 
Dramali. 

The Othoman army, when it mustered on the banks 
of the Sperchius, amounted to more than twenty 
thousand men. Of these about eight thousand were 
cavalry, composed chiefly of feudal mUitia, imder the 
command of five pashas and several Sclavonian Mussul- 
man beys of Macedonia and Thrace. A considerable 
portion of the infantry had served at the siege of 
Joannina. Abundant supplies of provisions and mili- 
tary stores were collected at Zeituni, and ample means 
of transport were provided. A member of the great 
feudal house of Kara Osman Oglou was appointed to 
superintend the commissariat. 

The army moved from Zeituni in the beginning of 
July 182a ; and since the day when AU Kumurgee 
crossed the Sperchius to reconquer the Morea from the 
Venetians in 1715, Greece had not witnessed so bril- 
liant a display of military pomp. But in the century 
which had elapsed the strength of the Othoman empire 
appeared to have melted away. Ali Kumurgee was 
attended by a corps of military engineers, who opened 
roads for his artillery, and who constructed bridges 
for his ammunition-waggons. Dramali moved only 



CORINTH RETAKEN. 351 

with such baggage as could be transported over rugged a. d. I822. 
limestone paths on the backs of mules and camels. "^^ ^ 
Ali Kumurgee enforced the strictest discipline ;^ Dra- 
mali could not prevent every Albanian buloukbash 
from laying waste the country. 

The ill-timed disputes of the central government 
with Odysseus left Eastern Greece without defence* 
Even the troops sent to guard the passes over Mount 
Geranion fell back and fled from the great derven 
before the Turks arrived. The defence of the Acroco- 
rinth had been intrusted to a priest named Achilles 
Theodorides, because he belonged to the faction of the 
Notaras family, not because he had the slightest know- 
ledge of military matters. He murdered the Turkish 
prisoners in his hands, and abandoned the impregnable 
fortress of which he was the commandant, though it 
was amply supplied with provisions. On the 17th of 
July, Dramali took up his quarters in Corinth, where 
he was joined by Yussuf Pasha from Patras. 

The Turkish leaders held a council of war to decide 
on their future operations. The seraskier was a man 
of a sanguine disposition and haughty character, ignor- 
ant of mountain warfare, and full of contempt for 
the Greeks. The ease with which he had marched 
through Eastern Greece and the flight of the garrison 
of Corinth increased his confidence. The terror which 
his presence seemed to have inspired, the facility with 
which he had obtained forage for his cavalry, and thei 
certainty, as he supposed, of being joined by the Otho- 
man fleet at Nauplia, induced him to believe that he 
was destined to overrun the Morea with as much ease 
as Ali Kumurgee. He proposed, therefore, to marcl^ 
with his whole army to Nauplia. The pashas under 
his immediate orders, who looked to him for promo- 
tion, warmly supported his opinion. The beys who 

^ Ch'eece under Othoman Dondnation, p. 269. 



852 TURKISH PLANS. 

BOOK III. commanded the feudal cavalry agreed to this plan, as 
— '■ — it promised a speedy termination of the campaign. 

Two men alone maintained a different opinion. 
Yussuf Pasha, and Ali Pasha, a great landlord of 
Argos, both knew the country and the enemy. They 
proposed making Corinth the headquarters of the 
Othoman army, and forming large magazines of pro- 
visions and military stores under the protection of its 
impregnable citadel. A Turkish squadron already 
commanded the Gulf of Lepanto ; by fortifying Ken- 
chries a second squadron might be maintained in the 
Saronic Gulf. The insurgents in the Morea would 
then be cut off from all communication with the axma- 
toli in Romelia. They then recommended dividing 
the Othoman army into two divisions. The main body 
under the seraskier would be amply sufficient to relieve 
Nauplia and recover possession of Tripolitza. The 
second division would march along the Gulf of Lepanto, 
supported by the Turkish ships which had brought 
Yussuf to Corinth. It would compel the inhabitants 
of Achaia to submit to the sultan, and secure for the 
Turks all the profits of the currant crop, and of the 
custom-duties on the exportation of Greek produce. 
These divisions of the army, when established firmly 
at Tripolitza and Patras, could then concert their ulte- 
rior movements in co-operation with the garrisons of 
Coron and Modon, and with the Turkish fleet. This 
judicious plan was rejected, and the seraskier advanced 
without even waiting to form magazines at Corinth. 

The direct road from Corinth to Nauplia and Argos 
passes through a narrow defile called the Dervenaki 
(anciently Tretos), but there is another difficult road 
parallel to this at a short distance to the east. There 
are also two other roads, — one making a circuit to the 
west by Nemea and the village of St George, and the 
other passing considerably to the east by Aghionoros 



CAPITULATION OP NAUPLIA. 853 

and the pass of Kleisura. Dramali passed the defile of a. d. 1822. 
the Dervenaki without encountering opposition; and 
with inconceivable rashness and stupidity he left no 
guard to keep possession of the pass, and neglected to 
occupy the villages of St George and Aghionoros, to 
secure his flanks, and prevent his communications with 
Corinth from being inteiTupted. He established his 
headquarters in the town of Argos on the 24th of 
July, having sent forward Ali Pasha, attended by 500 
cavalry, to assume the command of the garrison of 
Nauplia, immediately on entering the plain. 

Had the Greeks acted with good faith, they would 
have gained possession of Nauplia before Dramali 
reached Argos. At the end of June, the garrison 
was reduced to such extremities by hunger, that 
they signed a capitulation, saying that it was better 
to be quickly massacred than to die slowly. This 
capitulation stipulated that the Turks should surren- 
der the fortress, and deliver up their arms and two- 
thirds of their movable property, on condition that 
the Greeks should allow them to hire neutral vessels 
to transport them to Asia Minor, and supply them 
with provisions until the arrival of these vessels. 
Hostages were given by both sides for the exact ful- 
filment of the treaty, and the Greeks were put in pos- 
session of the small insular fort that commands the 
port called the Burdjee. 

The Greek government immediately sent secretaries 
into Nauplia to register the property of the Turks, and 
these officials were accused of behaving like Bobolina 
and the agents of Kolokotrones at Tripolitza. Both 
parties soon considered it for their advantage to re- 
tard the execution of the capitulation. The members 
of the Greek government contrived to make large 
sums of money by secretly purchasing the property of 
the Turks, by selling them provisions, and promising to 

VOL. I. z 



354 CAPITULATION OP NAUPLIA. 

BOOK III. aid them in escaping with their families. After Mavro- 

CHAP III *"' 

— '■ — '- cordatos had abandoned the presidency of Greece to 
play the general in Epirus, the members of the execu- 
tive body and the Greek ministers enjoyed little con- 
fidence. When they pretended that no money could 
be raised to pay the freight of the neutral vessels ne- 
cessary for transporting the Turks in Nauplia to Asia 
Minor, the allegation was considered a mere pretext 
for enabling their secretaries in the fortress to make 
larger profits by their bargains with the wealthy fami- 
lies in the place. It was well known that, when the 
Turks signed the capitulation, they were so anxious to 
escape that they would have deposited the sum neces- 
sary to pay the freight of neutral vessels within twenty- 
four hours. But when they obtained regular rations 
from the Greek government, and succeeded in pur- 
chasing supplies of every necessary from private per- 
sons, they endeavoured to prolong their stay until 
the arrival of Dramali's army, which was known to 
be on its march to relieve them. They also expected 
that the place would be revictualled by the Othoman 
fleet. 

, Things were in this state when Ali of Argos entered 
Nauplia to assume the command. His first care was 
to secure all the hostages, and arrest the secretaries 
sent into the place by the Greek government. He 
asserted that the Greek government had repudiated 
the treaty by neglecting to fulfil its conditions, and he 
retained the hostages as pledges for the safety of the 
Turkish hostages in the hands of the Greeks. In this 
case, self-interest induced both parties to listen to the 
voice of humanity. Ali's next object was to prepare 
for a long defence, but Dramali had conducted his 
operations with such improvidence that he could ob- 
tain only scanty supplies from the Othoman commis- 
sariat. The fate of Nauplia depended on the fleet, and 



POSITION OF BRAMALI. $55 

all hopes of immediate assistance from that quarter a. D.1822. 
were destroyed by the news that it had passed round '~~~~^- 
the Morea, in order to take on board Mehemet, the 
new capitan-pasha, who was then at Patras. The con- 
voy destined for Nauplia, which it was escorting, could 
not be expected for some weeks. 

This proceeding of the Othoman fleet entailed ruin 
on the expedition of Dramali. Common prudence re- 
quired him to remain at Corinth until he was informed 
that the fleet had landed supplies for his army in 
Nauplia. When he found himself at Argos without 
provisions, it was so evident that he could not advance 
farther into the Morea that he ought immediately to 
have fallen back on Corinth, and sent to Patras for a 
few transports to proceed up the gulf and replenish his 
magazines. He could throw no supplies of provisions 
into Nauplia, yet he wasted his time uselessly at Argos, 
ashamed to admit that he would have done well to 
have listened to the counsels of Yussuf Pasha. 

The conduct of the Greek government was not wiser 
than that of the seraskier. Some of its political 
leaders, particularly the Zinzar Vallachian, Kolettes, 
and the Ionian exile Metaxas, were men whose names 
in future years were connected with the worst party 
proceedings that stained the Eevolution. They now 
showed themselves utterly unfit for their high station. 
Greece at this conjuncture was saved by the constancy 
and patriotism of the people, not by the energy of the 
government or the valour of the captains. The mem- 
bers of the government fled from Argos as the advanced- 
guard of Dramali issued from the Dervenaki. In their 
hurried flight, the ministers abandoned the national 
archives and a large quantity of plate which had just 
been collected from churches and monasteries for the 
public service. The military followers of ministers 
and generals, who had swarmed into Argos to share 



356 FLIOHT FROM ARGOS. 

Bcx)K Til. the plunder of Nauplia, took advantage of this moment 
'^^''' '"' of confusion to plunder their countrymen. 

The reign of anarchy was established. During the 
night, cries of alarm were raised, and firearms were 
discharged in the quarter of Argos near the road that 
leads into the town from Corinth. Men shouted that 
the Turks were entering the place. Thousands of the 
inhabitants, particularly the refugees from Smyrna, 
Kydonies, and Chios, rendered more timid than others 
by the calamities they had witnessed, rushed from 
their houses in frantic terror, leaving all their pro- 
perty behind. The roads to Lerna and Tripolitza exhi- 
bited scenes of confusion and of misery which would 
fill a volume. Crowds pressed blindly forward with- 
out knowing what direction they had taken ; family 
followed family for hours in sad procession ; men 
hurried along carrying bundles snatched up at the 
moment of flight, or bending under the weight of sick 
parents ; women and children, suddenly roused from 
sleep and half clad, strove to keep up with the crowd 
of fugitives, but many sank exhausted by the road- 
side, weeping, praying, and awaiting death at the hands 
of their imaginary pursuers. 

In the mean time the houses they quitted were 
plundered with remorseless rapacity. Horses, mules, 
and working oxen were carried off from the stables of 
the peasants, and laden with booty at the houses of the 
citizens. The residence of the executive body, the pro- 
perty of the members of the legislative assembly, and 
most of the private dwellings in the town, were sacked 
by bands of Greek klephts before the Turks entered it. 
The small but choice library of Theodore Negris, the 
secretary of state, was carried off on a stolen horse by 
a Maniat soldier. The horse fell lame ; the Maniat 
then sold it for two dollars to an officer who bought it 
to carry water to his soldiers, who were posted on the 



GREEKS IN THE LARISSA. 357 

hilJ above Lerna ; to his surprise he found himself in a. d. 1822. 
possession of a library. Some days after, the books 
came into the possession of Captain Hastings, who in- 
formed Negris of the fate of his library ; but that rest- 
less politician never expressed a wish to repossess them, 
perhaps never afterwards had a place where he thought 
them safe. 

Amidst these disorders, some of the local magistrates 
of the Albanian population of Argolis took prompt and 
prudent measures for defending their country. Before 
they retreated, they burned all the grain and forage 
which they could not carry off, and filled up some of 
the wells. Nikolas Stamatepopulos, the brother of 
Niketas, who had commanded the principal body of 
troops employed in the long blockade of Nauplia, dis- 
tinguished himself as much by his judgment at this 
period as he had previously done by his personal 
valour. He retired to the eastward, and took up his 
post in the plain of Iri. 

When Dramali established his headquarters in Argos, 
he had about ten thousand men under his immediate 
orders, and nearly one-half of this force consisted of 
cavalry. While the ministers, senators, and the chief- 
tains of Greece were escaping on board the vessels 
anchored at Lerna, and their followers were plundering 
the town, a body of volunteers threw themselves into 
the ruined castle on the Larissa, where the ancient 
acropolis of Argos stood. The patriotic conduct of 
these men during the general panic was so meritorious 
that the name of every one ought to be handed down 
to the gratitude of Greece. They defended the exposed 
position they occupied with great firmness, and their 
success revived the courage of the troops who had 
posted themselves at Lerna, and emboldened them to 
return and occupy the line of the Erasinus. 

On this occasion Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes re- 



358 PATRIOTISM OF HYPSILANTES. 

BOOK III. gained the esteem of his countrymen by displaying 
^"^"' " " unwonted activity in addition to his usual courage. 
The members of the legislative body, from mean 
jealousy, summoned him to take his place on board the 
ship in which they had sought refuge, and act as their 
president. He despised the summons of the cowards, 
and remained among the people, where they, ought to 
have been. Though he had personal reasons for being 
dissatisfied with the conduct of Kolokotrones, who had 
treated him with rudeness and insolence after the 
taking of Tripolitza, he now hastened to confer with 
that influential chieftain, in order to urge him to im- 
mediate action. The energy and patriotism of Hypsi- 
lantes electrified everybody he addressed. Petrobey, 
the nominal commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus, 
and Krevatas, a primate of Mistra, caught something 
of his enthusiasm. The Peloponnesian Senate stepped 
forward and assumed the duties of government, which 
the executive body had abandoned. The people had 
flown to arms without waiting for the csdl of their 
official leaders. Captains and primates were carried 
along by the general impulse. The patriotism of 
Greece was completely roused. 

Hypsilantes returned to the mills of Lerna, where, 
finding that the body of volunteers in the Larissa was 
hard pressed, he boldly threw himself into the castle, 
accompanied by several young chiefs. The force in the 
Larissa was now increased to one thousand men, but it 
was scantily supplied with provisions and water. The 
Turks kept the place closely invested, and defeated two 
attempts of the Greeks at Lerna to throw in additional 
supplies. But the object of the volunteers who first 
occupied the place was gained. The progress of the 
Othoman army had been arrested until the delay had 
given time to a Greek force to assemble strong enough 
to meet it in the field. Hypsilantes and the greater 



GREEK ARMY IN THE FIELD. 359 

part of the garrison of the Larissa withdrew, therefore, A.r>. I822. 

in the night, but a few of the original band of its de- 

fenders determined to keep possession of the place 
until they had finished their last loaf. Their escape 
then became extremely difficult, but on the night of the 
1st of August they succeeded in forcing their way 
through the Turkish line of blockade. A Maniat officer, 
Athanasios Karayianni, boasted of being the first to 
enter the place, and the last who quitted it. 

The position of the Greeks was now improving 
rapidly, while that of the Othoman army was becom- 
ing untenable. Upwards of five thousand troops were 
assembled at the mills of Lerna. The position was 
fortified by low walls, and flanked by the artillery of 
several Greek vessels. The Erasinus, which issues in 
a large stream from a cavern about two miles from 
Argos, confines the road leading to Lerna and Tripo- 
litza between a rocky precipice and several dilapidated 
artificial channels formed to conduct the water to turn 
mills, or to irrigate plantations of maize and cotton. 
Lower down, towards the sea, the plain is intersected 
with ditches and planted with vineyards. The line of 
the Erasinus consequently offered ground well suited 
to the operations of the irregular infantry of the 
Greeks, and almost impracticable for the Turkish 
cavalry. On this line numerous skirmishes took 
place, and the Greeks at last gained a decided supe- 
riority. 

Other strong bodies of Greeks assembled on all the 
mountains which overlook the plain of Argos. The 
season was singularly dry. The Turkish horsemen 
found great difficulty in procuring forage, and they 
were often obliged to skirmish with their enemy while 
watering their horses. Provisions grew scarce, and the 
soldiers dispersed in the vineyards, and devoured grapes 
and unripe melons. Disease soon weakened the army, 



360 GREEK ARMY IN THE FIELD. 

BOOK III. and before Dramali had occupied Argos a fortnight, 
^^^^' '"* he found himself compelled to fall back on Corinth. 

On the 6th of August he sent forward the first di- 
vision of his army to occupy the passes. The Greek 
force in the field now exceeded the Othoman army in 
number. About eight thousand men, nominally under 
the command of Kolokotrones, who had been elected 
generalissimo or archistrategos, but really under the 
immediate orders of a legion of chiefs, occupied the 
hills from Lerna to the Dervenaki. Another corps of 
two thousand men had established itself at Aghionoros 
under Niketas, the archimandrite Dikaios, and Deme- 
trius Hypsilantes ; and a third body of about two 
thousand sturdy Albanians from Kranidi, Kastri, and 
Poros, had joined the troops of Nikolas Stamatepopu- 
los, and advanced to watch Nauplia. The want of 
system which reigned wherever Kolokotrones com- 
manded, or pretended to command, prevented the 
Greeks from occupying permanent stations and erect- 
ing redoubts, which would have compelled the army 
in Argos to submit to any conditions tlie Greeks might 
have thought fit to impose. Had Kolokotrones pos- 
sessed any military capacity, he might have cut off 
Dramali's retreat, and secured the immediate surrender 
of Nauplia. Every hour added to the numbers of the 
Greeks. Almost every village sent a contingent of 
armed men to the spot which some local chief consi- 
dered the best position for cutting oflF a portion of the 
seraskier's baggage. 

The advanced-guard of the Othoman army consisted 
of one thousand Albanians. These men, who had 
studied the country as they advanced with the instinct 
of warlike mountaineers, took the western road by the 
plain of Nemea, and kept so good a look-out that they 
contrived to pass the troops of Kolokotrones, stationed 
at St George, without even a skirmish. It is diflScult 



DEAMALI'S DEFEAT. SGt 

to ascertain whether the Moreots mistook these Al- a. d. 1822. 
banians for a body of Greek troops on account of the 
similarity of their dress, or whether they avoided an 
encounter with veteran warriors, and allowed them 
purposely to pass unmolested. 

A body of Dramali's cavalry, sent forward about the 
same time to occupy the Dervenaki, found the Greeks 
intrenched in the pass. The first division of the 
Turks, therefore, took the road by Aghio-Sosti. The 
leading horsemen had almost gained the open valley 
below the village of St Basili, when Niketas, who had 
hastened to meet them from Aghionoros, fell on their 
flank, and threw himself into the valley before them. 
Niketas seized a position commanding the junction 
of the road of Aghio-Sosti with that issuing from the 
Dervenaki. The rest of the Greek troops who followed 
Niketas, under Dikaios and Hypsilantes, attacked the 
right flank of the Turks. The Othoman cavalry 
charged boldly to the front, but recoiled under the* 
steady fire of the select body of marksmen on the low 
eminence occupied by Niketas. The little hill over- 
looked a ravine, through which the Turks were forced 
to pass. A fierce struggle took place at this spot. 
The Delhis attempted to force their way onward with 
desperate valour, but the Greeks encumbered the pass- 
age through the ravine by shooting a number of 
horses, and then heaping over them the bodies of their 
riders. The attack was renewed several times, and at 
last such numbers pressed forward from behind that 
retreat became impossible. A desperate body of well- 
mounted horsemen then dashed past the Greeks, and, 
gaining the open ground in the plain of Kortessa, 
reached Corinth without further opposition. Above 
the ravine the scene of slaughter was terrible. Con- 
fusion spread along the whole Turkish line. The 
Greeks who attacked it in flank covered the road with 



362 DRAMALIS DEFEAT. 

BOOK III. dead and wounded. Their principal object was to cut 
— ^— off the baggage, shoot baggage-mtdes, and secure the 
booty. The Turks fled in every direction, leaving their 
baggage to arrest the pursuit of their enemy. Few 
could make much progress up the side of a rugged 
mountain, and armed men seemed to spring up out of 
every bush to attack them. Many abandoned their 
horses, and succeeded in finding their way to Corinth 
during the night. Long trains of baggage-mules and 
camels, and a number of richly-caparisoned horses, 
were captured. The booty gained was immense. 

The conduct of Niketas on this occasion received 
well-merited praise. He executed a judicious man- 
oeuvre with rapidity and courage. He also gained 
the prize of personal valour in the combat, by rushing 
sword in hand on a body of Turkish infantry which 
was endeavouring to form a mass in order to attack 
his position. His soldiers gave him the name of 
Turkophagos (the Turk-eater), as the legionaries of 
Rome saluted their general Imperator ; and the title 
was adopted by all the Greeks. Kanaris, Miaoulis, 
Marco Botzares, and Niketas, were men whose valour 
and patriotism raised them above envy. 

This defeat stupefied Dramali : he remained a whole 
day inactive. But as it was impossible to continue in 
the plain of Argos, he moved forward on the 8th of 
August by the road of Aghionoros. This road was 
guarded by the archimandrite Dikaios. As the Turks 
slowly wound their way up the steep ascent of the 
Kleisura, the archimandrite opposed them in front, 
and Niketas and Hypsilantes, who had marched to 
support him from Aghio-Sosti and Aghio-Basili, as- 
sailed them on their left flank. The Turks were soon 
thrown into confusion. The Greeks on this occasion 
directed their attention exclusively to gaining posses- 
sion of the baggage ; and while they were occupied in 



DRAMALl's DEFEAT. 363 

cutting it oflF from the line of retreat, a chosen troop a.d. 1822. 
of Delhis succeeded by a brilliant charge in clearing '■ 

the front, and enabled Dramali, with the main body of 
the cavalry, to escape to Corinth. But the seraskier 
purchased his personal safety by abandoning his mili- 
tary chest and the whole baggage of his army to the 
Greeks. 

Had the Greeks combined their movements with 
skill, not a man of the Turkish army could have 
escaped. The seraskier's retreat was foreseen several 
days before it commenced, and each leader took mea- 
sures for securing to himself and his followers as large 
a share of booty as possible ; but no general measures 
were adopted for destroying the Turkish army, and no 
information was transmitted of the enemy's movements 
from one corps to another. The honours of victory are 
often obtained by those who have little share in the 
fight. In the present case, though the troops under the 
immediate orders of Kolokotrones had no share in the 
glories of the two days' combat, they gained a con- 
siderable share of the booty, and Kolokotrones, because 
he was generalissimo, was supposed to be the conqueror 
of Dramali. Thousands of Moreots returned to their 
native villages enriched with the spoil they had gained, 
who attributed their good fortune to the generalship 
of Kolokotrones. The imaginary tactics of the old 
klepht were said by his ignorant partisans to have 
caused the destruction of a mighty army of thirty 
thousand men. History, which is too often the record 
of party passions and national prejudices, has repeated 
the fable. 

The great success of the Greeks on this occasion, 
like the great disaster at Petta, increased the popular 
aversion to military discipline, and strengthened the 
general conviction that patriotism could conduct mili- 
tary operations as well as science. Tactics were sup- 



364 GREEKS RETAIN THE BURDJEE. 

BOOK III. posed to be useless against the Turks, whom the ortho- 

CHAP. 111. ■•• O ' 

dox believed God had delivered into their hands. 

The remains of Dramali's army melted away at 
Corinth. The seraskier himself died in December 
1822. 

Nauplia had now nothing to rely on but the Otho- 
man fleet. The Greeks retained possession of the 
small insular fort called the Burdjee, while Dramali's 
army occupied Argos, and after his departure they 
made some efforts to gain possession of the fortress. 
A French officer, Colonel Jourdain, offered to bum all 
the houses in the town with incendiary balls fired from 
the guns in the Burdjee. The destruction of the 
houses in which the wealthy Turks had accumulated 
considerable stores of provisions during the armistice, 
would have compelled the garrison to surrender in a 
short time. There were, however, still some officers 
and soldiers in the Greek army who opposed this mea- 
sure, because they thought it would diminish their 
share of the long-expected plunder to be obtained when 
the fortress surrendered. 

When Ali of Argos entered Nauplia and assumed 
the command of the garrison, there were only about 
twenty Albanians of Kranidi in the Burdjee, and 
their captain was a boatman, ignorant of the very ele- 
ments of gunnery. Colonel Jourdain was ordered by 
the Greek government to enter the place and put his 
plan into execution. He contrived to excuse himself 
from remaining in it, but Captain Hastings, assisted 
by two young artillery officers — Hane, an Englishman, 
and Animet, a Dane — volunteered to make the attempt 
to burn Nauplia with the colonel's combustible balls. 
A noisy cannonade was kept up between the batteries 
of Nauplia and this little insular fort, which was situ- 
ated under the guns of the fortress, and ought to have 
been knocked into a heap of broken stones and mortar 



OPERATIONS OF THE HOSTILE FLEETS. 365 

in six hours. The firing on both sides continued forx. d. i822. 
several days without inflicting much loss on either 
party. Jourdain's balls, when thrown into the town, 
made a vast deal of smoke, but set nothing on fire. 
The Turkish shot generally flew past the Burdjee 
without hitting it. But what with the stray shots 
that did not miss, and the concussion of the artillery 
in the place, the walls were so shaken that it became 
dangerous to fire the heaviest guns, which were alone 
of any effect against Nauplia. Fortunately, just as 
things reached this state, the retreat of Dramali's army 
induced the garrison of Nauplia to stop their fire. 
The Kranidiots then intimated to Hastings and his 
companions that their presence was no longer neces- 
sary ; that they could not expect a share of the booty 
in Nauplia; and that no rations would in future be 
supplied to them. Hastings was not a man to remain in 
a place where there was no danger, when his presence 
was considered unnecessary. 

On the 20th September, the Othoman fleet, consist- 
ing of eighty sail, including transports, was descried 
from the beacon of Hydra, and on the following morn- 
ing the capitan-pasha stood in towards the island of 
Spetzas with a fair wind, and the gulf of Nauplia open 
before him. The Greek fleet, consisting of sixty sail, 
chiefly brigs of from eight to fourteen guns, stood out 
to engage the Turks. A distant cannonade ensued ; but 
it was in the power of the capitan-pasha to have sent 
on his transports to Nauplia under the escort of his 
corvettes and brigs, while with his heavy ships he op- 
posed the Greeks. The weather was fine, the wind 
very light, and the capitan-pasha both fool and 
coward. The Christians acted with timidity as well 
as the Turks, and the firing was carried on at such a 
distance that neither party sustained any damage. In 
the evening the wind died away. 



CUAP. III. 



366 OPERATIONS OP THE HOSTILE FLEETS. 

BOOK III. For three days the Othoman fleet remained man- 
oeuvring idly off Spetzas. The capitan-pasha did 
not venture to approach near enough to the Christians 
to use his heavy guns with effect. The Albanians of 
Hydra and Spetzas showed neither skill nor daring in 
the employment of their fire-ships. Kanaris was not 
present. On the night of the 23d the ^nd blew into 
the gulf, a circumstance rather rare at this season of 
the year; but the capitan-pasha, instead of pressing 
all sail, hove to during the night. At the time there 
was not a single Greek ship near enough to prevent 
the transports from reaching Nauplia. The cowardice 
of the capitan-pasha prevented him from profiting by 
this favourable opportunity. On the morning of the 
24th the Othoman fleet proceeded up the gulf with a 
light breeze. 

The Greek fleet was then nine miles distant, hugging 
the island of Spetzas. Twenty-three men-of-war and 
five fire-ships were in advance. The breeze freshened, 
and had the Turks done their duty, Nauplia would 
have been relieved without diflSculty or danger. But 
the^ capitan-pasha sent forward only an Austrian 
merchantman, without the escort of a single man-of- 
war. He appears to have trusted to the protection of 
the Austrian flag, A Greek vessel detached near the 
head of the gulf issued from her place of concealment 
and captured this hired transport. After this abortive 
attempt the capitan-pasha made no further effort to 
throw supplies into Nauplia. He quitted the gulf, and 
sailed for Suda on the 26th of September. 

The series of naval skirmishes in the Gulf of Nauplia 
was disgraceful to the Turks, and by no means honour- 
able to the Greek navy. The Albanian seamen of 
Hydra and Spetzas showed very little enterprise on 
this trying occasion. Their exertions were probably 
paralysed by their ignorance of naval tactics, and by 



BURDJEE ABANDONED. 367 

their fear to move far from their own islands, which a. d. I822. 
they had neglected to put in a proper state of defence. ~'- 
The captains of a few ships displayed some boldness, 
but in general the crews were neither steady nor obe- 
dient. In spite of the incapacity of the Turks, the 
only serious loss sustained by the Othoman fleet was 
the result of accident. An Algerine frigate bore down 
on a Greek fire-ship, mistaking it for a brig of war. 
The crew set fire to the train before taking to their 
boats, and the flames burst out as the Algerine ran 
alongside to board it. The sails of the frigate caught 
fire, and fifty men perished before the flames could be 
extinguished and the fire-ship set adrift. 

The approach of the capitan-pasha so terrified the 
Kranidiot garrison in the Burdjee that the fort was 
abandoned, and for nearly forty-eight hours that fort 
was only occupied by a Hydriot who had served in 
the French artillery, by a Spetziot sailor, and by Hane, 
the young English artillery officer, who had returned 
a few days before. After this interval, twenty lonians 
arrived to replace the Kranidiots, and shortly after 
the garrison was reinforced by a party of Albanian 
Christians from the Chimariot mountains, under the 
command of an officer who had served in the Albanian 
regiment of Naples. On the 24th of September, when 
the Turks in Nauplia felt sure of immediate relief from 
the capitan-pasha, they opened a heavy fire on the 
Burdjee from every gun which could be brought to 
bear on it ; but when the Othoman fleet retired, their 
fire ceased, and was never again renewed. 

The defence of Nauplia was now prolonged only 
from fear of treachery on the part of the Greeks. In 
the beginning of December children were frequently 
found dead in the streets ; women were seen wander- 
ing about searching for the most disgusting nourish- 
ment, and even the soldiers were so weak from starva- 



S68 SECOND CAPITULATION OF NAUPLIA. 

BOOK III. tion that few were fit for duty. The fortress on the 

CBAP III* »^ 

'■ — high rock of Palamedes, which towers above the town, 

was abandoned by its garrison. No one could carry 
up provisions. The soldiers descended to obtain food, 
and were too weak to remount the long ascent. The 
Greeks, hearing of their retreat, entered the place be- 
fore daybreak on the 12th December 1822. 

The conquest of the Palamedes was announced to 
the Greek troops, who guarded the passes towards 
Corinth, by volleys of the whole artillery of the place. 
Kolokotrones soon arrived ; other captains quickly 
followed. A negotiation was opened with the Turks 
in the town, and a capitulation was at last concluded. 

The Greeks engaged to transport all the Mussul- 
mans in Nauplia to Asia Minor, and to allow them to 
retain a single suit of clothes, a quilt for bedding, and 
a carpet for prayer. Kolokotrones and the captains 
hindered all soldiers, except their own personal fol- 
lowers, from entering the place. To the mass of the 
soldiers who clamoured for admittance, they pleaded 
the orders of the Greek government, and the necessity 
of preventing a repetition of the massacres of Monem- 
vasia, Navarin, Tripolitza, and Athens. The soldiers 
replied that Kolokotrones paid no attention to the 
orders of government unless when it suited his pur- 
pose ; that the previous massacres had been caused by 
the faithlessness and avarice of the captains who 
cheated the troops; and they declared that they would 
not allow Kolokotrones and his confederates to appro- 
priate to themselves everything valuable in Nauplia. 
Large bodies of soldiers assembled before the land- 
gate, and threatened to storm the place, murder the 
Turks, and sack the town. The avarice and faithless- 
ness of Kolokotrones and the military chiefs had done 
more to make the Greek army a mere rabble than the 
absence of all military discipline. 



CONDUCT OF CAPTAIN HAMILTON. 869 

On this occasion Greece was saved from dishonour a. D.1821 
by the arrival of an English frigate on the 24th of 
December. The Cambrian was commanded by Cap- 
tain Hamilton, who was already personally known to 
several of the Greek chiefs then present. His frank 
and decided conduct won the confidence of all parties. 
He held a conference with Kolokotrones and the Moreot 
chieftains, whose Eussian prejudices induced them to 
view the interference of an English ofiicer with great 
jealousy. He was obliged to tell them in strong 
language, that if, on this occasion, they failed to take 
effectual measures for the honourable execution of the 
capitulation, they would render the Greek name des- 
picable in civilised Europe, and perhaps ruin the cause 
of Greece. The chiefs respected Hamilton's character; 
the wild soldiers admired his martial bearing and the 
frankness with which he spoke the whole truth. He 
took advantage of the feeling he had created in his 
favour to act with energy. He insisted on the Greek 
government immediately chartering vessels to embark 
the Turks, and to facilitate their departure he took 
five hundred on board the Cambrian.^ He thus saved 
the Greeks from the dishonour of again violating their 
plighted faith, but he inflicted a great sacrifice on 
England. Sixty-seven of the Turks embarked on board 
the Cambrian died before reaching Smyrna. The typhus 
fever, which they brought on board, spread among the 
crew, and several fell victims to the disease. Captain 
Hamilton was the first public advocate of the Greek 
cause among Englishmen in an influential position, 
and he deserves to be rauked among the greatest 
benefactors of Greece. 

Ali of Argos and Selim were the two pashas who 
commanded in Nauplia, and as both refused to sign 

^ Nine hundred were embarked in the Greek transports. 
VOL. 1. 2 A 



870 KANARIS AGAIN SUCCESSFUL. 

BOOK III. the capitulation, they were detained as prisoners by 
— '• — '-- the Greeks. 

Public opinion among the Greeks at this time 
was not generaUy favourable to Captain Hamilton's 
conduct, though the contrary has been subsequently 
asserted. The journal of a Philhellene who was at 
Tripolitza observes that the Greeks were in great 
choler against the English for having insisted on the 
immediate embarkation of the Turks. Captain Hast^ 
ings confirms this also in his journal.^ 

The capitan-pasha, after remaining a short time at 
Suda, sailed through the Archipelago unmolested, and 
anchored between Tenedos and the Troad. The con- 
tingents of the Greek fleet from the Albanian islands 
remained inactive in the ports of Hydra and Spetaas, 
and neglected to take advantage of the well-known 
inactivity and cowardice of Mehemet Pasha. But 
another brilliant exploit of Kanaris threw a veil over 
their shortcomings. By his persuasion, the commu- 
nity of Psara fitted out two fire-ships. 

On the 10th of November 1822 the Othoman fleet 
was riding at anchor without a suspicion of danger. 
At daybreak, Kanaris and his companion approached 
without exciting any attention- Two line-of-battle 
ships were anchored to windward of the rest of the 
fleet. Kanaris undertook the more difficult task of 
burning the leeward ship. The breeze which brougbt 
up the Greek fire-ships had hardly reached the Turks, 
who, under the influence of the current of the Helles^ 
pont flowing through the channel of Tenedos, were 
not swinging head to wind. Kanaris, with his cool 

I Hastings went on board the Cambrian on the 5th January 1828, and saw 
five hundred Turks embarked. He adds : " Much difference of opinion etiats 
among the Greeks on the conduct of Captain Hamilton; but I feel convinced 
that he saved the lives of the Turks by his prompt tneasures, and thus did a 
great service to Greece." A few days after, at Hydra, he writes : " I found 
here, as at Nauplia, various opinions concerning Captain Hamilton's conduct, 
but respectable people here were in his favour." 



KANARIS AGAIN SUCCESSFUL. 371 

sagacity, observed this circumstance, and ran hisAP. 182^ 
enemy aboard abaft the fore-chains on the larboard 7"^™™^ 
side. The fire-ship was to windward, the sails nailed 
to the masts, the yards were secured aloft by chains, 
and everything was saturated with turpentine, so that 
in an instant the flames blazed up higher than the 
main-top of the seventy-four, and enveloped her deck 
in a whirlwind of fire. There was no time for the 
crew to escape. Those who leaped into the sea perished 
before they could reach the distant shore. The ships 
at anchor cut their cables and made sail. The loss of 
the Turks is said to have reached eight hundred men. 

The flag-ship of the capitan-pasha, which Kanaris 
had left as a sure prey to his companion, escaped. It 
was already swinging to the breeze when the Greek 
ran his fire-ship under its bowsprit. In consequence 
of this ill-judged position, the fire-ship fell off and 
drifted away to leeward. The employment of fire- 
ships seems to have required the cool judgment and 
unflinching determination of Kanaris to insure suc- 
cess. The Othoman fleet, which dispersed in its first 
access of terror, soon reassembled at the Dardanelles ; 
but one corvette went on shore on Tenedos, and 
another was abandoned by its crew, and found float- 
ing a complete wreck in the Archipelago. Constan- 
tino Kanaris and the crews of the two fire-ships re- 
turned safely to Psara in their boats. The hero was 
received by his countrymen with universal enthusiasm. 
Envy for once was speechless in Greece. By the 
hand of one man, the sultan had lost two line-of-battle 
ships and nearly two thousand men during the year 
1822. Yet the naval operations of the year revealed 
to a scientific observer like Frank Hastings that the 
Greek navy, in its actual state, was unable to continue 
a prolonged contest with the Othoman fleet. 

The sultan could not send to sea a more incapable 



372 GKEEK AND TURKISH NAVIES. 

BOOK III. officer than Mehemet Pasha ; nor was it likely that 
■ ''"^^' '"• worse manned ships would ever quit the port of Con- 
stantinople than those he commanded. Yet, under 
these disadvantages, the Othoman Ifieet had thrown 
supplies into the fortresses of Coron, Modon, Patras, 
and Lepanto, and had twice navigated the Archipelago, 
without sustaining any loss which could not be easily 
repaired. Sultan Mahmud had obtained the convic- 
tion, that all the skill and enterprise of the Greeks 
could not secure for their light vessels any decided 
advantage over the inert masses of the Turkish ships. 
A prolonged naval war must therefore exhaust the re- 
sources of Greece, while it would be sure to improve 
the efficiency of the Turkish seamen. Some modifica- 
tion in the naval forces of the Greeks was evidently 
necessary to give them a decided victory. Hastings 
urged them to adopt the use of steam, and heavy artil- 
lery and shells fired horizontally, in order to confound 
their enemy with new engines and new tactics. His 
advice was rejected by the men of influence among the 
Greeks, who believed that their own fire-ships would 
secure them the victory. But this could only have 
happened if every Greek fire-ship had found a Kanaris 
to command it, and if every Othoman fleet should be 
sent to sea with a capitan-pasha as incapable as 
Mehemet.^ 

The greatest losses inflicted on the Turks this year 
were by the desultory expeditions of the Psarians and 
Kasiots. The Psarians cruised incessantly along the 
coast of Asia Minor, from the Dardanelles to Ehodes. 
The Kasiots infested the coasts of Karamania, Syria, 
and Egypt. Hardly a single Turkish coaster could 
pass from one part to another. On one occasion all 
the vessels in the port of Damietta were plundered, 
and three ships laden with rice, which were on the 

' See the Memorandum by Captain Hastings, in Appendix. 



STATE OF ATHENS. 873 

eve of sailing to supply the pasha's fleet at Alexandria, a. d. 1822. 
were carried off to Kasos. These daring exploits, how- ' 

ever, only enriched the captains and crews of the 
privateers engaged, and they weakened the Greek navy, 
by alluring some of the best ships and sailors to seek 
their private gain instead of serving the public cause. 
The misconduct of the central government and the 
crimes of Odysseus left Eastern Greece in a state of 
anarchy during the summer of 1822. Even at Athens 
order was not established, though the social condition 
of the inhabitants afforded peculiar facilities for organ- 
ising a regular administration. There were no pri- 
mates in Attica who exercised an influence like Turkish 
beys or Christian Turks — ^no men who, like Zaimes 
and Londos in Achaia, could waste the national reve- 
nues in maintaining bands of armed followers far 
from the scene of actual hostilities ; nor was there any 
military influence powerful enough to reduce the pro- 
vince to the condition of an armatolik. The Greek 
population of the city of Athens was un warlike. The 
Albanian population of Attica served in several bands 
under local captains of no great distinction. Many of 
the native soldiers, both citizens and peasants, were 
small landed proprietors, who had a direct interest in 
opposing the introduction of the irregular military 
system, to which Greece was rapidly tending. They 
united with the local magistrates and the well-disposed 
civilians in striving to organise a local militia capable 
of preserving order. Power was very much divided, 
and administrative talent utterly wanting. Every 
man who possessed a little influence aspired at com- 
mand, and was indifferent to the means by which he 
might acquire it. Athens, consequently, became a 
hotbed of intrigue ; but it would be a waste of time 
to characterise the intriguers and to describe their 
intrigues. Something must nevertheless be told, in 



374 ODYSSEUS GOVERNOR OP ATHENS. 

BOOK HL order to explain the result of their folly and selfish- 
. ness. 

An Athenian citizen employed by the central gov- 
ernment to collect the public revenues was murdered 
by the soldiery, who wished to seize the national re- 
sources, and make Attica a capitanlik of armatolL 
An Athenian captain gained possession of the Acro- 
polis, and displayed more insolence and tyranny than 
had been recently exhibited by any Turkish disdar. 
He was driven from power by another Athenian ; but 
against the authority of his successor constant intrigues 
were carried on. The shopkeepers of the city at last 
imagined that, like the Turkish janissaries at Constan- 
tinople, they could unite the occupations of hucksters 
and soldiers, and under this delusion they undertook 
to garrison the Acropolis themselves, instead of form- 
ing a corps of regular troops. As might have been fore- 
seen, each man did what seemed good in his own eyes, 
anarchy prevailed, and the persons possessing anything 
to lose sent a deputation to Prince Demetrius Hypsi- 
lantes, inviting him to come and take the command 
of the Acropolis. He arrived at Megara, but the sol- 
diery in the Acropolis refased to receive him as their 
leader, and in order to secure a powerful patron, they 
elected Odysseus as their general, and offered to put 
him in possession of the fortress. He hastened to seize 
the prize, and hurrying to Athens with only a hundred 
and fifty men, was admitted into the Acropolis on the 
2d of September 1822. The authority of Odysseus 
was recognised by the Athenians as the speediest way 
of putting an end to a threatening state of anarchy. 

Attica was thus lost to those who, from their 
opinions and interests, were anxious to employ its 
resources in consolidating civil order and a regular 
central administration, and was thrown into the scale 



ODYSSEUS GOVERNOR OF ATHENS. 375 

of the Albanian military system, which soon extended A« a 1822 . 
its power over all liberated Greece. 

As soon as Odysseus found himself firmly estab- 
lished as captain of Attica, he persuaded the people of 
Eastern Greece to form a provincial assembly at 
Athens, where he held the members under his con- 
trol. This assembly dissolved the Areopagus, and 
appointed Odysseus commander-in-chief in Eastern 
Greece. Without waiting for his confirmation by the 
central executive, he assumed the administration of the 
revenues of Attica, and compelled the municipality of 
Athens to sell the undivided booty surrendered by 
the Turks at the taking of the Acropolis. This money 
he employed in paying his followers, and in laying up 
stores of provisions and ammunition in the Acropolis, 
which all parties had hitherto neglected. He subse- 
quently added a strong angular wall to the Acropolis, 
in order to enclose a well situated below the northern 
wing of the Propylaea. 

But while he was making these prudent arrange- 
ments, he also gratified his malicious disposition by a 
cruel as well as a vigorous use of his power. Three 
persons were brought before him accused of treason- 
able correspondence with the Turks. The truth was, 
that they favoured the government party; but the 
accusation afforded Odysseus a pretext for revenging 
private opposition. He remembered the lessons of his 
old patron, Ali of Joannina. Two of the accused 
were hung, and the third, who was a priest, was built 
up in a square pillar of stone and mortar. As the 
mason constructed the wall which was to suffocate 
him, the unfortunate man solemnly invoked God to 
witness that he was innocent of the crime laid to his 
charge. 

The defeat of Dramali did not cause Ehurshid 
Pasha to relax his efforts for reconquering Greece, but 



876 OPERATIONS IN EASTERN GREECE. 

BOOK III. the disasters of the Othoman army in the Morea pro- 

CHAP III 

— '■ — - duced so much discontent in Macedonia, that he could 
only send forward about eight thousand to occupy 
Zeituni and secure the line of the Sperchius. A por- 
tion of this force advanced to Salona by the road of 
Gravia without encountering any serious resistance 
from Panouria. Mehemet Pasha, who commanded the 
Turks, after burning a part of Salona fell back to 
Gravia, in order to form a junction with a body of 
Albanians which had endeavoured to penetrate to 
Salona by Daulis and Delphi. 

A skirmish took place between the Greeks and Turks 
near Gravia on the 13th of November, which ended in 
the defeat of the Greeks. Odysseus lost several officers, 
and was in danger of falling into the hands of the 
Albanians in the Othoman army. The season was 
fortunately too far advanced for Mehemet Pasha to 
profit by his victory. The country between Gravia 
and Thebes had been laid w^aste, and was abandoned 
by the inhabitants. The Greek troops, however, who 
knew the places to which the people had retired with 
their cattle, would have hung on the flanks of the 
Turks, and cut off their communications with Zeituni. 
Odysseus was nevertheless terrified lest Mehemet Pasha 
should push boldly forward into Attica, trusting to 
obtain supplies of provisions from Negrepont. Such a 
movement might have induced the garrison of the 
Acropolis to join with the citizens in electing a new 
commander-in-chief. 

From this difficulty Odysseus extricated himself with 
his usual perfidy. He sent his secretary to Mehemet 
Pasha to propose an armistice, offering to make his 
submission to the sultan on condition that he should 
be recognised as captain of armatoli, and he engaged 
to persuade the other captains in Eastern Greece to 
submit on the same conditions. Mehemet had as 



ARMISTICE. 377 

little intention of executing these conditions as Odys- a.d. 1822. 
sens, but he accepted them, because they afforded him 
a pretext for returning to Larissa, where the death of 
Kiiurshid rendered his presence necessary. 

The long and not inglorious career of Khurshid 
Pasha had been suddenly terminated by a sentence of 
death, and his honourable service could not save him 
from falling a victim to Sultan Mahmud's determi- 
nation to sweep away every man of influence who 
adhered to the traditional system and supported the 
administrative organisation, which he was resolved to 
destroy. 

At the end of JNovember 1822 the Turks withdrew 
all their troops from Eastern Greece, south of Ther- 
mopylae, and took up their winter quarters in Zeituni. 
The peasantry commenced sowing their fields, with the 
expectation of reaping their crops before their enemy 
could return. The armistice concluded by Odysseus 
saved them from ruin ; and, as they knew nothing of 
its conditions, they approved highly of his proceed- 
ings, and became generally attached to his party. 

It is curious to observe by what accidents two men 
so depraved and morally worthless as Kolokotrones 
and Odysseus became the objects of hero-worship to 
the Greeks. The temple of fame is not always " a 
palace for the crowned truth to dwell in.'' 



END OF THE FIEST VOLUME. 



ERRATUM. 
Page 335, line 25, /or "Tricoupi" read *' John Tricoitpi.*' 



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